Chapter 4: Reconciling the irreconcilable: the political reform of Adolfo Suárez 1976–7

"The views of the Francoist establishment eliminated Areilza as the man to work the miracle. He was damned by his liberalism. Fraga had ruled himself out by his belligerent style. In any case, both were more dominant personalities than Juan Carlos wished...The ideal candidate now would be both younger and more acceptable to the Francoist élite. Thus it was that Torcuato Fernández Miranda stage- managed the 3 July meeting of the Consejo del Reino which was to choose the terna, or three-man short-list, from which the King would select his new Prime Minister. Since it was widely expected that Fernández Miranda would be fighting to include Fraga and/or Areilza, the prior decision not to choose either made his task easier. They were ‘sacrificed’ and the majority of the Consejo members were so pleased to have eliminated them that they seemed not to notice how Fernández Miranda used all his skill to ensure that the name of Adolfo Suárez appeared.

After lengthy debate and successive rounds of voting, his name stayed in the ring. For most Consejeros he was not so much a serious candidate but rather a safe Movimiento figure to vote for in order to keep others out. One Movimiento right-winger who did not vote for Suárez, Joaquín Viola Sauret, one-time Alcalde (mayor) of Barcelona, commented dismissively, ‘I may live in Barcelona, but I’m from Cebreros and I know this lad only too well.’ Cebreros in the province of Avila was Suárez’s home town. In the end, the terna consisted of Adolfo Suárez, Gregorio López Bravo, once the most glamorous of Franco’s technocrats, and Federico Silva Muñoz, the dourly conservative Christian Democrat. The Consejo presented the list in the confidence that the choice would be between the two senior candidates. Indeed, one Consejero even commented to Fernández Miranda that the inclusion of Suárez was a terrible waste since he had no chance of being picked and so his place could have been used to flatter a more important member of the establishment. 2 Only Areilza and Fraga can have been more surprised by the appointment on 3 July of Adolfo Suárez since both they themselves and the press had been confident about their own chances. 3

For the King, Suárez signified someone who, as a Movimiento apparatchik, would be able, especially under the guidance of Fernández Miranda, to use the system against itself and so initiate reform. That asset was not widely appreciated in mid-1976. Arias told Suárez that he was delighted with his appointment if only because it meant that neither Areilza nor Fraga would be President of the Council of Ministers. Indeed, Suárez’s Francoist credentials delighted the bunker as much as they horrified the opposition. Massive demonstrations in favour of political liberties and amnesty were thus called by the left in the second week of July. Their success left Suárez in little doubt that speedy and thorough reform was necessary if the crisis was to be resolved without violence. "

"With a government made up of men linked in various ways to the more progressive sectors of Spanish capitalism, Suárez set about introducing plans for a more meaningful democratization. He informed his new cabinet that his strategy would be based essentially on speed. He would keep ahead of the game by introducing specific measures faster than the continuistas of the Francoist establishment could respond to them. 8 His programme, announced on television, recognized popular sovereignty, promised a referendum on political reform and elections before 30 June 1977. It was accompanied by a limited royal pardon for political offences which was well received in most of Spain but did little for Suárez’s credibility in the Basque Country. For the bulk of non-politicized Spaniards, however, fearful of losing the material benefits of the previous fifteen years, but receptive to political liberalization, the combination of Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez was an attractive option. It seemed to offer the chance of both protecting the economic and social advances of recent times and of advancing peacefully and gradually towards democracy."

"The skill with which Suárez projected his television image of modernity and charm helped consolidate political support among the silent majority. Elsewhere, a dynamic and polemical press quickly became the arena for debate about political reform. Indeed, the press in general, and El País and Cambio 16 in particular, virtually became a protagonist in the transition process by acting as a constant source of pressure on Suárez. Despite his advantages, he faced a difficult situation just as Arias had done. On the one side, there was the bunker and the army, strong and suspicious. On the other, there was the opposition with its clamouring masses. At first, Suárez seems to have conceived his task as one of sharing out power between the opposition and the aperturistas of his cabinet. However, the opposition quickly made it clear that it was not looking for a back-stairs deal but rather conceived of the ruptura pactada as consisting of negotiations for the opening of a constituent period. Bringing the opposition to collaborate in a process of democratization within Francoist ‘legality’ was to be one of Suárez’s greatest tasks and consequently greatest triumphs.

Carrillo in particular was keeping up the pressure by a calculated policy of bringing the PCE back to the surface, challenging the cabinet either to tolerate his party’s existence or else to reveal its true colours by reverting to repressive action. He began by holding an open meeting of the PCE Central Committee in Rome at the end of July. Amply publicized by the media, it had considerable impact, revealing to the Spanish public for the first time that a significant number of intellectuals and labour leaders were Communists. Then, in the autumn, the Party began the distribution of carnets to its members inside Spain. Carrillo, who was living clandestinely in Madrid, informed Suárez through intermediaries that, if he did not receive a passport, he would hold a press conference in Madrid in the presence of Oriana Fallacci, Marcel Niedergang and other influential foreign correspondents. The reason for such tactics derived from a small incident in late July. Carrillo had applied formally for a passport at the Spanish embassy in Paris. He was received by the ambassador, Miguel María de Lojendio, and revealed to him that he had been inside Spain clandestinely. Shortly after getting Lojendio’s report, Suárez had reacted in classic Francoist style and relieved him of his post for receiving Carrillo without instructions. It was hardly surprising that the PCE had little or no faith in Suárez’s proclaimed reformist intentions. 9"

"It was clear that, to ensure a bloodless transition without economic or social dislocation, Suárez had to take the initiative away from the left. That could only be done by a skilful combination of substantial concessions and efforts to split the united front of the opposition. A prime objective was to force back the Communists from setting the pace of opposition demands to a more defensive position of trying to prevent their own isolation.

Throughout August, Suárez had interviews with a wide range of opposition personalities, including Felipe González, and made a favourable impression on them. The PSOE leadership was already convinced that the Francoist system was unlikely to be overthrown by popular action. There would be no Portuguese-style revolution of the carnations. By early 1976 the Socialists had come to the conclusion that, given the relation of forces, their ideal of totally sweeping away Francoism with a provisional government and a constituent Cortes to decide on the form of regime was Utopian. When Suárez met Felipe González on 10 August, the PSOE leader had already reached the conclusion that a constitution elaborated by a freely elected Cortes would in itself constitute a ruptura. He knew that, to get to that point, it would be necessary to negotiate with ‘the forces that occupy the apparatus of the State’"

"Suárez also made contact with Carrillo through the lawyer and director of the Europa Press Agency, José Mario Armero. He urged the PCE leader not to make the transition impossible. 13 By this, of course, he meant the sort of peaceful transition that would leave as much of the existing social, economic and political structure intact as possible. In fact, having spent time in Madrid talking to José María de Areilza and Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, Carrillo was fully aware that some kind of compromise with the reformist right was inevitable. Accordingly, knowing that the idea of a provisional government imposed by popular force was an unlikely outcome, he assured Suárez of his commitment to pacific change. 14"

"Inevitably, there were constant rumours of military subversion. Indeed, faced by the surging waves of opposition confidence, the army and the bunker huddled together ever more defiantly...overall responsibility for defence affairs passed, in both the Arias and Suárez cabinets, to the reactionary General Fernando de Santiago y Díaz de Mendívil. 16 Under his influence, relations between senior military figures and the civilian bunker were extremely close despite regular declarations of the armed forces’ apoliticism."

"Juan Carlos was aware of the extent to which the ultras were trying to block the transition. Accordingly, the appointment of Suárez had been matched by the naming of General Gutiérrez Mellado as Chief of the General Staff. The determined progress towards dialogue with the opposition caused first friction then rage among the ultras. The trend of the conflict was symbolized by General de Santiago’s furious response to the fact that Suárez had removed Arias’s life-size portrait of Franco from his office... Those invited to the meeting included the military ministers, the nine Captains-General and the Chiefs of Staff of the three services. Since they enjoyed the backing of Juan Carlos, Suárez’s persuasively expounded plans were accepted with reluctance and with a demand that the Communist Party be excluded from any future reform. Suárez placated them with an assurance that the international loyalties enshrined in the PCE’s statutes would preclude its legalization. He did not tell them that through his secret contacts with Carrillo, he was working towards a change in those statutes and an eventual legalization of the Communist Party. Curiously, eight years later, Suárez remained convinced that he had ‘never deceived any officer’. The confusion of sophistry and truth was a central part of Suárez’s armoury. Occasionally, it would backfire. In the case of the legalization of the PCE, what the army saw as the breaking of his word earned Suárez a bitter hatred which was to dog him until his departure from the political scene in 1981."

"General de Santiago circularized his senior colleagues with a letter explaining his position:

The political evolution of our fatherland is running along channels, and is based on premises, with which I have not felt myself identified. My deep conviction that a political intervention by the armed forces could only produce undesirable situations in the short term led me to eschew intransigent positions. However, I also consider, personally as well as in my capacity as the spokesman of the armed forces inside the government, that such restraint and understanding are ultimately limited by the mistaken interpretations that have been placed upon them. The government is preparing a measure, which I have opposed in vain, authorizing trade union freedom. This means, in my opinion, the legalization of the CNT, UGT and FAI trade unions, responsible for atrocities committed in the red zone during the Civil War, and of the Workers Commissions, trade union organization of the Communist Party. I am convinced that the consequences of this measure will be immediate, and since neither my conscience nor my honour permit me to take responsibility for, nor implicate the armed forces in, such a Reconciling the irreconcilable: the political reform of Adolfo Surarez 73 measure, I decided to present my irrevocable resignation.

This text, apart from masking the fact that General de Santiago had effectively been dismissed, implied that any other officer who accepted a ministry in Suárez’s cabinet was both immoral and dishonourable. Santiago’s stance, and perhaps also his distorted vision of Spanish history, gave rise to declarations of solidarity from other officers and expressions of delight from the bunker press."

"Understandably, Suárez wished to assert his authority over the army. In this case, however, he acted precipitately in that such action was contrary to the tenets of Spanish military law. Prominent bunker figures like Juan García Carrés, Jaime Milans del Bosch and José Antonio Girón de Velasco rallied around Iniesta and encouraged him to oppose the punishment. After vigorous protest from Iniesta and frantic consultations with military juridical experts, the case was given to General Joaquín Fernández de Córdoba for adjudication. General Fernández de Córdoba was a traditionalist and a close friend of Iniesta. Not only did he declare the government’s decree improper but he also judged the conduct of both generals to have been blameless. In the full glare of publicity, the cabinet had been made to look ridiculous and vindictive. General Gutiérrez Mellado was placed in an appalling position, having to suffer the contempt of his comrades-in-arms and the hostility of General de Santiago, perhaps the most influential officer in the entire army. The bunker was delighted.19 It had found two paladins of its ideas and their articles in E1 Alcázar over the next five years were to reflect and promote the growth of anti- democratic sentiment, or golpismo, within the armed forces. None the less, Santiago’s removal deprived the bunker of a strategic position. Despite the hostile atmosphere in which he had to work, Gutiérrez Mellado was able to begin the urgent task of promoting a new generation of officers loyal to the coming democratic regime."

"In the meanwhile, however, the task of steering the reform project through the labyrinths of the Francoist establishment occupied most of Suárez’s time. The text approved by the cabinet on 10 September was made public shortly afterwards. The reaction of the opposition was mixed. Given that the project allowed for the elections promised before mid-1977 to be presided over by the existing government and that there was no question of Suárez resigning in favour of a provisional government, a declaration of the executive committee of the Communist Party on 15 September vehemently denounced the text as an ‘anti-democratic fraud’.21 Other groups within the opposition were, however, pleasantly surprised by the extent to which daily life was being liberalized, thereby giving substance to Suárez’s claims. The press was functioning normally, political groups to the right of the PCE were unhindered and the PSOE was preparing to hold its XXVII Congress. The Minister of the Interior, Rodolfo Martín Villa, had issued provincial civil governors with instructions to prohibit all public activities by the Communists. 22 Yet, to a certain degree, even the PCE was unofficially allowed to go about its business. The initiative was swinging Suárez’s way. He insinuated to the Socialists and the left Christian Democrats that he could make even greater concessions provided that they did not rock the boat and provoke the army by prematurely insisting on the legalization of the PCE. With typical skill and cunning, Suárez was trying to use the issue to drive a wedge into the opposition and to impose caution on Carrillo. Thus, in late September, Felipe González was adamant that legalization of the Communist Party was a non-negotiable pre-requisite of democracy. Yet by the end of November, he was arguing that it was unrealistic to insist on it.23 Faced with the self-evident impossibility of imposing changes against the will of the army and with the substantial indications that things were progressing steadily under Suárez’s guidance, the opposition could do little but acquiesce. 24"

"In fact, with the aid of Torcuato Fernández Miranda, Suárez was having considerable success in steering his reform project through the Francoist institutions, although he was constantly worried that the obstacles could at any moment prove too great. Votes were nervously counted in advance and many were secured by promises of positions of influence in the post-election democratic regime. 25...The likely outcome had been carefully calculated. Some possibly recalcitrant procuradores, as the Francoist Cortes members were called, were packed off on an Reconciling the irreconcilable: the political reform of Adolfo Surarez 75 official junket to Panama, via the Caribbean. Others were promised seats in the future
Senate. Much was made of the fact that the proposed democratic Cortes and Senate had the same number of seats combined as the Francoist Cortes. This influenced many procuradores who had come to believe that they genuinely ‘represented’ the areas on which they had been imposed and therefore assumed that they would simply be elected by their grateful constituents. In general, the vote in favour of the political reform project was a collective suicide based on the ingrained habits of obedience to authority, an inflated sense of patriotism and, above all, tempting promises whispered in the ears of those whom Suárez later referred to as the ‘procuradores del harakiri’.26"

"In fact, the opposition remained distrustful, which was understandable after the empty efforts of reform witnessed successively from Solís, Carrero Blanco and Arias Navarro. On 23 October, Coordinación Democrática had united with five regional fronts from Valencia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands and Galicia, to form the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos. Meeting on 4 November in Las Palmas, the new organization rejected Suárez’s plans for a referendum on his political reform project. Arguing that the referendum would be meaningless while political parties were still illegal, while the government still maintained monopolistic control over radio and television, while there were still political prisoners, and while the huge apparatus of the Movimiento still existed as a mechanism of electoral pressure, the POD called for abstention. 28 However, despite the apparent strength and firmness of the opposition stance, the pace was increasingly being dictated by Suárez"

"the broad mass of the people welcomed the changes introduced by Suárez and were likely to vote in favour of his project. In addition, the incorporation into the opposition of centrist elements had led to a softening of militant attitudes. Accordingly, the great general strike called for 12 November was posed in economic rather than political terms. Its slogans were protests against the wage freeze and redundancies, although the political implications were clear enough. In the event, more than a million workers were involved, but the strike never spilled over into the great national action against the Suárez reform that the Communists had hoped for...taking place only three days before the project was to be submitted to the Cortes, the relative failure of the strike strengthened his hand. It contributed to his success in the Cortes from 16 to 19 November. Furthermore, it confirmed the tendency of many opposition groups to acknowledge the validity of dealing with Suárez in order to liquidate Francoism. The president’s many conversations with moderate opposition figures were paying dividends. With more liberal and social-democrat groups joining the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos, the readiness to negotiate displayed by Joaquín Ruiz Giménez prevailed over the more maximalist positions of the Communists and the Socialists"

"The extent to which Suárez’s option had established itself was indicated by the pre- electoral tone of the XXVII Congress of the PSOE held in Madrid at the beginning of December. The PSOE leaders were clearly aware of the popular impact of Suárez’s progress so far and they were also anxious to prevent the president exploiting a weakness on their flank. Suárez had astutely permitted the emergence of a number of other pretenders to the socialist mantle. There was the Federación de Partidos Socialistas, a collection of small provincial groupings of vaguely socialist independents. More influential was the tiny Partido Socialista Popular, a group of significant intellectuals and professionals. They were led by two political scientists, the opposition veteran, known as the ‘old professor’ (el viejo profesor), Enrique Tierno Galván, and his assistant Raul Morodo. Finally, and potentially the most dangerous, were the returned exiles and old militants of the so-called PSOE-Histórico, who had not recognized the fact that Felipe González had replaced the Toulouse-based émigré leaders. They might be able to mount an irritating challenge to the PSOE’s legitimacy.

In consequence, the PSOE leadership feared that, if they refused to participate in the elections out of a reluctant solidarity with the Communists, people would go to the polls anyway and PSOE votes would go to the rival socialist parties. In retrospect, these parties appear inconsequential but, at the time, they were perceived within the PSOE as potential rivals. A crucial task for the party was thus to establish the PSOE’s authenticity. Alfonso Guerra skilfully orchestrated the presence of Willy Branch, Michael Foot, Mario Soares and other major European Socialist leaders in such a way as to demonstrate the PSOE’s exclusive membership of the international socialist family. Then, Felipe González not only imposed an unequivocally moderate line on his party, but he also made it clear that the PSOE would participate in the coming elections even if all parties had not been legalized beforehand. 31 This approach reflected the advice of the German Socialist leadership whose influence on the PSOE was considerable."

"The wisdom of the Socialists’ moderation was confirmed on 15 December when, despite the abstention calls of the opposition, the referendum on political reform saw the Reconciling the irreconcilable: the political reform of Adolfo Surarez 77 project approved by 94 per cent of the vote. The abstention calls were certainly a tactical error. However, without more guarantees from Suárez regarding the legalization of political parties, neither the PSOE nor the PCE leaderships felt able to endorse his line publicly. There was an unreal air about their declarations on abstention calls and they were not taken as binding by the left-wing rank and file. Indeed, both Carrillo and González knew that the referendum would be a success for Suárez. They certainly did not perceive the result as a defeat for themselves. "

"Flushed with success and on the verge of negotiations in which he held most of the cards, Suárez still faced two problems either of which could have upset the delicate balancing act that he was performing. The unresolved questions of the legalization of the Communist Party and of terrorism, particularly that of ETA, were always likely to destroy Suárez’s uneasy truce with the army. "

"In fact, when Suárez came to power, he inherited a virtually impossible Basque situation, certainly one that could not be solved by police action or by the use of ultra- rightist terror squads. What was required was a dramatic conciliatory gesture which could have isolated ETA from its mass support. However, total amnesty and the legalization of the Basque flag, the Ikurriña, were beyond what the bunker would tolerate, and, for that matter, beyond what Suárez himself could yet countenance."

"By comparison with ETA, Suárez’s other outstanding problem on the left, the legalization of the Communist Party, was relatively uncomplicated. The popular
endorsement of his programme in the December referendum and the PSOE’s decision to take part in elections even without the legalization of the PCE gave Suárez most of the cards in the coming contest with Carrillo. Nevertheless, aware that the rest of the opposition was unlikely to risk its own gains in order to help the Communists, Carrillo played his own hand with skill and daring. Already in contact with Suárez through intermediaries, Carrillo’s clandestine presence in Madrid was an open secret among the political élite. He now decided to force the pace by coming out into the open. On 10 December, he called a press conference with over seventy Spanish and foreign journalists. It was a provocation which deeply embarrassed the Ministry of the Interior. 36 However, Carrillo’s words to the assembled reporters were conciliatory. He insinuated that, provided the PCE was allowed to take part in the elections, the Communists would co-operate in the elaboration of a social contract to deal with the economic crisis.

In the light of Communist influence in the Comisiones Obreras, and given that working-class unrest was one of the main reasons why Francoists had ever contemplated reform in the first place, this was a significant offer. Indeed, it foreshadowed the extent to which Carrillo would be a useful parliamentary ally to Suárez in years to come. At the time, the government was furious and ordered Carrillo’s detention, although it took the police until 22 December to find him. The PCE executive committee used the time before his inevitable arrest to prepare a massive campaign in favour of his release. Detained for eight days, Carrillo posed a dilemma for the government and no matter what they did he stood to gain. Suárez wanted to avoid the issue by deporting him to France until Martín Villa pointed out that to do so would merely postpone the problem since Carrillo would certainly be back within a few weeks. Not to have released him, or to have staged a trial, Reconciling the irreconcilable: the political reform of Adolfo Surarez 79 would have damaged the Prime Minister’s reforming credibility. By freeing Carrillo, as he realized that he had to, Suárez was taking a substantial step towards legalizing the PCE. 37"

"As part of the rightist strategy of tension, on the same day as the kidnapping of Villaescusa, ultra terrorists murdered five people, four of whom were Communist labour lawyers, in an office in the Atocha district of Madrid. The PCE refused to be provoked and instead issued appeals for serenity. At the funeral of the victims, the Party organized a gigantic display of silent solidarity. Not only was Suárez personally impressed by the demonstration of Communist strength and discipline, but much popular hostility to the legalization of the PCE was dissolved by the restraint of its response to the tragedy. A delegation of opposition leaders negotiated with Suárez and, in return for promises of action against the bunker’s violence, they offered him a joint government- opposition declaration denouncing terrorism and calling for national support for the government. It was a significant advance for Suárez. His popular backing was substantially reinforced and he was publicly endorsed by the left as belonging to the democratic forces in Spain.39"

"Thus, the poisonous situation in the Basque Country aside, Suárez was advancing along the path towards controlled democracy in the rest of Spain, dealing adequately with both the bunker and the Communists. None the less, the ultimate objective was not merely to proceed to elections which the better-organized left-wing parties might win. The entire point of the operation was to guarantee the political and economic survival of that broad spectrum of the Francoist establishment which, unlike the bunker, had thrown in its lot with the monarchy. In that respect, the Suárez option was the last card of aperturismo. Accordingly, the vision of Suárez and his closest collaborators went far beyond the projected elections. Regular public opinion polls carried out by the government convinced them that a centre-right party, not too tainted by Francoism, and backed by Suárez’s control both of the apparatus of the Movimiento and of the media, would have a healthy electoral future. In fact, throughout the autumn of 1976, the various progressive ex-Francoists who had swelled the ranks of the moderate opposition in increasing numbers over the previous decade joined with more recent converts to democracy in frantic preparation for political life under a democratic regime. 40

One of the first off the mark was Manuel Fraga. He was sure that forty years of dictatorship had left the majority of Spaniards as convinced rightists. Accordingly, he linked up with six other ex-Francoist dignitaries, Laureano López Rodó, Licinio de la Fuente, Federico Silva Muñoz, Cruz Martínez Esteruelas, Enrique Thomas de Carranza and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora. Known collectively as the ‘siete magníficos’ (the magnificent seven), they hoped to capture this imagined majority of what was called ‘sociological Francoism’. Although Fraga underestimated the popular urge for change, he was successful in attracting large sectors of Suárez’s political association, the Union del Pueblo Español. It was to become eventually the focus of the ambitions of many optimistic Francoist veterans including Gregorio López Bravo and Carlos Arias Navarro. With substantial backing from the banks, Fraga’s party Alianza Popular was created with breathtaking speed in the second half of September 1976, although its electoral impact lay in the distant future. 41 To some extent, the forging of Alianza Popular, together with the evidence of the opinion polls, confirmed Suárez’s growing conviction that the most appropriate territory for his own political future was the centre. There existed centre-right parties and grupuscules by the score. The process whereby they coalesced to become the Unión de Centre Democrático under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez was kaleidoscopic, confusing and highly unedifying.

One of the extraordinary features of the political manoeuvring of the autumn and winter of 1976 had been the elimination of the more liberal and anti-Francoist Catholics led by Joaquín Ruiz Giménez and José María Gil Robles. This was especially ironic since Ruiz Giménez had been the first politician to perceive the possibilities of a great union of the centre. United in the so-called Equipo de la Democracia Cristiana, Ruiz Giménez’s Izquierda Democrática and Gil Robles’s Federación Popular Democrática were widely expected to have a significant presence in the coming democratic regime. In fact, they were to be excluded from the great political operation of the centre and were thus condemned to electoral annihilation."

"The demise of the Christian Democrat left, rather as the creation of Alianza Popular had done at the other end of the spectrum, helped demarcate the political centre which was to be occupied by the UCD...Suárez was impressed by the success of the nascent coalition and, with his own Unión de Pueblo Español drifting into the orbit of Manuel Fraga, was anxious to take it over as his own electoral vehicle. Given the government’s control of Radio-Televisión Española and of local administrative machinery, he was confident of being an acceptable leader.

...Similarly, practical rather than ethical considerations dictated the inclusion into UCD of its fifth and crucial component group, the Movimiento bureaucrats, rather like Suárez himself, who were coalescing around Rodolfo Martín Villa. Various provincial governors, town mayors and top syndical officials had been encouraged to resign and dedicate themselves to the new grouping in return for promises that there would be places for them in the future regime. They were known as the Azules, because of the blue shirts of the Falange which they had once worn."

"As an electoral coalition, UCD was united around Suárez because of his access to state funds and his control of government patronage and the radio and television networks. Once those assets had contributed to electoral victory, he was to be able to dissolve the component elements of the coalition into a party united around himself as the fount of patronage. Without a coherent ideology, UCD would inevitably suffer from its clientelist nature. In 1977, however, it was the natural home of those lesser Francoists who had foreseen in time the obsolescence of the dictatorship. It was also the fruit of the dissatisfaction with Francoism manifested by the more enlightened members of the economic establishment since the late 1960s. Thus, UCD was composed of junior Francoists uncompromised by the worst crimes of the regime. Many had held the post of ministerial under-secretary or director-general under Franco and most had worked for the government in some way, especially in state-run enterprises. Except for the Azules, they could not be defined as committed Francoists, although pro-Franco declarations littered their early careers. Rather they were ambitious men launched by the competitive state examination system of oposiciones into the world of public administration and committed to little except their own careers"

"While UCD was still in the process of being forged, Suárez had still to steer his reform project to its culmination. The process of legalizing political parties had begun in February 1977. The stumbling block was the PCE. For the bunker and the army, to legalize the Communists meant throwing away everything that they had fought for in 1936. General Gutiérrez Mellado’s plans to liberalize the army had already led to unrestrained verbal attacks on him. On 24 January 1977, the same day as the Atocha massacre, a large number of senior officers met at the Casino Militar in Madrid and called for the resignation of the government. Then the first of an escalating series of incidents took place at the funeral of two policemen killed by GRAPO. Ultra slogans were chanted and Gutiérrez Mellado was publicly insulted by the naval captain, Camilo Menéndez Vives, who went virtually unpunished and was to become something of a fixture of rightist subversion. 51 . It was obvious that the rage of the ultras would be pushed on to an altogether higher plane when Suárez legalized the PCE. He had little choice. Democracy would simply be incomplete if it excluded a party of the significance of the PCE. In any case, Suárez was confident that, by delaying the PCE’s entry into the game, he would diminish Communist electoral support. Accordingly, by 27 February, the President was prepared to meet Carrillo, although his decision to do so was the death blow to his already deteriorating relations with Torcuato Fernández Miranda. 52

After a marathon eight-hour meeting at the home of José Mario Armero, Carrillo and Suárez reached a basic agreement. In return for legal status, Carrillo undertook to recognize the monarchy, adopt the red-yellow-red monarchist flag of Spain and offer his support for a future social contract

...The sophistry did not save Suárez from the unrelenting hatred of the bunker, although he was never to understand why. In 1984, he was still affirming that he had not deceived the military. The attempted coup of 23 February 1981 was eventually to be the most graphic consequence of the army’s conviction that he had. Fury in the bunker was compounded by the fact that, while jubilant Communists celebrated their legalization, the gigantic red Yoke-and-Arrows symbol was being removed by workmen from the façade of the Movimiento headquarters at Calle Alcalá 44. 54 By legalizing the Communists, Suárez became guilty in the eyes of the ultras of a vile betrayal of the cause for which the Civil War had been fought. The immediate result was the indignant resignation of the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Pita da Veiga. A number of civilian ministers, headed by the Finance Minister Eduardo Carriles, were also ready to resign, but were dissuaded by Alfonso Osorio. 55 The Army Minister, General Félix Alvarez Arenas, drew back from resignation only because his senior colleagues made it clear that no one would replace him. Allegedly egged on by Fraga and the other ‘magníficos’, no senior officer would agree to replace Pita. Only after much embarrassment was Suárez able to persuade the retired Admiral Pascual Pery Junquera to take over as Minister for the Navy.

Suárez met the high command on 11 April to justify to them what he had done. He even played them a tape-recording of the proceedings of their meeting on 8 September 1976. It was to little avail."

"The slowness of Suárez to grasp the gravity of the Basque problem had thus led him to give both ETA and the bunker the clear impression that amnesty had been a capitulation in the face of armed violence. 58

Since October 1975, the abertzale groups had been united into a loose popular front known as KAS or the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista. Its programme, known as the Alternativa KAS, called for total amnesty, the removal of the army from Euskadi, the dissolution of the government-controlled forces of order and self-determination for Euskadi, as well as a number of other demands which could equally never be accepted by any Madrid government. Both before and after the negotiated ceasefire of 20 May, there had been heated debate within the KAS liaison committee over the question of electoral participation. Broadly speaking, ETA-Político-Militar, and the political party associated with it, EIA or Euskal Iraultzako Alderdia (the Party of the Basque Revolution), favoured taking part in order to give a parliamentary voice to popular left nationalism. ETA- Militar, and its own political front, LAIA or Langile Abertzale Iraultzaileen Alderdia (the Patriotic Workers’ Revolutionary Party), came out against participation after some agonized contortions."

"Nevertheless, it would be churlish not to recognize the astonishing advances achieved by Suárez. In addition to gaining Francoist acceptance of his political reform and gaining control of a major electoral coalition, he had reached agreement with the moderate opposition, legalized the PCE, and secured ETA’s agreement not to disrupt the elections. Still, the louring presence of the army ensured that the joint commission of the opposition and the government had elaborated an electoral law in a spirit of some trepidation. However, the campaign was carried out in an atmosphere of popular fiesta which recalled for many the coming of the Second Republic in 1931. The best-attended meetings were those of the PSOE, followed by those of the PCE. UCD’s campaign tended to concentrate on television, press and radio where its resources were virtually unlimited. 60 Eighteen million people voted, nearly 80 per cent of the total electorate, and 90 per cent of them voted clearly for change.

In fact, Spaniards wanted change but not confrontation and this favoured Suárez and Felipe González. In contrast, Carrillo and Fraga awakened memories of the conflicts of the past."

"The Communists were especially disadvantaged by memories of the Civil War. This was perhaps inevitable since the post-Franco liberalization had unleashed a publishing boom in popular history and thereby revived awareness of the PCE’s past Stalinist crimes. The Communists themselves did not help matters by giving prominence in their lists to wartime figures like Carrillo or Dolores Ibárruri. The Socialists, on the other hand, derived benefit from their Civil War record and from a hidden continuity of PSOE tradition in many families. Equally, the image of honesty and competence generated by Felipe González and the prestige conferred by the support of European Socialist leaders made him a serious rival to Suárez. However, one error made by both the Socialists and Communists was to believe, on the basis of opinion poll predictions, that Fraga’s Alianza Popular would constitute a more serious danger than it eventually did. Thus, they tended to concentrate too much of their electoral fire in his direction. 62

In consequence, neither the PSOE nor the PCE made direct attacks on the UCD during the campaign. "

"In the summer of 1976, however, bloody confrontation had still seemed possible. That it did not come about was a tribute to the skill of Adolfo Suárez and his advisers, to the courage and determination of King Juan Carlos but, especially, to the reason and moderation displayed by Felipe González, Santiago Carrillo and the other leaders of the opposition. It is extremely difficult to exaggerate the sacrifices made by the opposition. The terrorist outrages of early 1977 inclined the left to moderate its aspirations. Hopes of significant social change were shelved in order that the urgent immediate goal of political democracy might be secured. "

"Hopes of a thoroughgoing change of the social fabric, agrarian reform, redistribution of wealth, the most minimal aims of the left, were thus quietly dropped in order to guarantee the crucial political reform. The leadership of the opposition and its politically aware cadres knew this but the broad popular masses did not. Accordingly, while the Suárez reform was ample for the conservative middle classes, the great popular hunger for change went unsatisfied"

Chapter 5: Building a new world with the bricks of the old: the democratic pact 1977–9