"The steady progress in the achievement of self-determination among the Arab peoples of the Levant; the reality of foreign, Christian imperial rule, albeit benign and constructive; the political separation of Palestine from (French-ruled) Syria-Lebanon; and the influx of Zionist immigrants with deeply held national aspirations, triggered a Palestinian Arab nationalist ‘awakening’. But almost from inception, the Palestinian Arab national movement was rent into two camps, whose growth and polarisation was the chief characteristic of the politics of Arab Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s. One camp, assembled around the Husseini clan and the person of Haj Muhammad Amin al Husseini, from 1921–1922 the Mufti of Jerusalem and the head of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) and, from 1936, chairman of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), soon demanded an immediate termination of the Mandate, the cessation of Jewish immigration and the establishment of an Arab state in all of Palestine, vaguely promising civil and religious rights for the Jews already in the country. The ‘Opposition’ camp, led by the Nashashibıs, another aristocratic Jerusalem clan, was generally more moderate, less insistent on immediate independence, and more conciliatory, at least in tone, towards the Yishuv (occasionally accepting Jewish Agency bribes in exchange for softening its criticism of Zionism). The ‘Opposition’ never really agreed to Jewish statehood in all or part of Palestine but during the late 1930s was willing to accept an at least temporary confederation of parts of Palestine with King Abdullah’s Transjordan. But the Husseinis generally set the tone of Palestinian Arab politics – toward Zionism, Britain and Transjordan – and from the mid-1930s dominated the national movement."
"The revolt began with sporadic acts of violence and a countrywide general strike. It was directed in the first instance against the British and, secondly, against what were seen as their Zionist wards. It spread from the towns to the countryside, and won for the Husseinis and their allies the unchallenged leadership of the national movement. From mid-1937, Opposition families became a target of Husseini terrorism and suppression; during late 1938–1939, the Nashashibis in effect collaborated with the British (and the Zionists) in helping to crush the revolt. But by its end, in spring 1939, the Opposition had expired as a serious political force. The crushing of the revolt vastly weakened Palestinian society, both militarily and politically, and paved the way for its defeat in 1948.
But the revolt persuaded Whitehall, beset as it was by the prospect of a multi-front war against Germany, Japan and Italy, of the advisability of maintaining tranquillity in the Middle East. Initially, the British had hoped that the dispatch to Palestine in November 1936 of the fact-finding Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel would propitiate the Arabs. But in July 1937, Peel tabled his report, proposing that the country be partitioned into a Jewish state (on 20 per cent of the land) and an Arab area (on more than 70 per cent) to be joined to Transjordan. A strip of land – including Jerusalem and Bethlehem with an outlet to the Mediterranean at Jaffa – was earmarked for continued British rule. But while the Zionist movement, after much agonising, accepted the principle of partition and the proposals as a basis for negotiation, the AHC flatly rejected them – and in September 1937 renewed the revolt."
"Whitehall swiftly distanced itself from the idea of partition and, while crushing the revolt (the message to the Arabs was that Britain was not to be messed with), took vigorous steps to appease the Palestinians and, through them, the Arab world in general.
The main step was the publication in May 1939 by Whitehall of a new White Paper on Palestine, amounting to a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration policy that had, with ups and downs, guided British policy since 1917. The new White Paper severely curbed Jewish immigration, in effect leaving millions of Jews stranded in Europe and about to fall victim to the Nazi extermination machine, and almost completely prohibited Jewish land purchases. It also promised the Arabs, who would remain in the majority, independence within 10 years."
"Over the years, the Yishuv’s leaders and political parties had managed to forge the institutional tools for achieving and perpetuating statehood. Its ‘National Institutions’ almost from the first were built with an eye to conversion into institutions of state.4 By May 1948, it had a shadow government, with almost all the institutions (and, in some fields, such as agriculture and settlement, an excess of institutions) of state in place and ready to take over. The Jewish Agency (JA), with its various departments (political, finance, settlement, immigration), became the Provisional Government, the departments smoothly converting into ministries; the JA Executive (JAE) and, subsequently, the ‘People’s Administration’ (minhelet ha‘am) became the Cabinet; the Haganah became the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). By 1948, the Yishuv was in many respects functioning like ‘a state within a state’; the National Council (hava‘ad hale’umi) and the JA, together with municipalities, local councils and the Histadrut, the trades union federation, in coordination with the Mandate Government departments, provided the Yishuv with most essential services (health, education, social welfare, industrial development). The Yishuv taxed itself, the funds going to various services and goals. The Histadrut taxed its members to provide health services and unemployment allowances; the Jewish National Fund (JNF) levied taxes for afforestation, land purchase and settlement infrastructure; special taxes were instituted to purchase arms and cover the costs of immigrant absorption. As well, the Yishuv received continuous financial aid from the Diaspora, with special, large-scale emergency funding during 1947–1949."
"by September 1947, possessed 10,489 rifles, 702 light machine-guns, 2,666 submachine guns, 186 medium machine-guns, 672 two-inch mortars and 92 three-inch mortars. (The Haganah had no military aircraft, tanks or artillery at the start of the 1948 war.) Many more weapons were purchased, or stolen, from the withdrawing British, during the first months of hostilities. Moreover, the Yishuv had a relatively advanced arms producing capacity. Between October 1947 and July 1948, the Haganah’s arms factories poured out 3 million 9mm bullets, 150,000 mills grenades, 16,000 submachine guns (‘Sten Guns’) and 210 three-inch mortars.5
From November 1947, the Haganah, with some 35,000 members (a proportion of them women), began to change from a territorial militia into a regular army. Apart from a handful of fulltime ‘shock companies’ (the Palmah, established with British help in 1941 and numbering 2,000–3,000 troops), few of the units had been well trained by December 1947, and it was only gradually, over December 1947–May 1948, that the full membership was mobilised and placed in uniform on a permanent footing. Haganah members usually trained for 3–4 days a month, for the rest being fulltime civilians. But the organisation had a relatively large pool of British Army veterans and a highly committed, internally trained officer corps. By March–April 1948 it fielded still under-equipped ‘battalions’ and ‘brigades’; by the start of June, it had become the ‘IDF’, an army, and consisted of 11–12 brigades, including artillery and armoured units, and an embryonic air force and navy.6 By May 1948, the Haganah had mobilised and deployed 35,780 troops – 5,000–10,000 more than the combined troop strength of the regular Arab armies that invaded Palestine on 15–16 May (though the invaders were far better equipped and, theoretically, better trained).7 The Haganah’s successor, the IDF, by July 1948 had 63,000 men under arms.8
But, perhaps even more important than the numbers, which meant that by July 1948 one person in 10 (or one out of every 2–3 adult males) in the Yishuv was mobilised, was the Haganah’s organisation, from its highly talented, centralised General Staff, with logistical, intelligence and operations branches, down to its brigade and battalion formations. By April–May the Haganah was conducting brigade-size offensives, by July, multi-brigade operations; and by October, divisional, multi-front offensives. By mid-May, it had thoroughly beaten the Palestinian militias and their foreign auxiliaries; by October–December, it had beaten the invading Arab armies."
"The Palestinian Arab defeat owed much to the society’s shortcomings and divisions. Palestinian society was poor, agriculturally based, largely illiterate,9 politically and socially primitive and disorganised, and deeply divided. The rifts in Palestinian society – between town and country, Husseinis and Nashashibis, Muslims and Christians, beduin and settled communities – were rooted in history."
"But it is well to recognise that there was also a parallel process at work during the 19th century, namely the immigration to Palestine of tens of thousands of Maghrebi (North African), Egyptian, Bosnian, Kurdish and Caucasian peasants and beduin tribes, either on their own volition or by Ottoman design. Many of these immigrants established new villages, particularly in the less populated lowlands of the Galilee and in the Coastal Plain. The names of some of the villages bore testimony to these immigrant waves; for example, there were a number of Kafr Misrs (‘Misr’ is Egypt in Arabic) and two ‘Kirads’ (indicating Kurdish origins). Later, the relative prosperity and order of Mandate Palestine drew thousands of additional Arab immigrants from the neighbouring countries, especially to the large towns"
"The Palestinian national movement took root mainly among the urban elite and middle classes, but over the decades of British rule, in which there was a major growth in education and literacy, the national idea began to filter down to the urban and peasant masses. The fact that each bout of anti-Zionist (and anti-British) rioting during the Mandate (1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936–1939) was larger than its predecessor reflected the growth and spread of political consciousness among the masses. In the course of the Mandate, in part as a result of improvements in education, the politicisation of the urban elites and growing middle class, and the threatening Zionist enterprise, villagers became increasingly politicised...
But, by and large, the villager still maintained primary allegiances to family, clan and village; those were the focuses of his interest. Rural society was based on the village rather than the district or the country. And the experience of 1936–1939, in which villages were sucked into the maw of the revolt and devastated thereby, sufficed to cure many of political activism.15 As late as the 1940s, for most villages and villagers politics and the national struggle were remote, playthings of sophisticated city folk. As one Arab memorialist from the Galilee village of Mi‘ilya put it, ‘The Mi‘ilyan’s world was his village – the land and the people. Matters of national or even regional politics were the concern of [only] one or two people in the village.’16"
"The enormous growth in transportation affected agriculture, commerce and industry. Commercial ties with Europe were channelled through chambers of commerce and an efficient banking network had developed in the towns by the end of World War II. The war was crucial; the credit of the largest Arab bank, the ‘Arab Bank’, grew between 1941 and 1945 eighteenfold, and deposits twentyfold. Industry, too, had begun to develop.19
Some 30–35 per cent of the urban Arabs were employed in light industry, crafts and construction, 15–17 per cent in transportation, 20–23 per cent in commerce, 5–8 per cent in professions, 5–7 per cent in public service and 6–9 per cent in other services. By the late 1940s, Palestinian Arab society was in the throes of rapid urbanisation. British rule and, particularly, the onset of World War II had triggered a small measure of industrialisation. Yishuv intelligence identified the beginnings of a change from ‘the typical primitive workshop’ economy to ‘modernisation’. Sweet and chocolate factories and three glass factories were established; there was a significant growth of the textile industry; and a modern cigarette plant was set up in Haifa.20 By the end of the Mandate, there were in Arab Palestine some 1,500 industrial workshops and small factories employing altogether 9,000 workers with an average of 5–6 employees per workshop. (By contrast there were 1,900 industrial workshops and plants in Jewish Palestine, employing 38,000 workers, an average of 19–21 workers per plant.) Other Arabs worked in Jewish-owned plants and in British-run plants and services. Altogether, the Arab proletariat numbered some 35,000, with 5,000 employed by oil companies and 8,000 in the government railway service. During the war, tens of thousands were employed by the government in public works and 30,000 in British Army camps (though most of these were laid off in the immediate post-war years).21"
"In the late 1940s, 28 of the 32 members of the AHC were from the ‘Ayan; the remaining four were bourgeoisie; none were peasants or proletarians. Some 24 were of urban extraction, and only four or five originated in the countryside. The wide gulf of suspicion and estrangement between urban and rural Arab Palestine was to underlie the lack of coordination between the towns and their rural hinterland during the hostilities. The elite families had no tradition of, or propensity for, national service and their members did not do military service with the Turks, the British or neighbouring Arab armies. Almost none of the military leaders of the 1936–1939 rebellion were from the ‘Ayan. It was mainly a peasant rebellion, with the town dwellers restricting themselves largely to civil protest (demonstrations, riots and a general strike) and, at a later stage, to inter-factional terrorism.23"
"During the 1930s, the elite families set up formal political parties. In 1935 the Husseinis established the Palestine Arab Party, which became the Arabs’ main political organisation. Earlier, in 1934, the Nashashibis had set up the National Defence Party. In 1932 Awni ‘Abd al Hadi of Samaria set up the Istiqlal Party, which was pan-Arab in ideology, and in 1935, Jerusalem mayor Dr Husayn Khalidi set up the Reform Party. The early 1930s also saw the establishment by Ya‘qub Ghusayn of the Youth Congress Party and the Nablus-based National Bloc Party. The proliferation of parties tended to dissipate the strength of the Opposition. But the parties for the most part existed on paper and were powerless. All opposed Zionism and, in varying degrees, British rule, and aimed at Arab statehood in all of Palestine (though the Istiqlal did not espouse separate Palestinian statehood). The parties had no internal elections or western-style institutions, and no dues, and were based on family and local affiliations and loyalties. Families, clans and villages rather than individuals were party members, with semi-feudal links of dependence and loyalty determining attachment. Few ‘Ayan families managed to remain neutral in the Husseini–Nashashibi struggle.25"
"All the parties, representing both over-arching factions, initially made common cause in 1936 in backing and leading the revolt. Differences were set aside and party activity was stopped. Representatives of the six parties constituted the AHC on 25 April 1936 to coordinate the struggle nationally. On the local level, the parties set up National Committees (NCs) in each town to run the strike and other political activities, but as the strike gave way to widespread violence, the traditional enmities re-surfaced, with the Nashashibis and their allies re-emerging as the Opposition. The Nashashibis came to represent and lead those Arabs who came to regard the revolt as fruitless. The Husseini response, of intimidation and assassination, decimated the ranks of the Opposition; terrorism, extortion, rapine and brigandage against villagers and town dwellers by the armed bands and the inevitable search and destroy operations against the rebels by the British military alienated much of the population. By late 1938–1939, it had grown tired of the fight. Villages turned against the rebels and, with Opposition and British intelligence backing, anti-rebel ‘peace bands’ were formed.
The outcome of the rebellion, apart from the political gains embodied in the 1939 White Paper, was that several thousand Arabs were killed, thousands were gaoled, and tens of thousands fled the country; much of the elite and middle class was driven or withdrew in disgust from the political arena. Husseini–Nashashibi reconciliation became inconceivable; implacable blood feuds were born, with telling effect for the denouement of 1947–1948.
In suppressing the rebellion, the British outlawed the AHC, arresting or exiling its members, some of whom fled to Germany and served the Axis during World War II. The Palestinians remained politically inactive during the war years, political parties and factions reconstitut-ing themselves only 1944–1945. The AHC also re-emerged, with the Husseinis dominant. In early 1946 the rifts reappeared and in March 1946 the Arab League stepped in and appointed a new AHC composed only of Husseinis and their allies. Its leading members were Amin al Husseini (president), Jamal Husseini (deputy president), Husayn Khalidi (secretary), Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Emil Ghawri. The Opposition was left out in the cold."
"Another divisive element built into Palestinian society was the Muslim–Christian rift. The Christians, concentrated in the towns, were generally wealthier and better educated. They prospered under the Mandate. The Muslims suspected that the Christians would ‘sell out’ to the British (fellow Christians) or make common cause with the Jews (a fellow minority). Indeed, Christians took almost no part in the 1936–1939 rebellion. Sometime in 1946–1947, HIS compiled a list of prominent Christians ‘with a tendency to cooperation with the Jews’. There are 'few such Arabs among the Muslims, and many among the Christians’, wrote HIS.
The reason for this is that the Christians suffered a great deal under the Muslims and see a blessing in Jewish immigration to the country and to the Middle East as a whole . . . But there are few willing to express their opinion publicly for fear of the reaction of the Muslims.27"
"According to HIS, relations between the communities were
not good, though outwardly appearances of coerced friendship were maintained. The relations between the lower and middle classes were worse than among the rich. In fact, there was no contact (apart from commercial relations) between the communities . . . The Christians had participated in the 1936–37 disturbances under duress and out of fear of the Muslims."
"And in Haifa, a mere month before the passage of the UN partition resolution, a meeting of Haifa Christian notables had resolved to set up a Christian militia to
protect the lives and property of the Christians. Outwardly the call for recruits would be to prepare for attacks by the Jews, but in truth they want to defend themselves against attacks that the Muslims might launch against them if a situation of anarchy prevails during the withdrawal of the British army.34"
"Already in early November 1947, according to HIS, some Christians were ‘trying to flee the country’. The reason was that
the Christians in Nazareth, among them most of the high officials in the district administration, live in fear for their property and lives (in this order) from the Muslims. The Husseini terror has recently grown worse and large amounts of money are extorted from the Christians.35"
"It is likely that the majority of Christians would have preferred the continuation of the British Mandate to independence under Husseini rule; some may even have preferred Jewish rule. All were aware of the popular Muslim mob chant: ‘After Saturday, Sunday’ (meaning, after we take care of the Jews, it will be the Christians’ turn). To compensate, Christian community leaders repeatedly went out of their way to express devotion to the Palestinian national cause"
"During the first weeks of war, Christian–Muslim relations deteriorated against the backdrop of Jewish–Arab violence and Muslim suspicions that the Christians were collaborating or might collaborate with the Jews. HIS in Jerusalem reported:
The Christians continue to complain about bad behaviour by the Arabs [sic] towards them. Many of them wish to leave their homes. The gang members [i.e., Arab irregulars] indeed threaten to kill them after they finish with the Jews.’36"
"Arab society was highly sectorial and parochial. It was backward, disunited and often apathetic, a community only just entering the modern age politically and administratively. In some fields (land-purchasing, militia organisation), its leaders tried to copy Zionist models, but the vast differences in the character of the two populations and levels of consciousness, commitment, ability and education left the Arabs radically outclassed. The moment the Yishuv quantitatively reached what proved a critical mass, the outcome – in hindsight – was ineluctable.
Before 1948, much of the Arab population had only an indistinct, if any, idea of national purpose and statehood. There was clarity about one thing only – the Jews aimed to displace them and they had to be stymied or driven out; they were less enthusiastic or united over wanting the British out. On the whole, save for the numerically small circle of the elite, the Palestinians were unready for the national message or for the demands that national self-fulfilment imposed upon the community, both in 1936–1939 and, far more severely, in 1947–1948. Commitment and readiness to pay the price presumed a clear concept of the nation and of national belonging, which the Arabs, still caught up in a clan-centred, a village-centred or, at most, a regional outlook, by and large lacked. As late as the 1940s, most of them still lacked a sense of separate national or cultural identity distinguishing them from, say, the Arabs of Syria."
"This absence of political consciousness and commitment (as well as the lack of educated personnel) provides a partial explanation for the failure to establish self-governing institutions. And even in the one field where the Arabs enjoyed ‘self-governing’ institutions based on some form of elections (albeit irregularly held, in 1926, 1934 and 1946, and with very limited, propertied suffrage) – the municipalities – they failed to function as well as the selfsame institutions in the Yishuv. Budgets give an idea of scope of operations. (Arab) Ramle, with a population of some 20,000 in 1941, had an annual budget of P£6,317. Jenin, a far smaller town, had a budget of P£2,320; Bethlehem, with a population of over 10,000, P£3,245; Nablus, with a population in 1942 of about 30,000, P£17,223; and Jaffa, with an overwhelmingly Arab population of about 70,000 in 1942, P£90,967. By comparison, all-Jewish Petah-Tikvah, with a population of 30,000, had a budget of P£39,463 in 1941; Tel Aviv, with 200,000, in 1942 had a budget of P£779,589."
"The only body that resembled a national ‘government’ ( à la the JA) was the AHC. But it functioned only spasmodically, during 1936–1939 and 1946–1948, and its members – the Palestinian Arab ‘Cabinet’ – by and large operated from outside the counry during late 1937–1948. The Mufti was the nominal ‘president’ and the day-to-day running was in the hands of his cousin Jamal Husseini. During 1947–1948 the AHC had six departments that theoretically oversaw various areas of political endeavour: A Lands Department (headed by Mustafa Husseini), responsible for purchasing land and preventing Jewish purchases; a Finance Department (headed by ‘Azzam Taunus), in charge of expenditure and fund-raising; the Economic Department (headed by Yassin al-Khalidi), responsible for commercial ties, imports and exports and the ‘Boycott Committee’ (headed by Rashid al-Khatib), which supervised the boycott of Jewish goods and services; the Department for National Organisation (headed by Rafiq Tamimi), responsible for sports agencies and paramilitary youth associations; the Department of Prisoners and Casualties (headed by Muhammad Sa‘id Gharbiya and Salah Rimawi), responsible for caring for those killed, hurt or imprisoned while serving the nation and their families; and the Press Department (headed by Mahmoud Sharkas), an information or propaganda body responsible for media coverage and relations with journalists. This structure failed to cover other important areas of government (health services, education, transportation, foreign affairs, defence) and what was covered, was covered poorly, according to the HIS:
In truth, chaos reigned in most of the departments and the borders between them were generally blurred. [Each] official interfered in his colleague’s affairs, there was little [taking of] responsibility and public criticism was legion, while, moreover, the selection of the officials and departmental heads was improper [i.e., marred by corruption and nepotism].
By late January 1948 only one department – the Treasury – was still functioning.39
In effect, in most areas, the Palestinians remained dependent on the Mandate administration. Consequently, when the administration folded over winter and spring 1947–1948, and the towns, villages and roads were engulfed by hostilities, Arab Palestine – especially the towns – slid into chaos. Confusion and even anarchy characterised the distribution and sale of food, the delivery of health care and the operation of public transport and communications. Law and order collapsed. Palestine Arab society fell apart. By contrast, the Yishuv, under the same conditions of warfare and siege, and with far less manpower and no hinterland of friendly states, proved able to cope."
"More important in the ‘militarisation’ of Arab Palestine was the establishment by the Husseinis of the Futuwa (youth companies), in which youngsters were trained in military drill and the use of weapons. The movement, modelled after the Nazi youth organisations,40 never amounted to much though it supplied some of the political cadres who organised the general strike of 1936 and the terrorism later in the rebellion. The Futawa were re-established after World War II but never numbered more than several hundred youths under arms.
A larger organisation was the Najjada (auxiliary corps), set up in the post-war period, largely at Opposition initiative, with its centre in Jaffa. In summer 1946 it had 2,000–3,000 members and was led by Muhammad Nimr al Hawari; its officers were mainly Palestinians who had served in the British Army. The organisation lacked arms. In the run-up to the 1948 war, the Husseinis tried to gain control of the Najjada, in the process destroying it.41 In the end, the Palestinians entered the war without a national militia.
During the 1948 War, Palestinian military power rested on a handful of mobile armed bands, each numbering several hundred irregulars, on town militias, and on individual village ‘militias’."
"Under the Mandate, the Palestinians had relied on (mostly Jewish) government doctors and medical institutions; the lack of medical services was to plague the Palestinians through the ensuing war.46
Palestinian efforts to acquire weaponry during the last months of 1947 were hindered by the Husseini–Nashashibi divide, by poverty, and by a general unwillingness to contribute to the national cause, itself a reflection of the low level of political consciousness and commitment. From mid-1947, as the United Nations decision drew near, the Palestinian leaders began to levy taxes and ‘contributions’ to finance the impending struggle. Taxes were imposed on cigarettes (one mil per packet) and on bus tickets (five mil per ride). But, ‘it appears that the Arab public was not participating enthusiastically and by 1.11.1947 only P£25,000 were raised. It was clear that such a sum could not suffice to finance the activities of the AHC, which steadily increased.’47 During the first month of the war, HIS monitored dozens of cases of local Arab leaders and armed bands extorting ‘contributions’; the will to give was absent. For example, on 29 December 1947 the mukhtars of ‘Arab al Satariyya and Yibna village in the lower Coastal Plain were reported to be exacting, ‘with pressure and threats’, P£5 per head to finance arms purchases.48 The Palestine Arabs had no arms production capacity."
"A British military intelligence assessment from July 1947 estimated that an embryonic Jewish state would defeat the Palestinian Arabs, even if they were clandestinely assisted by one or two of the Arab states.56 The Arab League Military Committee, based in Damascus, in October 1947 reached similar conclusions:
A. The Zionists in Palestine – organisations and parties, political, military and administrative – are organisationally on a very high level. These institutions can immediately transform into a Zionist government possessing all the means necessary for governing.
B. The Jews today have large forces, in terms of manpower, armaments and equipment . . .
C. The Jews have enormous economic resources in the country and outside it . . .
D. The Jews have a great ability to bring reinforcements and equipment from overseas in great quantities.
As for the Palestinian Arabs:
A. Currently the Palestinian Arabs do not have enough forces (manpower, weapons and equipment), to withstand in any [acceptable] way the Zionist organisations.
B. In the areas where a Jewish majority is in control live today 350,000 Arabs – in isolated villages and blocks threatened with destruction, should the Zionists carry out wide-ranging operations.
A month later, two days before the passage of the UN partition resolution, General Ismail Safwat, the Iraqi chairman of the League Military Committee, reported to the Iraqi chief of staff that ‘most of the [Palestinian] Arabs cannot today in any way withstand the Zionist forces, even though numerically the Arabs are superior . . .’57 Thus all observers – Jewish, British, Palestinian Arab, and external Arab – agreed on the eve of the war that the Palestinians were incapable of beating the Zionists or of withstanding Zionist assault. The Palestinians were simply too weak."
"The Palestinian Arabs believed that succour would come from the Arab world around them, but the rifts within Palestinian society were matched by the rifts between the Palestinians and those who came to ‘help’ them. The Yishuv had financial help from Western, primarily American, Jewry; the Arabs, despite continuous efforts, enjoyed no such steady, reliable aid from the Arab states or the Muslim world. Indeed, the rejection by the Arab governments and armies of local and national Palestinian pleas for money, arms and reinforcements in late 1947 and early 1948 was merely a continuation of what had gone before. Cumulatively, it engendered among the Palestinians a sense of abandonment, which underlay their despair through 1948"
"On 14 May, the State of Israel was declared and the British left – and, on 15–16 May, the armies of Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Iraq invaded Palestine. Their declared aim was to help the Palestinians and, if possible, to thwart the establishment of the Jewish state and to occupy both Jewish and Arab parts of Palestine. The secretary general of the Arab League, ‘Azzam Pasha, spoke of a massacre of the Jews akin to the Mongols’ pillage of Baghdad in the 13th century. In Jordan’s case, the principal aim of the invasion was to occupy as much as possible of Arab Palestine with the aim of annexation."
"In July 1948, about midway in the first Arab–Israeli war, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Ernst Bevin, wrote that ‘on a long term view . . . there may be something to be said for an exchange of populations between the areas assigned to the Arabs and the Jews respectively.’1 A few days later, he expatiated:
It might be argued that the flight of large numbers of Arabs from the territory under Jewish administration had simplified the task of arriving at a stable settlement in Palestine since some transfers of population seems [sic] to be an essential condition for such a settlement.
But he then went on to argue that as there were only a handful of Jews living in the territory earmarked for Arab sovereignty in Palestine, there was no ‘basis for an equitable exchange of population’ and therefore Britain should pursue with the United Nations Mediator the possibility of a return of the displaced Palestinian Arabs to their homes.2 By this time, 400,000–500,000 Arabs (and less than five thousand Jews) had been displaced in the fighting.
But the logic propelling Bevin’s thinking, before he pulled on the reins, was highly persuasive: The transfer of the large Arab minority out of the areas of the Jewish state (as of the minuscule Jewish minority out of the Arab-designated areas) would solve an otherwise basic, insur-mountable minority problem that had the potential to subvert any peace settlement. The selfsame logic underlay the analysis, a month later, of London’s Middle East intelligence centre, the Cairo-based British Middle East Office:
The panic flight of Arabs from the Jewish occupied areas of Palestine has presented a very serious immediate problem but may possibly point the way to a long term solution of one of the greatest difficulties in the way of a satisfactory implementation of partition, namely the existence in the Jewish state of an Arab community very nearly equal in numbers to the Jewish one.
Previous examinations of this problem have always led to the rejection of transference of populations as a solution for the reason that the number of Arabs to be transferred from the Jewish state was 40 times as great as the number of Jews to be transferred from the Arab state. [But] this disparity has for the moment been largely reduced by the flight of Arabs from the Jewish state . . .
Now that the initial difficulty of persuading the Arabs of Palestine to leave their homes has been overcome by Jewish terrorism and Arab panic it seems possible that the solution may lie in their transference to Iraq and Syria . . . The project [of resettling the refugees in the Arab states] would have to be launched with utmost care. If it were put forward at the present stage the immediate reaction in all Arab minds would be that we had been working for this all along. But if it becomes obvious that through unwillingness on the part of either the Jewish [sic] or Arabs there is little or no chance of the displaced Arabs of Palestine being reinstated in their own homes, it might be put forward as a solution to the problem as it then appeared.3
Similar assumptions pervaded American thinking at the end of the war. The consul-general in Jerusalem, William Burdett Jr., no friend of Zionism, advised Washington in February 1949:
Despite the attendant suffering . . . it is felt security in the long run will be served best if the refugees remain in the Arab states and Arab Palestine instead of returning to Israel. Since the US has supported the establishment of a Jewish State, it should insist on a homogeneous one which [sic] will have the best possible chance of stability. Return of the refugees would create a continuing ‘minority problem’ and form a constant temptation both for uprisings and intervention by neighbouring Arab states.4"
"The obvious, logical solution lay in Arab emigration or ‘transfer’. Such a transfer could be carried out by force, i.e., expulsion, or it could be engineered voluntarily, with the transferees leaving on their own steam and by agreement, or by some amalgam of the two methods. For example, the Arabs might be induced to leave by means of a combination of financial sticks and carrots. This, indeed, was the thrust of the diary entry by Theodor Herzl, Zionism’s prophet and organisational founder, on 12 June 1895:
We must expropriate gently . . . We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country . . . Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discretely and circumspectly.7
This was Herzl’s only diary entry on the matter, and only rarely did he refer to the subject elsewhere. It does not crop up at all in his two major Zionist works, Der Judenstaat (The Jews’ State) and Altneuland (Old-New Land). Nor does it appear in the published writings of most of the Zionist leaders of Herzl’s day and after. All understood that discretion and circumspection were called for: Talk of transferring the Arabs, even with Palestinian and outside Arab leaders’ agreement, would only put them on their guard and antagonise them, and quite probably needlessly antagonise the Arabs’ Ottoman correligionists, who ruled the country until 1917–1918."
"Herzl, Motzkin, Ruppin and Zangwill, of course, had been thinking not of such mini-displacements but of a massive, ‘strategic’ transfer. But however appealing on the practical plane, the idea was touched, in most Zionists’ minds, by a measure of moral dubiety. True, at least down to the 1920s or 1930s, the Arabs of Palestine did not see themselves and were not considered by anyone else a distinct ‘people’. They were seen as ‘Arabs’ or, more specifically, as ‘southern Syrian Arabs’. Therefore, their transfer from Nablus or Hebron to Transjordan, Syria and even Iraq –especially if adequately compensated – would not be tantamount to exile from the homeland; ‘Arabs’ would merely be moving from one Arab area to another.
Moreover, the transfer of ethnic minorities to their core national areas, was regarded during the first half of the 20th century as morally acceptable, perhaps even morally desirable. It also made good political sense. The historical experience in various parts of the globe during the 1920s and 1940s supported this view. The double coerced transfer of Muslim Turks out of Greek majority areas in Thrace and the Aegean Islands and of Christian Greeks out of Turkish Asia Minor during the early 1920s, a by-product of Greek–Turkish hostilities, at a stroke seemed to solve two long-standing, ‘insoluble’, minority problems, rendering future Greek–Turkish relations more logical and pacific. 1947–1948 witnessed even larger (and bloodier) transfers, of Muslims and Hindus, between India and Pakistan, as these states emerged from the womb of history.11 The world looked on, uncondemning and impervious. Indeed, the transfer of German minority groups from western Poland and the Czech borderlands to Germany at the end of the Second World War was positively lauded in most Allied capitals. In both the West and the Communist Bloc it was seen as both politically imperative and just. These minorities had helped to subvert the European order and a cluster of central and eastern European nation-states, at a mind-boggling cost in lives, suffering and property; it was just and fitting that they be uprooted and ‘returned’ to Germany, both as punishment and in order that they might cause no trouble in the future."
"Still, the notion of transfer remained, in Zionist eyes – even as Zionist leaders trotted out these historical precedents – morally problematic. Almost all shared liberal ideals and values; many, indeed, were socialists of one ilk or another; and, after all, the be-all and end-all of their Zionist ideology was a return of a people to its homeland. Uprooting Arab families from their homes and lands, even with compensation, even with orderly re-settlement among their own outside Palestine, went against the grain. The moral dilemma posed was further aggravated during the 1930s and 1940s by the dawning recognition among many of the Zionist leaders, including Ben-Gurion and Zeev Jabotinsky, the leader of the right-wing Revisionist Movement, that Palestine’s Arabs had brought forth a new, distinct (albeit still ‘Arab’) nationalism and national identity; Palestinian transferees might not feel at home in Transjordan or Iraq. For all these reasons, the notion of transfer was something best not mulled over and brought out into the open in public discourse and disputation; best not to think about it at all. Zionism might necessitate displacement of Palestinians, but why trouble one’s conscience and linger over it?
Rather, the Zionist public catechism, at the turn of the century, and well into the 1940s, remained that there was room enough in Palestine for both peoples; there need not be a displacement of Arabs to make way for Zionist immigrants or a Jewish state. There was no need for a transfer of the Arabs and on no account must the idea be incorporated in the movement’s ideological–political platform."
"Hence, if during the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century Zionist advocacy of transfer was unin-sistent, low-key and occasional, by the early 1930s a full-throated near-consensus in support of the idea began to emerge among the movement’s leaders. Each major bout of Arab violence triggered renewed Zionist interest in a transfer solution. So it was with the riots of 1929. In May 1930, the director of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department and the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine, Colonel F. H. Kisch, proposed to the president of the Zionist Organisation, Chaim Weizmann, that the Jewish Agency should press the British to promote the emigration of Palestinian Arabs to Iraq, which is
in urgent need of agricultural population. It should not be impossible to come to an arrangement with [King] Faisal [of Iraq] by which he would take the initiative in offering good openings for Arab immigrants . . . There should be suitable propaganda as to the attractions of the country which indeed are great for Arab immigrants – and there should be specially organised and advertised facilities for travel. We, of course, should not appear [to be promoting this], but I see no reason why H.M.G. should not be interested . . . There can be no conceivable hardship for Palestinian Arabs – a nomadic and semi-nomadic people – to move to another Arab country where there are better opportunities for an agricultural life – c.f. English agricultural emigrants to Canada.12"
"To be sure, the Zionist leaders, in public, continued to repeat the old refrain – that there was enough room in the country for the two peoples and that Zionist immigration did not necessitate Arab displacement. Jabotinsky, the leader of the Revisionist movement, had generally supported transfer.16 But in 1931 he had said: ‘We don’t want to evict even one Arab from the left or right banks of the Jordan. We want them to prosper both economically and culturally’;17 and six years later he had testified before the Peel Commission that ‘there was no question at all of expelling the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea was that the Land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan [i.e., Palestine and Transjordan] would [ultimately] contain the Arabs . . . and many millions of Jews . . .’ – though he admitted that the Arabs would become a ‘minority.’18"
"But by 1936, the mainstream Zionist leaders were more forthright in their support of transfer. In July, Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and de facto leader of the Yishuv, and his deputy, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the director of the Agency’s Political Department, went to the High Commissioner to plead the Zionist case on immigration, which the Mandatory was considering suspending:
Ben-Gurion asked whether the Government would make it possible for Arab cultivators displaced through Jewish land purchases . . . to be settled in Transjordan. If Transjordan was for the time being a country closed to the Jews [i.e., closed to Jewish settlement], surely it could not be closed to Arabs also.
The High Commissioner thought this a good idea . . . He asked whether the Jews would be prepared to spend money on the settlement of such Palestinian Arabs in Transjordan.
Mr. Ben-Gurion replied that this might be considered.
Mr. Shertok remarked that the Jewish colonising agencies were in any case spending money in providing for the tenants or cultivators who had to be shifted as a result of Jewish land purchase either by the payment of compensation or through the provision of alternative land. They would gladly spend that money on the settlement of these people in Transjordan.19
Three months later, the Jewish Agency Executive debated the idea. Ben-Gurion observed:
Why can’t we acquire land there for Arabs, who wish to settle in Transjordan? If it was permissible to move an Arab from the Galilee to Judea, why is it impossible to move an Arab from the Hebron area to Transjordan, which is much closer? . . . There are vast expanses of land there and we [in Palestine] are over-crowded . . . We now want to create concentrated areas of Jewish settlement [in Palestine], and by transferring the land-selling Arab to Transjordan, we can solve the problem of this concentration . . . Even the High Commissioner agrees to a transfer to Transjordan if we equip the peasants with land and money . . .20"
"The commission pointed to the useful Greco-Turkish precedent, in which about 1.3 million Greeks and 400,000 Turks were compulsorily exchanged or transferred in the first half of the 1920s. ‘Before the [exchange] operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant. Now the ulcer had been cleaned out, and Greco-Turkish relations, we understand, are friendlier than they have ever been before.’ Formally, the commission spoke not of ‘transfer’ but of a ‘population exchange’ involving the removal to the Jewish state-to-be of ‘1,250’ Jews from the Arab-populated areas and of the removal of '225,000’ Arabs out of the Jewish state-to-be to the Arab areas. But, in effect, not an equitable exchange but a transfer of Arabs with a very small figleaf transfer of Jews, was what was envisaged. The commission preferred that the Arabs move voluntarily and with compensation – but regarded the matter as so important that should the Arabs refuse, the transfer should be ‘compulsory’, that is, it should be carried out by force. Otherwise, the partition settlement would not endure. 21
The recommendations, especially the transfer recommendation, delighted many of the Zionist leaders, including Ben-Gurion. True, the Jews were being given only a small part of their patrimony; but they could use that mini-state as a base or bridgehead for expansion and conquest of the rest of Palestine (and possibly Transjordan as well). Such, at least,
was how Ben-Gurion partially explained his acceptance of the offered ‘pittance.’ 22 But Ben-Gurion had another reason: ‘The compulsory transfer of the Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something which we never had, even when we stood on our own during the days of the First and Second Temples . . . ,’ Ben-Gurion confided to his diary. ‘We are being given an opportunity that we never dared to dream of in our wildest imaginings. This is more than a state, government and sovereignty – this is national consolidation in an independent homeland.’ Ben-Gurion deemed the transfer recommendation
a central point whose importance outweighs all the other positive [points] and counterbalances all the report’s deficiencies and drawbacks . . . We must grab hold of this conclusion [i.e., recommendation] as we grabbed hold of the Balfour Declaration, even more than that – as we grabbed hold of Zionism itself . . . because of all the Commission’s conclusions, this is the one that alone offers some recompense for the tearing away of other parts of the country [and their award to the Arabs] . . . What is inconceivable in normal times is possible in revolutionary times . . . Any doubt on our part about the necessity of this transfer, any doubt we cast about the possibility of its implementation, any hesitancy on our part about its justice, may lose [us] an historic opportunity that may not recur . . . If we do not succeed in removing the Arabs from our midst, when a royal commission proposes this to England, and transferring them to the Arab area – it will not be achievable easily (and perhaps at all) after the [Jewish] state is established . . . This thing must be done now – and the first step – perhaps the crucial [step] – is conditioning ourselves for its implementation.’23"
"The Peel report had, for the first time, accorded the idea of transfer an international moral imprimatur. At the same time, its publication triggered a profound and protracted debate in the Zionist leadership: Should the movement renounce its historic claim to the whole of Palestine and accept the principle of partition and the offered 20 per cent of the land? The controversy cut across party lines, with Ben-Gurion’s own Mapai Party split down the middle. For the Revisionist right there was no problem; they claimed Transjordan as well as the whole of Palestine; partition was a non-starter. For the left, represented by Brit Shalom and Hashomer Hatza’ir, the Peel proposals were beside the point; they favoured a binational Arab–Jewish state, not partition. But for the moderate left and centre – the core and mainstream of the movement – the dilemma was profound. The culminating and decisive debate took place in the especially summoned Twentieth Zionist Congress in Zurich August 1937 (the Revisionists did not attend). Ben-Gurion mobilised the Peel transfer proposal in support of acceptance of partition:
We must look carefully at the question of whether transfer is possible, necessary, moral and useful. We do not want to dispossess, [but] transfer of populations occurred previously, in the [Jezreel] Valley, in the Sharon [i.e., Coastal Plain] and in other places. You are no doubt aware of the Jewish National Fund’s activity in this respect. Now a transfer of a completely different scope will have to be carried out. In many parts of the country new settlement will not be possible without transferring the Arab peasantry . . . It is important that this plan comes from the Commission and not from us . . . Transfer is what will make possible a comprehensive settlement programme. Thankfully, the Arab people have vast empty areas. Jewish power, which grows steadily, will also increase our possibilities to carry out the transfer on a large scale. You must remember, that this system embodies an important humane and Zionist idea, to transfer parts of a people [i.e., Palestine’s Arabs] to their country [i.e., Transjordan and Iraq] and to settle empty lands . . .
Ben-Gurion seemed to suggest that the transfer would be compulsory and that not the British but Jewish troops would be carrying it out. Other speakers at the Congress, including Weizmann and Ruppin, spoke in a similar vein, though all preferred a voluntary, agreed transfer, and some, such as Ussishkin, doubted that the whole idea was practicable; the British would not carry it out and would prevent the Jews from doing so. Many, including Berl Katznelson, the Mapai co-leader, opposed the gist of the Peel package, which was partition (while theoretically supporting transfer). 24
In the end, after bitter debate, the Congress equivocally approved – by a vote of 299 to 160 – the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiation. The vote marked an in principle endorsement of the concept of partition. No specific mention was made in the resolution of the transfer proposal – though it was implicitly accepted as part of the package whose territorial provisions the Zionists sought to renegotiate (i.e., they wanted more than the 20 per cent offered). 25"
"But during the months of Woodhead deliberations, the Zionist leadership – unaware of London’s secret, in principle, rejection of partition – roundly examined and debated the Peel proposals and the practicalities of their implementation. Transfer got a protracted, thorough airing. A ‘Transfer Committee’ of experts, chaired by Thon, then head of the Palestine Land Development Company, was established and investigated ways and means of implementing transfer – how many and which Arabs could or should be transferred? Where to? With what compensation? The problems were vast and the political circumstances were volatile (an ongoing Arab Revolt, a British Government whose support for the Peel recommendations was uncertain, a world drifting toward total war, when the problem of Palestine would surely be put on the back burner). The committee broke up in June 1938 without producing a final report. 26
But simultaneously, the Jewish Agency Executive – the ‘government’ of the Yishuv – discussed transfer. On 7 June 1938, proposing Zionist policy guidelines, Ben-Gurion declared: ‘The Jewish State will discuss with the neighbouring Arab states the matter of voluntarily transferring Arab tenant-farmers, labourers and peasants from the Jewish state to the neighbouring Arab states.’ (As was his wont, Ben-Gurion at the same time endorsed complete equality and civil rights for the Arabs living in the Jewish State; some executive members may have regarded this as for-the-record lip service and posturing for posterity.) 27 Five days later Ben-Gurion laid his cards baldly on the table: ‘I support compulsory transfer. I don’t see in it anything immoral.’ Ussishkin followed suit: there was nothing immoral about transferring 60,000 Arab families:
We cannot start the Jewish state with . . . half the population being Arab . . . Such a state cannot survive even half an hour. It [i.e., transfer] is the most moral thing to do . . . I am ready to come and defend . . . it before the Almighty . . .
Werner David Senator, a Hebrew University executive of German extraction and liberal views, called for a ‘maximal transfer’. Yehoshua Supersky, of the Zionist Actions Committee, said that the Yishuv must take care that ‘a new Czechoslovakia is not created here [and this could be assured] through the gradual emigration of part of the Arabs.’ He was referring to the undermining of the Czechoslovak republic by its Sudeten German minority. Ben-Gurion, Ussishkin and Berl Katznelson agreed that the British, rather than the Yishuv, should carry out the transfer. ‘But the principle should be that there must be a large agreed transfer’, declared Katznelson. Ruppin said: ‘I do not believe in the transfer of individuals. I believe in the transfer of entire villages.’ Eliezer Kaplan, the Jewish Agency’s treasurer, thought that with proper financial inducement and if left impoverished in the nascent Jewish State, the Arabs might agree to a ‘voluntary’ departure. Eliahu Berlin, a leader of the Knesset Yisrael religious party, proposed that ‘taxes should be increased so that the Arabs will flee because of the taxes’. There was a virtual pro transfer consensus among the JAE members; all preferred a ‘voluntary’ transfer; but most were also agreeable to a compulsory transfer, preferring, of course, that the British rather than the Yishuv carry it out. 28
In one way or another, Zionist expressions of support for transfer during 1936, 1937 and the first half of 1938 can be linked to the Peel Commission’s work and recommendations. Not so Ben-Gurion’s tabling of a new transfer scheme in early December 1938. Peel was now dead and buried. But in Germany, the Nazis had just unleashed the mass pogrom of Kristalnacht; in Palestine and London, the British, the Arabs and the Zionist leaders were preparing for the St James’s Conference, soon to open in the British capital. The Zionist leadership was desperate to find a safe haven for Europe’s Jews and to empty Palestine in preparation for their arrival. ‘We will offer Iraq ten million Palestine pounds to transfer one hundred thousand Arab families from Palestine to Iraq’, Ben-Gurion jotted down in his diary. On 11 December he raised the idea at a meeting of the JAE. The Iraqis, he said, were in urgent need of manpower to fill their empty spaces and to develop the country. But Ben-Gurion was not optimistic; he anticipated opposition from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. He was driven by a premonition of unprecedented disaster:
The Jewish question is no longer that which was [the question] until now . . . Millions of Jews are now faced with physical destruction . . . Zionism [itself ] is in danger . . . We now need, during this catastrophe that has befallen the Jewish people, all of Palestine . . . [and] mass immigration . . .29
Nothing came of these deliberations and plans. In November, the Woodhead Committee had scuppered any possibility of British endorsement of either partition or transfer; the St. James Conference of February 1939 produced only further deadlock; and in May, in a new ‘White Paper,’ Whitehall disavowed its commitment to Zionism itself, in effect supporting a continued, permanent Arab majority and Arab rule in Palestine within a decade."
"In the absence of Anglo–Arab–Zionist agreement about a blanket transfer, proposals periodically surfaced regarding the selective transfer of this or that Arab religious or ethnic group. In March 1939, the leader of Syria’s Druse, Sultan al-Atrash, proposed that the Yishuv buy up the dozen odd Druse villages in Palestine and that their 15,000 inhabitants be transferred to Jabal el-Druse in southern Syria. The envisioned voluntary transfer would benefit both the Druse and the Jews – and might serve as a model for further population transfers from Palestine, al-Atrash argued. Weizmann responded enthusiastically, launching a series of consultations with American Zionist leaders and French army officers and officials. He reported that the French – who ruled Syria – were in favour but Shertok, in Tel Aviv, was skeptical about the willingness of Palestine’s Druse to move and ultimately quashed the negotiation. There the matter seemingly ended. 30"
"Ben-Gurion was obliquely referring to the proposal by Harry St. John Philby, an orientalist and adviser to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, to establish at the end of the war a Middle Eastern ‘federation’ of states, with Ibn Saud as its ruler. The plan also provided for a Jewish state in Palestine, transferring most of Palestine’s Arabs out of the country, and the payment to Saudi Arabia of 20 million pounds sterling. Both Weizmann and Shertok were initially enthusiastic. 32"
"A few months later, an almost identical exchange took place between Shertok, visiting Cairo, and Walter Smart, the secretary for Arab affairs at the British Legation in Egypt. They spoke of possible massive Polish Jewish immigration to Palestine.
I [Shertok] said . . . that the Land of Israel could accommodate a population of at least five million. But how many Jews? – he asked.
I said: Three million Jews and two million Arabs. The Arabs increase thanks to Jewish immigration [which expands the economy that facilitates the absorption of Arab immigrants], but if we evict the Arabs there will be room for more Jews; and this will [also] benefit the Arabs.
What will you do with them? [asked Smart].
Syria, for example, will that country develop with such a small population, with its empty spaces? If several hundred thousand Arabs from the Land of Israel were transferred there, the Jewish people would provide funds, Syria would get an income. The same applies to Iraq.
During the visit, Shertok said similar things at his meeting with the American minister, Alexander Kirk. 35
Nothing, of course, came of these meetings. But they give us an insight into the desperation growingly felt by the Zionist leadership as the news of the awful fate of Europe’s Jews began to seep out – and into the measures they were willing to contemplate and propound to save their people."
"But solving the Jewish problem or the question of Palestine were far from priorities for the Allied leaders and generals during the world war; they had more pressing problems. Transferring Arabs to make way for Jews was hardly an urgent or, indeed, attractive proposition. Nonetheless, the news that gradually emerged during the second half of the war from Nazi-occupied Europe about the ongoing Holocaust certainly caused pangs of conscience among Western politicians and officials and underlined the urgency of a solution of the Jewish problem in Europe by way of a safe haven in Palestine. Pro-Zionist tendencies were rein- forced. The Executive of Britain’s Labour Party in April 1944 adopted a platform endorsing mass Jewish immigration to, a Jewish majority in, and a transfer of Arabs out of, Palestine as part of a Middle East peace settlement. ‘. . . In Palestine surely is a case, on human grounds and to promote a stable settlement, for transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully organised and generously financed’, stated the resolution, which was published in the Labour Party’s volume, The International Post-War Settlement. 37 The publication of the resolution prompted a debate on 7 May in the JAE – not so much about the notion of transfer (all were agreed about its merits if not its practicality) as about how the Zionist leadership should react. Shertok, Israel’s future first foreign minister and second prime minister, said: ‘The transfer can be the archstone, the final stage in the political development, but on no account the starting point. By doing this [i.e., by talking prematurely about transfer] we are mobilising enormous forces against the idea and subverting [its implementation] in advance . . .’ And he continued (prophetically): ‘What will happen once the Jewish state is established – it is very possible that the result will be transfer of Arabs.’ Shertok was followed by Ben-Gurion:
When I heard these things [about the Labour Party Executive’s resolution] . . . I had some difficult thoughts . . . [But] I reached the conclusion that it is best that this remain [i.e., that the resolution remain as part of Labour’s official platform] . . . Were we asked what should be our programme, I would find it inconceivable to tell them transfer . . . because talk on the subject might cause harm in two ways: (a) It could cause us harm in public opinion in the world, because it might give the impression that there is no room [for more Jews] in Palestine without ejecting the Arabs . . . [and] (b) [such declarations in support of transfer] would force the Arabs onto . . . their hind legs.’ Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion added: ‘Transfer of Arabs is easier than any other type of transfer. There are Arab states in the area . . . and it is clear that if the Arabs [of Palestine] are sent [to the Arab countries] this will improve their situation and not the contrary . . ."
"In effect, what Glubb was saying was that partition, between a Jewish state and Transjordan, was the only solution; that for partition to work, there would have to be a transfer of the Arabs out of the Jewish state (as of the far smaller number of Jews out of the Arab areas); and that the transfer would have to be voluntary and compensated because a compulsory transfer, by British or Jewish or Arab troops, was inconceivable and\or would merely lead to widespread hostilities.
But it wasn’t only Zionist activists and British officials who during the early and mid-1940s swung around to acceptance of partition accompanied by a transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish state to-be. So did senior Arab politicians – or at least that is what generally reliable British officials recorded them as saying at the time. In December 1944, Nuri Sa‘id, Iraq’s senior politician and sometime prime minister, told a British interlocutor that if partition was imposed on the Arabs, there would be a ‘necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish state\thought it could be done by exchange . . .’. Sa‘id assumed that the settlement would not provoke a violent Arab reaction but supported the idea – a small Jewish state in Palestine and transfer – only if it provided ‘finality’ to the problem. In a follow-up conversation, the British official heard similar things from Iraq’s foreign minister, Arshad al-Umari: ‘Arshad . . . repeated what Nuri had said . . . over [i.e., regarding] probable [Arab] reactions and also the necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish State.’ 44 Nuri had put his position still more forcefully in a conversation with Alec Kirkbride, the British Resident in Ammam:
Provided the partition was effected on an equitable basis, it might perhaps be best to lose part of Palestine in order to confine the Zionist danger within permanent boundaries . . . Nuri Pasha said that the only fair basis could be the cession to the Jews of those areas where they constituted a majority . . . [while] the Arab section of Palestine would be embodied in Transjordan.45
In Amman there was an understandable sympathy for a partition of Palestine between the Jews and Transjordan – and it quite naturally led to acceptance of partition’s corollary, transfer. At a meeting in Jerusalem in February 1944 between Sir Harold MacMichael, the high commissioner, Lord Moyne, the Minister Resident in the Middle East, Kirkbride, and General Edward Spears, head of the British political mission in Syria and Lebanon, there was general agreement that ‘partition offers the only hope of a final settlement for Palestine’. And, according to Moyne, Jordan’s prime minister, Tawfiq Abul Huda, and Egypt’s prime minister, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, both recognised that ‘a final settlement can only be reached by means of partition’ (though the Arab leaders, it was said, would not say so publicly). 46
Abul Huda had informed Kirkbride directly of his position at two meet- ings, on 3 December 1943 and 16 January 1944. At the second meeting, Abul Huda – according to MacMichael – had said that ‘he did not . . . see any alternative to partition . . .’. 47 Two years later, in July 1946, Kirkbride cabled London about meetings he had just had with King Abdullah and Transjordan’s new prime minister, Ibrahim Pasha Hashim:
[Abdullah] is for partition and he feels that the other Arab leaders may acquiesce in that solution although they may not approve of it openly . . . [Hashim said] the only just and permanent solution lay in absolute partition with an exchange of populations; to leave Jews in an Arab state or Arabs in a Jewish state would lead inevitably to further trouble between the two peoples. Ibrahim Pasha admitted that he would not be able to express this idea in public for fear of being called a traitor . . . [He] said that the other Arab representatives at the discussions would be divided into people like himself who did not dare to express their true views and extremists who simply demanded the impossible. 48
A month later, Kirkbride commented:
King Abdullah and Prime Minister of Jordan both consider that partition followed by an exchange of populations [meaning, as all understood, a transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish state-to-be] is only practical solution to the Palestine problem. They do not feel able to express this view publicly . . . 49"
"My feeling is that the transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s was not tantamount to pre- planning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan of expulsion; the Yishuv and its military forces did not enter the 1948 War, which was initiated by the Arab side, with a policy or plan for expulsion. But transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was ‘Arab’ into a ‘Jewish’ state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab popu- lation; and because this aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs which, in turn, persuaded the Yishuv’s leaders that a hostile Arab majority or large minority could not remain in place if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure. By 1948, transfer was in the air. The transfer thinking that preceded the war contributed to the denouement by conditioning the Jewish population, political parties, military organisations and military and civilian leaderships for what transpired. Thinking about the possibilities of transfer in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned hearts and minds for its implementation in the course of 1948 so that, as it occurred, few voiced protest or doubt; it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population. The facts that Palestine’s Arabs (and the Arab states) had rejected the UN partition resolution and, to nip it in the bud, had launched the hostilities that snowballed into fullscale civil war and that the Arab states had invaded Palestine and attacked Israel in May 1948 only hardened Jewish hearts toward the Palestinian Arabs, who were seen as mortal enemies and, should they be coopted into the Jewish state, a potential Fifth Column.
Thus, the expulsions that periodically dotted the Palestinian Arab exodus raised few eyebrows and thus the Yishuv’s leaders, parties and population in mid-war accepted without significant dissent or protest the militarily and politically sensible decision not to allow an Arab refugee return."
Chapter 3: The first wave: the Arabexodus, December 1947 – March 1948
"The UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, which endorsed the partition of Palestine into two states, triggered haphazard Arab attacks against Jewish traffic. The first roadside ambushes occurred near Kfar Syrkin the following day, when two buses were attacked and seven Jewish passengers were shot dead. 1 The same day, snipers in Jaffa began firing at passers-by in Tel Aviv. The AHC, which flatly rejected the resolution and any thought of partition, declared a three-day general strike, beginning on 1 December, thus releasing the urban masses for action. On 2 December a mob, unobstructed by British forces, stormed the (Jewish) new commercial centre in Jerusalem, looting, burning shops and attacking Jews."
"Strategically speaking, the period December 1947 – March 1948 was marked by Arab initiatives and attacks and Jewish defensiveness, increasingly punctuated by Jewish reprisals. Arab gunmen attacked Jewish cars and trucks, from late December increasingly organised in British- and Haganah-protected convoys, urban neigbourhoods and rural settlements and cultivators. The attackers never pretended to single out combatants; every Jew was a legitimate target. The hostilities swiftly spread from a handful of urban centres to various parts of the countryside. The Haganah initially retaliated by specifically and accurately targeting the offending terrorist or militia group or village. But this often proved impossible and, in any case, failed to suppress Arab belligerence, and by February–March 1948 the organisation began to dispense with such niceties and to indiscriminately hit Palestinian traffic and villages, but still with relative restraint and in retaliation."
"Given the geographically intermixed populations, the presence in most areas of British forces and the militia-cum-underground nature of the opposing forces, the hostilities during December 1947 – March 1948 combined elements of guerrilla and conventional warfare, and terrorism. In the countryside, the Arabs gained the upper hand by intermittently blocking the roads between the main Jewish population centres and isolated communities, especially west Jerusalem, with its 100,000 Jews, the Etzion Bloc, south of Bethlehem, and the kibbutzim in western Galilee and the northern Negev approaches. The introduction by the Haganah of steel-plated trucks and buses in escorted convoys was more than offset, by late March, by improved Arab tactics and firepower. Moreover, the gradual British military withdrawal and continuing IZL-LHI attacks on British troops resulted in increasing British inability (and reluctance) to protect Jewish traffic. In a series of major successful ambushes in the last days of March, irregulars trapped and destroyed the Khulda, Nabi Daniel and Yehiam convoys, severely depleting the Haganah’s makeshift armoured-truck fleet. Ben-Gurion feared that now-besieged west Jerusalem might fall."
"By the end of March 1948, some 100,000 Arabs, mostly from the urban upper and middle classes of Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, and from villages in Jewish-dominated areas such as the Jordan Valley and the Coastal Plain, had fled to Arab centres to the east, including Nazareth, Nablus, and Bethlehem, or out of the country altogether.
Wealthy urban Arab families began to get the jitters already during the countdown to the partition resolution. Some families, it was reported, wished to leave Nazareth already in the first week of November 1947. 2 The actual flight began on the first day of hostilities. On 30 November Haganah intelligence reported ‘the evacuation of Arab inhabitants from border neighbourhoods’ in Jerusalem and Jaffa.3 Jewish agents in Jaffa on 1 December 1947 reported the flight of families from several Jaffa border neighbourhoods"
"By 11 January 1948, according to Elias (Eliahu) Sasson, the director of the Arab Division of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, Arab morale was low in all the main towns and their rural hinterlands. Sasson wrote to Transjordan’s King Abdullah:
Hunger, high prices, and poverty are rampant in a frightening degree. There is fear and terror everywhere. The flight is painful, from house to house, from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, from city to city, from village to village, and from Palestine to the neighbouring countries. The number of these displaced persons is estimated in the thousands. 11"
"The Yishuv entered the war without a plan or policy regarding the Arab civilian population in its midst. To be sure, its leaders during the 1930s and 1940s had always taken for granted that the prospective Jewish state would have a substantial Arab minority and had always asserted that the Arab inhabitants would be treated fairly and as equals. But with- out doubt, come November 1947, they were unhappy with the prospect of having such a large Arab minority (some 400,000 Arabs alongside 500,000 Jews). As Yosef Nahmani, the director of the JNF office in eastern Galilee and a veteran Zionist defence activist, jotted down in his diary:
In my heart there was joy mixed with sadness. Joy that the peoples [of the world] had at last acknowledged that we were a nation with a state, and sadness that we lost half the country . . . and . . . that we have 400,000 Arabs . . .12"
Settlement committee: Assuming an Arab minority
"But during the first weeks of violence it was unclear to most observers, Jewish, British and Arab, that the two peoples, indeed, were now embarked on a war; most thought they were witnessing a recurrence of fleeting ‘disturbances’ 'a la 1920, 1929, or 1936. During December 1947 – January 1948, senior Mapai settlement figures (including Shimon Persky (Peres), Avraham Harzfeld, Levi Shkolnik (Eshkol), and Zalman Lifshitz (Lif), discussed the future Jewish state’s settlement policy and produced a blueprint entitled ‘Guidelines for a Development Plan for Agricultural Settlement in the Three Years 1949–1951’. It was assumed by the participants that their recommendations would serve as a basis for the state’s policies. The discussions took little account of the surrounding violence or that a war, which might radically change everything, was gradually unfolding outside the room. The report they produced assumed that the partition resolution would be implemented as written.
At the meeting of 23 December, Yosef Weitz addressed the demographic problem. ‘I have always been a supporter of transfer’, he said.
But today we won’t raise the matter even in a hint. Nonetheless, I believe that in the future a certain part of the Arab population will emigrate of its own free will and through the will of the rulers of neighbouring countries, who will have need of them [i.e., of such immigrants]. The Beit Shean [Beisan] area for example, will in the future empty of its beduins, as they wish to join their tribes across the Jordan, and there are others like them in other areas.
Weitz assumed throughout that the Jewish State’s borders would remain those laid down in the UN resolution.
Weitz added that the Jewish State ‘would not be able to exist with a large Arab minority. It must not amount to more than 12–15 per cent [of the total population]’. But he envisioned the growth of the Jewish percentage – despite the Arabs’ ‘overly high’ rate of natural increase – as attainable within 10–12 years through massive Jewish immigration. In all, both in the discussions and the final report (the ‘Guidelines’), the participants assumed that (a) there would be no coerced expropriation by the state of Arab lands, (b) the state would allocate to the Arabs substantial water resources (20 per cent of the total), and (c) that the state’s population, at least in its first years, would be 35 per cent Arab. Weitz’s thoughts notwithstanding, a transfer of population was neither assumed nor endorsed. 13
But throughout these first months of the civil war, there was also an underlying desire among Zionist officials and Haganah officers to see as few Arabs as possible remain in the country, and occasional concrete proposals designed to obtain this result were tabled. On 4 January 1948, Danin wrote: ‘D[avid] Hacohen [a senior Mapai figure] believes that transfer is the only solution. I, for my part, agree . . .’ 14 Tel Aviv District Haganah officer Zvi Aurbach’s recommendation of early January 1948 was perhaps atypical in its forthrightness, but not in its intent: ‘I propose . . . that Jaffa’s water reservoir be put out of commission . . . and by so doing we shall force a large number of Arabs to leave the city.’15 Similarly atypical, but telling, was Ben-Gurion’s description on 7 February of his recent visit to Jerusalem:
From your entry into Jerusalem through Mahane Yehuda, King George Street and Mea Shearim – there are no strangers [i.e., Arabs]. One hundred per cent Jews. Since Jerusalem’s destruction in the days of the Romans – it hasn’t been so Jewish as it is now. In many western [Jerusalem] Arab neighbourhoods – one sees not one Arab. I do not assume that this will change . . . [And] what has happened in Jerusalem . . . could well happen in great parts of the country – if we [the Yishuv] hold fast . . . And if we hold fast, it is very possible that in the coming six or eight or ten months of the war there will take place great changes . . . and not all of them to our detriment. Certainly there will be great changes in the composition of the population of the country. 16
Running through this passage is both an expectation and a desire.
But official policy assumed the continued existence of a large Arab minority in the state. This line was explicitly embodied in the JAE’s draft statement of 12 December 1947:
Many thousands of Arabs will be living in the Jewish State. We want them to feel, right from this moment, that provided they keep the peace, their lives and property will be as secure as that of their Jewish fellow-citizens. 17
Similarly, during January 1948 the Arab Department of the Histadrut, the powerful, Mapai-dominated trades union federation, distributed to ‘the Arab workers’ at least two leaflets calling for peace and cooperation among Jewish and Arab proletarians. The second leaflet stated that
the Arab worker, clerk and peasant in the Jewish state will be citizens with equal rights and duties . . . In this state there be no room for discrimination . . . Workers: Do not be led astray and pulled along like sheep after shepherds towards destruction. 18
The overarching, general assumption, then, during the war’s first weeks was that the emergent Jewish State would come to life with a large Arab minority. Certainly, the Yishuv did not enter the war with a master plan of expulsion. But developments over the following months – the most important of which were the unfolding Arab exodus itself and the Arab attacks on Jewish settlements, neighbourhoods and traffic – were to steadily erode this assumption. And the exodus itself was to be triggered not by an activation of some Jewish plan or policy but by constantly changing military and psychological realities on the ground in each sector along the time-bar. These realities were in some measure determined by changes in Haganah strategy and tactics, themselves by and large responses to Arab strategy, tactics and actions."
Yishuv military strategy: Restraint, November - December
"It is useful, in this respect, to look at the evolution of the Yishuv’s military strategy and tactics during the first stage of the civil war. During the war’s first days, it was agreed in the Defence Committee (va‘ad habitahon), the Yishuv’s supreme political supervisory body in defence matters, composed of representatives of the Haganah National Staff (hamate haartzi shel hahaganah) (HNS), the JA, the Histadrut and the National Council (hava‘ad haleumi), and the HGS, that:
the outbreaks should not yet be seen as the start of planned, systematic and organised Arab aggression . . . The Arab population does not want a disruption of peace and security and there is still no decision [by the Arab leadership to go to war]. We judged these outbreaks as of a local character . . . [We decided] that we did not want our behaviour to aid the AHC and the Mufti to suck into this circle [of violence] wider strata of the Arab population.
The Defence Committee and the Haganah commanders decided against ‘widening the circle of violence’. 19 This line conformed to the drift of the committee’s thinking during the first half of November 1947, before the eruption of hostilities. On 13 November the discussion focused on the Haganah’s Plan B (tochnit bet), which assumed an attack on the Yishuv by the Palestinian Arabs with some assistance, in manpower and weaponry, from the neighbouring states. Ya‘akov Dori, the Haganah’s chief of general staff, said that the plan provided for Haganah retaliatory strikes against Arab perpetrators or potential perpetrators and against Arab targets identical to those attacked by Arab terrorists, such as road traffic. Galili, head of the HNS, a quasi-military body sandwiched uncomfortably between the JAE (and its defence ‘minister’, Ben-Gurion), the Defence Committee, and the HGS, which actually ran the Haganah,
said:
Our interest, if disturbances break out, is that the aggression [i.e., violence], won’t spread out over time and over a great deal of space. From this perspective, the most important defensive measure is where we are attacked, there to retaliate; that will be the effective method of stamping out the fire.
Galili, in effect the Yishuv’s deputy defence minister, added that if effective retaliation could not be carried out at the time and place of the original Arab attack, then the Haganah must have ready plans of attack against
those . . . not . . . directly guilty . . . places . . . persons . . . villages . . . tending to [anti-Yishuv violence] . . . [But] the Haganah is not built for aggression, it does not wish to enslave, it values human life, it wants to hit only those who are guilty, it does not want to ignite, but to douse out flames . . . Occasionally, [moral values] are a burden on the Haganah’s operations, and [i.e., but] we must take them into account. 20
During the first week of hostilities, the committee continued to cleave to a policy of ‘not spreading the conflagration’ and against indiscriminate reprisal killings. As Ben-Gurion put it, ‘we shall retaliate by hitting their vehicles, not passengers . . . If their property is damaged, perhaps they will be deterred’. Ben-Gurion, like Hapoel Hamizrahi Party’s Moshe Shapira, was concerned lest over-reaction by the Haganah would push the Arab masses, until then uninvolved, to support Husseini and his gunmen."
Yishuv military strategy: Active Defence, From December
"If Ben-Gurion, Galili and Shapira represented a moderate middle way, a crystallising harder line was already audible. Shkolnik (Eshkol) argued that perhaps on 30 November and 1–2 December it had been possible to hope that what the Yishuv faced was a brief, transitory eruption; but this was no longer tenable. ‘From now on, if something happens, we [must] respond with full force, an eye for an eye, [if not] for the moment two eyes for one.’ Eliahu Elyashar, a Sephardi notable from Jerusalem, argued that ‘the Arabs don’t want disturbances, they want quiet, but the Arab – his nature is like a primitive man’s, if you make concessions, he thinks you are weak . . .’ Events in Jerusalem had only whetted Arab appetites. Yosef Sapir, of Ha’ihud Haezrahi Party, declared: ‘After several days [of Arab violence] have passed without response, we must not continue with this policy of restraint.’ 21 But the committee adopted Ben-Gurion’s line – to retaliate while ‘avoiding harming people’. 22"
"During the following months, HGS\Operations carefully modulated the brigades’ operations against Arab transportation. Occasionally, it ordered strikes on specific days against traffic on specific roads; 26 some- times, when the Jewish death toll from Arab ambushes mounted, it instructed the brigades to automatically retaliate along specific roads without further instructions;27 occasionally, the order went out to attack all Arab traffic along all roads. These orders, precipitated by ‘the increase in attacks on our transport in different parts of the country’, were designed to ‘quiet down the enemy’s activities’. But, down to the end of March, they were invariably superseded, within a day or two, by orders to halt or suspend attack.28
Galili signalled the limited gear-change at the meeting of the HNS on 10 December 1947: ‘The time has come for active defence [haganah pe‘ila], reprisals and punishment.’ 29 The meeting of the Defence Committee the following day was decisive. Galili said that the ‘assumption that [the flames] would either die down or be extinguished’ had not materialised. The Mufti’s hold on the Arab public had grown stronger and the Opposition was paralysed. ‘The fact that the events are getting worse necessitates a certain change in our . . . policy . . . [but] not an essential change . . .’ Arab losses had not deterred further attacks and they were interpreting the lack of Haganah reprisals as a sign of weakness. Moreover, the world might begin to think that ‘the Jews’ strength is insufficient [to hold on] and inside the Yishuv [too] they will cease to believe that we can weather the storm’. People would come to doubt the Haganah’s strength and perhaps shift their support to the more militant Revisionists. Galili proposed that the Haganah continue to defend itself ‘in the classical way’ but also retaliate against Arab targets, specifically attacking ‘[Arab] transportation . . . hitting the property of the responsible inciters [and] of the attackers . . .’."
"On 18 December, the Haganah summed up the limited change of strategy thus:
During the first week of disturbances we implemented an aggressive defence at the moment and place of [Arab] attack and we refrained from sharp reprisals which would have aided the inciters. We called upon the Arabs to maintain peace . . . We had to examine whether the outbreak was local, incidental, and ephemeral . . . [But] the spread of the disturbances and terrorism has forced us to add to the aggressive defence . . . attacks on the centres of Arab violence. That’s the stage we are in now. The reprisals in Karatiya, Balad al Sheikh, Wadi Rushmiya, Ramle and the Jerusalem-Hebron road must be seen in this light. 37"
Yishuv military strategy: Plan May
"The gradual limited shift in strategy during December 1947 in practice meant a limited implementation of ‘Plan May’ (Tochnit Mai or Tochnit Gimel), which, produced in May 1946, was the Haganah master plan for the defence of the Yishuv in the event of the outbreak of new troubles similar to those of 1936–1939. The plan included provision, in extremis, for ‘destroying the Arab transport’ in Palestine, and blowing up houses used by Arab terrorists and expelling their inhabitants. 39
The shift of the second week of December involved mounting retaliatory raids against militia concentrations and villages from which they had set out for attacks on settlements and traffic, with destruction of houses and killing of gunmen and unarmed or disarmed adult males; specific, limited but indiscriminate attacks on Arab transport in response to indiscriminate Arab attacks on Jewish transport; and active patrolling near and in Arab villages with the aim of deterrence. Villagers and townspeople who expressed a desire for peace were not to be harmed.
There is no trace of an expulsive or transfer policy. In most of the operations, the troops were specifically ordered to avoid causing casualties among women, children and the old, and in most operations the troops tried to cleave to the guideline. A widely disseminated circular by the Haganah’s northern brigade, ‘Levanoni’ (later split into the Carmeli and Golani brigades), stated:
We must avoid as far as possible killing plain civilians [stam ezrahim] and to make an effort as far as possible to always hit the criminals themselves, the bearer of arms, those who carry out the attacks . . . We do not want to spread the disturbances and to unite the Arab public . . . around the Mufti and his gangs. Any indiscriminate massacre of Arab civilians causes the consolidation of the Arab masses around the inciters. 40
This, in effect, was Yishuv–Haganah policy down to the end of March 1948."
Yishuv military strategy: Operation Zarzir
"Another element of the revised defensive strategy was planning for the assassination of Palestinian political and militia leaders, code- named ‘Operation Zarzir’. In early January, the Haganah command ordered all units to target and kill specific Husseini-affiliated leaders...The units were ordered to make it appear, if possible, as the work of fellow Arabs and were forbidden to carry out the assassinations in places of worship or hospitals. 41 But, in fact, not much energy was invested in ‘Zarzir’ and only one assassination attempt was ever carried out – Sheikh Nimr al Khatib, a senior Haifa Husseini figure, was ambushed and seriously injured by a Palmah squad outside Haifa in January 1948."
Yishuv military strategy: Destruction of villages
"The lobbying by various figures to adopt the destruction of villages, which necessarily entailed the eviction of their inhabitants, as part of the routine reprisals policy, was rejected by Ben-Gurion and the HGS. But two villages were levelled during the period November 1947 – March 1948; unusual circumstances accounted for both. The first instance followed a particularly savage Arab attack: on 9 January militiamen from the small village of ‘Arab Suqrir (‘Arab Abu Suwayrih) murdered 11 Haganah scouts on patrol outside Gan-Yavne. The local HIS man recommended: ‘The village should be destroyed completely and some males from the same village should be murdered.’ 42 The recommendation was endorsed by the director of the HIS AD, Ziama Divon: ‘The Arabs in the area “expect” a reprisal . . . A lack of response on our part will be interpreted as a sign of weakness.’43 On 20 January, the appropriate operational order was issued: ‘. . . Destroy the well . . . destroy the village completely, kill all the adult males, and destroy the reinforcements that arrive.’44 But as it turned out, the operation, in the early hours of 25 January, was bloodless. The Arabs had evacuated their womenfolk and children a few days before and the 30-odd men who had stayed behind to guard the village fled after getting wind of the approach of the raiders. The company-sized Haganah force ‘found the village empty’ and proceeded to destroy the houses, two trucks and the nearby well (‘the village, apart from a few relics, no longer exists’). 45 The operation apparently left a deep impression: ‘The memory of “the night of the thunder”,’ wrote an HIS officer, ‘will stay in the memories of the surrounding [Arab] villages a long time’. Moreover, the inhabitants of ‘Arab Suqrir were angry that ‘no village dared to come to their help and they asked how can the Arabs fight this way’.46 (Some of the villagers apparently returned to the site soon after, and finally left at the end of March. 47)"
Yishuv military strategy: Reprisal policy
"The main Haganah response to Arab attacks, down to the end of March 1948, remained the retaliatory strike, either against traffic or against specific villages. The reprisal policy was thoroughly aired in a protracted two-day meeting between Ben-Gurion and his military and Arab affairs advisers on 1–2 January 1948. The discussion was triggered, in some measure, by a series of unauthorised or ill-conceived Haganah attacks in which innocent civilians were killed. The guiding assumptions were to avoid extending the conflagration to as yet untouched areas, to try to hit the ‘guilty’, and retaliation as close as possible to the time, place and nature of the original provocation.48 The resultant definition and refinement of Haganah policy was embodied in a two-page memorandum by Yadin sent to all units, entitled ‘Instructions for Planning Initiated Operations’, dated 18 January 1948. The targets for reprisals were to be selected from those enumerated in ‘Tochnit May 1946’, but subject to two qualifications, namely (a) ‘not to spread the disturbances. . . to areas so far unaffected . . .’, and (b) there should be ‘an effort to hit the guilty, while acknowledging the impossibility of [precise] individual targeting; to distinguish between [friendly and unfriendly] Arab villages’. The order outlined the methods of operation – sabotage, ambushes, etc. – and the types of objects to be hit: blowing up public and residential houses, ‘identifying and killing gang leaders. Harassing a settlement by firing at it and mining. Organising ambushes to hit transport to and from the settlement. Punitive operation against a village in order to hit the adult male combatants.’ All attacks required HGS approval. The memorandum gave special attention to attacking economic objectives, including ‘flour mills, storehouses, water pumps, wells and waterworks, workshops . . .’, and to attacks on Arab transportation in retaliation for attacks on Jewish vehicles. ‘On no account should holy places, hospitals and schools be hit.’ The brigade and city commanders were ordered to prepare plans and submit a list of objectives to the HGS. 49"
"Another result of the 1–2 January gathering was the appointment, at Ben-Gurion’s suggestion, of ‘Arab affairs advisers’ to each Haganah district, battalion and brigade headquarters. 50 The appointments were to bear on the Haganah’s – and the Yishuv’s – policy towards the Arab population. On 20 January, Galili issued detailed instructions. The brigade and urban district commanders were ordered to ‘consult the adviser in the selection of targets . . . and the method of [attack]’. When asking for the general staff’s approval of a particular operation, the district
or brigade commander had to append the adviser’s written opinion. 51 In his ‘Instructions for Planning Initiated Operations’ of 18 January, Yadin had ordered the brigade and city OCs to consult their Arab affair advisers before embarking on any operations not requiring further HGS approval. 52 In the course of March, the advisers were also made responsible for advising the regional Haganah commanders on how to deal with Arab communities in their areas. 53"
"But if there was a shift to more forceful retaliatory responses in many areas, Haganah national strategy remained – and was to remain until the end of March 1948 – one which would restrict as far as possible the scope of the conflagration and to avoid reprisals in areas free of hostilities. Initially, the motive was to avoid an all-out war between the Jewish and Arab populations. Deliberately provoking violence in hitherto quiet areas could bring the Yishuv into conflict with the British – the last thing Ben Gurion wanted as he contemplated the countdown to statehood – and probably eventual war with the Arab states as well. Moreover, the Haganah, in February–March 1948, felt stretched enough on the ground without adding new battlegrounds. Palmon on 1 January 1948 had put it this way: ‘Do we want the Arab people to be united against us, or do we want to benefit from . . . their not being united? Do we want to force all the . . . Arabs to act against us, or do we want to give them the opportunity not to act against us?’ Allon agreed. ‘There are still untroubled places in the country. There is no need to hit an area which has been quiet for a long time . . . we must concentrate on areas where in effect we are at war.’"
Yishuv military strategy: Atrocities
"The problem of killing non-combatants continuously exercised the Haganah commanders. Occasionally, indeed, raids were aborted out of fear that atrocities might result (as when a unit that set out to blow up buildings in Kafr ‘Aqeb, north of Jerusalem, decided to withdraw when it heard ‘the voices and screams of children’ emanating from a house they were about to destroy 65 ). But more common were cases of excessive behaviour. On 12 January 1948, militiamen from Kibbutz Ramat Hakovesh, contrary to explicit Haganah orders, shot at two Arab women, perhaps cultivating a field, nearby; at least one was injured and may have died. The matter was the subject of an internal investigation. No one appears to have been punished. 66 At the end of February, Haganah guards murdered an Arab peasant and his wife near Kfar Uriah, ‘without any provocation’, according to HIS.67 On 24 January, four Palmahniks boarded a taxi in Tiberias and murdered the Arab driver (who may have been connected to irregulars). 68 Ben-Gurion was probably referring to such incidents when he criticised ‘condemnable acts against Arabs’ at a meeting of the Defence Committee in early February. 69
The murder of the taxi-driver was subsequently investigated. 70 By early February, a senior Haganah officer recommended that the organisation set up ‘an authorised’ institution which could pass judgement in ‘matters of life and death’, 71 and in mid-February Galili ruled that Haganah units were forbidden to murder Arabs in order to gain possession of vehicles or other assets – even if these were ‘destined for Knesset [i.e., Haganah] use’.72
However, these incidents were the exception. Haganah operations were usually authorised and effectively controlled by the general staff. Moreover, notwithstanding the British view of Haganah operations, the HGS, through December 1947 – March 1948, attempted to keep its units’ operations as ‘clean’ as possible. While coming to accept the general premise that retaliatory strikes against traffic and villages would inevitably involve the death and injury of innocent people, orders were repeatedly sent out to all Haganah units to avoid killing
women, children and old people. In its specific orders for each operation, the HGS almost always included instructions not to harm non- combatants, as, for example, in the attack on the village of Salama, outside Jaffa, in early January 1948, when Galili specifically forbade the use of mortars because they might cause casualties among non-combatants. 73"
Yishuv military strategy: Arab policy
"On 8 January, Ben-Gurion said that so far, the Arab countryside, despite efforts to incite it, had remained largely quiescent. It was in the Yishuv’s interest that the countryside remain quiet, and this depended in large measure on the Yishuv’s own actions. ‘We [must avoid] mistakes which would make it easier for the Mufti’ to stir up the villages, he said. 74 Regarding the countryside, the Haganah’s policy throughout February and March was ‘not to extend the fire to areas where we have not yet been attacked’ while at the same time vigorously attacking known bases of attacks on Jews and, in various areas, Arab traffic. 75 This policy also applied to the Negev. The JNF’s Yosef Weitz, the chairman of the Negev Committee (the Yishuv’s regional supervisory body), put it this way: ‘As to the Arabs, a policy has been determined: We extend our hand to peace. Every beduin who wants peace, will be satisfied. But if anyone dares to act contrariwise – his end will be bitter.’76 A few weeks earlier, on 12 February, the commander of the Negev Brigade, Nahum Sarig, instructed his officers:
(A) Our job is to appear before the Arabs as a ruling force which functions forcefully but with justice and fairness.
(B) We must encourage the Arabs to carry on life as usual.
(C) We must avoid harm to women and children.
(D) We must avoid harm to friendly Arabs.
In praxis, this meant allowing Arabs to graze flocks in their own fields or public land but to prevent them from grazing on ‘our fields’ by hitting ‘the flock with fire’ while avoiding firing at the shepherd or confiscating the herd. Searches in Arab settlements should be conducted ‘politely but firmly . . . If the search is a result of an attempt to hit our forces, you are permitted to execute any man found in possession of a weapon.’ Searches of Arab cultivators in fields near Jewish settlements should be conducted ‘with emphatic politeness, preferably accompanied by an explanation and encouragement to the Arab to continue his work . . .’. Searches of Arab cars were also to be conducted ‘politely but firmly’. Only arms, military uniforms and identification cards, and stolen property were to be confiscated. If the arms were for self-defence (a single pistol or grenade), they were to be confiscated and the driver or passenger allowed on his way; if ‘aggressive’ (mines, machineguns, etc.), the owner was to be detained for HIS questioning. Sums of money in excess of PL100 were to be confiscated. Vehicles suspected of belonging to irregulars were to be confiscated or destroyed. If Arabs resisted the search, force was to be use, including ‘intimidation, blows and even execution’. 77"
"Until mid-January, apparently, Arab workers were still dorming in Jewish settlements. On 15 January, a Haganah commander issued a prohibition against Arabs cow-hands sleeping in Jewish settlements. 79 But Arab work in the Jewish areas continued, by order of Galili (who was a member of Kibbutz Na‘an, in the same sub-district); such work was to be stopped in specific areas at specific times only if there was a crucial security need. 80 ‘Ephraim’ was annoyed by a report that in Ramatayim, a Jewish town in his sub-district, the local Haganah commander had ‘forbidden Arabs of ‘Arab Abu Kishk to buy in the settlement’s shops and had destroyed Arab produce and had forbidden them from bringing it into town’. ‘Ephraim’ instructed that such actions should not be taken without approval from on high unless there was an immediate security need.81
Another sub-district OC, in the Coastal Plain, at the beginning of January ordered his deputies not to ‘carry out a general stoppage of Arab work’ in their areas ‘until an order to the contrary was given’. 82 Indeed, in one or two areas, including the Samaria sub-district, Arab work in Jewish fields, vineyards and groves continued into April 1948. Only at the end of that month, ‘Naftali’ ordered a stoppage of Arab labour in Zikhron Ya‘akov, Givat ‘Ada and Bat-Shlomo – and immediately triggered protests that, in the absence of available Jewish laborers, the crops would suffer. The Arabs were not a security risk for now and if the situation changed, they would stop coming to work of their own volition, he argued. 83
But different policies were in place in different areas; a lot depended on the specific security situation in each area and on the commanders involved. In Jerusalem, for example, orders were issued in early January forbidding the sale of goods by Jews to Arabs and shopkeepers were threatened with punishment. 84 Indeed, already in mid-December 1947, Arabs working in Jewish enterprises were warned by Haganah men – on order of the district intelligence officer – that if they continued, their lives would be in danger.85
By March, there were two principal, inter-related questions: how to deal with the remaining Arab communities in the Jewish areas and what to do with the property of those who had left. 86 Regarding property, the HGS and HNS were unhappy with ad hoc local arrangements. The property was falling victim to pillage and vandalisation by Jewish (and Arab) neighbours and military units. Some local Haganah commanders had appointed ‘inspectors’ of Arab property. 87 But a streamlined, national approach was called for. During the last week of March, the general staff set up a national ‘Committee for Arab Property’...it was to be responsible for the abandoned property. 8
The murder by an Alexandroni Brigade roadblock of six Arabs on 1 or 2 March seems to have triggered a fresh look at the problematic issue of the remaining Arab communities. 89 ...There was need for ‘clear orders about the status of the Arabs in the area’, complained a kibbutz member. 90 In late March, the HIS issued an order completely forbidding the movement of Arabs inside Jewish settlements without special permission. 91 More significantly, Alexandroni officers complained that the quarantine imposed on the village of Sheikh Muwannis was being evaded at night by Arabs skirting Haganah patrols and roadblocks. Alexandroni’s OC replied that the matter was being dealt with by the HGS.92 At the beginning of March, Galili ordered the Arab affairs experts to hammer out clear guidelines. 93 On the basis of their recommendations he issued the following blanket order, on 24 March, to all brigade OCs:
Subject: The Arabs Living in the Enclaves.
The behaviour of the Knesset [i.e., Haganah] toward the Arabs living in the area earmarked for the Jewish state or in continuous Jewish areas, in which the Arabs live in enclaves, stems from the Arab policy of the Zionist movement which is: Recognition of the full rights, needs and freedom of the Arabs in the Hebrew state without discrimination, and a striving for coexistence with freedom and respect.
From this policy one may deviate in the course of battle only if security conditions and requirements necessitate this.
The high command [i.e., the HGS and HNS] has appointed a committee which is responsible for determining in each place, together with the brigade OC or his representative, the rules of behaviour (matters of supplies, transportation, identity documents, etc.) with the Arab settlements in the continuous Jewish area, with the intention that security needs be stringently preserved as well as the wellbeing and needs of the Arabs living in the Jewish sector."
"The Haganah’s difficulty during December 1947 – March 1948 was that while it sought to maintain quiet wherever possible, its reprisals, some- times misdirected, sometimes excessive, tended to suck into the maelstrom more and more Arabs. Only strong, massive, retaliatory action, it was felt, would overawe and pacify the Arabs. But the reprisals often hit the innocent along with the guilty, bred anger and vengefulness and made additional Arab communities amenable to the Husseinis’ militant- nationalist appeals, despite great initial reluctance to enter the fray. 96
By and large, however, until the end of March, the Haganah’s operations conformed to the general principle of restricting the conflagration, at least geographically, as much as possible. At the same time, Haganah reprisals tended to increase in ferocity as the months passed, as its units operated in increasingly larger formations and more efficiently, as Jewish casualties increased and as the Yishuv growingly realized it was engaged in a life and death struggle. But from December 1947 through March 1948 the organisation’s policy remained constant: to defend against Arab attack and to retaliate in so far as possible against the guilty, while seeking to limit the scope of the conflict. 97 On 3 February, Ben-Gurion spoke of prospective Jewish settlement in the Negev. He said that those beduin tribes ‘who live in peace with us, we will not fight them, we will not harm them, we will supply them with a little water, they will grow vegetables there, they will stay . . .’.98 And three weeks later, Galili said:
. . . There is great importance in choosing the objectives [for retaliation, we] must distinguish . . . between villages guilty of attacking us and villages that have not yet attacked us. If we don’t want to bring about an alliance between the Arabs of the country and the foreign [irregulars] – it is important to make this distinction."
"Through the first months of the civil war, the JA and the Haganah publicly accused the Mufti of waging an organised, aggressive war against the Yishuv. The reality, however, was more nuanced, as most Zionist leaders and analysts at the time understood. In the beginning, Palestinian belligerency was largely disorganised, sporadic and localised, and for moths remained chaotic and uncoordinated, if not undirected. ‘The Arabs were not ready [for war] . . . There was no guiding hand . . . The [local] National Committees and the AHC were trying to gain control of the situation – but things were happening of their own momen- tum’, Machnes told Ben-Gurion and the Haganah commanders on 1 January 1948. He argued that most of the Arab population had not wanted hostilities. Sasson concurred, and added that the Mufti had wanted (and had organised and incited) ‘troubles’, but not of such scope and dimensions. 101 One senior HIS-AD executive put it this way:
In the towns the feeling has grown that they cannot hold their own against the superior [Jewish] forces. And in the countryside [the villagers] are unwilling to seek out [and do battle with] the Jews not in their area. [And] those living near the Jewish [settlements] are considered miskenim [i.e., miserable or vulnerable] . . . All the villages live with the feeling that the Jews are about to attack them . . . 102"
"‘Tsuri’, the HIS–AD officer in the north, reported that ‘during the past few years, the Galilee villager, be he Ghawarni [i.e., resident in the Hula Valley swampland], Matawali [i.e., Shi’ite], or Mughrabi [i.e., of Maghrebi origin], lacked any desire to get involved in a war with the Jews’. In general, ‘the Arab population of the Galilee is unable to bear the great and prolonged effort [of war] because of an absence of any internal organisation’. 106
In fact, the lack of organisation and weaponry was not restricted to the North. General Safwat, chairman of the Arab League Military Committee, in March 1948 had warned more generally of Palestinian Arab factionalism, with the proliferation of armed bands owing no obedience to the ‘general headquarters’ and of villagers acquiring arms to defend themselves against other Arabs, not the Jews. 107 Husseini lacked the tools to launch a fullscale assault on the Yishuv and limited himself to sanctioning minor attacks (in part to pressure the Arab states to come to the Palestinians’ aid), to tightening the economic boycott against the Yishuv and to organising the Arab community for defence. 108 Towards the end of December 1947, Husseini appears to have sent AHC member and Jerusalem NC leader Dr. Husayn Khalidi a letter explicitly stating that the purpose of the present actions was ‘to harass (and only to harass)’ the Yishuv, not , fullscale assault.109 He indicated that only at some un- specified future date the AHC would order a fullscale offensive though, meanwhile, preparations had to be taken in hand. 110 Khalidi didn’t need any pressing. He himself was ‘nervous, desperate and pessimistic’. According to HIS, Khalidi believed that in the disturbances of 1936–1939, 'the Arabs were . . . much readier, daring and willing to sacrifice. Now, by comparison, they demand payment for every action, are full of fear of the Jews and are constantly complaining.’ 111
Cunningham summarised matters fairly accurately five weeks into the war:
The official Arab policy is to stand on the defensive against Jewish attacks until aggression is ordered by the national leadership. That widespread assaults on Jews continue and are indeed increasing illustrates the comparatively feeble authority of most of [the National] Committees and of the AHC . . . The latter is anxious to curb Arab outbreaks but probably not to stop them entirely and is known to be worried at [sic] its lack of control . . . 112"
Palestinian Arab military strategy: Reluctance to fight
"Almost immediately, the Mufti’s attention was drawn to Arab Haifa and Jaffa, the two largest Arab centres; both were highly vulnerable to attack and siege. In both, the NCs and the monied middle and upper classes whom they represented, sought quiet, lest the Jews be provoked into reprisals that could harm their persons and property. Indeed, in Jaffa the NC and the orange grove owners had within days initiated a short- lived truce with their Jewish neighbours. 113 But the local leaderships were unsuccessful in reining in the militia groups that often operated on the towns’ peripheries. 114 Part of the Mufti’s concern regarding the two towns no doubt stemmed from reports about the beginning of flight by their inhabitants. During the second half of December 1947 and January 1948, the Mufti or his close associates appear to have tried to shift the focus of hostilities to the countryside. But the villagers were not rushing to join up115 (and, indeed, some of them sought to continue selling their produce to neighbouring Jewish towns 116 )."
"But the Mufti’s policy regarding the countryside was also characterised by ambiguity. In late January, according to Haganah intelligence, he told a delegation from the village of Masmiya al Kabira, in the south, ‘to keep quiet and not to clash with the Jews, unless attacked’. Similarly, Hajj Amin added: ‘So long as help from the Arab states is not assured, one should avoid battle with the Jews.’
The change in Arab strategy, of trying to move the focus of violence from the towns to the countryside, had come about, Sasson explained to Ben-Gurion, because of pressure on the Mufti by the townspeople. Sasson advised that the Haganah step up the pressure on the towns so that the urban notables would sue for a cease-fire. Attacks on villages, Sasson felt, would lead nowhere as the Mufti would be indifferent to ‘the death of fellahin’. 122"
"Both the AHC and the ALA during February-March seemed to signal Palestine’s Arabs that while low-level skirmishing by local militias and irregulars was fine and attacks on Jewish convoys, especially around Jerusalem, should be continued, a fullscale assault on the Yishuv was out of the question for the time being, though preparations for such an assault, to be unleashed just before or just after the British pullout, should be taken in hand."
"Side by side with the Haganah’s policy during the war’s first months of trying to restrict the violence, various Jewish bodies – including the Arab Division of the JA-PD, the Histadrut Arab Workers’ Department, Mapam and local Jewish authorities – tried to maintain peace, or at least a cease- fire, in certain areas. In some measure, this was a carry-over from the efforts during the earlier part of the 1940s to achieve Jewish–Arab coexistence (which elicited limited, localised, and only occasionally favourable responses from the Arab side). In greater measure, these efforts were triggered by the outbreak of hostilities in November-December 1947. At the same time, the hostilities also engendered a significant upsurge in peaceful Arab overtures to Jewish neighbours, primarily by communities that felt isolated or under threat in predominantly Jewish areas and were keen on self-preservation."
"Soon after the start of the hostilities, the somewhat dormant Arab Workers’ Department of the Histadrut initiated contacts with Arabs in order to promote peace between neighbouring communities. The fraternity of workers of all nations lay at the core of the trade union federation’s ideology. On 21 January 1948, the Histadrut distributed a poster addressed to ‘all Arab workers’ to live in peace with the Jews and to turn their backs on their leaders, ‘who are leading you to destruction’. 133
In the early months of the war, the desire for calm in certain areas took a number of forms. Several villages concluded formal peace agreements with neighbouring settlements or urban neighbourhoods. The notables of Deir Yassin on 20 January 1948 met with leaders of Jerusalem’s Jewish Giv‘at Shaul neighbourhood and agreed to mutual non-belligerency. Deir Yassin took upon itself to keep out bands of ir- regulars and if, nonetheless, some appeared, to inform Giv‘at Shaul of their presence ‘in daytime by hanging out laundry . . . (two white pieces with a black piece in the middle)’ and ‘at night Deir Yassin’s people will signal three dots with a flashlight . . . and place three . . . [lanterns?]’. Similarly, patrols from Giv‘at Shaul near Deir Yassin were to be armed with a mutually agreed password. Giv‘at Shaul was responsible for the safety of Deir Yassin’s vehicles passing through the neighbourhood. 134 The founder of the Arab Workers’ Department, Aharon Haim Cohen, was instrumental in concluding this agreement as well as similar agreements that month and in February with the villages of al Qastal, Sur Bahir and al Maliha. 135"
"During the war’s first three months, more than two dozen Arab villages and tribes sent out feelers to Jewish officials to conclude local non-belligerency agreements. They were mainly motivated by fear of Jewish attack or reprisal; in some measure, by traditional economic ties they wanted to maintain."
"In the Beit Shean (Beisan) Valley, it was a British official who tried to bring together local Jewish and Arab representatives. The local HIS representative, Yehoshua Sulz, advised the regional bloc committee ‘to grasp the offered hand’, but other Haganah officers, while also interested in ‘preserving the peace’, advised that ‘one must first clarify who it is who is demanding peace... We must demand that they send respected representatives and not children or nonentities. It is important that the Arabs not come from one family or one class alone . . .’ 146"
"Generally, matters were more straightforward: local Arab dignitaries approached and met with local Jewish representatives. On 7 January, for example, the mayor of Lydda, flanked by the mukhtar of Haditha, met in his office with the headman of Ben-Shemen, the neighbouring Jewish agricultural boarding school, an enclave in the Arab-populated area. The HIS-AD transcript of the meeting quotes the mayor as saying: ‘We want peace with you and we have announced it in the town and its environs. But you know that there are people without sense and responsibility who might do silly things off their own bat.’ He asked the Ben-Shemen headman not to post guards on the road but only inside the school compound. The Ben-Shemen headman, for his part, asked that the Lydda authorities allow Jewish automobiles to pass through the town unhindered. Shihadeh Hassuna, the head of Lydda’s militia, then called and the mayor put Ben-Shemen’s headman on the telephone. Hassuna said:
We have spoken to all the mukhtars in the area and have warned them to avoid any harm to Ben-Shemen. You have sat among us now for many years and nothing [bad] has happened between us . . . your convoys will not be touched. The local inhabitants, especially the older ones, want peace, but all sorts of strangers come to town, who act on their own and are difficult to control . . .
[Ben-Shemen] headman: Among us too there are elements who do not obey [orders] and act on their own and I cannot be responsible for them, as you cannot, as you say, be responsible for strangers. 147
(As late as 19 March, Lydda’s leaders were opposing attacks on Ben Shemen convoys. 148 )"
"A similar discussion took place a week later between a local HIS- AD officer (probably David Karon) and the head of the NC in Tal as Safi, a large Arab village southwest of Jerusalem. The Arab notable, Haj Muhammad Khalil al ‘Azi, promised to keep out ‘strangers’ and to keep Arab shepherds away from Jewish fields. Al ‘Azi added, for good measure, that the Husseinis ‘had no future’ and ‘control’ would soon pass to Abdullah, king of Jordan. The local NC had ordered a group of beduins who had settled in Tal a Safi five-six years before to leave lest their grazing lead to clashes with the Jews. 149
A few weeks later, Tal as Safi notables hosted a meeting between representatives of the Haganah and Hassan ‘Abd al ‘Aziz Mahana of Masmiyya al-Kabira, a large and influential village to the west. Mahana, a leading member of the village’s main family, initiated the meeting. He promised that peace would reign in the area so long as the Mahana dominated the village and its environs. He asked that the guards in the Haganah convoys passing through ‘not wave or point their weapons’. Mahana complained about both the Jewish and Arab leaderships who had brought about partition and the disturbances. The Mahanas, he said, had ‘decided to strenuously oppose the Husseinis and build their political future on King Abdullah’. 150"
"During late March, April and May a driving force among villagers seeking a truce or peace with Jewish neighbours was the harvest: the villagers wanted calm in order to bring in their ripening crops. Such, at least, was one explanation proffered by an HIS-AD officer for the newfound willingness of at least some people in the village of Tantura, south of Haifa, to conclude a ceasefire in early May. (Another reason, in Tantura’s case, was the fear generated by the fall of Arab Haifa a fortnight before.): ‘Now is the harvest season and this is a good additional reason for “peace” with the Jews’, he reported. 154 (Interestingly, at this time Jews from Zikhron Ya‘akov ‘on their own volition’ approached Tantura’s Arabs for an agreement on the harvest.155 ) The impending harvest also underlay the talks between the village of Qaqun and Kibbutz Hama‘apil in early April. The Haganah’s Arab affairs advisers in the area added, however, that ‘to assure the existence of the ceasefire . . . Qaqun and Hama‘apil should collect the harvest from their fields simultaneously’. 156"
"In late May, the Haganah reported an argument in the Galilee Panhandle village of Salihiya between youngsters and village elders. The youngsters did not want to assist the invading Syrian Army and thought it best ‘to approach the Jews and hand over their arms and stay’. The elders, however, feared that if an Arab army nonetheless reached their area, they would be deemed traitors, ‘and the village would be destroyed’. 171 "
"The Haganah always had a problem with approaches for a truce or surrender. Often it was the initiative of only one faction or notable in a particular village: was the approach serious and credible? And even if the village mukhtar made the approach, was he fully authorised? Perhaps the move was merely tactical, designed to gain a temporary reprieve to allow the collection of crops or the arrival of a shipment of arms – after which the village would again join the militants? And what was the point in agreeing to a ceasefire with a particular isolated Arab community while in other areas, where Arabs had the upper hand, they rejected any thought of armistice and peace? After all, Haganah policy had to be determined by national, not local, considerations. So, often, such Arab approaches came to nought. By May, facing imminent invasion by the Arab states, the Haganah preferred not to take chances and leave Arab villages, whose sudden professions of acquiescence and loyalty were at best dubious, behind its front lines.
In any event, villagers usually preferred to avoid formal contact or agreements with the Haganah – acts that bespoke treachery in fellow Arabs’ eyes; only a small minority are recorded as having made such approaches. But many more effectively refrained from initiating violence against Jews or refused, when asked, to join in; many actively prevented irregulars from entering or using their villages as bases. Occasionally, Arab villagers appealed to neighbouring villagers not to make trouble. The main consideration among the dozens of non-belligerent villages was to avoid Jewish retaliation against themselves."
"Just before 28 January, ‘Abd al Qadir, at the head of a band of 400 armed men, encamped near Deir Yassin. Apparently they tried to recruit villagers. The village elders ‘were op- posed’, and the band moved off to Beit Jala. 179 Deir Yassin’s mukhtar was summoned by AHC representatives in Jerusalem to be questioned about the village’s relations with the Jews. The mukhtar said that ‘the village and the Jews lived in peace’.180 A fortnight later, on 13 February, an armed band entered Deir Yassin bent on attacking nearby Giv‘at Shaul. ‘The villagers opposed this and the gang’s reaction was to slaughter all the village’s sheep . . .’181 A month later, on 16 March, an AHC delegation composed of two men and (unusually) a woman visited the village and asked that it host a group of Iraqi and Syrian irregulars ‘to guard the site’. The villagers refused and the delegation left empty handed.182 Deir Yassin’s notables registered a similar refusal on 4 April.183"
"The AHC strongly opposed local peace initiatives and agreements. The Mufti may at times have wanted a reduction in the scale of the conflict, but he opposed anything that smacked of peace with, or recognition of, the Yishuv. The AHC stymied a number of local peace efforts. In mid-January, for example, the British Galilee District Commissioner reported that the notables of the town of Beisan and the surrounding Jewish settlements were interested in ‘an informal agreement of mutual restraint’ but the AHC vetoed the idea. 188 By and large, however, as the fighting spread, suspicion and antagonism between neighbouring, and in some cases traditionally friendly, settlements grew and the possibility of concluding local peace agreements or maintaining local cease-fires receded."
"By the end of March, the Husseinis had managed to still the moderate voices in the Arab camp and had gained control over almost all of Arab Palestine. Most of the country was engulfed in warfare. The Haganah, especially on the roads, was sorely pressed and on the defensive. While some local truces remained in force, most Arab villages were now dominated by elements hostile to the Yishuv and many harboured active irregular units. And where the Husseinis were not in control, the locals, fearing the Mufti’s wrath, preferred to have no truck with the Jews. Palmon told a meeting of the executives of the JA-PD that contacts with the Arabs had been almost completely severed and that ‘in general, the Arabs could be defined as united [behind the Husseinis] . . . Today, there is almost no area of the country where we can talk with the Arabs, even on local matters, to pacify and calm things down.’
Both Palmon and Danin thought that, in great measure, the situation was a product of ill-conceived Jewish military actions and over-reactions, and that by and large, the Arab affairs experts on the national level and in each locality had been, or were being, ignored by the military commanders. The situation was such, said Palmon, that in future, the Yishuv might find it difficult ‘to prove that we weren’t the aggressors’ apart from the Jerusalem area, where the violence was clearly a product of Arab initiative. Danin added that ‘as a result of several superfluous [Haganah] operations, which mainly hurt “good” Arabs who were in contact with us . . . the [Arab] mass exodus from all places was continuing. The Arabs have simply lost their faith [in our goodwill?].’
The situation had caused general demoralisation in the Political Department’s Arab Division, whose ambivalent functions included both peace-making contacts and intelligence-gathering. Danin said that if things continued as they were, the Division ‘should be closed down’. Ya‘akov Shimoni, a senior division official, said that the Haganah commanders had concluded that ‘war was war and that there was no possibility of distinguishing between good and bad Arabs’. 190"
"The UN partition resolution had earmarked Haifa, with some 65,000 Arab and 70,000 Jewish inhabitants and a joint municipality, to be part of the Jewish state. Without doubt, this demoralised the Arab inhabitants. Their exodus began in early December 1947, with the start of hostilities. A British intelligence unit reported that both Jews and Arabs were evacuating the border areas between the two communities and moving to safer neighbourhoods."
"By 10 December HIS-AD was reporting that ‘a panicky evacuation is taking place from the [Arab] border neighbourhoods’.192 Abandoning one’s home, breaking a major psychological barrier, paved the way for eventual abandonment of village or town and, ultimately, of country. Danin and Palmon on 11 December noted the start of the flight from Haifa. Most of the Arab movement out of Haifa was due to the fighting – sniping and bombings – and fears of fighting that marked life in the border neighbourhoods. But a few Christian Arab families who lived inside or on the edges of Jewish neighbour- hoods on Mount Carmel were intimidated into leaving their homes in mid-December by IZL threats and orders. 193 By 23 December, HIS was reporting that ‘the economic condition in Haifa is – bad. Some 15–20 thousand Arabs, especially from the Hauran [Syria] and Egypt and many rich people, have left the city. Many shops and businesses have closed . . . The AHC demanded that the Haifa NC stop the flight . . . The Christians in Haifa live in fear of the Muslims . . .’ 194"
"The 14-member Haifa NC was established on 2–3 December, with Rashid Haj Ibrahim, a Muslim, in the chair. He was to lead the committee until its demise in late April 1948. From a letter he wrote to Husseini in May 1947, Haj Ibrahim emerges as violently anti-Zionist, even anti-Semitic. He wrote: Jews in Europe became symbols of ‘baseness and cheating.’ The ‘Arab world faces destruction [because] . . . the Jews want to take over Egypt, because Moses came from there’, and Lebanon and Syria ‘because they built the Temple with Lebanese cedars, and they want Iraq because our forefather Abraham came from there and they [feel they] have a right to Hijaz because Ishmael came from there and they demand Transjordan, because it was part of Palestine and Solomon’s kingdom.’ He predicted – fairly accurately – that the Jewish state, if it emerged in Palestine, would establish a giant navy and giant air force, and build atomic weapons, with which to overawe the Arab world. 195 But from the start of hostilities in December 1947, Ibrahim was to preach and embody moderation and to relentlessly pursue a ceasefire in Haifa."
"The Lebanese and Syrian consulates in Haifa reportedly issued 8,000 entry visas during December, ‘and many thousand left [the country] without visas and passports’. 196"
"Some of the flight, no doubt, was due to the rapid deterioration in the economic situation. The price of a sack of flour rose during December from P£1.750 to P£6.500, ‘and it is difficult to get it at this price as well. Most shops are closed all day. The vegetable market is closed and [public] transportation has almost completely stopped.’ 197 105 Arabs died and 248 were seriously injured in the violence that month.
From the first, the NC took note of the exodus and acted to stem it. Already on 6 December, Ibrahim forbade the members of the committee to leave town without NC approval198 and on 14 December issued a ‘warning’ against the exodus.199 Five days earlier, the NC decided to appeal to the AHC to instruct Palestinians not to leave without permission of their local NCs.200"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa oil refinery massacre
"It was this situation that prompted the NC, represented by the senior magistrate Ahmad Bey Khalil and ‘Omar Taha, to seek and conclude a ceasefire with the Haganah on 28 December 1947. 201 But the ceasefire only held for a few hours. Late on the morning of 30 December, IZL gunmen threw bombs into an Arab crowd milling about the gate of the Haifa Oil Refinery. Six died and some 50 were injured. Immediately, a mob of Arab refinery workers, reinforced by Arabs who had survived the bombing, attacked their Jewish co-workers with sticks, stones and knives. Altogether, 39 Jews were murdered and 11 seriously injured in the hour-long pogrom.202
The Haganah massively retaliated on the night of 31 December 1947 – 1 January 1948, raiding the villages of Balad al Sheikh and Hawassa, in which many of the refinery’s workers lived. The raiding units’ orders were to kill ‘maximum adult males’. 203 The raiders penetrated to the centre of Balad al Sheikh, fired into and blew up houses, and pulled out adult males, and shot them. According to the HGS, ‘the penetrating units . . . were forced to deviate from the line agreed upon and in a few cases hit women and children’ after being fired upon from inside houses. The Haganah suffered two dead and two injured. Haganah reports put Arab casualties variously at ‘about 70 killed’ 204 and 21 killed (‘including two women and five children’) and 41 injured.205 Following the raids, many families fled the two villages to Nablus, Jenin and Acre. 206
The raid was criticised in the Yishuv’s Defence Committee. Riftin argued that many of the refinery workers had not participated in the pogrom; a few actually had protected Jews; but the raids on Balad al Sheikh and Hawassa were conducted indiscriminately ‘and there is no knowing who was hit’. Moreover, the incident had been provoked by the IZL bomb attack. Ben-Gurion responded that ‘discrimination is impossible. We are at war, and in war you cannot make individual differentiation . . .; between . . . villages, yes, but not between individuals.’ 207
Following this cycle of violence, the NC pushed to renew the ceasefire. Most Jewish and Arab employees had stopped going to work in mixed work places, including the municipality...At a meeting with Haganah representatives on 2 January, Arab notables, including Ahmad Bey Khalil, said that they had issued orders to avoid the recurrence of refinery-type incidents. Rashid Haj Ibrahim himself declared that ‘the Arabs were interested in quiet in Haifa . . .’. 208 The NC was interested in ‘a protracted truce’.209 But Arab militants, and Husseini- affiliated politicians, such as Nimr al Khatib and Hassan Shibalak (both members of the Haifa NC), continued to foment violence. 210 Daily, there were ambushes and exchanges of fire. Following a bomb attack on a Jewish bus (which left four wounded), the Haganah blew up two houses and a garage and poured mortar and sniper fire into the Arab neighbourhoods; dozens were killed, including women and children and the militia leader Muhamad Hijawi and the deputy head of the National Bank, Muhamad Kanafani.211 Arab public transport ceased, there was a shortage of goods and the flight from the city continued. 212 Businesses closed down, and shopkeepers began selling their stock to Jews at 25 per cent reductions in order to close up quickly. 213
The British, for whom Haifa was pivotal to their plans for withdrawal from Palestine, stepped up their patrols and things calmed down. But the Jewish retaliatory strikes had severely shaken Arab morale; they sorely felt the Jews’ topographical advantage (the Jews lived up Mount Carmel), and their superiority in organisation, arms and equipment. 214 ‘The Haifa Arab public began to feel the weakness of its position and there were residents who began to emigrate from the city. Of course, this had a dampening effect on those who remained’, recalled Nimr al Khatib. 215"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Arab disagreements over truce
"On 18 January, Ibrahim returned from a visit to Damascus, where his pro-truce stand had received significant endorsement. As he told the NC that day, Taha al Hashimi, the inspector general of the ALA, had supported his desire ‘to refrain from incidents’, given the local Haganah superiority. Hashimi and the Syrian president and war minister, with whom Ibrahim had met, had all ‘agreed to our course of action . . . Hashimi had stressed that clashes in Haifa were to be completely avoided and [the Arabs were to] act only in a defensive manner.’ But Ibrahim had failed to receive from the Mufti a similar endorsement of a ceasefire and proposed that a delegation travel to Cairo to try to pin Husseini down. 216 The NC meeting had been dominated by talk of Arab suffering and emigration. 217 The committee ‘believed that Haifa needs quiet, or at least not to jump to the head of the [Arab] war [effort]’ On 18 January, Ibrahim returned from a visit to Damascus, where his pro-truce stand had received significant endorsement. As he told the NC that day, Taha al Hashimi, the inspector general of the ALA, had supported his desire ‘to refrain from incidents’, given the local Haganah superiority. Hashimi and the Syrian president and war minister, with whom Ibrahim had met, had all ‘agreed to our course of action . . . Hashimi had stressed that clashes in Haifa were to be completely avoided and [the Arabs were to] act only in a defensive manner.’ But Ibrahim had failed to receive from the Mufti a similar endorsement of a ceasefire and proposed that a delegation travel to Cairo to try to pin Husseini down. 216 The NC meeting had been dominated by talk of Arab suffering and emigration. 217 The committee ‘believed that Haifa needs quiet, or at least not to jump to the head of the [Arab] war [effort]’ and that ‘it is in their interest to maintain peace in Haifa as long as
possible’. 218
Meanwhile, Khalil, flanked by ‘Omar Taha, and Haifa Jewish community representatives Ya‘akov Solomon and Naftali Lifshitz renewed their meetings. Solomon demanded an open, public agreement. Khalil said that the NC had decided to send a delegation, headed by the Greek Catholic Archbishop George Hakim, to talk with the Mufti – and to threaten resignation if the Mufti’s men continued to defy the NC’s writ and launch attacks. 219 Meanwhile, a de facto truce began.
Hakim, accompanied by Sheikh ‘Abdul Rahman Murad, the Haifahead of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Yusuf Sahayun, a Husseini supporter, left for Egypt on 20 January; according to HIS, ‘Rashid [Haj Ibrahim] demanded that the delegation explain to the Mufti that many of the leaders of the city wanted to leave if explicit orders were not received to stop the terror in the city, and if their arguments were not accepted, then the leaders would leave the country and in the end Arab Haifa would empty of its veteran inhabitants.’ 220
Husseini’s reaction to the delegation’s appeal is unclear; probably it was deliberately ambiguous. According to one Haganah informant, the Mufti had said the problem was national, not local, and had ended the meeting by suggesting that the Arab struggle against the Jews and the British ‘could [end by] destroying half the Arabs in Palestine’. The implication was that he opposed a ceasefire and ‘his whole person be- spoke war against the Jews to the bitter end. All his thought is focused on how to exploit the Arab peoples to reach this end . . . There is no talking [reason ? peace ?] to the Mufti.’ 221 His only practical advice to the Haifa delegation had been ‘to remove the women and children from the danger areas in order to reduce the number of casualties’. 222
This advice conformed with the general guideline adopted by the Political Committee of the Arab League, meeting in Sofar, Lebanon, in September 1947, in preparation for the expected outbreak of hostilities in Palestine. The committee, in its unanimously adopted published resolutions, recommended that the Arab states ‘open their gates to the absorption of, and care for, the babies, women and the old from among Palestine’s Arabs – if events occur in Palestine that necessitate it’. 223 The resolution was adopted for two reasons: to try to avoid death and in- jury to Arab non-combatants, and especially to avoid violation of women, a desire deeply rooted in Arab tradition and mores; 224 and to free the adult males from the burden of dependents whose presence in prospective combat zones would hamper them in battle. As it turned out, this guideline, which during the first months of the civil war was endorsed and adopted (though by and large, especially in the towns, not acted upon) by the AHC and various NCs and village leaders, helped fuel the mass exodus from Palestine. As we shall see, in the course of the civil war, and in some areas also during the subsequent conventional war, dozens of villages, at the prodding of the AHC and NCs or off their own bat, evacuated women, children and old folk. The importance of these evacuations, underpinned and legitimised by the endorsement of the Arab states and the Palestinians’ own governing institutions, cannot be exaggerated. By providing a model of behaviour and a pointer to assuring self-preservation, the evacuation of dependents had a crucial demoralising effect on the menfolk who stayed behind to fight or guard villages and towns, and at the same time ate away at their motivation to stay and fight; after all, they were no longer protecting their families.
At the meeting with the delegation, Husseini had apparently handed them a letter instructing the NC ‘to oppose the exodus of families from Haifa, to avoid panic and to issue a call to those who had emigrated to return’ 225 and had agreed to at least a temporary truce because ‘the Arabs were in need of supplies . . . and mainly because the English were still in Haifa and the Arabs don’t want to clash with them’. 226 Most likely, Husseini had conveyed a deliberate ambivalence, saying one thing and then its opposite, or, at least, different things to Hakim and Murad."
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Christians
"Solomon and Lifshitz, who eventually met the notables, were de- briefed by Arazi. He believed that the de facto truce would not hold for long; the Arabs’ morale had risen following the entry into Palestine of ALA units. The NC would maintain non-belligerence only until the Arab militias were stronger or until the British withdrawal, but not thereafter. 228 Besides, the armed groups would continue to act without NC authorisation. Haifa’s Christian notables were disheartened. As a result of the disagreement in the NC about an end to the violence, ‘the rich Christians began to prepare to leave Haifa and the first was the merchant Amin Sahayun who moved his family with all their furniture in two large automobiles [trucks] to Lebanon. During the day many Christians said they will not stay in the town so long as Sheikh Nimr al Khatib’s gangs rule it.’ 229"
"The irregulars remained unruly, initiating attacks on Jewish targets and drawing down Haganah retaliation – which generated further flight. Christian–Muslim tensions increased, with the Christians angered by the radical Muslim NC members like Nimr al Khatib, who called them ‘traitors and pimps of the Jews’. 232 There was at least a grain of truth in the charge. As Yusuf Salim, a Christian notable, put it in early March:
the Jews must think hard before they push the Christian community into the conflict between them and the Muslim world . . . The Jews must discriminate between Muslim and Christian property [and not blow up Christian houses] . . . The Christian community . . . is still not cooperating in [the Muslim] aggression . . . 233
By early March, Haifa Christian morale had plummeted, mainly because of the entry of foreign (Muslim) irregulars into their neighbourhoods and the subsequent Haganah attacks, ‘and every family capable of leaving had left for Lebanon’. 234 Some families began to send away their children. Already in early February, according to HIS, the AHC had ordered the removal of the women and children from Haifa and arrangements were under way for their transfer to Lebanon and Syria.235...Husseini supported the evacuation of the non-combatants – but to sites inside Palestine, not out of the country. Hakim and the Haifa NC ignored his instructions. 243"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Ben-Gurion opposition to Truce
"The Haganah commanders (and Ben-Gurion) repeatedly brushed them aside, arguing that a truce would not be honoured by the irregulars and would be used by the Arabs to stockpile weaponry. In any case, Haifa was a place in which the Haganah clearly had the upper hand; a local truce could work only to the Arabs’ advantage. Ben-Gurion jotted down in his diary: ‘The Arabs are still leaving Haifa’ – seemingly making a connection between Haganah opposition to a truce and the idea that a truce might halt the exodus. 258"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Economic conditions
"The second half of March and the first half of April witnessed a further decline in the Arabs’ economic situation. Medicines and doctors were reportedly in short supply. Haifa doctors were demanding ‘at least P£1.5’ per house call. 259 (In general, by early April the flight of doctors was acutely felt throughout the country and the Arab Doctors Association in Jerusalem and the AHC were demanding that doctors who had fled return, threatening those who refused with (unnamed) punishment. 260 ) Bread and flour were scarce. The NC had requisitioned much of the flour allocated by the British authorities and given it to the militiamen. ‘Many merchants had refused to give part of [their] flour and responded that the strangers [i.e., foreign irregulars] should receive their livelihood from the neighbouring countries’, reported the Haganah. Some bakery- owners had fled to Safad and their bakeries had been confiscated by the NC. Nonetheless, militiamen complained that they were ‘hungry’. British troops were selling sugar and wheat from the government warehouses to Arabs. The NC of Jenin had demanded that the government’s food allocations to Haifa’s Arabs – flour, eggs, rice, sugar – be reduced as only ‘8,000 people had remained in Haifa’. Haj Ibrahim had checked and said there were ‘35-40,000’ Arab inhabitants left. Most other goods were said to be available.261 The tobacco manufacturers – Karaman, Dik and Salti – had all removed most of their machinery to Cyprus and Egypt; construction goods merchants refrained from opening shop because ‘there was no one to sell to’. ‘The rich, [including] the big merchants, were busy converting their [Palestine pounds] to gold and dollars and transferring them to the neighbouring countries’, reported the Haganah. 262 Telephones in the Arab sector often failed to work as the Jews had cut the lines. 263"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Concerns of refugees
The food shortages and the sense of military vulnerability and isolation caused by the Jewish settlements on the city’s access roads certainly contributed to the demoralisation that underlay the exodus of the upper and middle classes; so did the concomitant breakdown of law and order. The irregulars robbed and intimidated the locals, terrorising those they had been sent to protect, in the words of Nimr al Khatib. He blamed equally the irregulars, the British, for doing nothing, and the civilians who had fled, leaving behind houses that invited despoliation. 265 ‘Bands of robbers organised themselves . . . In March . . . waves of robbery and theft became frequent in Arab Haifa . . . From day to day, the feeling grew that Arab Haifa was on the verge of collapse. Anarchy and disorder prevailed in everything.’ The situation was aggravated that month by the wholesale desertion and flight of the city’s Arab constables, who usually took with them their rifles and ammunition.266 Without doubt, the exodus was linked to Haganah reprisals, Arab attacks and fears of subsequent Jewish retaliation, but for the better educated, especially the civil servants and professionals, there were also constant long-term considerations. Ephraim Krischer, a Mapam activist, identified a general fear of future ‘great disorder’ as the main reason for this early stage of the exodus, adding more specifically, that Arab municipal and Man- date employees feared that ‘in the Jewish state they wouldn’t have any chance of advancement in their careers because precedence would be given to Jews’. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that most Arab officials lacked fluent Hebrew.267
Mapam’s Arab Department, probably in part on the basis of Krischer’s report, in March analysed the flight from Haifa. The department noted the Arabs’ ‘fears . . . for their future’, both in the chaotic, transitional pre-State period and under Jewish rule, and pointed out that it was mainly ‘Christians, professionals, officials’ who were leaving. By 1 March, several mainly Christian districts were ‘almost completely’ empty. ‘The flight is less marked in the eastern parts of town, where the poorer classes, who are under the influence of the extremists, are concentrated’, stated the department. According to this analysis, the Christians were mainly worried about the transitional period, between the end of effective Mandate government and the start of effective Jewish government. They felt that they would then be ‘between the hammer and the anvil, the Arab terrorist operations and Jewish reactions’. 268
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Haifa: Failure of NC to stem exodus
"While the NC was clearly worried by the exodus, its efforts to stem it through most of December 1947 – early April 1948 appear to have been half-hearted and muted. In only one of the 12 communiques issued by the committee over the period did it urge the Arabs to remain. On 12 December the committee warned against ‘Fifth Columnists’ spreading defeatism and influencing people ‘to leave their properties and houses, which have become easy prey to the enemy who has seized and occupied them . . . Stay in your places’, the committee urged. In none of the communiques did the committee explicitly order the inhabitants not to leave. Over January–March 1948, the communiques failed altogether to order or urge the populace to stay at home or in the city. Several, however, urged Arabs to ‘stay at your posts’ – referring, apparently, to militiamen and officials. 269 It is only in the first half of April that we find the NC calling upon some of those who had fled to return. Indeed, on 1 April HIS was able to report that the remaining Arab notables were peeved at the municipal council members who had left ‘and abandoned the Arab interests precisely when the government’s powers were being transferred to the local authorities’. And it was Shabtai Levy, the city’s Jewish mayor, rather than the Arab notables, who issued a public call to Arab councilmen to return. 270"
"The NC’s failure to act strenuously to halt the exodus is easily understood. The committee lacked legal powers to curb emigration. More important, the pre-April 1948 exodus encompassed mostly the middle and upper classes – precisely the social strata from which the committee members were drawn. It was their relatives and friends, first and foremost, who were fleeing. Indeed, most of the NC itself had left. By 28 March, according to the Haganah, 11 of the 15 members had departed; efforts by chairman Ibrahim to lure them back had failed. 274 Indeed, Rashid Haj Ibrahim himself left Palestine in early April, never to return. 275 Those members who had remained behind were hardly in a position to vilify, condemn or punish would-be evacuees, however disruptive the exodus was understood to be to the Arab cause."
"But as with Haifa, the exodus from the town was triggered by the start of hostilities, which were initiated by Jaffa’s militiamen, who began sniping into neighbouring Tel Aviv on 30 November 1947. The following day, dozens of Arabs assaulted Jewish houses bordering on the northern Manshiya neighbourhood and an Arab mob in Abu Kabir, a neighbourhood to the west, attacked a Jewish car and murdered its three passengers. Jewish retaliatory strikes followed. The Haganah’s Kiryati Brigade blew up a house in Abu Kabir on 2 December and the IZL torched several buildings four days later, killing at least two persons. 276
Jaffa’s inhabitants feared that worse was to come. The evacuation from Jaffa’s border districts began already at the beginning of December. As with Haifa, the initial flight was from the peripheral neighbourhoods to the city centre. ‘Families, with their belongings, are leaving Manshiya’, reported Palmah scouts on 1 December. 277"
"Jewish behaviour contributed: on 5 December British observers reported an Arab beaten to death ‘by a Jewish crowd’ near the Mughrabi Cinema and Arab-owned shops and houses were set alight in the Carmel Market area 280 and in or near the Hatikva Quarter (all in southern Tel Aviv).281 Uniformed IZL men toured neighbouring Petah Tikva and demanded that Jewish employers ‘throw out their [Arab] workers’.282 The British, too, marginally added to the displacement by warning Arabs living or working in Tel Aviv to leave for Jaffa.283"
"Jews in seam neighbourhoods were also displaced by the hostilities. By mid-January 1948, some 7,000 had been rendered homeless. Efforts by the authorities to persuade them to return home were unavailing. 284 By 9 December, HIS was reporting:
Economic conditions in Jaffa are bad. The price of flour has soared. Arab refugees sleeping in the streets of the city . . . Families of the well-to-do are leaving the cities – for the interior of the country. The rich are emigrating to Syria, Lebanon and even Cyprus. 285"
"By the end of December, HIS reported that some ‘60 per cent’ of Jaffa’s Christians had left. 288...On 23 December, HIS reported that ‘25,000’ had fled Jaffa, 290 but on 1 February the Arab Division felt that the estimate that ‘15–20 thousand had left’ was an exaggeration. 291"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jaffa: Differing Arab leaders
"HIS identified three power centres in Jaffa – Hawari, Heikal, and local Husseini supporters, who were busy organising the violence in each neighbourhood. And armed extortionists had taken to the streets, intimidating people to contribute to ‘the national cause’.294 One Arab informant told HIS that the AHC ‘had not intended the disturbances to reach the level they had reached . . . They made a mistake when they called for a three-day strike without taking account of the character of the Arab public.’ Many were out of work and, hearing about the killings and arson in Jerusalem, ‘an atmosphere was created conducive to such deeds in Jaffa as well’. The Jaffa mob ran amok and Hawari and Heikal were powerless. 295 Hawari, who may have been a HIS agent, and Heikal fell out. Hawari fled the country at the end of December. 296 Moderate and Opposition figures were afraid that the Husseinis would resume anti-Opposition terrorism a la 1937–1939.297
Most local notables, represented by the Jaffa NC, opposed hostilities against Tel Aviv, aware of their militias’ inadequacy and fearful of Jewish retaliation. They were especially concerned about the orange crop in the surrounding groves, much of it destined for export through Jaffa. Initially, they even organised patrols in the peripheral neighbourhoods to prevent clashes. 298 Heikal, a prot ´eg ´e of Musa al ‘Alami, a veteran Palestinian moderate, probably flew to Cairo in early December 1947 to obtain Husseini or Arab League permission to conclude a ceasefire 299 but the activists in the town were busy provoking incidents and undermining the NC.300"
"As in Haifa, by the third week of hostilities notables in southern Jaffa were trying to reach a ceasefire with Bat-Yam. A meeting took place on 16 December. The Arabs asked that the Jews refrain ‘from shutting off their water and blowing up their houses’. The Jews demanded that the Arabs stop sniping at traffic. The Arabs ‘promised to make sure that no one fired’ and that night, ‘for the first time, there was electricity in the Jibalya [neighbourhood]’. 301
However, Husseini apparently opposed any local truce and, though aware that the city stood no chance of holding out in the long run, wanted it to continue to harass Tel Aviv as best it could, but with a minimum investment of external resources. 302 Apart from a lack of flour and oil, 303 Jaffa seems to have suffered no severe food shortages during the first four months of the civil war. 304 One reason was the proximity of its satellite villages (such as Yazur and Kheiriya) and the access between them and the town; another was that the quick depletion of the population left those who remained with a surplus of food coupons and a surfeit of produce."
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jaffa: Arab defeatism
"And there was an unwillingness to fight. One reason was the fear among Arab males that there would be no compensation or support for their widows and orphans. 311 People simply preferred to flee.
The refugees have no illusions. They refuse to endanger themselves [by staying in or returning to] Jewish areas. Their flight is spontaneous, not organised . . . [It causes] fright. There is no... use preaching against the exodus. People are fleeing to Nablus, to Nazareth, even to Egypt. 312
Haganah posters, threatening revenge and retribution, further undermined morale. 313 There was a ‘general feeling’ that Husseini ‘wanted to sacrifice Jaffa in order to stir up the Arab world against the Jews and against partition’.314 The efforts of the local NC and militia units to stem the floodtide of refugees – including the imposition of fines and property confiscations – failed. 315"
"A major landmark in the town’s demoralisation was the LHI’s 4 January 1948 demolition of the town hall (saraya), which housed a militia headquarters, with a powerful car bomb, which left dozens of dead 316 Utilities and municipal services broke down. With the flight of middle and upper class families, businesses closed and unemployment became rife. 317 HIS reported:
The town’s main markets, that in the past were crowded, are today desolate, the coffee shops are empty and the cinema houses closed. Road- blocks, with barbed wire, have been set up in the centre of town [and] . . . on its borders. The people in Jaffa live in fear – of the Jews’ bombs and internecine Arab attacks. Many Arabs, who lived on the peripheries . . . have left their places. It is estimated that from Manshiya alone fled three thousand families. Most moved to the old town, to the Nuzha and ‘Ajami [neighbourhoods]. They took over the houses by force and these houses are now crowded as in every room live more than ten people. Many families have left for Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Cyprus and Egypt.318
Trains to and from Jaffa stopped running. 319 Labourers stopped commuting to Tel Aviv, aggravating the unemployment. The local leaders became despondent. They put no trust in the contingents of foreign volunteers and many ‘loudly proclaimed’ that they wanted King Abdullah to conquer Palestine. At the same time, the Husseinis silenced Opposition figures.320 The Lebanese consulate in Jerusalem reported that Heikal had said:
that the situation in Jaffa has reached its worst [sic]. The Arabs he added were about to raise the white banners of surrender . . . for lack of ammunition and the general feeling [morale?] was completely broken down [sic] after the last big explosion [i.e., the saraya] . . . and if . . . the Jews wanted . . . they could conquer the whole town without great difficulties. The economic situation is so bad that it could not be described . . . 321
An Arab informant told Sasson: ‘There is no work. Whoever could leave, has left, there is fear everywhere, and there is no safety. Robbery and theft are common’, and the NC had lost its authority and was expected to resign. 322"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jaffa: Attempts for truce
"Through January, and perhaps also early February 1948, important Jaffa notables sought a truce. But the Haganah was reluctant. As in Haifa, the Haganah had the upper hand and had no intention of letting Jaffa live in peace so long as the Arabs in other places, principally in Jerusalem, did not allow the Jews to live in peace. Moreover, the Jewish commanders believed, with justification, that concluding a truce with Jaffa’s civilian leaders would not necessarily lead to a cessation of operations by the irregulars. 328
And rifts among the Jaffa Arabs from the beginning subverted all efforts at peacemaking. In February, Ben-Gurion wrote to Shertok that Heikal, through a British intermediary, was trying to secure an agreement with Tel Aviv but that the new irregulars’ commander, ‘Abdul Wahab ‘Ali Shihaini, had blocked him. The mayor had said ‘that without agreement, Jaffa [would] be entirely destroyed’. According to Ben-Gurion, Shihaini had answered: ‘I do not mind [the] destruction [of] Jaffa if we secure [the] destruction [of] Tel Aviv.’ 329
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jaffa: Behaviour of irregulars
As in Haifa, the irregulars intimidated the local population, echoing the experience of 1936–1939. ‘Most of the people who stayed with their commander, ‘Adel Nijam ad Din, behaved towards the inhabitants like conquerors. They confiscated their weapons and sold them, imposed fines and stole, and confiscated cars and sold them . . . The inhabitants were more afraid of their defenders-saviours than of the Jews their enemies’, wrote Nimr al Khatib. 330"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jaffa: Partial siege
"Between January and mid-April 1948, Haganah conquest of the town was out of the question; the British, it was understood, would prevent it. The Haganah restricted itself to a partial siege, limited reprisals and occasional harassment. It refrained from massive retaliation – save for the night of 12–13 February, when its units struck simultaneously at Abu Kabir, Jibalya and Tel a Rish, and the outlying village of Yazur...
These attacks, the general exodus and the withdrawal of the Iraqi and Syrian contingents prompted Heikal to make one last effort to save his city: he travelled to Amman to persuade King Abdullah to move Arab Legion units into Jaffa on 15 May or earlier. 342 By mid-April, HIS estimated that a full 50 per cent of the townspeople had fled. 343 The increasing efforts of the NC to stem the flow – including increased taxation against the evacuees (a tax on furniture, of P£12, was now added to the tax or ransom paid for each departee) – proved of no avail. Most of the important families had left – the Abu Khidras for Gaza, the Nabulsis and Dajanis for Egypt, the ‘Abd al Wahims for Beirut, the Baidases for Nablus. Without doubt, the flight of the middle and upper classes served to further demoralise the remaining masses. There was large-scale unemployment and those still in the city engaged in theft and looting to maintain their families. Food, while available, had soared in price; a sack of flour cost P£14 (a month before it had cost P£7). Relations between the various remaining leaders and between the various militia groups were bad.344"
"The Jewish population felt vulnerable and somewhat abandoned. Immediately following the passage of the resolution, the Jewish neighbourhoods, mostly in the western part of town, came under sniper fire from Arab quarters and, during the following months, the community was gradually strangulated by the blockade of the main road to Tel Aviv. By the end of March, despite the convoy system and occasional British military assistance, the city’s Jewish districts were under almost complete siege. However, the Haganah and the smaller IZL and LHI units in the town were relatively well-armed and organised, and in the fighting which erupted, the Arab neighbourhoods along the ‘seam’ between the two communities and the semi-isolated Arab quarters in mostly Jewish western Jerusalem, repeatedly hit by raids and mortar fire, were the ones that collapsed and emptied of their inhabitants. (But Jewish ‘seam’ neighbourhoods also were partially evacuated: in early January 1948, for example, some 75 per cent of the residents of north Talpiyot and Mekor Hayim had evacuated and one-third of the residents of Arnona and central Talpiyot. 345 )
Six weeks into the hostilities, on 10 January, Haganah intelligence tapped a revealing telephone conversation, between Dr Husayn Khalidi, the AHC and NC member, and an Arab merchant identified as ‘Abu Zaki’: ‘Everyone is leaving me. Six [AHC members] are in Cairo, 2 are in Damascus – I won’t be able to hold on much longer . . . Jerusalem is lost. No one is left in Qatamon, Sheikh Jarrah has emptied, people are even leaving the Old City. Everyone who has a cheque or a little money – is off to Egypt, off to Lebanon, off to Damascus’, said Khalidi. 346 Khalidi’s exaggerations regarding the extent of the flight were themselves symptomatic of the panic that had taken hold. Three days earlier, Haganah intelligence had reported that Arabs who turned to the authorities for arms were being turned away; there simply were none to hand out. In the Old City, the core of Arab Jerusalem, there were ‘depression, despair and anarchy’, and most of the population was unemployed. ‘Some say that it were better to turn to [King] Abdullah or even that the British stay in the country.’347"
"But the massive unemployment caused a rash of thefts and robberies as the poor couldn’t buy the produce in stock. 354 The government initially provided flour rations to each NC for distribution; but Arabs had robbed shipments of flour from government trains, so the high commissioner stopped the supply. 355 Apparently, there was also politically motivated discrimination in the distribution of the flour ration and some bakers were filling the bread with ‘other, strange and bad, elements’. 356 The Arab inspector responsible for the flour distribution to retailers, Martin Hadad, apparently stole large quantities and went into business for himself – selling ‘at inflated prices’, some apparently to Jews.357"
"The NC had organised a fund-raising campaign to cover war costs, including guard duty in each neighbourhood. Christian Arabs often felt they were being over-taxed or subject to extortion. But some Arabs simply paid P£2-3 per month to be exempted from guard duty (harking back to corrupt practices under the Ottomans). 358 There were also gangsters among the guard contingents who exploited their position to rob and steal. HIS reported that occasionally they would start shooting to precipitate panic and flight; then they would plunder the houses just abandoned.359 Irregulars also intercepted and robbed food shipments – as happened to one car-load of eggs and chickens bound for Jerusalem in early February. 360"
"The exodus of the Arabs from western Jerusalem can be said to have begun on 30 November, with the evacuation, in trucks, of three or four families from the mixed neighbourhood of Romema, which dominated the western entrance to the city and the beginning of the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv road. According to HIS-AD, the departees explained their evacuation as ‘preparatory to [military] operations on the part of the Arabs’. 366 The same day, a group of Arabs apparently ‘advised’ Jewish residents to leave the area’. 367 A week before, the Arab inhabitants of a house in Ethiopia Street in downtown (west) Jerusalem had ‘received instructions’ – apparently from Arab authorities – to evacuate and move to an Arab area; hostilities were imminent. 368"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Beginning of hostilities
"Hostilities began on 1 December, with Arab gunmen and stone throwers attacking Jewish buses at the Jaffa Gate and Mahane Yehuda and with a mob attack, on 2 December, against the downtown New Commercial Centre, where dozens of shops and workshops were torched and looted, and 24 Jews were injured. British troops and police failed to intervene against the rioters but arrested 16 Haganah men who had. 369 That night, IZL men reportedly looted Arab shops in west Jerusalem370 and a Jewish mob set fire to the Rex Cinema and adjoining Arab houses.371"
"On 4 December, some Arab families evacuated Lifta and several Jewish families evacuated the mixed, prosperous district of Talbiye, in the centre of west Jerusalem. 374 Lifta was apparently told by Arab authorities to evacuate its women and children and to prepare to house a militia company. A gang of some 20 oriental Jewish youths and a Jewish mob, consisting, according to Haganah observers, of ‘some 200 persons, children and adults from oriental communities’, rampaged in downtown west Jerusalem, torching Arab shops. 375 British police and Haganah men apparently tried to stop them. More Arab families were seen evacuating Romema.376 In Jerusalem’s Old City, some 1,500 of the Jewish Quarter’s 3,500 Jewish inhabitants (almost all ultra-orthodox) fled in organised fashion to west Jerusalem while Arab families living in and around the quarter moved to Arab areas, many of their homes (and some Armenians’ homes) being quickly garrisoned by Arab militiamen.377 By the second week of December, firefights between the seam neighbourhoods and inside the Old City were a daily occurrence; Arab irregulars began ambushing traffic along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road; and IZL operatives began to throw bombs at Arab crowds inside the city.378 Arab families were reported evacuating the Qatamon and Mekor Hayim neighbourhoods. The Mekor Hayim evacuees told Jewish interlocutors that they had been ‘ordered’ to do so, presumably by Arab authorities. 379 Jewish families in the southern Jerusalem neighbourhood of Talpiyot were ‘advised’ by Arab neighbours to evacuate their homes; they refused.380"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Romema
"The cycle of violence that precipitated Romema’s evacuation began with attacks on Jewish traffic leaving Jerusalem and the Haganah killing on 24 December of Atiya ‘Adel, the owner, from Qaluniya village, of the petrol station at Romema who, using a motorcycle, doubled as a scout and informant for the Arab irregulars about Jewish convoys. 392 The following day, villagers avenged the attack by throwing a grenade at a Jewish bus. From then on, there were daily exchanges of fire in and around Romema (and Lifta) and the Haganah, IZL and LHI repeatedly raided the two sites. Romema was struck by two Haganah raids on the night of 26 December393 and by the IZL (which destroyed a petrol station and coffee shop, killing at least five Arabs) on 27 December. 394 Some inhabitants apparently evacuated under British protection and in orderly fashion.395 By the beginning of January, HIS reports spoke of Romema as empty396 though some militiamen had apparently stayed and inhabitants kept returning, at least for brief visits, to inspect their property. 397 Threatening letters and telephone calls by the Haganah and LHI also, apparently, contributed to the neighbourhood’s depopulation. 398"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Talbiye
"Talbiye, southeast of Rehavia, contained a mixture of prosperous Jewish and (mainly Christian) Arab families who had lived in relative harmony before 1948. The hostilities gradually undermined the coexistence, though for a time both groups tried to preserve it in face of the tide of belligerence washing over the city. At the start of January, a meeting of the neighbourhood’s Arabs decided to boycott Arab peddlers, saying that ‘they introduced conflict into the neighbourhood. They decided to call on the Jews to join them in this’. 407 They also proposed setting up a joint Arab-Jewish-British police station in situ. 408 But the Arabs came under growing pressure from Arabs outside, who ‘informed [them] that they would take revenge against them if they kept up the good relations with the Haganah and [continued] giving [the Haganah] men tea’. When the Talbiye Arab housewives went shopping in the neighbouring German Colony area, irregulars from Hebron threatened them ‘that the time would come when they would arrange [through provocations] that the Jews kill them . . . Many Christians want to leave their homes and the city but have been warned that if they do this, [other Arabs] will destroy their houses and steal all their possessions.’ And Jews, too, occasionally intimidated the inhabitants, according to one HIS-AD report. Some families living in Karm al Ruhban, an area adjoining Talbiye to the west, were ‘told’ by Jews in early February to leave their homes. Specifically, a group of 10–13 Jews entered the home of George Mashbak, searched it and ‘behaved rudely. Similarly, the Wahaba family received a warning to leave immediately.’ 409 By 20 January, Zablodovsky was able to report that ‘Talbiyeh is . . . increasingly becoming Jewish, though a few Arabs remain’.410
The Arab attack on 10 February on Yemin Moshe, a Jewish neighbourhood just east of Talbiye, proved decisive...Either during the battle or immediately in its wake, Arab families were seen evacuating Talbiye with their belongings. 412 On 11 February, a Haganah car mounting a loudspeaker ‘drove around Talbiye and warned the Arabs of Haganah retaliation. The Arabs began to flee.’ The Arab national institutions opposed the flight and, using threats and persuasion, ‘demanded that the inhabitants stay put and summoned the [British] Army. When the police arrived . . . they arrested the car’s passengers.’ The Arab authorities apparently feared that once established in Talbiye, the Haganah would push southwards, taking additional Arab, or partly Arab, neighbourhoods, such as the German Colony and Bak‘a. 413 Some Talbiye Jews told their neighbours ‘that they had nothing to fear’ – but ‘60–70 [Arab] families left’, only three remaining. The Arab authorities were highly critical, saying that the evacuation had been ‘shameful and hurried’. Moreover, there was talk of taking revenge ‘against the rich Arabs “who had cooperated with the Jews in Talbiye”. All efforts to persuade the inhabitants to stay had failed and the feeling of shame is great.’414 The AHC decided – and apparently publicised – that every Talbiye house abandoned by its owners would pass under its control and would be garrisoned by irregulars. 415 But additional families left during the following days 416 and while a number of families were reported to have returned (perhaps only temporarily to guard or pack and collect belongings),417 in effect the neighbourhood had been evacuated. A few Arab males remained, ‘sitting on their packed belongings and ready to leave at a moment’s notice’. The Arab city OC had forbidden them to leave. The remaining Arabs sought to persuade the Haganah to agree to deem Talbiye a neutral, non-combat zone. 418 The Haganah apparently declined and they eventually departed."
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Defeatism
"Already by mid-January, ‘a spirit of depression and panic’ had gripped the Arab districts of Jerusalem, reported the Haganah; the mere rumour of a Jewish bomb led to panic flight from whole neighbourhoods. Even the non-prosperous were beginning to flee and the AHC was imposing heavy fines on the relatives of those leaving the country. Many Christians were saying out loud that ‘Jewish rule was better than the rule of the [Husseini] extortionists’.419"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Qatamon
"Qatamon, another prosperous, almost completely Arab neighbourhood, was largely abandoned during the first four months of the civil war. The neighbourhood’s handful of Jewish inhabitants left during the war’s first weeks, either out of fear or under Arab intimidation. 433 The Haganah reported Muslim Arabs leaving Qatamon already on 10 December 434 and ‘Lower Qatamon’ empty – with the British assisting the evacuation – by the beginning of January. 435 But the main precipitant to flight during the first months was, without doubt, the Haganah raid on the night of 5–6 January, in which the Semiramis Hotel was blown up. The Haganah believed that several irregulars’ commanders lived there and, possibly mistakenly, that the hotel served as the neighbourhood militia HQ. 436 Some two dozen Arabs – who may have included several Iraqi irregulars 437 – died in the explosion (as did the Spanish vice-consul, Manuel Allende Salazar). The Mandate Government denied that the hotel had served as an Arab militia HQ and condemned the attack as ‘dastardly and wholesale murder’.438 Cunningham called in Ben-Gurion for a dressing down; he called it ‘an offence to civilisation’ and the Haganah perpetrators, ‘murderers’. Ben-Gurion, ‘clearly upset’, said that the operation ‘had been carried out without central direction’. 439 The JA officially expressed ‘regret at the loss of innocent lives’ but criticised the government’s public announcement, saying that it had failed to condemn similar Arab outrages.440 Ben-Gurion informed Cunningham that the Haganah officer responsible – deputy Jerusalem OC Mishael Shechter (Shaham) – had been removed from command. 441
The operation had a shattering effect on Qatamon’s morale. It ‘deepened the sense of insecurity . . . Many who previously spoke of the Palestine question and of defending the country to their last drop of blood pass in the street with bent heads and are ashamed to look their friends in the face.’ 442 Immediately after the explosion, HIS reported that
many families are leaving [Qatamon], some for Egypt, some for Lebanon . . . Many decided that . . . the Husseinis had pulled them into a maelstrom . . . The economic situation is very bad. There are no eggs, no bread, etc. The explosion of the houses in the area had instilled fear in all the people of Qatamon. They argue that the Jews are well-organised economically and the Arabs cannot withstand such organisation. 443
Most of those fleeing were women, children and the old. 444 The Arab authorities tried to stem the flight445 and many of the young men who had fled to the Old City returned to Qatamon. 446 Some veteran inhabitants held on: ‘Whenever we saw people moving away, we tried to encourage them to stay’, recalled Hala Sakakini. ‘We would tell them: “You ought to be ashamed to leave. This is just what the Jews want you to do; you leave and they occupy your houses and then one day you will find that Qatamon has become another Jewish quarter!” ’ 447 But gradually, most of the neighbourhood emptied, families moving to the Old City or out of town altogether; a few moved to the southern end of Qatamon, around the Iraqi consulate, which was defended by an Arab Legion contingent. 448 LHI and Haganah raiders blew up additional Qatamon houses on the nights of 9 and 13 March. 449 By the end of March, only a handful of families remained, guarded by irregulars based in the San Simon Monastery, near the Iraqi consulate.450"
The First Stage of the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Jerusalem: Conclusion
"The major precipitant of the flight of the bulk of the Arab inhabitants in western and southern Jerusalem were Jewish military attacks and fears of attack. A secondary factor, without doubt, were Christian–Muslim and (in part overlapping) Opposition–Husseini, tensions, with Christian and Opposition families – the majority in these neighbourhoods – assailed by Muslim militia suspicions, intimidation and extortion. The spectre of 1936–1939, in which Husseini gunmen had terrorised Opposition and Christian families, was prominently in their minds. 454 There was also a more general fear of the future."
"The first village to be fully evacuated in the Tel Aviv area was Summeil, just north of the city, on 25 December. The villagers moved to nearby Jammasin, probably causing demoralisation among their hosts. 466 Some villagers had evacuated Jammasin already on 1 December. 467 Arab authorities ordered traditionally friendly Jammasin to stop trading with the Jews; 468 no doubt the inhabitants felt trapped between a rock and a hard place. The village appears to have tried to keep out irregulars but within weeks ‘small armed gangs’ of outsiders were spotted in its alleyways by Haganah scouts, and on 2 January they began sniping at passing Jewish buses. The Haganah sent in a patrol. It en- countered an Arab who asked whether it was dangerous to stay. The Jews responded ‘that there was nothing to fear’. The Arab said that all the women, children and farm animals had been evacuated to ‘Arab Abu Kishk, a large village to the north, and only troublemakers and militia- men had remained.469 That day or the next, the remaining inhabitants began ‘to leave in panic’. 470 The village mukhtar, along with the mukhtar of nearby Summeil, were reportedly in detention in Jaffa for trafficking with the Jews.471 The remaining inhabitants left in March-April, moving to Kafr Qasim and Jaljulya. 472"
The beginning of the Exodus of the Arab rural population: December 1947 to March 1948: Sheikh Muwannis
"As we have seen, in the area immediately to the north, the large village of al Sheikh Muwannis, just north of the Yarkon River, and the large tribe of ‘Arab Abu Kishk, living between the Yarkon and Herzliya-Ra‘anana, had accepted Haganah protection during the first weeks of the war, and agreed to live in peace and keep out irregulars. The two communities – the Abu Kishk had migrated to Palestine from Egypt in the mid-19th century and by 1948 were largely fellahin, living in houses or huts, though many still lived in tents – had traditionally enjoyed friendly relations with their neighbours. (But relations had not always been easy. In 1946 three men from Sheikh Muwannis had raped a Jewish girl. Parallel to Mandate court proceedings, the Haganah had shot and wounded one of the attackers and then kidnapped and castrated one of the others (and then deposited him in a hospital 473 ).) The start of hostilities in
the area gradually undermined these relations. Inhabitants were seen leaving Sheikh Muwannis, which dominated Tel Aviv’s airfield, Sdeh Dov, and the main Tel Aviv-Haifa coast road, already on 1 December 1947 474 but, by and large, the villagers stayed put, trusting in their agreement with the Haganah. The villagers rejected a request from Jaffa’s AHC leader Rafiq Tamimi that they set up their own NC. 475 During January- February, shots were occasionally (and inconsequentially) fired from Sheikh Muwannis or its environs in the direction of Jewish houses. The villagers quickly proffered this or that explanation, and the Haganah kept its peace. Nonetheless, they agreed to move some inhabitants who were living, probably temporarily, in a plot of land just south of the Yarkon River. The Haganah allowed the villagers to fish in the river (which was adjacent to Tel Aviv).476 Abu Kishk refused to allow entry to ALA irregulars, telling their emissary that ‘the Arabs of the area will cooperate with the Jews against any outside force that tries to enter’. 477 The ALA area commanders in Qalqilya, Madlul Bek and Sa‘id Bek, apparently knew of, and accepted, Abu Kishk’s relations with the Jews (‘given [Abu Kishk’s] special position’) and were themselves unenthusiastic about initiating hostilities. They had promised to inform Abu Kishk before any large scale ALA attack.478 One notable, Tawfiq Abu Kishk, was instru- mental in brokering a ceasefire between the settlement of Magdiel and the Arab village of Biyar Adas. 479 By mid-March, fearful that ALA units would enter the area, the Alexandroni Brigade imposed a ‘quarantine’ around Sheikh Muwannis, Abu Kishk and two smaller, satellite villages, Jalil al Shamaliya and Jalil al Qibliya 480 and Alexandroni even considered purchasing several houses in Sheikh Muwannis to house a small garrison.481 It is possible that several houses on the edge of the village were actually occupied by Alexandroni. 482
But Alexandroni’s cordon sanitaire may have had an additional purpose: to protect Sheikh Muwannis from IZL and LHI depredations 483 – for on 12 March LHI gunmen kidnapped five village notables. The inhabitants, according to HIS-AD, thus ‘learned that it was not sufficient to reach an agreement with the Haganah and that there were “other Jews” [i.e., dissidents] of whom one had to beware and perhaps of whom to beware of more than of the Haganah, which had no control over them’. 484 Sheikh Muwannis was gripped by fear. On 22 March the refugees from Summeil and Jammasin were seen evacuating Sheikh Muwannis485 and the Haganah’s Arab affairs experts reported that the villagers themselves ‘wanted to leave but stayed in place because of pressure by Jaffa’s NC’. Sheikh Muwannis was said to be ‘waiting for orders’ from the NC. 486 Haganah policy, as enunciated by Galili, remained unchanged – to leave in place and protect the Arab communities ‘in the enclaves’, inside Jewish-dominated territory. 487 And the kidnapped notables appear to have been released already on 23 March into Haganah hands and returned to Sheikh Muwannis.488 But the confidence of the inhabitants of the swathe of villages north of the Yarkon had been mortally undermined. During the following days, the inhabitants of Sheikh Muwannis and Abu Kishk began to evacuate and move to Qalqilya and Tulkarm489 after giving ‘power of attorney’ to Yosef Sutitzky of Petah Tikva to negotiate Haganah protection for their abandoned properties.490 Tawfiq Abu Kishk and his men held a large, parting 'banquet’ with their Jewish friends on 28 March; ‘the sheikh took his leave from the place and the [Jewish] people with moving words’. 491 For their part, the Yishuv’s leaders almost immediately set about allocating Sheikh Muwannis’s lands for Jewish use.492
A few days later, the Abu Kishk leaders explained their evacuation as stemming from ‘(a) the [Haganah] roadblocks . . . , (b) the [Haganah] limitations on movement by foot, (c) the theft [by Jews?] of vehicles, and (d) the last kidnapping of Sheikh Muwannis men by the LHI’. 493"
The beginning of the Exodus of the Arab rural population: December 1947 to March 1948: Qisarya
"As we have seen, Haganah policy until the end of March was non-expulsive. But there were one or two local, unauthorised initiatives. In early January, in the Hadera-Hefer Valley area, certain Jews apparently issued a ‘severe warning’ to their Arab neighbours ‘to leave their present.
And there was one authorised expulsion. The inhabitants of Qisarya, south of Haifa, lived and cultivated Jewish (PICA) and Greek Orthodox church lands. One leading family evacuated the village on 10 January. 519 Most of the population left – apparently for neighbouring Tantura – immediately after the 31 January LHI ambush of a bus that had just pulled out of Qisarya in which two Arabs died and eight were injured (one of the dead and several injured were from the village). 520 The Haganah decided to occupy the site because the land was PICA-owned. 521 But after moving in, the Haganah feared that the British might eject them. The commanders asked headquarters for permission to level the village. 522 Yitzhak Rabin, the Palmah’s head of operations, opposed the destruction – but he was overruled. On 19–20 February, the Palmah’s Fourth Battalion demolished the houses. The 20-odd inhabitants who were found at the site were moved to safety and some of the troops looted the abandoned homes. 523 A month later, the Arabs were still complaining to local Jewish mukhtars that their stolen money and valuables had not been returned.524 The Qisarya Arabs, according to Aharon Cohen, had ‘done all in their power to keep the peace . . . The villagers had supplied agricultural produce to Jewish Haifa and Hadera . . . The attack was perceived in Qisarya – and not only there – as an attempt by the Jews to force them (the Arabs) living in the Jewish area, to leave . . .’ 525
But some evacuations were precipitated by Arab orders or advice. In late December 1947, the Arab guards in Jewish groves around Hadera were ordered by the regional NCs, reportedly fearing for their safety, to move out along with their families, and some reportedly left. 526 Jaramla was partially evacuated in early February ‘on the order of the [Arab] gangs’ and finally abandoned, out of ‘fear’, on 1 April. 527 The inhabitants of Bureika, southeast of Zikhron Ya‘akov, were apparently ordered at the beginning of March by the AHC to evacuate so that the village might serve as a base for attack by irregulars on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road. 528 But most or all of the villagers appear to have stayed put."
"‘There is a tendency among our neighbours . . . to leave their villages’, Yosef Weitz wrote on 31 March 1948 to JNF chairman Avraham Granovsky (Granott). Weitz was writing after a visit to the North. He cited the departure of the inhabitants of (traditionally friendly 529 ) Qumya in the Jezreel Valley.530...
The Arab ‘tendency’ to depart was promoted by Weitz himself. Soon after the start of hostilities, he realised that the circumstances were ripe for the ‘Judaisation’ of tracts of land bought and owned by Jewish institutions (JNF, PICA) on which Arab tenant farmer communities continued to squat. Under the British, the Yishuv had generally been unable to remove these inhabitants, despite offering generous compensatory payments. Indeed, on occasion, Arab tenant farmers accepted compensation and then continued to squat. The conditions of war, anarchy and gradual British withdrawal in early 1948, Weitz understood, at last enabled the Yishuv to take possession. Often there was pressure by Jewish neighbours to remove the tenant farmers so that they could take hold of the land. Weitz related that at the end of March, settlers from Nahalal, the Beit Shean (Beisan) Valley and Kfar Yehezkeel had come to him to discuss ‘the problem of our lands . . . and their liberation from the hands of tenant farmers. We agreed on certain lines of action . . .’. 532
However, Weitz was not merely the voice of the Jewish settlements; he was an executive, an initiator of thinking and policy. His views on how to solve the tenant problem began to crystallise in early January. After meeting with JNF officials in the North, Weitz jotted in his diary:
Is not now the time to be rid of them [he was referring specifically to tenant farmers in Yoqne‘am and Daliyat ar Ruha]? Why continue to keep in our midst these thorns at a time when they pose a danger to us? Our people are considering [solutions]. 533"
"In March, Weitz, on his own initiative, began to implement his solution. First he tried, and failed, to obtain an HGS decision in principle to evict the tenants. Then, using his personal contacts in the settlements and local Haganah units, and HIS officers, he organised several evictions. At Yoqne‘am, southeast of Haifa, he persuaded HIS officer Yehuda Burstein to ‘advise’ the local tenant farmers and those in neighbouring Qira wa Qamun to leave, which they did. Weitz and his JNF colleagues in the North then decided to raze the tenants’ houses, to destroy their crops and to pay the evictees compensation. 535 At the same time, he organised with the settlers of Kibbutz Kfar Masaryk the eviction of the squatting Ghawarina beduin in Haifa Bay, and the eviction of small tenant communities at Daliyat ar Ruha and Buteimat, southeast of Haifa. 536
Towards the end of March, Weitz began pressing the military-political leadership – Galili, Ben-Gurion and Shkolnik – for a national-level decision to expel the Arabs from the partition plan Jewish state area, but his continuous representations and lobbying met with resistance or deflection: The leaders either rejected, or were unwilling to commit themselves to, a general policy of expulsion. 537 Weitz was left privately to promote local evictions. On 26 March, for example, at a meeting with JNF officials, he called for the expulsion of the inhabitants of Qumiya and neighbouring Tira, arguing that they were ‘not taking upon themselves the responsibility of preventing the infiltration of irregulars . . . They must be forced to leave their villages until peace comes.’ 538"
"The Arab reactions to the first months of the exodus were confused and uncoordinated – mirroring the confusion and lack of cooperation between the Arab states, between the states, the AHC, the NCs and the municipalities, between the various civilian authorities and the different armed bands, and between the various local militias and bands of irregulars.
The exodus at first appeared merely to reproduce what had happened in 1936–1939, when 25-40,000 Palestinians had temporarily fled the country. 549 As then, the evacuees who reached the Arab states during the first months of the war were mainly middle and upper class families, whose arrival was barely felt and was certainly not burdensome to the host countries. The rural evacuees from the Coastal Plain and the north mainly headed, at least initially, for Arab centres of population and villages to the east, inside Palestine (Nazareth and ‘the Triangle’). Most of the evacuees probably regarded their dislocation as temporary.
Hence, until the end of March, the exodus had only a slight impact In the Arab states and troubled their leaders little, if at all. The states did nothing to precipitate flight from Palestine, but, feeling obliged to accept fellow Arab refugees from a holy war with the Jews, they also did nothing, initially, to bar entry to the refugees. Indeed, before the war, in September 1947, the Arab League Political Committee, meeting in Sofar, Lebanon, had resolved that ‘the Arab states open their doors to absorb babies, women and old people from among Palestine’s Arabs and to care for them – if events in Palestine necessitate this’. 550 Some Arab leaders may have begun to display a glimmer of concern.551 But Arab League decisions were binding and so it was only natural that during the war’s initial months, the Arab states would by and large refrain from barring refugees from their territory, even though the AHC generally opposed the exodus and argued against giving refugees entry visas. 552
On 8 January, the AHC issued a proclamation denying allegations that it had ordered the evacuation of civilians from certain areas, claiming that it had endorsed only the evacuation of children and the old from villages on the firing line. Women, the proclamation stated, should stay put and help their fighting menfolk. 553
The problem was that not only dependants but army-age males were also leaving. But their numbers initially were too small to cause major concern, and it was only in the second half of March 1948 that the Arab governments began to address the problem. Around 22 March, the Arab governments apparently agreed among themselves that their consulates in Palestine would issue entry visas only to old people, women, children and the sick. Lebanon ordered that its borders be closed to Palestinians other than women and children. 554 In Haifa, it was reported on 23 March, the local Lebanese and Syrian consulates refused to give visas to ‘the many’ Haifa inhabitants who applied that day.555
But as seen from Palestine, the problem was far from marginal. Already in December 1947 we find the AHC and various NCs struggling against the exodus. There was especial concern about the flight of army-aged males. On 24 December an informant told the HIS that there was ‘a secret directive [presumably from the AHC] . . . forbidding all Arab males capable of participating in the battle to leave the country. A trip abroad will require the personal permission of the Mufti.’ 556 Rich families, mostly Christian, but also Arabs of ‘lower classes’, according to HIS, were also leaving. The AHC was ‘doing its best to prevent trips abroad’ and was forcing family members of those who had left for Syria or Egypt to pay ‘very high taxes’.557 In late January, British military intelligence noted that the AHC was worried by the phenomenon. Those who had left, the British reported, had been ordered by the Mufti to return home ‘and, if they refuse, their homes will be occupied by other [foreign] Arabs sent to reinforce [defenses] . . .’. 558 The Haganah made propaganda capital in its Arabic broadcasts out of the flight of the wealthy – and the AHC ‘Public Instruction Department’, headed by Abdullah Rimawi, issued a disclaimer, saying that the ‘Arabs emigrating abroad were not fleeing but merely joining the fighters’ camp [i.e., being trained before returning to fight] or travelling on national business’. 559 (The AHC apparently was not worried about movement from one part of Palestine to another, only by departures from the country.560)"
The Arab authorities' responses to the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: NC's prevent flight
"In each town, the NCs oversaw daily life, and in each neighbourhood its representatives or local militia groups put the guidelines into effect. By and large, the NCs, sometimes at AHC urging, sometimes independently, tried to combat the exodus, occasionally punishing departees by burning abandoned belongings or confiscating homes. 562 In Jerusalem’s Musrara neighbourhood, for example, the local militiamen in early January 1948 forbade the inhabitants from evacuating and told them to ‘guard their houses like the Jews [guard theirs]’.563 A few days later, after the demolition of the Semiramis Hotel, an order went out to ‘the youth of Qatamon to return to their places’. But few returned and the commander of the local militia threatened to resort to ‘drastic means’. He further threatened with fines and corporal punishment parents who prevented their children from returning.564 By late March, a fair number had been dragooned into returning565 and no one was being issued a permit to leave. One person was allowed to take his family to Lebanon but was forced to pay P£1,000 to the NC and had to promise that he himself would return.566 In Jerusalem’s Talbiyeh neighbourhood, ‘the Arab institutions tried every means of persuasion and threat to have the inhabitants stay but with no success’. 567 Indeed, the AHC decided that any house abandoned would ‘pass into its control’ 568 but the inhabitants ‘were continuing to evacuate . . .’.569
In Haifa, the NC already on 14 December 1947 decided to ‘issue . . . a warning concerning movement out of the city’. 570 In January, the preacher Sheikh Yunis al Khatib ‘attacked the rich who had fled the city out of fear that money would be demanded of them to finance those harmed [in the fighting]. He declared that according to Islamic law the property of anyone fleeing a jihad should be expropriated.’ 571 In Jaffa, too, the NC imposed fines on would-be leavers, and threatened to confiscate the property of departees.572"
The Arab authorities' responses to the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Inconsistency and failure of Arab policy
"But just as often, NCs or ALA commanders ordered villagers to evacuate villages for this or that reason. Usually, as in the case of the ALA and Sabbarin in early March, 576 and Jerusalem and Beit Safafa at about the same time,577 the militiamen wanted the villagers to evacuate so that their houses would be available to irregulars for bivouac or as positions. At other times, the evacuation was prompted by an unwillingness to leave communities under Jewish control, as with the order in December 1947 by the Tulkarm NC to the ‘Arab al Balawina to ‘be ready to leave their place at any moment’ 578 and, in February 1948, to the ‘Arab al Fuqqara ‘to leave’ (‘but they refused’) 579 and, more generally, to ‘all the Arabs in the area . . . to leave their places, and it is being carried out’. 580 A similar order was issued by the Gaza NC to the Wahidat beduin. 581
During December 1947 – February 1948, the Mufti and the AHC and most of the NCs did not mount a clear, consistent and forceful campaign against the exodus. The struggle against flight was at best lackadaisical. Perhaps some officials were not overly perturbed by a phenomenon that was still relatively small-scale. Perhaps, also, the Husseinis were not altogether unhappy with the exodus of many middle and upper class families who were traditionally identified with the Opposition. Moreover, the early exodus included Husseini-affiliated families and included many AHC members: to condemn them too strongly for fleeing might prompt backbiting within the Husseini camp. In general, the Palestinian leaders were quicker to condemn flight from villages than from the towns. In addition, the AHC had only an infirm grip in many localities. The fact that the Mufti disapproved of flight was no assurance that local NCs or irregulars would do much to stop it. As we have seen, the local leaderships and militias often had their own set of concerns and priorities. In various areas, especially in the cities, NCs were hampered in halting the exodus by the fact that many of the evacuees were from among their own kith and kin. Indeed, NC members were prominent among the evacuees. Nonetheless, in general, the local leaderships and militia commanders, whether in obedience to the AHC or independently, discouraged flight, even to the extent of issuing formal threats and imposing penalties, but it all proved of little avail.
A major reason for the failure of the Arab institutions to stem the exodus was the provision endorsed by the states, the Mufti and some of the NCs regarding women, the old and children. Husseini at times explicitly permitted and even encouraged the evacuation of women, children and old people from combat zones or prospective combat zones in order to reduce civilian casualties – in line with pre-war Arab League directives. He may also have believed, mistakenly, that the departure of dependents would heighten the males’ motivation to fight.
It was only in March 1948 that Husseini issued detailed, direct, personal orders to the NCs to halt the exodus. Husseini wrote to the NC of Tiberias:
The AHC knows that a large number of Palestinians are leaving the country for the neighbouring ‘sister’ countries . . . because of the situation . . . The AHC regards this as flight from the field of honour and sacrifice and sees it as damaging to the name of the holy war movement and damages the good name of the Palestinians in the Arab states and weakens the aid of the Arab peoples for the Palestinian cause, and leaves harmful traces in the economy and commerce of Palestine in general.
. . . The Arab governments have complained to the AHC in this matter.
The AHC has studied this important question from all angles and has decided that the good of the nation requires the Palestinians to continue their activities and work in their own country and not to leave it except in the event of necessity for the general good such as [reasons of] political or commercial or medical importance, with the consent of the AHC in consultation with the national committees.
Husseini added that ‘in areas where there was real danger to women, children and old people, they should leave the area for areas far from the source of the danger’. Those nonetheless wishing to travel out of the country should submit a request to their local NC, the NC would study it, and then pass it on, with a recommendation, to the AHC offices in Cairo or Jerusalem – and the AHC would then decide. 582
A similar (or identical) order went out to Jerusalem’s NC. The gist was: ‘The Mufti knows that a large number of Arabs is leaving the country. He opposes this because this exodus creates a bad impression about Pales tine’s Arabs in public opinion in the Arab states.’ Husseini wrote that only people with ‘an important political, economic or medical reason’ would be allowed to leave. In the event that there was danger in one part of Palestine, it was permissible to move women and children to other, safer parts, ‘but on no account should Arabs be allowed to leave Palestine’. 583 On 29–30 March, HIS reported that ‘the AHC was no longer approving exit permits for fear of [causing] panic in the country’. 584 On 31 March, a Galilee HIS officer was reporting: ‘Every Arab leaving the country is regarded as a traitor and would be put on trial in Syria. Everyone wishing to leave the country had to obtain permission from the Arab [National] Committee in Haifa.’ 585 The HIS surmised that it was this spate of orders that prompted Syria and Lebanon to close their borders to refugees toward the end of March.586"
The Arab authorities' responses to the Exodus: December 1947 to March 1948: Conclusion
"In general, NC members who had remained in Palestine regarded the exodus with misgivings. Their approach was perhaps embodied in an article in Al Sarikh, an Iraqi-financed Jaffa paper, on 30 March:
The inhabitants of the large village of Sheikh Muwannis and of several other Arab villages in the neighbourhood of Tel Aviv have brought a terrible disgrace upon all of us by quitting their villages bag and baggage. We cannot help comparing this disgraceful exodus with the firm stand of the Haganah in all localities in Arab territory . . . Everyone knows that the Haganah gladly enters the battle while we always flee from it.588"
"The Arab evacuees from the towns and villages left largely because of Jewish – Haganah, IZL or LHI – attacks or fear of impending attack, and from a sense of vulnerability. The feeling prevailed that the Arabs were weak and the Jews very strong, and there was a steady erosion of the Arabs’ confidence in their military power. Most of the evacuees, especially the prosperous urban families, never thought in terms of permanent refugeedom and exile; they contemplated an absence similar to that of 1936–1939, lasting until the hostilities were over and, they hoped, the Yishuv was vanquished. They expected the intervention, and possibly victory, of the Arab states.
Only an extremely small, almost insignificant number of the refugees during this early period left because of Haganah or IZL or LHI expulsion orders or forceful ‘advice’ to that effect. Many more – especially women, children and old people – left as a result of orders or advice from Arab military commanders and officials. Fears for their safety rather than a grand strategy of evacuation underlay these steps. And few were ordered or advised to leave Palestine; generally, the orders or advice were merely to move to safer areas within the country, where Arabs were demographically predominant.
Neither the Yishuv nor the Palestine Arab leadership nor the Arab states during these months had a policy of removing or moving the Arabs out of Palestine. With the exception of tenant farmers, the few expulsions that occurred were dictated by Jewish military considerations; the cases where Arab local commanders ordered villages to be wholly evacuated were motivated by both military and political considerations.
In general, before April 1948, the Palestinian leadership struggled, if not very energetically, against the exodus. The AHC and, by and large, the NCs opposed the flight. But there was no stopping it."
"The Yishuv looked to the end of March with foreboding: Its back was to the wall in almost every sense. Politically, the United States appeared to be withdrawing from its earlier commitment to partition, and was pressing for ‘trusteeship’ – an extension of foreign rule – after 15 May. Militarily, the Palestinian campaign along the roads, interdicting Jewish convoys, was slowly strangling West Jerusalem and threatening the existence of clusters of outlying settlements. The Galilee Panhandle settlements could be reached only via the Jordan Valley road and the Nahariya–Upper Galilee road; both were dominated by Arab villages. Nahariya and the kibbutzim of Western Galilee were themselves cut off from Jewish Haifa by Acre and a string of Arab villages. Haifa itself could not be reached from Tel Aviv via the main coast road as a chain of Arab villages dominated its northern stretch...The British evacuation, which would remove the last vestige of law and order in the cities and on the roads, was only weeks away, and the neighbouring Arab states were mobilising to intervene. The Yishuv was struggling for its life; an invasion by the Arab states could deliver the coup de grace.
It was with this situation and prospect in mind that the Haganah chiefs, in early March, produced ‘Tochnit Dalet’ (Plan D), a blueprint for securing the emergent Jewish state and the blocs of settlements outside the state’s territory against the expected invasion on or after 15 May. The battle against the militias and foreign irregulars had first to be won if therewas to be a chance of defeating the invading armies. To win the battle of the roads, the Haganah had to pacify the villages and towns that dominated them and served as bases of belligerency: Pacification meant the villages’ surrender or depopulation and destruction. The essence of the plan was the clearing of hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the territory of the prospective Jewish State, establishing territorial continuity between the major concentrations of Jewish population and securing the future State’s borders before, and in anticipation of, the invasion. The Haganah regarded almost all the villages as actively or potentially hostile."
"Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine’s Arabs: 1 It was governed by military considerations and geared to achieving military ends. But, given the nature of the war and the admixture of populations, securing the interior of the Jewish State and its borders in practice meant the depopulation and destruction of the villages that hosted the hostile militias and irregulars.
The plan called for ‘operations against enemy settlements which are in the rear of, within or near our defense lines, with the aim of preventing their use as bases for an active armed force’. Given Palestine’s size and the nature of the war, almost every village in or near the territory of the prospective Jewish state sat astride a main road or a border area or was located on or near one of the Arab armies’ potential axes of advance. Plan D provided for the conquest and permanent occupation, or levelling, of villages and towns. It instructed that the villages should be surrounded and searched for weapons and irregulars. In the event of resistance, the armed forces in the village should be destroyed and the inhabitants expelled. In the event of non-resistance, the village should be disarmed and garrisoned. Some hostile villages were to be destroyed ‘([by] burning, demolition and mining of the ruins) – especially . . . villages that we are unable to permanently control’. The Haganah wanted to preclude their renewed use as anti-Yishuv bases. 2
The plan gave each brigade discretion in its treatment of villages in its zone of operations. Each brigade was instructed:
In the conquest of villages in your area, you will determine – whether to cleanse or destroy them – in consultation with your Arab affairs advisers and HIS officers . . . You are permitted to restrict – insofar as you are able – cleansing, conquest and destruction operations of enemy villages in your area.3
The plan was neither understood nor used by the senior field officers as a blanket instruction for the expulsion of ‘the Arabs’. But, in providing for the expulsion or destruction of villages that had resisted or might threaten the Yishuv, it constituted a strategic–doctrinal basis and carte blanche for expulsions by front, brigade, district and battalion commanders (who in each case argued military necessity) and it gave commanders, post facto, formal, persuasive cover for their actions. However, during April–June, relatively few commanders faced the moral dilemma of having to carry out the expulsion clauses. Townspeople and villagers usually fled their homes before or during battle and Haganah commanders rarely had to decide about, or issue, expulsion orders (though they almost invariably prevented inhabitants, who had initially fled, from re- turning home after the dust of battle had settled).
In effect, Plan D was carried out during the eight weeks following 2 April. But most of the units mounting these offensives and counter- offensives were unaware that they were, in fact, carrying out parts of the grand design; most thought in terms of their own, local problems and perils, and their amelioration. Only the Alexandroni Brigade, responsible for the Coastal Plain from just north of Tel Aviv to just south of Haifa, appears from the start to have regarded its offensive operations, starting in early April, as parts of Plan D. "
"Plan D aside, there is no trace of any decision-making by the Yishuv’s or Haganah’s supreme bodies before early April in favour of a blanket, national policy of ‘expelling the Arabs’. Had such a decision in principle been taken by the JAE, the Defence Committee, the HNS or the HGS, it would have left traces in the documentation. Nor – perhaps surprisingly, in retrospect – is there evidence, with the exception of one or two important but isolated statements by Ben-Gurion, of any general expectation in the Yishuv of a mass Arab exodus from the Jewish part of Palestine. Such an exodus may have been regarded by most Yishuv leaders as desirable; but until early April, it was not regarded as likely or imminent. When it did occur, it surprised even the most optimistic and hardline Yishuv executives, including such a leading advocate of transfer as Yosef Weitz. On 22 April 1948, he visited Haifa, witnessed the start of the mass flight from the city, and wondered about ‘the reason . . . Eating away at my innards are fears . . . that perhaps a plot is being hatched [between the British and the Arabs] against us . . . Maybe the evacuation will facilitate the war against us.’ The following day, he wrote: ‘Something in my unconscious is frightened by this flight.’ 5 A few weeks later, Ben-Gurion told his cabinet: ‘Acre has fallen and not many Arabs have remained in it. This phenomenon is difficult to understand. Yesterday I was in Jaffa – I don’t understand how they left such a city . . .’ 6 Ben-Gurion was especially surprised by the rural evacuations: ‘. . . the assumption [among us] was that a village cannot be moved from its place, but the fact is that Arab villages were evacuated also where there was no danger. Sheikh Muwannis [for example] was not imperiled and nonetheless was evacuated.’
But a vital strategic change occurred during the first half of April: Clear traces of an expulsion policy on both national and local levels with respect to certain key districts and localities and a general ‘atmosophere of transfer’ are detectable in statements made by Zionist officials and officers. They are discernable, too, in the actions of Haganah units around the country. A vital shift occurred in the mindset of the political and military leadership. During 4–9 April, Ben-Gurion and the HGS, under the impact of the dire situation of Jewish Jerusalem and the ALA attack on Mishmar Ha‘emek, and under pressure from settlements and local commanders, decided, in conformity with the general guidelines of Plan D, to clear out and destroy the clusters of hostile or potentially hostile villages dominating vital axes...
As one IDF intelligence officer coyly put it: ‘There is an opinion that we must step up the eviction of Arabs from the territory of the State of Israel as it renders Arab administrative functioning far more difficult and, as well, the morale of the population declines with each new wave of refugees.’ 8"
"In general, the decision about the movement back into the area of Arabs who had left was postponed until the next meeting (the local OCs were ordered to set up roadblocks to ‘check’ incoming Arabs, implying that all or some would be permitted to enter). Should a unit, for military reasons, have to set up positions on Arab-owned lands, the owners should be ‘told and promised’ that there ‘is no intention to harm their property [or their rights over it].’ Lastly, a decision regarding the possible displacement of tenant-farmers from Jewish-owned lands was postponed, pending talks with the JNF. In other words, at the end of March, the advisers were still unclear about future relations with the local Arabs and the implication was that the status quo – with Arabs continuing to live in the Jewish areas or moving back into them – was to be maintained...
By 6 April, when the advisers met again, the policy had substantially changed. ‘An explicit order was issued that Arabs were not to be allowed into the area to reap [grain crops]’, and those ‘who had evacuated the area were not to be allowed back . . .’, it was decided."
"On 4 May, Ben-Gurion, in a public speech, spoke of the ‘great ease’ with which the Arab masses had fled their towns and villages (while the Yishuv, to date, had not abandoned a single settlement). ‘History has now shown’, he said, ‘who [i.e., which people] is really bound to this land and for whom this land is nothing but a luxury, to be easily abandoned.’19 But Zionist agency had considerably contributed to the Arabs’ demoralisation. During April, the HGS’s ‘Psychological Warfare Department’ had prepared and recorded six speeches, which were broadcast time and again by the Haganah’s radio station and loud- speaker vans...None of the recordings called upon the Arabs to flee. 20 But they were desiged to cause demoralisation – and HGS\Operations proposed to ‘exploit’ this demoralisation (it didn’t say how).21 "
"Alongside the mainstream ‘atmosphere of transfer’ and the Haganah’s general guideline and tendency to drive out Arabs and destroy villages along main roads and border areas, there surfaced during April–June a secondary tendency or counter-policy – to leave in place friendly or surrendering Arab communities. This tendency, which never became official Yishuv or Haganah policy and only infrequently guided the executive agencies in their operations, centred around the person of Bechor Shitrit, from 15 May Israel’s minister of police and minority afairs, and his Minority Ministry officials. Mapam’s Arab Department and certain Mapam kibbutzim also periodically acted as spoilers, curtailing the unfettered activation of the mainstream tendency.
Already on 22 April, the authorities – probably the JA-PD Arab Division – issued a set of formal guidelines relating to the occupation of surrendering villages: ‘In the course of events, we may face the phenomenon of surrendering villages or individuals who demand [Haganah] protection and the right to stay in the Jewish area.’ If the appellants live ‘in the border area or front line they must be moved to the rear’, where they could be properly guarded, states the guideline. Once transferred inland, their freedom of movement would have to be restricted and they should not be allowed contact with other Arabs, for reasons of intelligence. The Haganah was cautioned that ‘in every case of an approach to receive Jewish protection [hasut], it must be carefully weighed whether the Arabs can be left in place or [have to be] transferred to the rear’. 22 However, these guidelines were generally not taken seriously by Haganah units, though the inhabitants of a handful of surrendering villages at this time were ultimately allowed to remain."
"Less than three weeks later, on 10 May, Shitrit submitted a memorandum to the People’s Administration (the JAE’s successor as the Yishuv’s ‘Cabinet’), within days to become the ‘Provisional Government of Israel’. It appears that the memorandum was never debated by that body, which had its hands full preparing for the declaration of statehood and the impending invasion. The document was entitled ‘Memorandum of the Ministry for Minority Affairs, Subject: The Arab Problem’. The Zionist leaders had long announced their desire to live in peace with their neighbours and to give them ‘equal civil rights’, wrote Shitrit. The Jewish people, which had suffered centuries of oppression, would be judged according to how it treated its own minority. It was incumbent upon the new state to protect the property abandoned by the Arabs who had fled and ‘to maintain fair and proper relations with those who had stayed or who will want to stay among us or return [to live] among us’. Shitrit acknowledged that ‘criminal deeds’ had been committed in places captured by the Yishuv; he alluded specifically to looting. But the Zionist leadership had to look to the future and had to ‘restrain our evil drives’.
Shitrit demanded that matters relating to Arab property and existing communities be placed under his jurisdiction, including ‘the evacuation’ of villages, ‘the return of Arabs to their places’, and the ‘cooption [of Arabs] in government institutions and in the state’s economy if circumstances allow’. Close cooperation must be instituted with the defence forces.
IDFA files contain a second document produced at this time, possibly also by Shitrit or his officials, detailing the requisite behaviour of the military upon conquering an Arab towns and villages. The memorandum called for the immediate cooption into the staff of the IDF governor of any occupied zone a Minority Ministry official. Contact should immediately be established with the local Arab authorities; outsiders and combatants should be arrested and arms, fuel and vehicles confiscated. The authorities should provide the inhabitants with food and medical care, if necessary. ‘It must be remembered that cooperation with the local population will save on manpower needed for other operations’, states the memorandum. Places of worship and holy sites should be protected. The memorandum drew a sharp distinction between sites within the partition borders and communities outside them. Within the Jewish state, ‘governors’, not ‘military governors’, should be appointed. 24
The assumptions underlying these memoranda were that Israel would not oppose the continued presence within the state of (peaceful) Arab communities, that there would be a sizable minority, and that Israel would be open to a return of Arab refugees. But this was not, and not to be, the policy of the mainstream leadership. However, neither did Ben-Gurion, the People’s Administration\Provisional Government nor the Haganah\IDF GS formally adopt or enunciate a contrary policy. So Shitrit was left believing, or partly believing, that his guidelines were acceptable to Ben-Gurion and his colleagues – and briefly and hap- hazardly acted upon them. But the decisive institutions of state – the Haganah\IDF, the intelligence services, the kibbutz movements – as we shall see, acted in a contrary manner, promoting the Arab exodus in a variety of ways. It took Shitrit months to catch on and, reluctantly, follow suit.
Shitrit was only marginally effective in imposing his benign will, as the Haganah\IDF moved from conquest to conquest. By and large, in the countryside, military commanders were unhappy about leaving in place Arab communities, whom they would have to garrison, guard against and protect from Jewish depredation. So they normally didn’t. "
"The Giv‘ati, Harel and Yiftah brigades almost invariably ascertained that no Arab inhabitants remained in areas they had just conquered; the Golani Brigade, on the other hand, acted with far less consistency."
"Whatever the reasoning and attitudes of the Arab states’ leaders, I have found no contemporary evidence to show that either they or the Mufti ordered or directly encouraged the mass exodus of April–May. As to the Palestinian leaders, it may be worth noting that for decades their policy had been to hold fast to the soil and to resist the eviction and displacement of communities. But two qualifications are necessary. During April, the AHC and some NCs stepped up their pressure on villages in various areas and in some towns to send away women, children and the old to safety, and in some areas there was compliance. And in several areas, Arab military or political leaders ordered the complete evacuation of villages.
During April, the irregulars and at least some of the NCs, apparently at the behest of the AHC, continued to promote, either out of inertia or in line with reiterated policy, the departure from combat and potential combat zones of women, children and the old. Ben-Gurion took note – and explained (regarding Coastal Plain villages): ‘Possibly it is being done because of pressure from the gangs’ commanders out of Arab strategic needs: Women and children are moved out and fighting gangs are moved in.’ 37"
"Until the last week of April, the AHC and the Arab governments, at least publicly, did not seem to be unduly perturbed by the exodus. ‘Azzam Pasha, secretary general of the Arab League, to be sure, in April used the flight and the massacre at Deir Yassin (see below) to drive home anti- Zionist propaganda points, but there seems to have been no feeling that something momentous was happening. The Arab states did nothing: en large, they acted neither to aggravate the exodus nor to stem it. 95"
"The AHC during April and May was probably driven by a set of contradictory interests. On the one hand, its members – almost to a man out of Palestine by the end of April – were unhappy at the sight of the steady dissolution and emigration of their society. The exodus dashed their hopes of a successful Palestinian resistance to the Yishuv. On the other hand, led by the Mufti, by late April they understood that all now depended on the intervention of the Arab states. Husseini well knew the essential fickleness of the Arab leaders, and understood that Egypt’s Farouk, Jordan’s Abdullah, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Riad Solh and the rest were not overly eager to do battle in Palestine. Husseini may well have reasoned, as 15 May approached, that the bigger the tragedy, the greater would be the pressure – by public opinion at home, by the other states and by the demands of Arab ‘honour’ – on these leaders to abide by their commitment to intervene. Nothing would bind them to their word like a great Palestinian disaster. Moreover, the AHC was unhappy at the prospect of Arab communities surrendering and accepting Jewish rule. Pulled hither and thither by such considerations, during April and the first half of May Husseini and the AHC remained largely silent about the unfolding exodus.
Given the lack of clear direction from the Arab states and the AHC, the burden of decision-making fell mainly on the shoulders of local leaders, both civil and military. It is largely to the local leadership, therefore, that one must look for decision-making concerning staying or leaving by this or that Arab community during April 1948. Local leaders may have been motivated in part by what they thought the AHC would want them to decide, as in Haifa on 22 April, but in general, they were left to their own devices.
In most cases, the NCs during April–May acted to curb flight from their localities, especially of army-aged males. In Jerusalem, in late April the NC ordered militiamen to stop vehicles with fleeing inhabitants and to haul them back, 96 and issued the following communique:
There are people sowing false rumours and as a result [have] forced some Arabs to leave the city . . . These rumours help the enemy in our midst . . . The committee declares herewith that the state of Arab defences in the towns is relatively strong, and it demands of the citizens not to pay attention to the false rumours and to stay in their places. 97
The committee also resolved to punish satellite villages from which there was unauthorised flight; the villagers were ordered to ‘stay in place and not leave’. 98 In mid-May, as the Haganah occupied areas in central Jerusalem and threatened the Old City, masses of Arabs assembled in front of the NC building, demanding permits to leave. NC officials ‘refused’ and armed men were sent after vehicles fleeing the town without permits.99
Haifa’s NC acted similarly. The chairman appealed to NC members who had left to return 100 and threatened shopkeepers who had left that it would revoke their licenses. 101 Jaffa’s NC tried to halt flight by imposing fines and threatening property confiscation. Departing families were forced to pay special taxes. 102 The efforts to halt the evacuation seem to have ended with the IZL attack of 25–27 April"
"A few days before, perhaps under the cumulative impact of the fall of Arab Haifa and the mass evacuation of Jaffa, ALA headquarters in Ramallah issued a blanket proscription against flight. The Arab states, too, suddenly awakened to the problem. Already in late April, the Haganah noted that Abdullah was pressing beduin refugees from the Beit Shean Valley to return home. 124 On 5–6 May, the ALA, in radio broadcasts and newspapers, forbade Ramallah area villagers from leaving their homes: The homes of fleeing villagers would be demolished and their fields confiscated. Inhabitants who had fled were ordered to return.125 Jordan endorsed the order. According to the Haganah, the population of Ramallah was about to take flight, so the ALA was blocking the roads out: ‘The Arab military leaders are trying to stem the flood of refugees and are taking stern and ruthless measures against them’, reported the Haganah. On 5 May, Radio Jerusalem and Damascus Radio broadcast the ALA orders to those who had fled to ‘return within three days’.126 Haganah Radio, capitalising on the order, on 6 May broadcast that ‘in an endeavour to put a stop to the flight . . . the Arab command has issued a statement warning that . . . any Arab leaving . . . will be severely punished’. 127
During 5–15 May, King ‘Abdullah, ‘Azzam Pasha, and, more hesitantly, the AHC, in semi-coordinated fashion issued similar announcements de- signed to halt the flight and induce refugees to return. A special appeal, also promoted by the British Mandate authorities, was directed at the refugees from Haifa. On 15 May, Faiz Idrisi, the AHC’s ‘inspector for public safety’, issued orders to Palestinian militiamen to fight against ‘the Fifth Column and the rumour-mongers, who are causing the flight of the Arab population’. On 10–11 May, the AHC called on officials, doctors and engineers who had left to return and on 14–15 May, repeating the call, warned that officials who did not return would lose their ‘moral right to hold these administrative jobs in the future’. Arab governments began to bar entry to the refugees – for example, along the Lebanese border. 128
By the end of May, with their armies fully committed, the Arab states (and the AHC) put pressure on the refugee communities encamped along Palestine’s frontiers to go home. According to monitored Arab broadcasts, the AHC was arguing that ‘most of the [abandoned] villages had been made safe thanks to Arab victories’. 129 However, the sudden pan-Arab concern came too late, was never enunciated as official policy and was never translated into systematic action. Moreover, the Arab League Political Committee persisted in prodding member states to ‘grant asylum . . . to women, children and the elderly’ (while urging them to bar adult males).130 Having failed to halt the mass exodus at birth, the states proved powerless to curb its momentum, let alone reverse the process."
"The borders had become continuous front lines with free-fire zones separating the armies, and the victorious Yishuv was resolved to bar a return. Thus, the pressure by some of the Arab countries to push the refugees back across the borders, reported by IDF intelligence in early June, had little effect.131 And by August, indeed, the AHC was arguing against the repatriation of the refugees lest this would represent ‘recognition of the State of Israel’ and place repatriates at the mercy of the Jewish authorities. 132 But in the main, what the Arabs states, the AHC, the ALA, the NCs and the various militias did or did not do during April–June to promote or stifle the exodus was only of secondary importance; the prime movers throughout were the Yishuv and its military organisations. It was their operations that were to prove the major precipitants to flight."
"On 4 December 1947, a leading notable, Sheikh Naif Tabari – the Tabaris, originating in Ajlun, Transjordan, were the town’s most prosperous and respected family 133 – initiated talks with local Jewish leaders to conclude a local ‘peace pact’. 134 Nonetheless, Arab families, fearing trouble, began to leave their homes, some moving to purely Arab neighbourhoods and others, such as the small Shi‘ite community, leaving town altogether.135 Jewish families also fled the predominantly Arab ‘Old City’; by early February 1948, only a quarter of the Old City’s Jews were still in place...
The Tabaris, who controlled the NC, consistently stymied efforts by hotheaded youngsters to unleash hostilities 137 and preached peaceful coexistence.138 Yosef Nahmani, one of the Jewish community leaders and head of the JNF office in eastern Galilee, confirmed that they sought continued peace though Jewish youngsters were continually provoking the Arabs, which could lead to an ‘explosion’ and ‘a disaster’, he warned...
the NC, led by Sidqi Tabari, met with the town’s Jewish leaders, including Mayor Shimon Dahan, and concluded a non-belligerency agreement.139 But both the ‘mindless’ local Haganah commanders, ac- cording to Nahmani, and the shabab, according to the HIS, were un- happy with the pact. 140 Nonetheless, quiet was restored and one visiting HIS-AD operative was struck by how Arabs, including beduin, moved about freely in the Jewish markets, rode on Jewish buses, and conducted commerce with Jews, as if the two communities ‘know or hear nothing of what is happening between the Jews and the Arabs in the rest of the country’.141
The fragile truce collapsed in mid-March. Shooting erupted in down- town Tiberias on the 12th, apparently following efforts by Jewish policemen to disarm Arabs. The fighting went on intermittently for three days and the leaders of the two communities met in the town hall on 14 March. The Arabs charged that the Jews had provoked the shooting and Nahmani, in his heart (and diary), ‘endorsed the Arabs’ charges’. 142 Quiet resumed, with Israel Galili apparently endorsing the new pact: ‘It’s good that you’ve done this’, he told the Tiberias Jewish leaders, ‘because we have plenty of fronts and we would rather not spread ourselves [too thin].’ 143...
The (final) battle of Tiberias began on 8–9 April, when shooting once again erupted in the downtown area. On 10 April the Haganah bombarded ‘the Arab population [i.e., residential area]’ with mortars. 147 The British tried to mediate a truce but failed...The orders were ‘to destroy the enemy concentration’ in the village. During the four-hour skirmish, in which the Haganah met unexpected resistance, most of the population fled to Tiberias, and the village was occupied. The Haganah recorded 22 Arabs killed, six wounded and three captured (Haganah casualties were two lightly wounded).148 The Arabs subsequently alleged that ‘there had been a second Deir Yassin’ 149 in Nasir ad Din – and, indeed, some non-combatants, including women and children, were killed.150 The arrival of the Nasir ad Din refugees helped to undermine the morale of Arab Tiberias. 151 Nahmani reacted by jotting down in his diary:
I cannot justify this action by the Haganah. I don’t know whether there was justification for the assault and the killing of so many Arabs. The flight of the women and children of the village in panic made a bad impression on me.152
The British had not intervened in Nasir ad Din. The Haganah decided to pacify Arab Tiberias, which blocked the road to the Galilee Panhandle settlements. 153 On the night of 16\17 April, units of Golani and the Palmah’s 3rd Battalion, freshly introduced into Tiberias, attacked in the Old City, using mortars and dynamite, blowing up eight houses. The attack caused ‘great panic’. Arab notables apparently sued for a truce but the Haganah commanders refused to negotiate; they wanted a surrender.154 The Arabs appealed to the British to lift the Haganah siege on the Old City and to extend their protection to the Arab neighbourhoods. The British said that they intended to evacuate the town within days and could offer no protection beyond 22 April...
On 21 April, an HIS-AD officer reported that one of Tiberias’s militia leaders, Subhi Shahin Anqush, had left Tiberias on 17 April and had returned the following day ‘with a large number of buses from various Arab [transport] companies in Nazareth’. This might indicate that the idea of a complete evacuation had germinated on 17 April – rather than at British suggestion on 18 April. 158 It was Shahin, according to the HIS officer, who had made sure, using ‘threats and force’, that the evacuation of Tiberias would be complete after some 700 inhabitants had initially wanted to raise ‘the white flag’ and stay put. 159...
One Golani intelligence officer was sufficiently intrigued, or perturbed, to write during the following days a two-page analysis and explanation entitled ‘Why the Arabs had Evacuated Tiberias’. Strikingly, he made no mention at all of Arab orders (or even rumours of orders) from ‘outside’ or ‘from on high’ or of advice by the British, as the cause of the exodus. It was, he explained, the end result of a cumulative process of demoralisation. The exodus, which, he argues, began immediately after Nasir ad Din, was caused by (a) a sense of military weakness, stemming from the diffusion of power among three separate, and often rival, militias; (b) economic conditions, worsened by Haganah control of the access roads into town, and price rises; (c) societal ‘rottenness’ and the flight of the leaders; (d) the non-arrival of reinforcements from the hinterland; (e) the steadfastness of the Haganah contingent in the Old City, which held on, despite British threats and Arab siege and harassment; (f) the fall of Nasir ad Din and the demoralisation caused by the arrival of its refugees, with their ‘imaginative oriental stories’ of Jewish atrocities; and (g) the successful Haganah offensive of 16–18 April, which had included the demolition of the Tiberias Hotel. 160"
"In any event, at around noon on 18 April, a de facto truce took hold and the British imposed a four-hour curfew...That evening, a Golani patrol reported: ‘We have completed a reconnaissance of the whole of the lower city. There are no strangers [i.e., Arabs] on the site.’ The unit reported that it was guarding Arab shops and homes against looting. ‘Our morale is high.’163
But within hours, ‘the Jewish mob descended upon [the evacuated areas] and began to pillage the shops . . . The looting was halted by the armed intervention of the Jewish police . . .’ 164 HIS-AD reported that both Jewish residents and Haganah soldiers participated in the ‘robbery, on a large scale. There were disgusting incidents of robbery by commanders and disputes among people who fought over the loot.’ The looting continued intermittently during the following days and several malefactors were arrested; 165 a number were seriously injured by
Haganah troops. In one incident, a Haganah man shot a Sephardi looter (who later died). The largely Sephardi townspeople remarked ‘that the Ashkenazis shoot only Sephardis . . .’. Looting was resumed on 22 April, when the Haganah and the police completely lost control. 166 Nahmani jotted down in his diary:
Groups of dozens of Jews walked about pillaging from the Arab houses and shops . . . The Haganah people hadn’t the strength to control the mob after they themselves had given a bad example . . . [It was as if] there was a contest between the different Haganah platoons stationed in Migdal, Genossar, Yavniel, ‘Ein Gev, who came in cars and boats and loaded all sorts of goods [such as] refrigerators, beds, etc. . . . Quite naturally the Jewish masses in Tiberias wanted to do likewise . . . Old men and women, regardless of age . . . religious [and non-religious], all are busy with robbery . . . Shame covers my face . . .167"
"The Jewish troops had not been ordered to expel the Arab inhabitants, nor had they done so. Indeed, they had not expected the population to leave. At the same time, once the decision had been taken and once the evacuation was under way, at no point did the Haganah act to stop it...
Three days later, Jamal Husseini informed the UN that the Jews had ‘compelled the Arab population to leave Tiberias’ Years later, the OC of the Golani Brigade obliquely concurred when he recalled that the brigade’s conquest of the key Arab military position in the town had ‘forced the Arab inhabitants to evacuate’. 170 On the other hand, Elias Koussa, a Haifa Arab lawyer, in 1949 charged that ‘the British authorities forcibly transported the Arab inhabitants [of Tiberias] en masse to [sic] Transjordan.’ Instead of forcefully restoring order in the town, as was their ‘duty,’ they had ‘compelled the Arabs to abandon their homes and belongings and seek refuge in the contiguous Arab territory’. 171 How- ever, to judge from the evidence, the decision to evacuate Tiberias was taken jointly by the local Arab leaders and the British military authorities. It is possible that the idea of evacuation, under British protection, was first suggested by British officers – but it was the Arab notables who had decided whether to stay or go. The British unwillingness – actually, inability – to offer long-term protection and their announcement of impending withdrawal probably acted as spurs. The flight, before and at the start of the battle, of leading Tiberias notables, the real and alleged events at Nasir ad Din (reinforced by news of the massacre, a week before, in Deir Yassin) and the Haganah conquest on 10 April of the village of al Manara, to the south, cutting the road to Jordan, all probably contributed to the exodus.172"
"The departure of the town’s Arabs, who before the war had numbered 65,000, by itself accounted for some 10 per cent of the Arab refugee total."
"The mass exodus of 21 April – early May must be seen against the backdrop of the gradual evacuation of the city by some 20,000–30,000 of its inhabitants, including most of the middle and upper classes, over December 1947 – early April 1948; most NC members and municipal councillors, and their families, were among the departees. Haifa was especially vulnerable to the gradual closure of the Mandate Government camps, installations and offices, which sharply increased unemployment during March–April. 180 This, and the months of skirmishing, bombings, food shortages (especially of flour and bread) and sense of isolation from the Arab hinterland, had combined to steadily unnerve the remaining population.181
During the first week of April, Palmah intelligence reported, 150 Arabs were leaving a day. 182 Sometime during the first half of April, NC chair- man Rashid al Haj Ibrahim, left, apparently after quarrelling with the new militia commander, the Lebanese Druse officer Amin ‘Izz a Din Nabahani.183 Haganah intelligence reported that ‘more than 100’ militiamen, mostly Syrians and Iraqis, who had failed to receive their wages, left during the third week of April. 184 "
"Plan D called for the consolidation of the Jewish hold on the mixed cities by
gaining control of all government property and services, the expulsion of the Arabs from the mixed districts and even from certain [all-Arab] neighbourhoods that endanger our lines of communication in these cities or that serve as staging grounds for attack. Also [Plan D called for] the sealing off of the Arab population – in a part of the city that will be surrounded by our forces.
The plan assigned the neutralisation of Arab Haifa to the Carmeli Brigade, which was specifically instructed
to conquer and take control of Elijah’s Cave, the Old City, the German Colony, Jaffa Street, the old and new commercial districts, Nazareth Street, Wadi Rushmiya, the ‘shacks neighbourhood’ [i.e., Ard al Ghamal] and [the village of] Balad al Sheikh. 188"
"According to Nimr al Khatib, in ‘the early morning’ of 21 April a British officer had informed the NC of the ‘impending’ British redeployment. 194 Similar informal notice may have been given to the Haganah. More formally, Stockwell at 10:00 hours summoned Jewish and, subsequently, Arab leaders and handed them a prepared statement announcing the redeployment, which had already been completed. He asked both to end the hostilities and vaguely promised British assistance in maintaining peace and order. At the same time, he said that the British security forces would refrain from involvement in the clashes. 195
The sudden British redeployment triggered a hurried consultation in Carmeli headquarters. During the morning and early afternoon Mivtza Bi‘ur Hametz (Operation Passover Cleansing) was hammered out. In part, it was based on a plan drawn up in late March, Pe‘ulat Misparayim (Operation Scissors), which had provided for a multi-pronged assault on militia positions and the neutralisation of the irregulars’ power to disrupt traffic and life in the Jewish neighbourhoods. The objective of Scissors was to damage and shock rather than to conquer; Operation Passover
Cleansing aimed at ‘breaking the enemy’ by simultaneous assault from several directions, ‘to open communications to the Lower City [i.e., the downtown area and the port] and to gain control of Wadi Rushmiya in order to safeguard the link between Haifa and the north . . .’. 196 The planning did not call for, or anticipate, the conquest of most of Arab Haifa; the Carmeli commanders, led by brigade OC Moshe Carmel, deemed such an objective over-ambitious and probably unattainable, because of Arab strength and possible British intervention."
"In preparation for the assault, around midnight 21\22 April, the Haganah had let loose with a 15-minute, 50-round barrage of heavy mortars on the lower city, triggering ‘great panic . . . and the mass exodus began’. Further barrages were released periodically during the night and in the morning of 22 April. By the early afternoon, the attacks had broken the back of Arab resistance. Hours earlier, at 09:00, 22 April, Haganah units had reached Hamra Square and found it deserted: ‘All was desolate, the shops closed, no traffic . . . only several sick old Arab men and women moved about, confused.’198
Just before, at 06:00, a mass of Arabs had rushed into the harbour, and by 13:00 some 6,000 had boarded boats and set sail for Acre. A Palmah scout, who had been in the (Arab) Lower City during the battle, later reported:
[I saw] people with belongings running toward the harbour and their faces spoke confusion. I met an old man sitting on some steps and crying. I asked him why he was crying and he replied that he had lost his six children and his wife and did not know [where] they were. I quieted him down and told him that he mustn’t cry so long as he knew nothing [of their fate]. It was quite possible, I said, that the wife and children were transported to Acre but he continued to cry. I took him to the hotel . . . [and] gave him P£2 and he fell asleep. Meanwhile, people [i.e., refugees] arrived from Halissa . . .199
The panic-stricken rush of inhabitants from the Lower City into the harbour was later described by Nimr al Khatib:
Suddenly a rumour spread that the British army in the port area had declared its readiness to safeguard the life of anyone who reached thport and left the city. A mad rush to the port gates began. Man trampled on fellow man and woman [trampled on] her children. The boats in the harbour quickly filled up and there is no doubt that that was the cause of the capsizing of many of them. 200"
"The Haganah command issued orders to the troops to treat places of worship with respect, especially mosques, and to refrain from looting. 203
Throughout, the Haganah made effective use of Arabic language broadcasts and loudspeaker vans. Haganah Radio announced that ‘the day of judgement had arrived’ and called on the inhabitants to ‘kick out the foreign criminals’ and to ‘move away from every house and street, from every neighbourhood, occupied by the foreign criminals’. The Haganah broadcasts called on the populace to ‘evacuate the women, the children and the old immediately, and send them to a safe haven’. 204 The vans announced that the Haganah had gained control of all approaches to the city and no reinforcements could reach the embattled militiamen, and called on the Arabs to lay down their arms, urging the irregulars ‘from Syria, Transjordan and Iraq’ to ‘return to [their] families’. 205
Jewish tactics in the battle were designed to stun and quickly over- power opposition; demoralisation was a primary aim. It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units. The mortar barrages and the psychological warfare broadcasts and announcements, and the tactics employed by the infantry companies, advancing from house to house, were all geared to this goal. The orders of Carmeli’s 22nd Battalion were ‘to kill every [adult male] Arab encountered’ and to set alight with firebombs ‘all objectives that can be
set alight. I am sending you posters in Arabic; disperse on route.’ 206"
"Towards the end of April, one branch of British intelligence assessed that ‘the hasty flight of Amin Bey ‘Izz a Din . . . [was] probably the greatest single factor’ in the demoralisation of the Arab community. 211 This was also the judgement of the High Commissioner. On 26 April, Cunningham devoted a whole telegram to Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones on the flight of the leaders from Haifa and Jaffa.212 The British view was succinctly expressed on 6 May: ‘The desertion of their leaders and the sight of so much cowardice in high places completely unnerved the [Arab] inhabitants [of Haifa].’ 213 American diplomats sent Washington similar reports: ‘The Arab Higher Command all [reportedly] left Haifa some hours before the battle took place.’ Vice-consul Lippincott was comprehensively contemptuous of the Arab performance: ‘The Haifa Arab, particularly the Christian Arab . . . generally speaking . . . is a coward and he is not the least bit interested in going out to fight his country’s battles.’ 214"
"Against the backdrop of militia collapse and mass flight, early on the morning of 22 April members of the NC asked to see Stockwell with ‘a view to . . . obtaining a truce with the Jews’. Stockwell contacted lawyer Ya‘akov Salomon, the Haganah liaison, and asked to know the Jewish ‘terms [for an Arab] surrender’. Carmel was astounded; the Arabs, though strongly pressed, did not appear on the verge of collapse. The situation did not seem to warrant surrender ‘and the idea of our complete conquest of all of Haifa still appeared so fantastic as to be incomprehensible’. Nonetheless, Carmel jotted down terms and sent them to Stockwell, ‘who . . . said that he thought they were fair . . . and the Arabs would accept them . . .’. 217"
"According to the British reports, the Arabs merely sought Stockwell’s help in obtaining a truce, but the delegation feared that some might see this as a treacherous surrender. Hence, they wanted the onus to fall on the British. Stockwell had to be manoeuvred into declaring that the Arabs had been ‘forced’ to accept a truce. The Arabs would ask the British to fight the Haganah or allow in reinforcements; Stockwell would refuse; and the Emergency Committee, bowing to force majeure, would accede to the truce terms. This, at least, is how Stockwell viewed the meeting. ‘They felt that they in no way were empowered to ask for a truce, but that if they were covered by me, they might go ahead.’ The general recorded that the Arabs ‘wanted [him] to say’ that he would not intervene against the Haganah or allow in Arab reinforcements. Stockwell did as he was asked: He stated that he could not intervene or allow in reinforcements. 220 From the Stockwell and Marriott reports it emerges that the interests and views of the British and the Arab notables dovetailed that morning. Both feared, and opposed, a renewal of major fighting; both understood that the Arabs had lost; both feared that the arrival of Arab reinforcements would not tip the scales but merely cause additional bloodshed; both wanted a truce. And Stockwell was willing to ‘play along’.
The Arabs then asked to see the Haganah terms. Stockwell presented them and the notables left to talk it over in Khayyat’s home. They agreed to meet British and Jewish representatives at the town hall at 16:00 hours. Apparently, they felt that immediate acceptance would open them to charges of betrayal. Through the Syrian consul, Thabet al Aris, who had a radio transmitter, they attempted to contact the Arab League Military Committee in Damascus and the Syrians for instructions. But Damascus failed to respond. 221 Instead, Damascus activated the Lebanese Government, which summoned the British Minister in Beirut, Houstoun Boswall, to complain of British inaction against ‘Jewish aggression’. At the same time, the Syrian president, Shukri al Quwatli, flanked by his senior ministers, hauled in the British Minister, Philip Broadmead, and read him two telegrams by al Aris. The telegrams described the Jewish offensive and warned of ‘a massacre of innocents’. The president charged that the British were ‘doing nothing’ and implicitly threatened Syrian intervention. Broadmead warned him against taking ‘stupid action’.222
Broadmead left but was immediately summoned back, and Quwatli, saying he was ‘bewildered’, showed him a further cable from al Aris, who related that Stockwell had rejected the notables’ appeal for intervention or to allow in reinforcements. They sought ‘instructions’ in preparation for the town hall meeting. Quwatli said that he was ‘very nervous’ about Syrian public opinion and asked Broadmead ‘what instructions he [Quwatli] could send. What did I [Broadmead] suggest?’ Broadmead said he did not know the facts and urged moderation, and then asked London for ‘something’ that would ‘calm [Quwatli’s] mind’. 223 Quwatli had no idea what to instruct Haifa’s remaining Arabs: To surrender? To reject the Haganah terms? To stay put and accept Jewish sovereignty? To evacuate the city? Each option was acutely problematic. So he simply refrained from responding.
Meanwhile, Stockwell reviewed the Haganah terms, was ‘not entirely satisfied’, and sent for the Jewish representatives. Beilin, Salomon, and Mordechai Makleff, OC Operations of the Carmeli Brigade, arrived and, after discussion, accepted Stockwell’s amendments. The final version called for the disarming of the Arab community (with the arms going to the British authorities who only on 15 May would transfer them to the Haganah); the deportation of all foreign Arab males of military age; the removal of all Arab roadblocks; the arrest of European Nazis found in Arab ranks; a 24-hour curfew in the Arab neighbourhoods to assure ‘complete disarming’; freedom for
each person in Haifa . . . to carry on with his business and way of life. Arabs will carry on their work as equal and free citizens of Haifa and will enjoy all services along with the other members of the community. 224"
"The British were represented by Stockwell, Marriott, and a handful of senior officers; the Jews by mayor Shabtai Levy, Salomon, Makleff, and a number of officials; and the Arabs by Khayyat, Sa‘ad, Koussa, Anis Nasr, Muhammad Abu Zayyad (a businessman), Mu‘ammar, and Sheikh Abdul Rahman Murad, head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Haifa...According to Stockwell and Marriott, both delegations ‘unanimously agreed’ to a ceasefire, which amounted to an Arab surrender. Mayor Levy opened by declaring that ‘members of both communities in Haifa should live in peace and friendship together’. Stockwell read out the Haganah terms. A discussion ensued: The Arabs wished to retain licensed arms and asked that the curfew and house-to- house searches to be conducted by the British rather than the Haganah. They also ‘objected most strongly’ to recording on paper the eventual handover of the Arab arms to the Haganah. ‘This was evidently to protect themselves against the displeasure of the AHE [i.e., AHC]’, commented Stockwell.226 The Jews insisted that the clause remain, as formulated, but agreed to compromise on most other issues. The Arabs ‘haggled over every word’, recorded Beilin. 227
Stockwell thought that the Jewish representatives had been ‘conciliatory’. Marriott, who was soon to turn fiercely anti-Israeli, was even more emphatic. ‘The Jewish delegation’, he wrote, ‘made a good impression by their magnanimity in victory, the moderation of their truce terms, and their readiness to accede to the modifications demanded by General Stockwell.’"
"The meeting recessed at 17:30 hours, the Arabs asking for 24 hours in which to consider the terms. The Jews demurred. At the GOC’s insistence, it was agreed that the Arabs would have an hour. The delegates reassembled at 19:15, with the Arabs – now consisting only of Christian notables, the Muslims, Abu Zayyad and Murad, staying away – stating
that they were not in a position to sign a truce, as they had no control over the Arab military elements in the town and that . . . they could not fulfill the terms of the truce, even if they were to sign. They then said as an alternative that the Arab population wished to evacuate Haifa . . . man, woman and child. 22
The Jewish and British officials were surprised, even shocked. Levy appealed ‘very passionately . . . and begged [the Arabs] to reconsider’. He said that they should not leave the city ‘where they had lived for hundreds of years, where their forefathers were buried and where, for so long, they had lived in peace and brotherhood with the Jews’. But the Arabs said they ‘had no choice’. 230 According to Carmel, who was briefed on the meeting by Makleff, Stockwell ‘went pale’ when he heard the Arabs’ decision, and also appealed to them to reconsider and not make ‘such a grave mistake’. He urged them to accept the terms: ‘Don’t destroy your lives needlessly’, he said. He then turned to Makleff, and asked: ‘What have you to say?’ Makleff replied: ‘It’s up to them [i.e., the Arabs] to decide.’231 Salomon, in his recollection of events, wrote that he also appealed to the Arabs to reconsider, but to no avail. 232
Israeli chroniclers of these events subsequently asserted that the Haifa Arab leadership on 22 April had been ordered by the AHC to evacuate the city. Carmel wrote that sometime after 22 April,
we learned that during the intermission [in the meeting, the Arabs] had contacted the AHC and asked for instructions. The Mufti’s orders had been to leave the city and not to accept conditions of surrender from the Jews, as the invasion by the Arab armies was close and the whole country would fall into [Arab] hands. 233
Some Jewish officials, flustered by the unexpected exodus from Haifa, at the time believed that it was part of a comprehensive Arab or Anglo- Arab plot, which also accounted for the mass flight from other parts of Palestine in late April. 234 On 23 April Sasson cabled Shertok, who was in New York:
Mass flight of Arabs now witnessed here there Palestine, as Tiberias, Haifa, elsewhere, is apparently not consequence of mere fear and weakness. Flight is organised by followers of Husseinites and outcarried cooperation foreign ‘fighters’ with object: (1) Vilifying Jews and describing them as expellants who are out outdrive Arabs from territory Jew[ish] State. (2) Compelling Arab States intervene by sending regular armies. (3) Create in Arab world and world opinion in general impression that such invasion undertaken for rescue persecuted Pal[estinians].
Sasson also asserted that the flight of the Arab commanders at the start of each battle was part of the plot to ‘spread chaos, panic’ among the Arabs, leading to flight. 235
However, if Sasson meant that the exodus was orchestrated or ordered from outside Palestine, the weight of the evidence suggests that this is incorrect. As we have seen, the local notables had tried and failed to obtain instructions from Damascus. Damascus preferred silence. Nor is there any persuasive evidence that orders came from Husseini or the AHC. Haifa’s Arabs were simply left to decide on their own 236 and it is probable that the local Husseini-supporting, Muslim notables – perhaps doing what they thought the AHC\Husseini would have wanted them to do – intimidated and ordered their fellow Christian notables gathered at the town hall after 19:00, 22 April, to reject a truce or anything smacking of surrender and acquiescence in Jewish rule, and to opt for evacuation."
"But if the weight of the evidence suggests that the initial order to evacuate had come from the local leadership, there is a surfeit of evidence that the AHC and its local supporters endorsed it ex post facto during the following days, egging on the continuing evacuation. On 25 April, Lippincott, reported: ‘Local Mufti dominated Arab leaders urge all Arabs leave city . . .’, and added the following day: ‘Reportedly AHC ordering all Arabs leave.’ 237 British observers concurred. Cunningham on 25 April reported to Creech-Jones: ‘British authorities at Haifa have formed the impression that total evacuation is being urged on the Haifa Arabs from higher Arab quarters and that the townsfolk themselves are against it.’ The Sixth Airborne Division was more explicit: Probable reason for Arab Higher Executive [i.e., AHC] ordering Arabs to evacuate Haifa is to avoid possibility of Haifa Arabs being used as hostages in future operations after May 15. Arabs have also threatened to bomb Haifa from the air."
"Most widespread was a rumour that Arabs remaining in Haifa would be taken as hostages by the Jews in the event of future Arab attacks on other Jewish areas. And an effective piece of propaganda with its implied threat of Arab retribution when the Arabs recapture the town, is that people remaining in Haifa acknowledged tacitly that they believe in the principle of the Jewish State. It is alleged that Victor Khayyat is responsible for these reports
said one British intelligence unit. But for these ‘rumours and propaganda spread by the National Committee members remaining in the town’, many of the Arabs ‘would not have evacuated Haifa’ over 22–28 April, according to the British Army’s 257 and 317 Field Security Section. 239"
"Haganah intelligence also monitored what was happening: ‘The Arabs in Haifa relate that they have received an order from the AHC to leave Haifa as soon as possible, and not to cooperate with the Jews.’ 242
The present Haifa Arab leadership, while speaking to our people of bringing life back to normal, their practical policy is to do the maximum to speed up the evacuation . . . Higher Arab circles relate that they have received explicit instructions to evacuate the Arabs of Haifa. The reason for this is not clear to us . . . The [Arab] masses explain the order to evacuate Haifa as stemming from [the prospect that] Transjordanian forces intend to commit wholesale massacre. (Artillery, airplanes, and so on). 243
HIS reported that Arab residents were receiving ‘threatening letters’ in which they were ordered to leave; otherwise they would ‘be considered traitors and condemned to death’. 244
HIS periodically described the mechanics of the AHC encouragement of the exodus. On 25 April ‘Hiram’ reported that on the afternoon of 23 (or 24) April, Salomon and Mu‘ammar jointly went to ‘refugees’ in Abbas Street and urged women, children and men aged over 40 ‘to return to their homes’. The refugees were about to return home when Sheikh Murad and another Muslim figure appeared on the scene. Murad, according to HIS, told the refugees:
The Arab Legion has volunteered to give 200 trucks to take the refugees to a safe place outside Haifa, where they will be housed and given food and clothes aplenty and all without payment, and he threatened that if they stayed in Haifa, the Jews would kill them and not spare their women and children.
The crowd changed its mind and many made their way to the evacuation point in the harbour. 245"
"Some 15,000 Arabs probably evacuated Haifa during 21–22 April. Most of them left by sea and land to Acre and Lebanon well before the notables had announced the decision to evacuate. By nightfall, 22 April, there were still some 30,000–40,000 Arabs in the town (the Emergency Committee spoke of ‘37,000’ 247 )...
At the beginning of the mass evacuation, Arab leaders even appealed to the Jewish authorities for help in organising the departure as the British, they complained, were not supplying enough transport. Beilin responded enthusiastically: ‘I said that we would be more than happy to give them all the assistance they require.’ 251
However, Beilin, at this stage, was unrepresentative of the local Jewish leadership that, for the most part, was clearly embarrassed and un- easy about the exodus. Several municipal (and, apparently, Haganah) figures during 22–28 April tried to persuade Arabs to stay. One Jewish officer was reported by HIS to be ‘conducting propaganda among the refugees in the Abbas area not to leave’. 252 Salomon later recalled that on the morning of 23 April, he had gone to Abbas Street and Wadi Nisnas, after receiving ‘instructions . . . to go to the Arab quarters and appeal to the Arabs not to leave’. He did not say who issued the instructions – the Haganah, Shabtai Levy, or someone else – but noted that he was accompanied by ‘a Haganah officer’. Despite warnings from his friends that it was still dangerous, Salomon ‘went from street to street and told the Arabs . . . not to leave. [But] the net result was that during that day and the next few days many Arabs left . . .’ 253 The man who accompanied Salomon may have been Tuvia Lishansky, a senior HIS officer. Lishansky later recalled ‘a feeling of discomfort . . . As soon as we capture a city . . . the Arabs leave it. What will the world say? No doubt they will say – “such are the Jews, Arabs cannot live under their rule”.’ Lishansky recalled trying to persuade the Arabs to stay. 254 These efforts did not go unnoticed. On 25 April, Baghdad Radio reported that ‘the Haganah is trying to persuade [the Arabs] to stay in Haifa’.255 And on 28 April, the British police were still reporting: ‘The Jews are . . . making every effort to persuade the Arab populace to remain and settle back into their normal lives . . .’256
British military intelligence concurred:
The Arab evacuation is now almost complete. The Jews have been making extensive efforts to prevent wholesale evacuation, but their propaganda appears to have had very little effect. [In trying to check the Arab exodus, the Haganah] in several cases [had resorted] to actual intervention . . . Appeals have been made on the [Jewish] radio and in the press, urging Arabs to remain in the town; the Haganah issued a pamphlet along these lines and the Histadrut, in a similar publication, appealed to those Arabs previously members of their organisation [sic], to return. On the whole, [however] Arabs remain indifferent to this propaganda. 257"
"Both the British, including Cunningham, and Lippincott believed, at least initially, that the Jews of Haifa wanted the Arabs to stay mainly for economic reasons. The Jews feared ‘for the economic future of the town’ once its Arab working class had departed, reported the High Commissioner. 261 More explicitly, Lippincott wrote that unless the Jews succeeded in persuading the Arabs to stay or return, ‘acute labour shortage will occur’. 262 (The Jews also wanted the Arabs to stay ‘for political reasons, to show democratic treatment’, thought Lippincott. 263 ) British units reported that ‘the Jews are being forced to man the factories and places of essential work with their own people where Arabs worked before and this is proving most unsatisfactory for them as Arab labour was much cheaper’.264"
"But the Haganah was not averse to seeing the Arabs evacuate...Carmel’s commanders were keenly aware that an exodus would solve the brigade’s main problem – how to secure Jewish Haifa with very limited forces against attack by forces from outside the town while having to deploy a large number of troops inside to guard against insurrection by a large, potentially hostile Arab population. 267"
"But the situation in Haifa between 23 April and early May was confused and complex... Initial Jewish attitudes towards the Arab evacuation changed within days; and what Jewish liaison officers told their British contacts did not always conform with the realities on the ground or with those quickly changing attitudes. The local Jewish civilian leadership initially sincerely wanted the Arabs to stay (and made a point of letting the British see this). But the offensive of 21–22 April had delivered the Arab neighbourhoods into Haganah hands, relegating the civil leaders to the sidelines and for almost a fortnight rendering them relatively ineffectual in all that concerned the treatment of the Arab population. At the same time, the attitude of some of these local leaders radically changed as they took stock of the historic opportunity afforded by the exodus – to turn Haifa permanently into a Jewish city. As one knowledgeable Jewish observer put it a month later, ‘a different wind [began to] blow. It was good without Arabs, it was easier. Everything changed within a week.’ 269 At the same time, the Haganah commanders from the first understood that an Arab evacuation would greatly ease their strategic situation and workload."
"In Haifa, for days, the civilian authorities were saying one thing and the Haganah was doing something quite different. Moreover, Haganah units in the field acted inconsistently and in a manner often unintelligible to the Arab population. The Arabs, who had coexisted with Jewish civilians for decades, were unaccustomed to Jewish military behaviour or rule, which was only lifted on 3 May. 276 The Arabs did not grasp the essential powerlessness of the civilian authorities during the previous fortnight"
"Carmeli reported that he was continuing to promote evacuation by ‘reducing’ the bread ration issued by the warehouses under his control (while profiting from this). 280"
"By 27–28 April, there was a substantial improvement in conditions in the Arab quarters. Most of those still in the city had been allowed to return to their homes, although martial law remained in force. They needed special travel passes, obtainable only after a long wait in a queue and close questioning, to move from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. There was no electricity in most Arab areas (and, hence, Arabs could not hear radio), no Arabic newspapers, no buses, and Arabs were not allowed to drive cars – the Haganah arguing that the IZL might confiscate them. Arrests and house searches were common."
"On 28 April, the Histadrut published an appeal, in Hebrew and Arabic, to Haifa’s Arabs to resume the coexistence with the Jews and stay:
Do not destroy your homes . . . and lose your sources of income and bring upon yourselves disaster by evacuation . . . The Haifa Workers Council and the Histadrut advise you, for your own good, to stay . . . and return to your regular work. 282
But most Arabs were not responding. British police reported long queues waiting in the harbour for places on boats to Acre: ‘Some families have lived and sleep on the quaysides for several days waiting a chance to get away.’ 283 But in the days following the resumption of civilian rule, the situation did not much improve. The Committee for Arab Property and Golda Meir, the acting head of the JA-PD, appointed a local committee of Jews to care for the remaining Arabs and look after Arab property. A joint meeting of Meir, the Committee for Arab Property and the newly appointed local committee resolved ‘to treat the remaining Arab inhabitants as citizens with equal rights’. The local committee spawned a host of well-meaning sub-committees (‘Committee for Prisoners and Detainees’, ‘Committee for Supervision of Holy Places’, and others). 284
But nothing seems to have changed. Carmeli reported at the end of the first week of May:
The Arabs of Haifa are in despair. No one knows what to do. Most of the Christians are waiting for the government salaries and think of leaving. Anyone staying is regarded as a traitor. In town, sanitary conditions are terrible. Most of the houses have been broken into and robbed. There are still corpses [lying about] . . ."
"But were Haganah actions, over 23 April – early May, motivated by a calculated aim to egg on the evacuation? At the level of Carmeli head- quarters, no orders, as far as we know, were ever issued to the troops to act in a manner that would precipitate flight. Rather the contrary. Strict, if somewhat belated, orders were issued forbidding looting, and leaflets calling on the Arabs to remain calm and return to work – if not explicitly to stay in the city – were distributed. 288 But if this was official policy, there was certainly also an undercurrent of expulsive thinking, akin to the IZL approach. Many in the Haganah cannot but have been struck by the thought that the exodus was ‘good for the Jews’ and must be encouraged. A trace of such thinking in Carmeli headquarters can be discerned in Yosef Weitz’s diary entries for 22–24 April, which he spent in Haifa. ‘I think that this [flight prone] state of mind [among the Arabs] should be exploited, and [we should] press the other inhabitants not to surrender [but to leave]. We must establish our state’, he jotted down on 22 April. On 24 April, he went to see Carmel’s adjutant, who informed him that the nearby Arab villages of Balad ash Sheikh and Yajur were being evacuated by their inhabitants and that Acre had been ‘shaken’. ‘I was happy to hear from him that this line was being adopted by the [Haganah] command, [that is] to frighten the Arabs so long as flight-inducing fear was upon them.’289 There was a dovetailing here of Jewish interests, as perceived by Weitz and likeminded Yishuv figures, with the wishes of the local Arab leaders and the AHC, who believed that the exodus from the city would serve the Palestinian cause (or, at least, that the non-departure of the inhabitants would serve the Zionist cause). Weitz, it appears, had struck a responsive chord in Carmeli headquarters. It made simple military as well as political sense: Haifa without Arabs was more easily defended and less problematic than Haifa with a large minority."
"The memorandum’s authors argued for urgency both because such an opportunity ‘might not recur in our time’ and because it would be cheaper, in terms of expected compensation suits, to carry out the demolitions swiftly: ‘One may assume as well that for lack of evidence, not many suits for compensation will be launched.’ The detailed list of buildings earmarked for destruction included 46 ‘small houses’ in the Vardiya neighbourhood, which endangered Jewish traffic and health (lack of sewage)
...On 16 June, Ben-Gurion met with Uriel Friedland, a factory manager and senior Haifa Haganah officer, and urged that the project be taken in hand ‘immediately with the [final] British evacuation’. 321 IDF Planning Branch immediately ordered the start of the demolitions – to insure a convenient and safe route . . . between Hadar Hacarmel and the industrial part [of the city] and the krayot [i.e., the northern suburbs], to safeguard the route to the harbour, and to reduce the manpower needed now for guard duty in the city.322
...Meanwhile, Levy was brought around, persuaded by Interior Minister Gruenbaum of the necessity, and benefit of the operation – designated by the IDF ‘Operation Shikmona’. And his mind was laid to rest on the compensation issue; Gruenbaum explained that the operation was military rather than civilian, so compensation was not required by law. 325"
"Through the civil war, the Haganah believed that there was no need to frontally assault Jaffa. While firing from the town occasionally disturbed south Tel Aviv, it posed no strategic threat. The Haganah felt that the inhabitants’ sense of isolation and the realities of siege would eventually bring it to its knees; it would fall like a ripe plum the moment the British withdrew. Plan D did not call for the conquest of Jaffa but rather for penning in its population and conquering its suburbs of Manshiya, Abu Kabir and Tel al Rish.330 The Haganah planners failed completely to anticipate, let alone plan for, the exodus of the population.
But the Haganah was not to have the decisive say. Since the start of April, when the Haganah went over to the offensive, the IZL had been looking for a major objective, partly to demonstrate that the Haganah was not the Yishuv’s only effective military force. "
"Writing shortly after the battle, Begin claimed that the mortar- men were ordered to avoid hitting ‘hospitals, religious sites’ and consulates.340 But as the IZL’s fire control and ranging were at best amateur, even if restrictions had been imposed, they would have been meaningless. In any case, the objectives of the three-day barrage, in which 20 tons of ordnance were delivered, were clear: ‘To prevent constant military traffic in the city, to break the spirit of the enemy troops, [and] to cause chaos among the civilian population in order to create a mass flight’, is how Amihai Paglin, the IZL head of operations, put it in his pre-attack briefing. The mortars were aimed roughly at ‘the port area, the Clock Square, the prison, King George Boulevard and ‘Ajami’.341 Cunningham wrote a few days later: ‘It should be made clear that IZL attack with mortars was indiscriminate and designed to create panic among the civilian inhabitants.’ 342 And, indeed, most of the casualties were civilians, according to Haganah intelligence. 343 "
"At the end of April, Shertok, in an address to the UN General Assembly, charged that in both Tiberias and Jaffa ‘the mass evacuation had been dictated by Arab commanders as a political and military demonstration . . . The Arab command ordered the people to leave.’ With regard to Jaffa, there is little evidence for this assertion; 353 rather, an obverse process seems to have occurred. The shelling ‘had produced results beyond expectation’. It had ‘caused dread and fear among the inhabitants’, precipitating flight.354"
"The IZL assault on Jaffa, following hard upon the fall of Arab Haifa, had placed the British in a difficult position, eventually sparking a mi- nor crisis in Whitehall. Arab leaders in Palestine and outside blamed the British for what had happened in Haifa: they claimed that Stock- well had conspired with the Haganah, or at least had played into Jewish hands, by his sudden redeployment of troops out of the city centre; that he had prevented the entry of Arab reinforcements; that he had failed to halt the Haganah offensive, which, the Arabs alleged, had included ‘massacres’; and that he had promoted the truce, which was effectively a surrender. In general, the Arabs argued that Britain was officially and legally in control of Palestine until 15 May and should have acted accordingly. 356
Cunningham, Stockwell and the War Office rejected the charges. As the War Office succinctly put it:
After defeat at Haifa[,] in order to excuse their own ineptitude, Arab leaders accused us of helping Jews and hindering Arabs although it was actually due to inefficient and cowardly behaviour of Arab Military Leaders and their refusal to follow our advice and to restrain themselves. Consequently[,] Anglo-Arab relations have considerably deteriorated. 357
This deterioration, which took place against the backdrop of the impending withdrawal from Palestine, was acutely felt in Whitehall, and led directly to a clash between Bevin and the army chiefs and to British intervention in the battle for Jaffa. The Foreign Office felt that the Haifa episode had undermined Britain’s position throughout the Arab world. On the evening of 22 April, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Montogmery, was summoned to 10 Downing Street, where he was apparently forced to admit that he had not been kept posted by his generals about events in Haifa. Bevin ‘became very worked up; he said 23,000 [sic] Arabs had been killed and the situation was catastrophic’. Montgomery said he would try to ascertain what was happening. 358
The Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, Bevin and Montgomery reconvened the following morning at 10 Downing Street, with Bevin, according to the Field Marshal, ‘even more agitated’. Bevin thought the army should have stopped the Haganah: ‘The massacre of the Arabs had put him in an impossible position with all the Arab states.’ Bevin concluded his attack by saying that ‘he had been let down by the Army’. 35"
"Whitehall squabbling aside, the chief upshot of Haifa was to be forceful British intervention in Jaffa. Its aim was to ‘compensate’ for Britain’s alleged role in Haifa and to restore the prestige and goodwill lost in the Arab world. When the first news of the IZL attack reached London, Bevin ‘got very excited . . . and [instructed] the CIGS . . . to . . . see to it that the Jews did not manage to occupy Jaffa or, if they did, were immediately turned out’. Such was Bevin’s fear of a re-enactment of Haifa that he had bypassed normal channels (the Defence Minister and High Commissioner) in trying to get the army to act. 361 On 27 April, the British military – who had no direct lines to the IZL – informed Tel Aviv Mayor Yisrael Rokah and the HIS that they intended to ‘save Jaffa for the Arabs at all costs, especially in the light of the fact that the Jews had conquered Haifa’. 362
The following day, the British went into action. Some 4,500 troops, with tanks, moved into the city; Spitfires swooped overhead and fired some bursts; warships anchored in Jaffa harbour; and British mortars shelled IZL positions. In tripartite negotiations between Britain, the Haganah and the IZL, the British demanded the IZL’s withdrawal from Manshiya. On 30 April, agreement was reached, the IZL withdrew – after blowing up the local police fort – and British troops were left in control of the city. Haganah intelligence reported that the IZL had left behind ‘badly mutilated . . . Arab corpses’ 363 and that the British were looting the abandoned houses.364"
"One reason the British were unsuccessful was Mivtza Hametz (Operation Hametz), the Haganah’s offensive during 28–30 April against a cluster of villages just east of Jaffa...the fall of these villages further undermined the morale of the 15,000–25,000 inhabitants still left in the town; 375 it was completely cut off and any possibility of Arab military relief had vanished. The rural hinterland that had supplied the town’s food was no more. 376"
"By 8 May, Jaffa was almost a ghost town, with convoys of evacuees departing daily, its streets dominated by British soldiers and looting militia gangs. Bands of robbers pillaged the town’s warehouses, often after bribing British guards. 382 Only some 5,000 inhabitants remained, many of them ‘ill, poor, handicapped and old’. 383 Kiryati’s intelligence officer provided a concise portrait of the dying city:
In Jaffa – complete anarchy and collapse. The mayor [Heikal] has fled the city. All the municipal departments, banks and the government hospital have shut down . . . The court buildings are being evacuated. The postal offices have been occupied by the British Army. The robbery and looting continue. Armed irregulars – apparently Iraqis – break into shops and steal food from the port area. [British] soldiers too appear to be taking part in the robbery. Food and fuel supplies are disastrous. 384
Cunningham wrote that ‘nearly all councillors and members of National Committee have fled’. The remaining notables apparently hoped that the Jews would take over and restore order – but were afraid to say so publicly. 385 Nimr al Khatib wrote that the ALA contingent, headed by Michel al Issa, which arrived at the end of April, ‘acted as if the town was theirs, and began to rob people and loot their houses. People’s lives became worthless and women’s honour was defiled. This prompted many inhabitants to leave . . .’ 386 Cunningham concluded that ‘Jaffa is the fruit of the premature military action against which the Arab Governments have been repeatedly warned and that further premature action on their part will only add to the sufferings of the Arabs of Palestine . . .’.387"
"On 12 May, the members of the ‘Jaffa Arab Emergency Committee’ – Amin Andraus, Salah al Nazer and Ahmad Abu Laban – crossed into Tel Aviv and met Kiryati officers to smooth the way for the Jewish takeover and discuss terms... In the ‘Agreement’ that was signed, Ben-Gal committed the Haganah to abide by ‘the Geneva Convention and all International Laws and Usages of War’; the Arab signatories endorsed the ‘instructions’ the brigadier was about to issue. The ‘Instructions to the Arab Population by the Commander of the Haganah, Tel Aviv District, given on 13th May 1948’ included the handover of all arms and the punishment of those not complying, the screening of all adult males, and the internment of ‘criminals or persons suspected of being a danger to the peace’. Lastly, Ben-Gal stated that adult males wishing to return would be individually screened, implying that women and children could return to Jaffa without such screening. 392"
"On 13 May, Kiryati issued the operational order for ‘Operation Dror’ 393 and on 14 May Haganah units, accompanied by token IZL forces, occupied Jaffa in an orderly, uncontested deployment. Kiryati issued a special ‘order of the day’: ‘Jaffa is almost empty of inhabitants. We have promised to allow the inhabitants to live peacefully, with respect, and each of us must abide by this promise.’ 394 Yitzhak Chizik was appointed military governor. On 18 May, Ben-Gurion visited the town and commented: ‘I couldn’t understand: Why did the inhabitants . . . leave?’ 395
Chizik did his best to protect the population – a quick census registered some 4,100 inhabitants – from the occupying troops: He stationed guards outside public buildings, organised Military Police patrols, and ordered homes and businesses that had been checked to be secured against looters and vandals. But the following days saw a great deal of unpleasantness, and some brutal behaviour, vis- ´a-vis the occupied population, which was arbitrarily pushed about, screened, and concentrated in one or two areas behind barbed wire fences, and its property vandalised, looted and robbed. Troops briefly used inhabitants for forced, unpaid labour. 396
On 25 May, 15 Arab men were found dead in the Jibalya neighbourhood, near the waterfront: All had been shot and four had on them ID cards issued by the Military Governor’s office, indicating that they – and probably all 15 – had been killed after the Haganah had occupied the town. Three doctors who examined the bodies two days later determined that they had been shot a week or so before. 397 On 14 or 15 May, a 12-year-old girl was raped by two Haganah soldiers; 398 there were also a number of attempted rapes. There was widespread institutional and private looting by Haganah and IZL troops and Tel Aviv citizens who infiltrated the town, there was robbery on the roads by patrolling Jewish troops (with ‘watches, rings, cash, etc.’ taken) and there was widespread vandalisation of property. In general, the inhabitants complained, they were ‘being incessantly molested’. 399 The looting was so bad that Chizik appealed directly to Ben-Gurion, who on 22 May ordered the IZL and the Haganah to obey Chizik’s instructions. 400 A senior Kiryati officer, Zvi Aurbach, made a point of washing his hands of any responsibility for property in Jaffa.401 On 25 May, one official reported: ‘During the whole day I walked about the streets . . . I saw soldiers, civilians, military police, battalion police, looting, robbing, while breaking through doors and walls . . .’402
...A month earlier, a senior IDF officer – possibly Ben-Gal – had told the Red Cross that he was aware of all the ‘incidents’ that had occurred, including the rape, and assured him that those responsible had been put on trial. He added that this was his fourth war and that conditions in Jaffa, compared to the terrible things he had seen elsewhere, were ‘like paradise’. 405 But few if any trials had actually occurred. On 21 June Chizik complained that ‘despite the many cases of soldiers being caught stealing . . . I have not yet received a single report showing a verdict against any of the perpetrators’. Chizik, clearly, believed that no one had actually been punished. 406"
"On 16 April, the British evacuated Safad and on 28 April, nearby Rosh Pina. On 21 April, three days after the exodus from Tiberias, Palmah OC Allon flew in to review the situation. The following day he recommended to Yadin and Galili launching a series of operations, in line with Plan D, that would brace the area for the expected Arab invasion. He recommended ‘the harassment of Beit Shean [i.e., Beisan] in order to increase the flight from it . . . [and] the harassment of Arab Safad in order to speed up its evacuation.’ Both were sensitive border towns – Beisan was five kilometres from Jordan and Safad 12 kilometres from Syria – and Allon did not want to leave Palestinian population centres immediately behind what would be HIS front lines. 410"
"The minister’s cable elicited from London a response similar to that following the IZL attack on Jaffa. Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones, presumably after consulting with Bevin, authorised Cunningham to intervene militarily to prevent a Jewish victory:
The Arab states are clearly most concerned at the possibility of an Arab disaster and it is of the greatest importance to our relations with them to avoid anything of this kind. Such a disaster would almost certainly involve the entry of forces of Arab states into Palestine before the end of the Mandate. If you would in your judgement warrant it[,] you and the G.O.C. are authorised to use all practical means including air action to restore the situation.’ 437
But the Haganah attack failed and the British did not intervene."
"It was later reported that some of the commanders had ‘advised’ the inhabitants to flee. 443 The Palmah ‘intentionally left open the exit routes for the population to “facilitate” their exodus . . . The 12,000 refugees (some estimate 15,000) . . . were a heavy burden on the Arab war effort’, recalled Allon.444 reinforcements made its way to Safad – and met the stream of departing inhabitants, ‘loaded down with parcels, women carrying their children in their arms, some going by foot, others on ass and donkey-back’. The en- counter surely did little for the troops’ morale – and most reportedly fled Safad hours after arriving. 445 The Haganah also apparently dropped a handful of makeshift bombs from reconnaissance aircraft and fired some mortar rounds at or near the columns of refugees to speed them on their way.446"
"A major cause of the collapse of Arab resistance and the exodus was the absence and\or flight of militia commanders. On 11 May, fleeing irregulars complained of ‘the treachery of their commanders who fled at the start of the battle’. 449"
"The Palmah troops scouring the abandoned quarters found about 100 Muslims, ‘with an average age of 80’, according to Safad’s newly ap- pointed military governor, Avraham Hanochi, of Kibbutz Ayelet Hashahar. They were expelled to Lebanon later that month. 452 Only 34–36 Christian Arabs remained. Distancing themselves from the ‘the Arabs who had migrated’, they pleaded to stay on, under Jewish rule 453 and, initially, refused to budge.454 HIS saw them as an intelligence risk and recommended their transfer to Haifa. 455 On 13 June, this last remnant of the Arab community was shipped to Haifa and deposited in two convents – Les Filles de la Charit ´e de la Sacr ´e Cour and Les Dames de Nazareth – with the Arab Affairs Committee of Haifa providing some of the maintenance costs. The matter caused a bureaucratic wrangle, with the Foreign Ministry demanding that the IDF allow them back to Safad ‘to improve our relations with our minorities’. The ministry was also worried about the effect that the eviction might have on relations with the churches. But the army refused.456 Shertok, uncharacteristically, persisted. His stand, as conveyed by his aide-de-camp Yehoshafat Harkabi, was that while Israel absolutely refused ‘to accept back Arab refugees from outside Israel, we must behave towards the Arabs inside the country with greater moderation. Through this will be tested our ability to govern the Arab minority.’ Shertok, supported by the Minority Affairs Ministry, demanded that at least some of the Christians be allowed back. 457 But, against the backdrop of the start of the settlement of new Jewish immigrants in the abandoned quarters, the army rejected the request. The Safad group remained in Haifa, welfare cases maintained by the municipality, local Arabs and the Haifa convents. Of this group three were in their eighties and six in their seventies. By spring 1949, three had died, five were hospitalised and two women had become demented, according to Marriott.458"
"On the night of 10\11 May, Golani units occupied Beisan’s two main satellite villages, Farwana and al Ashrafiya, the inhabitants fleeing to Jordan as the troops approached. Haganah sappers began to blow up the houses. The following night, Golani units mortared Beisan and stormed Tel al Husn, a hill dominating the town from the north. Faruqi appears to have fled that night, taking with him P£9,000 of tax revenues. 469 During the fight for Tel al Husn, a Haganah officer telephoned the Beisan militia HQ and ‘advised’ surrender. A militia officer responded defiantly. But following the hill’s fall, the Arabs repeatedly pleaded with the Haganah for a ceasefire. The Haganah agreed and at a meeting on the morning of 12 May, presented terms – surrender of weapons and expulsion of foreign irregulars.470 The Arabs apparently were ‘told that any inhabitant wishing to stay . . . could do so’; 471 those wishing to leave were offered safe passage. The notables – Hanna Nimri, Hashim al Solh and Mayor Rashad Darwish – said they had to obtain agreement from the HQ in Nablus (or Jenin) and a delegation left for the Triangle. Meanwhile, the ALA troops and most of the inhabitants fled, mainly to Jordan. The notables announced the town’s surrender and Israeli troops moved in the next day.472
Some 1,000–1,200 inhabitants initially remained, 473 much to Weitz’s chagrin.474 The Haganah provided them with water and food. 475 Martial law and a curfew were imposed, arms were collected, and a committee of local Jewish settlers was appointed to oversee property and life in the town. Shmuel Govrin, of Kibbutz Kfar Ruppin, was appointed civilian governor. An Arab police force was appointed.476
But the presence of this concentration of Arabs just behind the lines and the constant coming and going of Beisan residents and former residents – who plundered the abandoned houses – troubled Haganah commanders. They sought and obtained authority, probably from HGS, to expel the remaining inhabitants. ‘There was a danger that the in- habitants would revolt in the rear, when they felt a change in the military situation in favour of the [Arab] invaders, [so within days] an order was given to evict the inhabitants from the city’. Most were apparently expelled around 15 May across the Jordan. 477
Govrin later recalled:
. . . I received an order to clear the town of Arabs, we went from house to house and we told the [townspeople] with loudhailers that they had to leave by the following morning. They were very frightened. There were no vehicles there and I had to order them to go by foot to the Sheikh Hussein Bridge, and to throw them across. It was hard seeing the old people with the bundles, the women and the children. A difficult eviction– not brutal, but difficult . . . I gave them food. The last to leave was a priest . . . Suddenly the town had emptied, had turned into a ghost town surrounded by mines. 478
An HIS-AD agent, ‘Giora’, visited Beisan on 18 May and reported the town ‘completely empty’, but for some 300 persons, many of them Muslims. Jewish inspectors had pinned yellow tags on shop doors to signify that they had been checked; Arab inspectors wandered around with yellow armbands. ‘Giora’ commented that both reminded him of the ‘mark of shame’ which he ‘wished to avoid’. But the officer was pleasantly received by the local Qadi and Mayor Rashad, who both praised the governor’s behaviour. But Rashad appeared ‘very depressed’, ‘Giora’ commented. 479 On 28 May the remaining inhabitants were given the choice of transfer to Jordan or Nazareth (at the time also outside Jewish territory). The majority, perhaps Christians, preferred Nazareth, to which the IDF trucked them the same day. 480 Beisan had reverted to being Beit Shean.
To keep it Jewish, the Haganah began systematically to mine the approaches and alleyways, to prevent infiltration back. On 10 June, a Haganah commander reported that on the previous night marauding Arabs (and dogs and donkeys) had set off no less than 11 mines, with a commensurate loss of life and injuries. 481 The returning exiles, who also torched and vandalised buildings, 482 were motivated by hunger and poverty.483"
"As in Haifa, most members of the NC, including the mayor, Hussein Halifi, had opposed attacks on Jewish neighbours or traffic, fearing reprisals. But local and foreign irregulars flouted him. 487 On 20 January, members of the NC visited al Sumeiriya, to the north, and cautioned the villagers not to clash with their neighbours, Regba and Shavei Zion, arguing that the Jews could cut the Acre–Lebanon road. 488 Halifi asked the British police to mediate a local ceasefire. 489 But Jewish ambushes outside Acre eventually triggered retaliation by militiamen, in which a Jewish driver was killed. The cycle of violence resulted in the departure from town of ‘several families’. 490 In the second half of March, Haganah forces effectively isolated Acre by blowing up a series of bridges, preventing people from going to work and causing an increase in crimes against property.491 HIS reported that there was no flour to be had, until a large shipment arrived on 8 April. But there were plenty of meat and vegetables.492 The NC again sought a truce. 493"
"The fall of Haifa and its repercussions prompted the British to seek to prevent the fall of Acre (as of Jaffa) before their scheduled pullout. At the end of April, the British repeatedly intervened to frustrate Jewish attacks on the town. But the exodus to Lebanon continued. "
"A further precipitant to flight was the outbreak of typhoid (possibly caused, directly or indirectly, by Haganah actions, which forced the inhabitants to dig unsanitary wells). 502 At the end of April, British observers had predicted an outbreak of disease in the overcrowded town.503 Cunningham feared ‘a very large number of cases’ of typhoid. Indeed, in early May conditions were such that many refugees wanted to return to Haifa, but were being prevented, according to the British, by ‘strong [anti-return Arab] propaganda’. At the same time, Cunningham, the Haganah and the Haifa civil authorities thought such a return from Acre ‘inadvisable’ precisely because of fear of an epidemic. 504 But the outbreak was contained. HIS estimated that ‘the panic that arose following the rumours of the spread of the epidemic’ was more important in generating flight than the cases themselves.505"
"During the First Truce (11 June), the front between the Haganah/IDF and the ALA stretched along a line 7–10 kilometres to the east of Acre. As the truce neared its end and renewed hostilities loomed, IDF Northern Front sought to evict the inhabitants of Acre, either to Jaffa or across the border. The IDF did not want a large Arab civilian concentration just behind its lines and lacked the manpower to oversee and provide for the inhabitants. The army asked the Foreign Ministry’s opinion. Ya‘akov Shimoni, acting head of the Middle East Department, turned to Foreign Minister Shertok. Shertok, recorded Shimoni, ‘had no objection in principle to the transfer of [Acre’s] Arab inhabitants to another place (Jaffa), in order to free our soldiers . . .’. But who would care for them? Shimoni approached Shitrit. 527 Shitrit was upset: This was the first he had heard of a possible eviction of Acre’s inhabitants – and, after all, they were part of his ‘constituency’. Indeed, there was a standing IDF-GS order (of 6 July, see below), he informed Shimoni, that no inhabitants
were to be uprooted . . . without a written order from the Defence Minister . . . So long as the Defence Minister has not . . . issued a written order, the local army authorities must not evacuate a complete town and cause suffering, wandering and upset to women, children and the old.
The population could not be evicted. Nor, he added, could Jaffa serve as a dumping ground for transferees. And his ministry could not care for their maintenance. Lastly, Jaffa’s empty houses were needed for resettling Jews. 528
And Shitrit did not limit himself to argumentation; he sought and obtained the powerful support of Finance Minister Kaplan. Kaplan called the eviction proposal ‘strange’. 529 Shitrit had made a stand and, in effect, dared Ben-Gurion to issue an explicit transfer order. Ben-Gurion backed down and shelved the idea. It is worth noting that throughout 1948, Ben-Gurion had always avoided personally issuing explicit expulsion or transfer orders."
"During December 1947 – March 1948, irregulars and militiamen from the villages dominating the eastern half of the Tel Aviv – Jerusalem road (including Deir Muheisin, Beit Mahsir, Suba, al Qastal and Qaluniya) had intermittently attacked Jewish traffic to and from Jerusalem. By late March, Jewish Jerusalem, despite occasional British intervention, was under siege, its 100,000 inhabitants sorely pressed for food, fuel and munitions.
On the night of 31 March – 1 April, Ben-Gurion and the HGS decided that the Haganah’s first priority was to relieve the pressure on Jerusalem. Representatives of Jerusalem’s Jews had appealed to the JA for ‘real action’. The community was ‘already hungry and if, heaven forbid, their morale should break there was a danger of a general collapse of the Haganah front line’. 531 At Ben-Gurion’s insistence, a force of 1,500 troops was mobilised for the largest Jewish offensive to date. The objective was to push several large convoys through to Jerusalem. Strategically speaking, as a senior Haganah officer later put it, Nahshon marked the transitional stage between the prior, defensive, ‘policing’ approach of safeguarding Jewish convoys by manning them with guards and the ‘military’ approach of protecting the convoys by conquering and holding the routes themselves and the heights dominating them. 532"
"Yadin, OC Haganah\Operations, was empowered to instruct the Nahshon troops ‘to try so far as possible to take up positions near villages and not to conquer them. If no such possibility exists – then conquer them.’ 537 Yadin was still perturbed by the notion of conquering villages and queried his political masters. Galili responded:
1) If securing the Jerusalem road requires that our units take control of villages whose inhabitants have abandoned them – it must be done.
2) Regarding villages not abandoned by their inhabitants and that securing the road requires that they be isolated and surrounded and intimidated by our units – it should be done.
If the British Army intervened and ordered the Haganah to evacuate villages, the Haganah should use delaying tactics – but ultimately, it must comply. 538 Underlying these equivocations was fear of British intervention."
"Operation Nahshon began, in effect, with the Palmah Fourth Battalion’s unopposed conquest of al Qastal on the night of 2\3 April. The village, which dominated the approach to Jerusalem, had for weeks been involved in hostilities. On 16 March it was raided by Palmah troops. On 1 April, militiamen attacked Jewish positions around Motza. Haganah counter-fire and fear of assault resulted in the flight that night of almost all of Qastal’s inhabitants. The Haganah feared that foreign irregulars would occupy the village, so Palmah troops moved in in the early hours of 3 April.539 The troops were instructed that ‘if there is no opposition, do not to blow up the village’s houses’. This conformed to the Plan D guide- line not to destroy villages that offered no resistance. The commander at the site appealed against the order, saying that leaving the houses intact made ‘the defence of the place difficult’. 540 But permission to raze the village was not granted; the local Palmah company commander, Uri Ben-Ari, was subsequently to define the non-demolition of the village as ‘a decisive mistake’.541 And, indeed, on 8 April, the site was retaken by Arab irregulars following repeated assaults; among the dozens of Arabs killed was ‘Abd al Qadir al Husseini, the Palestinian Jerusalem District OC, who was shot while walking toward a Palmah-held house during a lull in the fighting. 542 The ‘mistake’ – of not demolishing Qastal after its initial conquest – was rectified on 9 April, after the village fell to a renewed Palmah attack: ‘The blowing up of all the houses not needed for defence of the site was immediately begun’, reported the commander. 543
The lesson of Qastal was extended to other sites. On 11 April Palmah units conquered neighbouring Qaluniya, whose inhabitants had fled on 2 April. The village was held by foreign irregulars. The attackers were ordered to kill everyone they found and to blow up the village. Some Arabs may have died in the attack; others, it would appear, possibly including two Egyptians, an Iraqi and an Englishman (identified by the Palmah as ‘Taylor?’) found at the site, were captured and executed. Haganah units spent that day and the next blowing up the village."
"On 6 April – the official start of Nahshon – Khulda and Deir Muheisin fell to Haganah forces. After the battles for Qastal, the hesitancy regarding the fate of the villages gave way to a growingly definite resolution, with an appropriate shift in the terminology employed. By 10 April, Haganah orders explicitly called for the ‘liquidation’ [hisul] of villages. 546 By 14 April, Operation Nahshon HQ, within the context of ‘cleansing [tihur]’ operations, generally ordered ‘the continuation of intimidation and cleansing activities as a first stage in operations [geared to] the destruction and conquest of enemy forces and bases [i.e., villages]’."
"Operation Nahshon was a strategic watershed, characterised by an intention and effort to clear a whole area, permanently, of hostile or potentially hostile villages. The destruction of the Jerusalem Corridor villages both symbolized and finalized the change in Haganah strategy. The change was epitomised in the successive orders regarding Qastal: The Etzioni Brigade order, of 2 April, not to destroy the village if there was no resistance, was superceded by the orders of 8–10 to level the village (and neighbouring Qaluniya). In practice, the Plan D provision to leave intact non-resisting villages was superceded by the decision to destroy villages in strategic areas or along crucial routes regardless of whether or not they were resisting. The Qastal episode had powerfully and expensively demonstrated why the harsher course had to be adopted; intact villages could quickly revert to becoming Arab bases. Initially, the architects of Nahshon, mindful of possible British intervention, had thought of securing the road by occupying positions on dominant hillsides and in abandoned villages and by positioning am- bushes near villages from which militia bands might strike. But mid-way through the operation, HGS and Nahshon HQ changed strategy, ordering the occupation and destruction of villages that were or might represent a threat to the convoys. Indeed, from 9–10 April onwards, the emphasis of Nahshon HQ orders was on levelling villages. Levelling villages, of course, assumed the evacuation or expulsion of their inhabitants – and assured that they, and irregulars, would have nowhere to return to.
The strategic change represented by the evolving nature of the Operation Nahshon orders had a wider significance. If, at the start of the war, the Yishuv had been (reluctantly) willing to countenance a Jewish State with a large, peaceful Arab minority, by April the Haganah’s thinking had radically changed: The toll on Jewish life and security in the battle of
the roads and the dire prospect of pan-Arab invasion had left the Yishuv with very narrow margins of safety. It could not afford to leave pockets of actively or potentially hostile Arabs behind its lines. This was certainly true regarding vital roads and areas such as the Jerusalem Corridor. No comprehensive expulsion directive was ever issued; no hard and fast orders went out to front, brigade and battalion commanders to expel ‘the Arabs’ or level ‘the Arab villages’. But the demographic by-product and implications of the implementation of Plan D were understood and accepted by the majority of Haganah commanders at this juncture, when the Yishuv faced, and knew it faced, a life and death struggle. The gloves had to be, and were, taken off. The process of taking off the gloves is embodied in the shift in Nahshon orders from hesitancy (3–6 April) to village levelling, expulsive resolve (8–15 April).
Operation Nahshon was partially successful. It briefly opened the Tel Aviv – Jerusalem road and enabled the Haganah to push through three large supply convoys to the besieged city. But the hills and some villages were quickly reinvested by irregulars and the door to Jerusalem once again slammed shut. So Nahshon was followed, in the second half of April and in May, by operations Harel, Yevussi and Maccabi, all aimed at re-securing and widening the Jewish-held corridor and wresting from Arab control further areas in and around Jerusalem."
Deir Yassin
"The attackers encountered unexpectedly strong resistance and, being relatively inexperienced, suffered four dead and several dozen wounded before pacifying the village after a full day of fighting. The units had advanced from house to house, lobbing grenades and spraying the interiors with fire, in the routine procedure of house-to- house combat.558 They blew up several houses with explosives. 559 The attackers shot down individuals and families as they left their homes and fled down alleyways. 560 They apparently also rounded up villagers, who included militiamen and unarmed civilians of both sexes, and murdered them, and executed prisoners in a nearby quarry. On 12 April, HIS OC in Jerusalem, Yitzhak Levy, reported:
The conquest of the village was carried out with great cruelty. Whole families – women, old people, children – were killed . . . Some of the prisoners moved to places of detention, including women and children, were murdered viciously by their captors. 561
The following day he added: ‘LHI members tell of the barbaric behaviour of the IZL toward the prisoners and the dead. They also relate that the IZL men raped a number of Arab girls and murdered them afterward (we don’t know if this is true).’ 562 The HIS operative on the spot, Mordechai Gichon, reported on 10 April:
Their [i.e., the IZL?] commander says that the [initial] order was: To take prisoner the adult males and to send the women and children to Motza. In the afternoon [of 9 April], the order was changed and became to kill all the prisoners . . . The adult males were taken to town in trucks and paraded in the city streets, then taken back to the site and killed with rifle and machine-gun fire. Before they [i.e., other inhabitants] were put on the trucks, the IZL and LHI men . . . took from them all the jewelry and stole their money. The behaviour toward them was especially barbaric [and included] kicks, shoves with rifle butts, spitting and cursing (people from Givat Shaul took part in the torture).
Gichon reported that the HIS’s ‘regular informer’, ‘the mukhtar’s son’, was ‘executed [in front of his mother and sisters] after being taken prisoner’. 563 Meir Pa‘il, a Palmah intelligence officer who claimed to have spent part of the afternoon of 9 April in Deir Yassin as a ‘guest’ of the
LHI, reported on 10 April:
In the quarry near Givat Shaul I saw the five Arabs they had paraded in the streets of the city. They had been murdered and were lying one on top of the other . . . I saw with my own eyes several families [that had been] murdered with their women, children and old people, their corpses were lying on top of each other . . . The dissidents were going about the village robbing and stealing everything: Chickens, radio sets, sugar, money, gold and more . . . Each dissident walked about the village dirty with blood and proud of the number of persons he had killed. Their lack of education and intelligence as compared to our soldiers [i.e., the Haganah] was apparent . . . In one of the houses at the centre of the village were assem- bled some 200 women and small children. The women sat quietly and didn’t utter a word. When I arrived, the ‘commander’ explained that they intended to kill all of them. [But] in the evening I heard that the women and children had been transported and released in Musrara. 564"
"Altogether about 100–120 villagers died that day. 566 The IZL and LHI troops subsequently transported the remaining villagers in trucks in a victory parade through west Jerusalem before dumping them in the Musrara Quarter, outside the Old City walls.567 The weight of the evidence suggests that the dissidents did not go in with the intention of committing a massacre but lost their heads during the protracted combat. But from the first, the IZL’s intention had been to expel the inhabitants."
Deir Yassin Aftermath
"The massacre was immediately condemned by the mainstream Jewish authorities, including the Haganah, 568 the Chief Rabbinate, 569 and the JA; the agency also sent a letter of condemnation, apology and condolence to King Abdullah. 570
News of what had happened immediately reached the Mandate authorities, the Arab states and the West through the survivors who reached east Jerusalem, and Zionist and Red Cross officials. For days and weeks thereafter, the Arab media broadcast the tale of horror and atrocity as a means of rallying public opinion and governments against the Yishuv. 571 Cunningham wrote that ‘the bitterness resulting from the massacre has produced an atmosphere in which local Arabs are little inclined to call off hostilities’. The massacre and the way it was trumpeted in the Arab media added to the pressure on the Arab states’ leaders to aid the embattled Palestinians and hardened their resolve to invade Palestine. The news had aroused great public indignation – which the leaders were unable to ignore. However, the most important immediate effect of the massacre and of the media atrocity campaign that followed was to trigger and promote fear and further panic flight from Palestine’s villages and towns. 572"
"On 14 April, an IZL radio broadcast repeated the message: The sur- rounding villages had been evacuated because of Deir Yassin. ‘In one blow we changed the strategic situation of our capital’, boasted the organisation. 574 A few months later, the LHI declared: ‘Everybody knows that it was Deir Yassin that struck terror into the hearts of the Arab masses and caused their stampede . . .’ 575 Begin, who denied that civilians had been massacred, later recalled that the ‘Arab propaganda’ campaign had sowed fear among the Arabs and ‘the legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel . . . Panic overwhelmed the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael . . . [It] helped us in particular in . . . Tiberias and the conquest of Haifa.’576
IZL leaders may have had an interest, then and later, in exaggerating the panic-generating effects of Deir Yassin, but they were certainly not far off the mark. In the Jerusalem Corridor area, the effect was certainly immediate and profound. Haganah intelligence reported on 14 April that the episode was ‘the talk of the Old City’ and the horrors were being amplified and exaggerated in the Arab retelling. 577 More specifically, HIS reported that ‘fear of Deir Yassin’ had fallen upon the village of al Fureidis, which immediately appealed to the Haifa NC for arms.578"
"The British noted that the Haganah, whether or not involved in Deir Yassin, had ‘profited from it. The violence used so impressed Arabs all over the country that an attack by Haganah on Saris met with no opposition whatsoever.’ 585"
"The battle of Mishmar Ha‘emek, over 4–15 April, was initiated by Qawuqji’s ALA. It began as a desperate Jewish defence and turned into a Haganah counteroffensive conforming with Plan D guidelines. The available evidence indicates that here, for the first time, Ben-Gurion explicitly sanctioned the expulsion of Arabs from a whole area of Palestine (though, as we shall see, the expulsion was largely preempted by mass flight sparked by the fighting)."
"On 7 April, the ALA agreed to cease fire for 24 hours and called on the kibbutz to surrender its weapons and submit to Arab rule. During the ceasefire, the kibbutz evacuated its children. 589 At the same time, the Arab commanders – and the British intermediary – demanded that the Jews promise ‘not to take reprisals against local villages’ or traffic. 590 The kibbutz responded that it would not attack the neighbouring villages but could not vouch for Haganah forces outside. In any case, the kibbutz leaders said, they needed to consult Tel Aviv. 591 A few hours later they added: ‘The men of Mishmar [Ha‘emek] have agreed to nothing.’ 592 Meanwhile, on 8 or 9 April, as the HGS hastily began to organise a counteroffensive, a delegation of Mishmar Ha‘emek leaders came to Ben-Gurion and, according to Ben-Gurion,
said that it was imperative to expel the Arabs [in the area] and to burn the villages. For me, the matter was very difficult. [But] they said that they were not sure [the kibbutz could hold out] if the villages remained intact and [if] the Arab inhabitants were not expelled, for they [i.e., the villagers] would [later] attack them and burn mothers and children.
Ben-Gurion related this story in July, within the context of polemics with Mapam, which was accusing him of implementing a policy of expulsion. He charged the Mapam leaders with hypocrisy, arguing that during Mishmar Ha‘emek they had come to realise that ideology (i.e., Jewish–Arab brotherhood) was one thing and strategic necessity another. ‘They faced a cruel reality . . . [and] saw that there was [only] one way and that was to expel the Arab villagers and burn the villages. And they did this. And they were the first to do this.’ 593
In reality, HGS began thinking of destroying the villages around the kibbutz shortly after Qawuqji launched his attack. On 5 April, HGS\Operations instructed the Golani Brigade: ‘You must tell the following villages . . . that we cannot assure their safety and security, and that they must evacuate forthwith.’ Among the four villages named were Abu Shusha, next to Mishmar Ha‘emek, and Daliyat al Ruha and Rihaniya, 4–5 kilometres to the west-northwest. 594
Ben-Gurion and HGS decided to reject the ALA proposal, to mount a comprehensive counterattack, and to drive the ALA and the Arab inhabitants out of the area and level their villages, permanently removing the threat to Mishmar Ha‘emek and denying an invading force from Jenin easy passage to Haifa. "
"The battle of Mishmar Ha‘emek had left a bitter taste in the mouths of some of the local kibbutzniks. On 14 April, Eliezer Bauer (Be’eri), a Middle East scholar and member of Hazore‘a (Mapam), dispatched a pained letter to senior Mapam defence figures:
Of course in a cruel war such as we are engaged in, one cannot act with kid gloves. But there are still rules in war which a civilised people tries to follow . . . [Bauer focused on events in Abu Zureiq a day or two earlier.] When the village was conquered, the villagers tried to escape and save themselves by fleeing to the fields of the [Jezreel] Valley. Forces from the nearby settlements sortied out and outflanked them. There were exchanges of fire in which several of these Arabs were killed. Others surrendered or were captured unarmed. Most were killed [i.e., murdered]. And these were not gang members as was later written in [the Mapam daily] Al Hamishmar but defenceless, beaten peasants. Only members of my kibbutz [Hazore‘a] took prisoners . . . Also in the village, when adult males were discovered hiding hours after the end of the battle – they were killed . . . It is said that there were also cases of rape, but it is possible that this is only one of those made-up tales of ‘heroism’ that soldiers are prone to. Afterwards, all the village’s houses and the well were blown up . . . Of the property in the houses and the farm animals left without minders, they took what they could: One took a kettle for coffee, another a horse, a third a cow . . . One may understand and justify, if they took cows from the village for Mishmar Ha‘emek for example, or if soldiers who conquered the village would slaughter and fry chickens for themselves. But if every farmer from a nearby moshava [the allusion is to Yoqne‘am] takes part in looting, that is nothing but theft . . .
Bauer called on the Mapam leaders to make sure that the troops were ordered to abide by the Geneva Conventions. 610
Bauer’s letter, and the events described, were roundly discussed in the general members’ meetings at Hazore‘a on 18 and 20 April. One member, Yosef Shatil, spoke out against the looting; another, ‘Arnon’, said he was not happy with what had happened to Abu Zureiq and nearby Qira wa Qamun; ‘Fritzie’ condemned the cruel treatment meted out to the prisoners at Abu Zureiq. But Fritzie added, at the second meeting, that the members should refrain from ‘argument about transfer’. 611"
"An epilogue to the battle was provided by the IZL, whose units from Zikhron Ya‘akov, Hadera, Binyamina and Netanya on 12 May attacked and cleared the last Arab villages in the Hills of Menashe, overlooking Mishmar Ha‘emek from the west... At Sindiyana, whose inhabitants continued until early May 1948 to work in Zikhron Ya‘akov and which had barred Syrian irregulars, 615 the mukhtar and some 300 inhabitants stayed put and raised a white flag. A few days before they had proposed to their Jewish neighbours that they jointly ‘stage’ a Jewish attack on themselves, which would enable them to sur- render honourably.616 "
"The inhabitants of the large village of Miska, northeast of Qalqilya, had enjoyed a special dispensation and in early April were allowed to stay. 637 But on the 19th, after sniping from the village and several Haganah dead, the headman of neighbouring Kibbutz Ramat Hakovesh ordered the inhabitants ‘to depart within two hours’. The order was softened by members of the Committee for Arab Property, who proposed, instead, that the villagers hand over their arms, accept Jewish rule, and move inland, to Khirbet al Zababida, inside the Jewish area. But they refused and opted for evacuation eastwards. On 20–21 April, the villagers departed, as described in one Yishuv logbook: ‘That day and the next the movement of motor vehicles, donkeys and camels from Miska to Tira did not cease.’ Haganah troops moved in on the evening of the 21st. 638"
"A few days later, a few kilometres to the south, the small village of Jaramla was evacuated ‘out of fear of Jewish assault’.643 In early April, in view of the impending harvest, the large village of Fajja, bordering on Petah Tikva, had sued for a truce with its Jewish neighbours. 644 But the inhabitants were under pressure from the ALA, which demanded that they sever their ties with the Jews645 and contribute ‘volunteers’ for the ‘gangs’. The mukhtar, Abdullah al Haj, was reluctant, fearing retaliation, 646 and was interrogated by the ALA commanders in Ras al ‘Ein. 647 The villagers evacuated just after 10 April, but a handful returned a few days later, to mount guard.648 They were fearful both of the ALA and the Jews, who periodically pillaged the empty houses. 649"
"on 13 May Alexandroni units took Kafr Saba, prompting a mass evacuation. The village had lived in ‘dread’ of Haganah assault for some time, and was guarded by a small ALA detachment. 654 Nonetheless, the attack caught them by surprise and triggered a ‘panic flight’. The local Syrian ALA commander stood at the exit to the village and extorted P£5 from each evacuee. 655 Nine old men and women, incapable of speedy flight or of paying up, were left in the village656 and were later expelled."
Tantura
"At the last minute – probably prompted by the start of the pan-Arab attack on Israel and the failure of the Haganah to offer them terms – the villagers (along with those of ‘Ein Ghazal, Jab‘a and Ijzim) decided to ‘stay . . . and fight’. 661 The villagers worked on fortifications, laying mines on the approach roads; inhabitants of hamlets in the area were ordered to concentrate in, and help defend, Tantura and Ijzim.662
"Alexandroni HQ issued the operational order for the attack on 22 May; no mention was made of the prospective fate of the civilian inhabitants 663 – though there can be little doubt that the troops went in with the intention of driving out the inhabitants. The village was not offered the option to surrender quietly. The attack began that night with a barrage of machine-gun fire; infantry companies then moved in simultaneously from north, east and south, with a naval vessel blocking escape from the sea. The villagers offered serious resistance but the battle was over by 08:00, 23 May. Dozens of villagers were killed. The initial report spoke of ‘300 adult male prisoners’ and ‘200 women and children’. 664
As usual, the fall of the village was followed by looting by settlers from nearby, and Haganah efforts to stop it...There was also widespread destruction of property. 666 For days, the village and its environs remained strewn with human and animal corpses, creating a health hazard.667"
"Some of the villagers fled to Arab-held territory. Hundreds of others, mostly women and children, were moved to al Fureidis, an Arab village to the east that had earlier surrendered, where hundreds of Tantura refugees were already encamped. On 31 May, Minority Affairs Minister Shitrit asked Ben-Gurion whether to expel these women and children, as maintaining them in Fureidis was a problem. 668 HIS-AD also applied pressure; the Tantura evictees were leaking intelligence to neighbouring, unconquered, villages and there were problems of overcrowding and sanitation. 669 Ben-Gurion’s reply, if any, is unknown. But on 18 June, some 1,000 Tantura ‘women, children and old Arabs’ (together with ‘80’ detainees from elsewhere) were expelled from Fureidis to Iraqi- held Tulkarm in Samaria. 670 Another 200 women and children, probably with menfolk still in Israeli detention, stayed on in Fureidis. 671"
"During the second half of April and in May, as part of Plan D, the Haganah secured the border from Metula to the Sea of Galilee in expectation of the Syrian invasion. In the course of Operation Yiftah, as it was eventually called, the Arab population of eastern Galilee – earmarked for Jewish sovereignty in the partition resolution – was evicted."
"The inhabitants of the Shi‘ite village of Hunin, who had for years maintained good relations with Jewish neighbours and bad relations with Sunni Safad, were ordered to evacuate within six days – apparently by Arab, perhaps Lebanese, authorities. 688 A fortnight later a Palmah raid on the village resulted in the flight of most of the inhabitants. 689 (About 400 remained. Shitrit thought that Israel should foster special relations with the (Palestinian) Shi‘ites, 690 but the army thought otherwise."
"In his report of 22 April, Allon had recommended, among other things, ‘an attempt to clear out the beduin encamped between the Jordan [River], and Jubb Yusuf and the Sea of Galilee’. With Safad now targeted, this sub-operation became imperative. 694 On 4 May, Allon launched Operation Broom (Mivtza Matate). The nomadic and semi-settled inhabitants – al Qudeiriya, ‘Arab as Samakiya, ‘Arab as Suyyad, ‘Arab al Shamalina and the Zanghariya – had for months harassed Jewish traffic between Tiberias and Rosh Pina. Operation Yiftah HQ defined the objectives as ‘(a) the destruction of bases of the enemy . . . (b) to destroy points of assembly for invading forces from the east [and] (c) to join the lower and upper Galilee with a relatively wide and safe strip’ of continuous, Jewish territory. The order to the company commanders stated that Zanghariya and Tabigha, and the ‘Arab al Shamalina, should be attacked, ‘their inhabitants expelled and the[ir] houses blown up’. Friendly Arabs and churches ‘should on no account be harmed’. 695"
"The Syrians informed the British that the operation had created a further 2,000 refugees. 699 As ‘Azzam Pasha had understood and predicted, Allon was ‘driving out the inhabitants’ from areas ‘on or near roads by which Arab regular forces could enter the country . . . The Arab armies would have the greatest difficulty in even entering Palestine after May 15th.’700"
"Safad’s fall also helped Allon in the biggest psychological warfare operation of the war:
The echo . . . carried far . . . The confidence of thousands of Arabs of the Hula [Valley] was shaken . . . We had only five days left . . . until 15 May. We regarded it as imperative to cleanse the interior of the Galilee and create Jewish territorial continuity in the whole of Upper Galilee. The protracted battles reduced our forces, and we faced major tasks in blocking the invasion routes. We, therefore, looked for a means that would not oblige us to use force to drive out the tens of thousands of hostile Arabs left in the Galilee and who, in the event of an invasion, could strike at us from behind. We tried to utilise a stratagem that exploited the [Arab] defeats in Safad and in the area cleared by [Operation] Broom – a stratagem that worked wonderfully.
I gathered the Jewish mukhtars, who had ties with the different Arab villages, and I asked them to whisper in the ears of several Arabs that giant Jewish reinforcements had reached the Galilee and were about to clean out the villages of the Hula, [and] to advise them, as friends, to flee while they could. And the rumour spread throughout the Hula that the time had come to flee. The flight encompassed tens of thousands. The stratagem fully achieved its objective . . . and we were able to deploy ourselves in face of the [prospective] invaders along the borders, without fear for our rear. 704
...HIS-AD estimated that ‘18%’ of the exodus from the panhandle was due to the ‘whispering campaign’. "
"In all, the traumatic effect of the fall of the regional ‘capital’, Safad, Jewish attacks and a general fear of being caught up in a crossfire were probably more significant as causes of demoralisation and departure than the deliberate whispering campaign; or, put another way, the psychological warfare ploys were effective because they came on top of the other factors, which included orders for partial or full evacuation by local commanders and the Syrians. The picture that emerges from the IDF intelligence analysis of June 1948 of the evacuation is more complex than Allon’s subsequent recollection – that the exodus was simply the result of the orchestrated whispering campaign."
"In the south, the Haganah and, later, the IDF, remained on the defensive throughout the period. No major offensives were undertaken and, from the Egyptian invasion of 15 May, the Negev and Giv‘ati brigades had their hands more or less full averting a Jewish collapse. However, both brigades mounted sporadic, local attacks on the peripheries of their zones, usually with specific tactical aims, to facilitate defence against expected or continuing Egyptian advances. These attacks, especially those east of Majdal (Ashkelon) and Isdud by Giv‘ati, caused the flight of tens of thousands of local inhabitants.
Plan D’s guidelines to the Giv‘ati Brigade gave Lt. Col. Avidan wide discretion. In order to stabilise his lines, the plan stated ‘you will deter- mine alone, in consultation with your Arab affairs advisers and Intelligence Service officers, [which] villages in your zone should be occupied, cleansed or destroyed’. 733 During May – early June, before and after the invasion, Avidan moved to expand his area of control westwards and southwards."
"The inhabitants of ‘Arab Abu Fadl (‘Arab al Satariyya), northwest of Ramle, were unenthusiastic about assisting the Husseinis but felt trapped between the Haganah, which demanded neutrality or submission, and the nearby commanders of Ramle, who urged belligerence. Families began to leave in December 1947. In late April 1948, the mukhtar, Sheikh Salim, appealed for Haganah protection. 748 But before the Haganah could respond, the authorities in Ramle, perhaps sensing that treachery was afoot, ordered the villagers to evacuate. 749 By 9 May, ‘Arab al Satarriya (along with the nearby village of Bir Salim) evacuated.750"
"By late June, both Sawafir al Gharbiyya and Sawafir al Sharqiyya were once again ‘full of Arabs’. 774
The problem of leaving conquered villages both ungarrisoned and intact, with villagers simply returning after the Haganah had left, continued to plague Giv‘ati. On 23 May, for example, HIS-AD reported that the Sawafir villagers, and those of nearby Beit Daras, Jaladiya, Summeil, and Juseir, slept at night in the fields and returned to the villages to work during the days. 775 Nonetheless, the Haganah attacks, the flight of inhabitants and the partial destruction of the villages drove the inhabitants to despair776 and contributed to their eventual permanent exodus."
"In coordination with Giv‘ati’s local pushes southwards, the besieged Palmah Negev Brigade during May carried out a number of small pushes northwards and eastwards. Burayr, northeast of Gaza, was taken on 12–13 May. Its inhabitants fled to Gaza. The 9th Battalion troops killed a large number of villagers, apparently executing dozens of army-age males. They appear also to have raped and murdered a teenage girl. 777 The same day, the inhabitants of neighbouring Sumsum and Najd, to the west, were driven out. In Sumsum the occupying troops found only a handful of old people. They blew up five houses and warned that if the village’s weapons were not handed over the following day, they would blow up the rest. 778 But inhabitants repeatedly returned to the village, either to resettle or to cultivate crops. At the end of May, a Negev Brigade unit, with orders to expel ‘the Arabs from Sumsum and Burayr and burn their granaries and fields’, swept through the villages, encountering resistance in Sumsum, and killed ‘5’ (or, according to another report, ‘20’) and blew up granaries and a well. 779 The troops returned to Sumsum yet again, on 9 or 10 June, again burning houses and skirmishing with Arabs.780
"The inhabitants of Huleiqat and Kaukaba, to the north, fled westwards in mid-May under the impact of the fall of Burayr. 781 A fortnight later, on the night of 27\28 May, Negev Brigade units raided al Muharraqa and Kaufakha, south of Burayr, driving out or expelling their inhabitants. 782 The villagers of Kaufakha had earlier repeatedly asked to surrender, accept Jewish rule and be allowed to stay, to no avail. 783 The Haganah generally regarded such requests as insincere or untrustworthy; with the Egyptian army nearby, it was felt that it was better not to take a chance.
Beit Tima, north of Burayr, was conquered by the Negev Brigade’s 7th Battalion on 30\31 May; some 20 Arabs were killed, and the granary and a well were destroyed.784 On 31 May, the brigade expelled the villagers of Huj, seven kilometres south of Burayr, to the Gaza Strip. Huj had traditionally been friendly; in 1946, its inhabitants had hidden Haganah men from a British dragnet. In mid-December 1947, while on a visit to Gaza, the mukhtar and his brother were shot dead by a mob that accused them of ‘collaboration’.785 But at the end of May 1948, given the proximity of the advancing Egyptian column, the Negev Brigade decided to expel the inhabitants – and then looted and blew up their houses. 786"
"But Haganah\IDF behaviour in various parts of the country was not monolithic. The Giv‘ati and Negev brigades tended to expel communities near their front lines against the backdrop of the approach or proximity of the invading Egyptians, whom HGS for weeks believed to be far stronger than they were. But Golani’s and Carmeli’s operations were anything but uniform in character or effect. On 16 May, hours after Iraqi and Syrian troops invaded, Golani captured the villages of ‘Indur and Kaukab al Hawa. At ‘Indur (biblical ‘Ein Dor, home of the witch), most of the inhabitants probably fled at the start of the battle and several who were captured and ‘[later] tried to escape’ were shot. Three rifles were captured. The commander briefly left a small garrison in place and, he reported, ‘the [remaining] population is being transferred in the direction of Nazareth’. 803 A fortnight later, on 7 June, a large Golani patrol, mounted on an armoured car and three buses, swept through ‘Indur, where it encountered ‘no foreign force’ and blew up two houses. Moving on, the force entered the large village of Tamra, where it found only women and children (the men had fled as the column approached). The troops demanded that the villagers hand over their arms – or ‘depart . . . within half an hour’. But the commander relented and gave them several days. The patrol moved on to Kafr Misr, where it managed to surprise the menfolk. The commander demanded that their arms be delivered up within half an hour – or all the menfolk would have to leave. The villagers handed over eight rifles and promised to deliver several more the following day. ‘The inhabitants asked permission to continue the harvest and to [be able to] move freely to Nazareth. I said that they would receive an answer after they delivered the arms.’ The patrol then drove to Na‘ura, south of Tamra. Most of the males had left and the mukhtar said that he would give up the arms to two local officers. The commander opined that ‘there is no need to expel these inhabitants but to reach an agreement with them after they deliver up their arms’. 804
But other Golani troops behaved differently (if also somewhat erratically). A few days earlier, on 4 June, two platoons of Golani’s 12th (‘Barak’) Battalion, commanded by Haim Levakov and mounted on three trucks and a jeep, swept through the villages of Hadatha, ‘Ulam, Sirin, and Ma‘dhar, some10 kilometres west-southwest of Samakh. In Hadatha, ‘Ulam and Ma‘dhar, the force found a handful of Arabs busy with the harvest. All had written permission to stay. In Sirin they found about 100 inhabitants. The troops checked identity cards, searched for weapons (finding only some knives) and left; no hostile irregulars were found and the inhabitants were left in place – though the battalion’s in- telligence officer, in his report, recommended that ‘the Arabs should be ejected from the area, the young men should be arrested, and the crops confiscated . . .’. 805
A half a century later, one of the Israeli participants, Victor ‘Oved, described this or a similar patrol:
On one of the hot summer days as part of the effort to clear areas of hostile Arabs, we set out at midnight to check a number of Arab villages above Ramat Yavniel . . . We approached . . . on foot . . . From a distance we began to smell the special smell of the Arab village, to hear the chickens and the braying of donkeys . . . and the barking of tens of dogs. In a number of minutes we’re on the outskirts . . . dozens of villagers . . . start screaming: The Jews have come . . . The mukhtar is summoned to the commander and is given an order to evacuate the village in reasonable time. Thus we moved from village to village and carried out a meticulous search from house to house, but without success. At the last and largest village, the mukhtar was given an order as in the other villages, to prevent the entry of hostile enemy forces.
As the Israeli force was about to leave, an Arab approached the commander, ‘began to kiss his hands and feet’, and complained that during the search, a batch of bank notes had disappeared from the pocket of a coat that had been hanging in his house. The commander announced to the assembled platoons that the force would not move out until the money was returned and that the culprit would not be punished. Suddenly, the money was dropped on the floor. The villager was given back his money and he then kissed the commander’s feet and hands ‘again and again . . . We return to base satisfied but with a bitter taste.’ Soon afterwards, according to ‘Oved, the villagers left, taking whatever they could with them, including livestock, ‘doors [and] windows . . . During [the subsequent] fighting, this area was quiet and this saved the IDF a lot of troops and, of course, unnecessary clashes.’ 806"
"From the foregoing, it appears that Golani and Carmeli had no over- all, monolithic guideline about how to relate to Arab communities behind and along the front lines (save to disarm them): Some units expelled villagers or made sure that villages stayed empty, while others merely occupied or searched and disarmed them. Unlike in Giv‘ati’s zone of operations, arms confiscation operations did not invariably result in expulsion. And while some communities initially left in place were subsequently expelled, other communities were left in place permanently and these large Muslim villages remain to this day (al Makr, Judeida and others)."
"From the foregoing, it emerges that the main, second wave of the exodus, resulting in 250,000–300,000 refugees, was not the result of a general, predetermined Yishuv policy. The exodus of April–May caught the Yishuv leadership by surprise, though it was immediately seen as a phenomenon to be exploited. As Galili put it on 11 May:
Up to 15 May and after 15 May we must continue to implement the plan of military operations [i.e., Plan D] . . . which did not take into account the collapse and flight of Arab settlements following the route in Haifa . . . [But] this collapse facilitates our tasks. 812
A major shift in attitudes towards Arab communities can be discerned in the Haganah and among civilian executives during the first half of April, when, reeling from the blows of the battle for the roads, the Yishuv braced for the expected Arab invasion. The Plan D guidelines, formulated in early March, to a certain degree already embodied this new orientation. Their essence was that the rear areas of the State’s territory and its main roads had to be secured, and that this was best done by driving out hostile or potentially hostile communities and destroying swathes of villages. During the first half of April, Ben-Gurion and the HGS approved a series of offensives – in effect, counterattacks (Operation Nahshon and the operations around Mishmar Ha‘emek) – embodying these guidelines. During the following weeks, Haganah and IZL offensives in Haifa, Jaffa, and eastern and western Galilee precipitated a mass exodus.
During its first months, the exodus was regarded by the Arab states and the AHC as a passing phenomenon of no particular consequence. Palestinian leaders and commanders struggled against it, unsuccessfully. The transformation of the exodus in April into a massive demographic upheaval caught the AHC and the Arab states largely unawares
and caused great embarrassment: It highlighted the AHC’s (and the Palestinians’) weakness and the Arab states’ inability, so long as the Mandate lasted, to intervene. At the same time, it propelled these states closer to the invasion about which they were largely unenthusiastic. There is no evidence that the Arab states and the AHC wanted a mass exodus or issued blanket orders or appeals to flee. At the same time, the AHC and the Arab states often encouraged villagers (and, in some places, townspeople) to send their women, children and old people out of harm’s way. Local political and military leaders also ordered some villages to evacuate in order to forestall their (treacherous) acceptance of Jewish rule. In certain areas (around Jerusalem, and along the Syrian border), the Arab states ordered villages to uproot for strategic reasons. The picture that emerges is complex and varied, differing widely from place to place and week to week. In trying to elucidate patterns, it is necessary to distinguish between the towns and the countryside.
The evacuation of the towns during April–May must be seen as the culmination of a series of processes and events and against the backdrop of the basic weaknesses of Palestinian society: The Arab inhabitants of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and, to a lesser extent, Safad, Beisan and Acre had for months suffered from a collapse of administration and law and order, difficulties of communications and supplies, isolation, siege, skirmishing and intermittent harassment at the hands of Jewish troops. In the case of Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, the steady exodus of the middle and upper classes over December 1947 – March 1948 considerably demoralised the remaining inhabitants and provided a model for their own departure once conditions became intolerable. The urban masses (and the fellahin) had traditionally looked to the notability for leadership.
A major factor in the exodus from the towns was the earlier fall of and exodus from other towns. The exodus from Arab Tiberias served as a pointer and model for Haifa’s Arab leaders on the eve of their own decision to evacuate. It also undermined morale in Safad. Even more telling were the fall and exodus of Arab Haifa: These strongly affected the in- habitants of Jaffa, and also radiated defeatism throughout the north, affecting Safad, Beisan and Acre. If mighty Haifa could fall and be up- rooted, how could relatively unarmed, small communities hope to hold out? Moreover, the exodus from the towns demoralised the surrounding hinterland"
"The ‘atrocity factor’ certainly fuelled the process. What happened, or allegedly happened, at Nasser ad Din demoralized Arab Tiberias. In a more general way, the massacre at Deir Yassin, and the exaggerated descriptions broadcast on Arab radio stations for weeks undermined morale throughout Palestine, especially in the countryside.
A major factor in the urban exodus was the dissolution and flight of the local civil and military leadership just before and during the final battles. The flight of the Tabaris from Tiberias; the flight of the NC and the commanders from Arab Haifa just before and during the battle; the flight of Jaffa’s leaders during and after the IZL assault; and the departure from Safad and Beisan of prominent local families and commanders – all contributed to the mass exodus from each town and its hinterland."
"Undoubtedly, as was understood by IDF intelligence, the most important single factor in the exodus of April–June was Jewish attack. This is demonstrated clearly by the fact that each exodus occurred during or in the immediate wake of military assault. No town was abandoned by the bulk of its population before the main Haganah\IZL assault. In the countryside, while many of the villages were abandoned during Haganah\IZL attacks and because of them, other villages were evacuated as a result of Jewish attacks on neighbouring villages or towns; they feared that they would be next.
In general, Haganah operational orders for attacks on towns did not call for the expulsion or eviction of the civilian population. But from early April, operational orders for attacks on villages and clusters of villages more often than not called for the destruction of villages and, implicitly or explicitly, expulsion. And, no doubt, the spectacle of panicky flight served to whet the appetites of Haganah commanders and, perhaps, the HGS as well. Like Ben-Gurion, they realised that a transfer of the prospective large minority out of the emergent Jewish State had be-
gun and that with very little extra effort and nudging, it could be expanded. The temptation proved very strong, for solid military and political reasons.
By and large, when it came to ejecting Arab communities, Haganah commanders exercised greater independence and forcefulness in the countryside than in the towns. This was due partly to the greater distance from headquarters, where senior officers and officials, as exemplified by Ben-Gurion, were reluctant to openly order or endorse expulsions, and partly, to the guidelines set down in Plan D, which enabled local commanders to expel and level villages but made no provision for wholesale expulsions from towns.
During April–June, a time factor clearly influenced Haganah behaviour. The closer drew the 15 May British withdrawal deadline and the prospect of invasion by the Arab states, the readier became commanders to resort to ‘cleansing’ operations and expulsions to rid their rear areas, main roads, and prospective front lines of hostile and potentially hostile civilian concentrations. After 15 May, the threat and presence of the Arab regular armies near the Yishuv’s population centers dictated a play-safe policy of taking no chances with communities to the rear; hence, the Giv‘ati Brigade’s expulsions in May–June near Rehovot. In general, however, the swift collapse of almost all the Palestinian and foreign irregular formations and of civilian morale, and the spontaneous panic and flight of most communities meant that Jewish commanders almost invariably did not have to face the dilemma of expelling: Most villages were completely or almost completely empty by the time they were conquered."
"The exodus confronted the Yishuv with a major problem:
Whether or not to allow those who had fled or been expelled to return. Already during the spring, refugees in various localities began pressing to return. Local Haganah and civic leaders had to decide, without having national guidelines, whether to allow this – and almost invariably ruled against.1 In May, the Arab states, led by Jordan, began clamouring for a refugee return. From early summer, the Yishuv’s leaders came under intense international pressure – spearheaded first by Count Folke Bernadotte, the Swedish United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and later by the United States – to repatriate the refugees. At the same time, the government was subjected to lobbying by army and local authorities in various parts of the country to bar a refugee return. In mid-June the Cabinet discussed the matter and a consensus emerged to prevent a return, at least so long as the hostilities continued. The consensus turned into a formal Cabinet decision in July. Without doubt, this was one of the most important decisions taken by the new State in its first formative months.
The decision, taken against the backdrop of the pan-Arab invasion and the intensification of the fighting, had crystallised over April–June. Already in early April, as the Haganah switched to the offensive, local commanders and Arab affairs advisers in predominantly Jewish areas decided to bar a return to their areas. For example, Alexandroni’s Arab affairs advisers, responsible for a large section of the coastal plain, formally decided ‘not to allow the return of the Arabs who evacuated the area’. They were driven mainly by calculations of Jewish security, but also by a desire to protect the Arabs from Jewish depredations and by considerations of economic advantage (preventing a refugee return to harvest crops would translate into Jewish economic gain). 2"
"Golda Myerson (Meir), the acting head of the JA-PD, visited Arab Haifa a few days after its conquest. She reported on 6 May:
It is a dreadful thing to see the dead city. Next to the port I found children, women, the old, waiting for a way to leave. I entered the houses, there were houses where the coffee and pita bread were left on the table, and I could not avoid [thinking] that this, indeed, had been the picture in many Jewish towns [i.e., in Europe, during World War II]’.
The situation, she said, ‘raised many questions’. Should the Jews
make an effort to bring the Arabs back to Haifa, or not [?] Meanwhile, so long as it is not decided differently, we have decided on a number of rules, and these include: We won’t go to Acre or Nazareth to bring back the Arabs. But, at the same time, our behaviour should be such that if, because of it, they come back – [then] let them come back. We shouldn’t behave badly with the Arabs [who remained] so that others [who fled] won’t return. 3
A few days later, Myerson spoke about the issue within the context of general policy toward Palestine’s Arabs. She told the Mapai Central Committee that the Jews could not treat villagers who had fled because they did not want to fight the Yishuv, ‘such as [those of] Sheikh Muwannis’, in the same way as hostile villagers. But while implying that she thought ‘friendly’ villagers should be allowed back, Myerson avoided saying so outright. Rather, she posed questions:
What are we to do with the villages . . . abandoned by friends? . . . Are we prepared to preserve these villages in order that their inhabitants might return, or do we want to wipe out every trace that there had been a village on the site?
She then turned to Haifa:
I am not among those extremists – and there are such, and I applaud them, who want to do everything that can be done in order to bring back the Arabs. I say I am not willing to make extraordinary arrangements to bring back Arabs.
The question remained of how the Yishuv should behave toward those who had remained. Ill-treatment might both prompt those who had remained to leave and discourage those who had left from returning – ‘and we would [then] be rid of the lot of them’. She concluded by saying that the party and, by implication, the Yishuv, had entered the war without a clear policy regarding Palestine’s Arabs. She called for a comprehensive discussion of the ‘Arab Question’ in the central committee. 4 But the call went unheeded.
Myerson’s line was an amplification of the policy sketched by Ben- Gurion during his visit to Haifa on 1 May: The Jews should treat the remaining Arabs ‘with civil and human equality’ but ‘it is not our job to worry about the return of [those who had fled]’. Clearly, neither he nor Myerson was interested in their return (though Myerson implied that she was willing to make an exception of ‘friendly’ Arabs). Ben-Gurion had already said as much back in early February, specifically regarding the depopulated Arab neighbourhoods of west Jerusalem. 5
The crystallisation in the national leadership of the policy against a return was heralded on 25 April – as the exodus from Haifa and Jaffa was under way – in a cable from Shertok, in New York, to his officials in Tel Aviv: ‘Suggest consider issue warning Arabs now evacuating [that they] cannot be assured of return.’ 6
Pressure for a return began to build up in early May as, for their part, the Arab leaders began to contemplate the political, economic, and military implications of the exodus. At a meeting in Amman on 2 May, Arab officials and notables from Haifa agreed that ‘the Arabs should return to Haifa’. There was, apparently, coordination with the British as the following day, the British Army removed several Haganah roadblocks in the town and took up positions in the abandoned Arab neighbourhoods. Immediately afterward, ‘Azzam Pasha, ‘Abdullah and Qawuqji all issued well-publicised calls to the refugees to return, while the Mandate Government proclaimed, on 6 May: ‘In the view of the Government, the Arabs can feel completely safe in Haifa.’ 7 The day before, ‘Abdullah had called on ‘every man of strength and wisdom, every young person of power and faith, who has left the country [i.e., Palestine], let him return to the dear spot. No one should remain outside the country except the rich and the old.’ ‘Abdullah went on to thank ‘those of you . . . who have remained where they are in spite of the tyranny now prevailing’, and went out of his way to cite the JA condemnation of the Deir Yassin Massacre. 8 By the end of the month, HIS-AD was reporting that ‘in the Arab states the pressure on the refugees to return’ was ‘building up’.9
This joint Arab–British effort, aiming at a general repatriation and not only to Haifa, came to nought. The Haganah was not allowing Arabs to return and, given the continued fighting and confusion on the ground, the call to return may not have generated much enthusiasm among the refugees themselves. In Haifa itself, where initially the local Jewish civilian leadership had not been averse to a return, a major change of heart took place. One participant (expressing the general view) in a meeting of local officials in Haifa’s town hall on 6 June, put it this way: ‘There are no sentiments in war . . . Better to cause them injustice than that [we suffer] a disaster . . . We have no interest in their returning.’ 10"
"The talk and diplomatic movement in May surrounding a possible re- turn helped trigger the consolidation in Israel of an effective, if loosely coordinated, lobby against repatriation. The lobby consisted of local authorities, the kibbutz movements, the settlement departments of the National Institutions, Haganah commanders and influential figures such as Yosef Weitz and Ezra Danin.
Weitz regarded the exodus, which he had helped to promote in a number of places, as an implementation, albeit unplanned and largely spontaneous, of the transfer schemes of the late 1930s and early and mid-1940s, which had envisaged the movement of the Arab minority out of the future Jewish State so that it would be homogeneous, politically stable and secure against subversion from within. He and his colleagues realised that, for Israel’s sake, the exodus must be expanded by nudging or propelling more Arab communities into flight and the post- exodus status quo consolidated and shored up. A return would endanger the Jewish State. Weitz considered that the matter was sufficiently important to merit the establishment of a special state body to supervise what he defined as the ‘retroactive transfer’. During March and April, Weitz energetically sought political backing and help to implement the transfer. From May, Weitz pressed Ben-Gurion and Shertok to set up a ‘Transfer Committee’, preferably with himself at its head, to oversee ‘transfer policy’, which in the main was to focus on measures that would assure that there would be no return. More guardedly, the committee was also to advise the political leadership and the Haganah on further population displacements.
The first unofficial Transfer Committee – composed of Weitz, Danin and Sasson, now head of the Middle East Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry – came into being at the end of May, following Danin’s agreement to join and Shertok’s 28 May unofficial sanction of the committee’s existence and goals.
In mid-May, Danin resigned from the Committee for Arab Property. Danin wrote Weitz that what was needed was ‘an institution whose role will be . . . to seek ways to carry out the transfer of the Arab population at this opportunity when it has left its normal place of residence’. Danin thought that Christian organisations could be found, acting under the rubric of helping the refugees, which would assist in their resettlement in the Arab countries. ‘Let us not waste the fact that a large Arab population has moved from its home, and achieving such a thing would be very difficult in normal times’, he wrote. To prevent a refugee return ‘they must be confronted with faits accomplis’. Among the faits accomplis Danin proposed were the destruction of Arab houses, ‘settling Jews in all the area evacuated’ and expropriating Arab property. 11
On 28 May, Weitz went to Shertok and proposed that the Cabinet appoint himself, Sasson and Danin as a Transfer Committee ‘to hammer out a plan of action designed [to achieve] the goal of transfer’. Shertok, according to Weitz, congratulated him on his initiative and agreed that the ‘momentum [of Arab flight] must be exploited and turned into an accomplished fact’. 12 On 30 May, Weitz met Finance Minister Kaplan, number three in the Mapai hierarchy, and, according to Weitz, received his blessing.13 That day, the Transfer Committee met for its first working session, and Weitz began preparing a draft proposal for its activities.
But official authorisation by Ben-Gurion and\or the full Cabinet continued to elude him. Nonetheless, from the beginning of June, with JNF funds and personnel, the committee set about razing villages in various areas. On 5 June, Weitz, armed with a three-page memorandum, signed by himself, Danin and Sasson, entitled ‘Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel’, went to see Ben-Gurion.
The memorandum stated that the war had unexpectedly brought about ‘the uprooting of masses [of Arabs] from their towns and villages and their flight out of the area of Israel . . . This process may continue as the war continues and our army advances.’ The war and the exodus had so deepened Arab enmity ‘as perhaps to make impossible the existence of hundreds of thousands of Arabs in the State of Israel and the existence of the state with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants who bear that hatred’. Israel, therefore, ‘must be inhabited largely by Jews, so that there will be in it very few non-Jews.’ ‘The uprooting of the Arabs should be seen as a solution to the Arab question . . . and, in line with this, it must from now on be directed according to a calculated plan geared toward the goal of “retroactive transfer”.’
To consolidate and amplify the transfer, the committee proposed:
‘(1) Preventing the Arabs from returning to their places.
(2) [Extending] help to the Arabs to be absorbed in other places.’
Regarding the first guideline, the committee proposed:
(1) Destruction of villages as much as possible during military operations.
(2) Prevention of any cultivation of land by them [i.e., the Arabs], including reaping, collection [of crops], picking [olives] and so on . . .
(3) Settlement of Jews in a number of villages and towns so that no “vacuum” is created.
(4) Enacting legislation [geared to barring a return].
(5) [Making] propaganda [aimed at non-return].
The committee proposed that it oversee the destruction of villages and the renovation of certain sites for Jewish settlement, negotiate the purchase of Arab land, prepare legislation for expropriation and negotiate the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries. 14
Weitz recorded that Ben-Gurion ‘agreed to the whole line’ but thought that the Yishuv should first set in train the destruction of the villages, establish Jewish settlements and prevent Arab cultivation, and only later worry about the organised resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries. Ben-Gurion agreed to the idea of a supervisory committee but was opposed to Weitz’s ‘temporary committee’. At the same time, he approved the start of organised destruction by the committee of the villages, about which Weitz had informed him. 15
According to Ben-Gurion’s account of the meeting, he had approved the establishment of a committee to oversee ‘the cleaning up [nikui ] of the Arab settlements, cultivation of [Arab fields] and their settlement [by Jews], and the creation of labour battalions to carry out this work’. Nowhere did he explicitly refer to the destruction of villages or the prevention of a refugee return. 16
The following day, 6 June, Weitz wrote Ben-Gurion:
I . . . take the liberty of setting down your answer to the scheme proposal I submitted to you, that: A) You will call a meeting immediately to discuss [the scheme] and to appoint a committee . . . B) You agree that the actions marked in clauses 1, 2 [i.e., the destruction of villages and the prevention of Arab cultivation] . . . begin immediately.
Weitz continued: ‘In line with this, I have given an order to begin [these operations] in different parts of the Galilee, the Beit Shean Valley, the Hills of Ephraim and Samaria.’ 17 Weitz, of course, was covering himself. He sensed that on this sensitive subject, Ben-Gurion might prefer not to commit anything to paper, and he did not want to leave himself open to charges that he had acted without authorisation. Probably he also wanted to prod Ben-Gurion to set up the committee.
Then, using his JNF branch offices, Weitz set in motion the levelling of a handful of villages (al Mughar, near Gedera, Fajja, near Petah Tikva, Biyar Adas, near Magdiel, Beit Dajan, east of Tel Aviv, Miska, near Ramat Hakovesh, Sumeiriya, near Acre, Buteimat and Sabbarin, southeast of Haifa). His agents toured the countryside to determine which other villages should be destroyed or preserved and renovated for future Jewish settlement. He remained hopeful that official Cabinet-level endorsement of his actions would be forthcoming and that an official letter of appointment would be issued for the Transfer Committee.
But, at least initially, Weitz was unaware that his semi-covert activities had been noted by Mapam and that Mapam, together with Shitrit, had launched a counter-campaign to halt the destruction of the villages and to resist the atmosphere of transfer of which this destruction was a manifestation. This campaign was probably at least in part responsible for Weitz’s inability to obtain formal, Cabinet-level authorisation for the Transfer Committee. At the beginning of July, Weitz suspended the destruction operations, effectively terminating the activities of the first, unofficial, self-appointed Transfer Committee."
"Justice Minister Felix Rosenblueth (Pinhas Rosen) had spoken out against transfer and criticised ‘the plunder of [Arab] property’ and the destruction of villages as designed to prevent a refugee return. 19 And on 29 May the official state radio station, Kol Yisrael (the Voice of Israel), had proclaimed that Israel would allow a refugee return.20
Weitz had notified Foreign Minister Shertok of the broadcast and Shertok had minuted his director general, Walter Eytan:
We must avoid unequivocal statements on this matter. For the moment, only [use] a negative formulation. That is, so long as the war continues, there should be no talk of allowing a return. [But don’t let it appear] from our statements that at the war’s end, they will be allowed back. Let us keep open every option. 21"
"From around the country, local leaders demanded that the government bar a return. The more distant from the centre of Jewish population or isolated the settlement, and the more vulnerable, the stronger was the clamour against a return."
"In the first days of June, the notables of the Safad Jewish community attempted to appeal directly to the Cabinet. They journeyed to Tel Aviv and got as far as Shlomo Kaddar, the Principal Assistant at the Cabinet Secretariat. He reported that they had demanded that the government bar a return, set up a ring of Jewish settlements around the town and settle Jews in Safad’s abandoned houses. ‘The Jewish community will not be able to withstand the pressure of the returning Arabs, especially in view [of the fact] that most of the Arab property in Safad has been stolen and plundered since the Arabs left’, they said. If the Arabs were allowed to return, the Jewish community would leave, they warned. A similar message was conveyed by Safad’s leaders to a visiting delegation of Yishuv officials on 5 July. If Jewish settlers were not brought to Safad, then it were best that ‘the Arab houses . . . be destroyed and blown up lest the Arabs have somewhere to return to’. 26 If the Jews did not quickly fill the abandoned villages, they would be ‘filled with returning Arabs with hatred in their hearts’, Weitz concluded after visiting the Safad area. 27"
"The input of the military lobby may have weighed even more heavily with the Cabinet. IDF intelligence regarded the prospect of a mass refugee return as a major threat to the war effort. As the First Truce approached, local commanders began to press GS\Operations for guidelines. ‘Waiting for exact instructions regarding the ceasefire, for fear of a return of Arabs to the villages’, ‘Oded’ of Northern Front radioed on 2 June. 31 ‘The problem of the return of the refugees is increasing’, Northern Front radioed six days later. 32 On 16 June, the head of the IDF Intelligence Service wrote to Reuven Shiloah, the director of the Foreign Ministry’s Political Division:
There is a growing movement by the Palestinian villagers who fled to the neighbouring countries [to] return now, during the days of the [First Truce]. There is a serious danger [that returning villagers] will fortify themselves in their villages behind our front lines, and with the resumption of warfare, will constitute at least a [potential] Fifth Column, if not active hostile concentrations.
If nothing was done, there was a danger that at the end of the truce, the IDF would have ‘to set aside considerable forces again to clean up the rear and the lines of communication’. 33 Some officers thought that the piecemeal refugee return was part of a deliberate policy by the Arab states with clear political and economic goals. 34
Officials from government departments also weighed in. At the start of the First Truce, the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Department noted the Arab leaders’ calls for the return to Palestine of ‘the 300,000 refugees’. Already, a trickle of refugees had infiltrated back. The department conjectured that a major reason for this return was the desire ‘to harvest the [summer] crops . . . The Arabs in their places of wandering are suffering from real hunger.’ But this harvest-geared return, the department warned, could
in time bring in its wake [re-]settlement in the villages, something which might seriously endanger many of our achievements during the first six months of the war. It is not for nothing that Arab spokesmen are . . . demanding the return . . . [of the refugees], because this would not only ease their burden but weigh us down considerably. 35"
"Matters came to a head in mid-June. The institution of the truce had stilled the guns along the front lines, posing the physical possibility of a refugee return. A trickle of refugees began making their way back to villages and towns. At the same time, the truce enabled the Arab states to ponder the enormous burden that they had unexpectedly incurred; solving the refugee problem became a major policy goal. Similarly, as the dust of battle temporarily settled, the international community at last took note. Public opinion in the West began to mobilize and refugee relief drives were inaugurated. The newly appointed Mediator, Bernadotte, who in World War II had worked on refugee assistance, having successfully orchestrated the inauguration of the truce made clear his intention to focus on a final settlement, in which a solution to the refugee problem would, it was believed in Tel Aviv, figure prominently. 37 He was due back in Israel on 17 June.
The Cabinet met on 16 June. In a forceful speech, Ben-Gurion set out his views, which were to serve as the basis of the consensus that emerged. ‘I do not accept the version [i.e., policy] that [we] should encourage their return’, he said, in an obvious response to the resolution of Mapam’s Political Committee the day before, to support the return of ‘peace-minded’ refugees at the end of the war.38 ‘I believe’, said Ben- Gurion, ‘we should prevent their return . . . We must settle Jaffa, Jaffa will become a Jewish city . . . [Beisan and Abu Kabir must not be resettled with Arabs.] To allow the return of the Arabs to Jaffa would be . . . foolish.’ If the Arabs were allowed to return ‘and the war is renewed, our chances of ending the war as we wish to end it will be reduced . . . Meanwhile, we must prevent at all costs their return’, he said, and, leaving no doubt in the ministers’ minds about his views on the ultimate fate of the refugees, he added: ‘I will be for them not returning also after the war.’ He added that he favoured a ‘treaty’ between Israel and the Arab states and said that the Turkish-Greek experience proved that it was possible: They were
enemies for more than four hundred years – and after the last war in which the Turks won and expelled the Greeks from Anatolia – they became friends and signed a treaty of peace, and it is also possible between us and the Arabs.39"
"Shertok spoke against a return with equal vehemence. A return to the status quo ante was inconceivable. Jaffa, a ‘Fifth Column’ and ‘pest’ in the heart of Israel, must not revert to becoming an ‘Arab city’. Israel had managed to ‘clear of Arabs’ a continuous line from Tel Aviv to Romema, in west Jerusalem. Most of the country was now clear of Arabs. There was now
a need [for the government] to explain [to the Israeli public] the enormous importance of this [demographic] change in terms of [possibilities of Jewish] settlement and security, and in terms of the solidity of the state structure and [of] the solution of crucial social and political problems that cast their shadow over the whole future of the state. Had anyone arisen among us and said that one day we should expel all of them – that would have been madness. But if this happened in the course of the turbulence of war, a war that the Arab people declared against us, and because of Arab flight – then that is one of those revolutionary changes after which [the clock of] history cannot be turned back, as it did not turn back after the [sic] Syrian-Greek [i.e., should be Turkish-Greek] war, [or] after the war in Czechoslovakia . . . which caused revolutionary changes, in the social or ethnic composition in those countries . . . The aggressive enemy brought this about and the blood is on his head and he must bear [the consequences] and all the lands and the houses that remained . . . all are spoils of war . . . all this is just compensation for the [Jewish] blood spilled, for the destruction [of Jewish property] . . . This compensation is natural . . .
Nonetheless, Shertok felt that Israel must be ready to pay compensation for the land ‘and this would facilitate the [refugees’] resettlement in other countries’. But ‘this is [i.e., must be] our policy: That they are not returning’, he said. 42
Cisling said that ‘at this time [i.e., during the war] we must not give the Arabs back even a shoelace. If I have reservations it is only about places where we left [Arabs in place] and we shouldn’t have, because this endangers peace.’ At the same time, he warned that the refugees would breed hatred toward Israel in their places of exile in the Arab world. ‘They will carry in their breasts the desire for revenge and for a return . . . This orientation, of prohibiting a return of the Arabs . . . will be to our detriment.’ 43 He implied, though did not say explicitly, that the refugees should be allowed back after the war – but added that the villagers of Qumiya, which overlooked his own home in the Jezreel Valley kibbutz of ‘Ein Harod, should not be allowed back.44
No formal vote was taken or resolution passed by the ministers. But the line advocated by Ben-Gurion and Shertok – that the refugees should not be allowed back – had now become Israeli policy. Orders immediately went out down the IDF chains of command to bar the re- turn of refugees. 45 During the following weeks, again and again orders reached the brigades manning the lines to prevent a return, ‘also with live fire’.46 The military’s opposition to a return was to remain firm and consistent through the summer"
"In the diplomatic arena, this policy was given a somewhat less definitive, more flexible countenance. At their meeting on 17 June, Bernadotte asked Shertok whether Israel would allow back ‘the 300,000’ refugees ‘and would their proprietary rights be respected?’ Shertok responded that ‘they certainly could not return so long as the war was on’ 48 or, alternatively, that ‘the question could not be discussed while the war was on’ and that the government had not yet ‘fixed its policy on the ultimate settlement of the matter’. Shertok added that Arab ‘proprietary rights would certainly be respected’.49
Shertok appeared to leave open the possibility that Israel might allow back the refugees after the war. This clearly eased the task of Israeli officials meeting with United Nations and American representatives. But it seems to have been the product less of diplomatic expediency than of the exigencies of coalition politics and the need to maintain national unity in wartime. The nettle in the garden was Mapam, Mapai’s chief coalition partner in the Provisional Government. Mapam opposed transfer and endorsed the right of ‘peace-loving’ refugees to return after the war. Had Ben-Gurion definitively closed the door to the possibility of a return, a coalition crisis would have ensued, undermining national unity and isolating Mapai in the Cabinet, where Ben-Gurion would have been left, embarrassingly, with only non-socialist and religious parties as partners. Moreover, the top echelons of both the military and, to a lesser degree, the civil bureaucracies of the new state were heavily manned by Mapam cadres.
During the summer, Mapam’s Political Committee, after weeks of debate, at last formulated the party’s Arab policy. The party – as its co- leader Meir Ya‘ari said – was agreeable to deferring a refugee return until the termination of hostilities, 50 but it opposed ‘the intention [megama] to expel the Arabs from the areas of the emerging Jewish State’ and proposed that the Cabinet issue a call to peace-minded Arabs ‘to stay in their places’. As to the Arabs already in exile, the party declared: ‘The Cabinet . . . should [announce] that with the return of peace they should return to a life of peace, honour and productivity . . . The property of the returnees . . . will be restored to them.’ 51"
"ppeals on behalf of Jaffa’s refugees also began to reach the authorities, within weeks of their exodus. The petitions, presented by the remaining notables, were anchored in the surrender agreement signed with the Haganah in mid-May. That agreement had stated that those wishing to leave were free to do so;
likewise, any male Arab who left Jaffa and wishes to return to Jaffa may apply for a permit to do so. Permits will be granted after their bona fides has been proven, provided that the [city] commander of the Haganah is convinced that the applicants will not . . . constitute a threat to peace and security. 53
The notables thus had good grounds for their appeal to allow back refugees, men, women and children. 54 Yitzhak Chizik, the town’s military governor, passed on the appeal to Shitrit, with a covering letter: ‘You will certainly recall’, he wrote, ‘that in Clause 8 of the surrender agreement it states that every Arab who left Jaffa and wishes to come back, can do so by submitting a request, on condition, of course, that their presence here [in Jaffa] will not constitute a security risk.’ 55 Chizik’s letter triggered a debate in the upper reaches of the government. Shitrit wrote to Ben-Gurion and Shertok that similar appeals were reaching him from Haifa. 56 Replying for Ben-Gurion, Shlomo Kaddar wrote:
I have been asked to tell you that the prime minister is opposed to the return of the Arab inhabitants to their places so long as the war continues and so long as the enemy stands at our gates. Only the full Cabinet, the prime minister believes, can decide on a change of approach. 57
Shertok, for his part, passed on Shitrit’s letter to Yehoshua Palmon for comment. Palmon, perhaps to Shertok’s surprise, proposed:
I think that we should adopt a public posture that we do not oppose the return of the Arab inhabitants of Jaffa, and even to announce this in a [radio] broadcast to the Arabs – but, in practice, their return should be contingent on certain conditions and restrictions.
Palmon thought that the returnees should be asked to sign a loyalty oath and fill out detailed questionnaires. This, he argued, ‘would leave in our hands complete supervision of their actual return. We shall have the ability to let back mainly [non-Moslems] . . . something that could be of use [to us] in the future.’ 58
But Palmon’s letter drew a blunter rejoinder from Ya‘akov Shimoni, the acting director of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Affairs Department. Shimoni was prepared to allow exceptions in special cases of hardship. But in general he supported the ‘no return during the war’ line. 59 Shertok came down solidly behind Shimoni, adding: ‘I fear a loosening of the reins . . . Permission [to return] should be forthcoming only in a limited number of special cases.’60"
"But Israel’s main problem was to be not the uncoordinated, individual or communal Arab attempts to return or requests to return but the increasing international pressure, spearheaded by Bernadotte, for Israeli agreement to a mass repatriation. After several rounds of meetings with Israeli and Arab leaders, Bernadotte, on 27 June, demanded that Israel recognise ‘the right of the residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there, have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property’. 61 The Israelis responded on 5 July, rejecting Bernadotte’s other ‘suggestions’, that Palestine and Jordan be joined in economic ‘Union’, that immigration to Israel be subject to that Union’s – or UN – jurisdiction, that Jerusalem be given over to Arab rule, and that – in Shertok’s phrase – a settlement be ‘imposed’ from the outside on the parties rather than reached through direct negotiations ‘between the interested parties’. (Bernadotte had not explicitly made this last ‘suggestion’.) Tergiversating, the Israeli reply did not specifically refer to the demand that Israel recognise the ‘right of return’, but suggested somewhat vaguely that the Mediator should reconsider his ‘whole approach to the [Palestine] problem’. 62
But the refugee problem could not be dismissed by a sleight of hand, and the Israeli Cabinet understood that Bernadotte’s ‘suggestion’ would eventually have to be directly addressed. By the second half of July the United States, too, was pressing for an Israeli answer. In the course of July – when another 100,000 or so Arabs became refugees (see below) – the Cabinet hammered out the official line.
Yet even before the final formulation was agreed upon, Shertok instructed his diplomats as follows:
Our policy: 1) Arab exodus direct result folly aggression organized by Arab states . . . 2) No question allowing Arabs return while state of war continuing, as would mean introduction Fifth Column, provision bases for enemies from outside and dislocation law and order inside. Exceptions only in favour special deserving cases compassionate grounds, subject [to] security screening . . . 4) Question Arab return can be decided only as part peace settlement with Arab State[s] and in context its terms, when question [of] confiscation property Jews [in] neighbouring countries and their future will also be raised. 5) Arabs remaining [in] Israel [to be] unmolested and receive due care from State as regards services. 63
The Cabinet consensus of mid-June had thus undergone a significant reshaping. The Cabinet had formally resolved against a return during the hostilities, leaving open the possibility of a reconsideration of the matter at war’s end. But Shertok was now saying that there would be no return during the war and reconsideration and a solution of the problem only within the framework of talks aimed at a general peace settlement and with a linkage to the confiscation of the property, and the fate, of the Jewish communities in the Arab world. Thus links were forged between (a) a full-fledged peace settlement and Israeli willingness to consider a return, making the refugees a bargaining counter in Israel’s quest for recognition and peace in the region, and (b) the fate of the refugees and that of the Jews in the Arab states. 64"
"Bernadotte recalled that Shertok had once told UN Secretary General Trygve Lie that displaced Arabs would be allowed to return home. Shertok responded (so he told his Cabinet colleagues) that he may once have said this, but it was under different circumstances, when there were only a handful of refugees. But since then, ‘circumstances have radically changed’. The matter should not be treated, or resolved, solely on a humanitarian basis – ‘it is a matter for political and military calculation’. Moreover, long-term humanitarian considerations may indicate that resettlement in the Arab countries may well be the best solution, as with the Greek–Turkish population exchanges. Shertok told the Mediator that there could be no return during the war – such a return would be a ‘warlike measure’ against us, ‘the introduction of a Fifth Column . . . and of an explosive to blow us up from within’. But Bernadotte, according to Shertok, stuck to his guns and ‘showed little flexibility’: Indeed, he pointed out that a population of long standing had been uprooted and was being replaced by new Jewish immigrants.
To his fellow ministers Shertok now proposed the following formula:
We cannot agree to a mass return of Arab refugees so long as the war continues. We are ready to discuss exceptional cases, be it involving extraordinary suffering or special privilege – each case on an individual basis.
Bernadotte, said Shertok, had argued that the ‘world would not understand’ Israel’s position. He, Shertok, disagreed: ‘The world, which understood the uprooting of the Sudeten [Germans] from Czechoslovakia, would also understand this.’ Moreover, the Arab states were demanding that Israel pay for the upkeep of the refugees in their places of exile. Shertok suggested that Israel demand compensation from the Arab states for the destruction and expenditure inflicted on the Yishuv by the war they had launched. Ben-Gurion seconded the motion. Interior Minister Grunbaum endorsed the Shertok–Ben-Gurion line: No return during the war. Shitrit agreed, but supported the return to their homes of refugees still inside Israeli-held territory – such as refugees from Jaffa living in Lydda. Peretz Bernstein, minister of commerce and industry, agreed with Shitrit. Ultra-orthodox Social Welfare Minister Yitzhak Meir Levin wasn’t so sure about flatly rejecting the call for a refugee return: ‘Every gentile has a bit of anti-Semitism in him, but we may yet need the Mediator’s [good will].’ Levin, supporting Immigration and Health Minister Moshe Shapira, called for allowing a partial return, of women and children. But the Ben-Gurion–Shertok line won the day. At the end of the meeting the Cabinet decided, by nine votes to two, that ‘so long as the war continues there is no agreement to the return of the refugees’. 67"
"Kohn pinpointed Israel’s main potential problem – the United States, not Bernadotte. Kohn surmised that the growing American concern was a result of pressure by American ambassadors in Muslim countries, who were arguing that the ‘pauperized, embittered’ exiles were a seedbed for ‘communist revolution’ in the host countries, and that it was best that the refugees return to Palestine. 73 Israel’s chief fear was that Washington would soon openly back the Mediator’s position. American diplomats were already bluntly describing – even to Israelis – Israel’s positions as ‘rigid and uncompromising’. 74 They had begun to sense that Israel was never going to allow the refugees back. ‘There is little if any possibility of Arabs returning to their homes in Israel or Jewish-occupied Palestine’, wrote the American Consul General in Jerusalem, John MacDonald."
"Shertok reported that Bernadotte had asked for an Israeli ‘gesture’. He had replied, he told the Cabinet, that perhaps it would raise Israel’s stock
among idealists and the naive, but not among men of action . . . And the rulers in the world at this time are not idealists but men of action. They would say that the Jews are fools – they hold an important card and are discarding it [to no purpose] . . . Bernadotte laughed and did not respond.
Shertok told his colleagues that he had said that
the Arab minority in our state should be made as small as possible . . . If there was a large Arab minority . . . as much as we would pamper them, they would charge us with discrimination, and these charges would serve as a pretext for intervention by the Arab states in our affairs.
On the other hand, for these states, three hundred thousand refugees were but ‘a drop in the ocean’, and easily assimilable. ‘Bernadotte thanked me for the explanation.’ 81
Only one dissenting voice emerged from the higher reaches of Israeli officialdom, that of Eliahu Sasson, the peripatetic director of the For- eign Ministry’s Middle East Affairs Department. Sasson, a Syrian-born Arabist with a liberal outlook, wrote to Shertok:
I would advise reconsidering the refugee problem . . . I do not by this advice mean, heaven forbid, the return of all the refugees. No, and again no. My meaning is to the return of a small part of them, 40 to 50 thousand, over a long period . . . [starting] immediately, to silence a lot of people in the next meeting of the UN [General Assembly]. 82
Through late 1948 – early 1949, Sasson was to remain a consistent (and isolated) advocate of this position. He was prompted both by a desire to brighten Israel’s image in the West and to facilitate peace (he resided for much of this time in Paris, where he tried to initiate secret talks with Arab leaders). 83"
"Weitz (once again) proposed the appointment of a non-governmental authority to formulate a ‘plan for the transfer of the Arabs and their resettlement’. 89 Although no formal decision was reached, a committee – the second and official Transfer Committee – with far narrower terms of reference than Weitz had originally sought, was at last appointed by Ben-Gurion. 90
The 18 August gathering at the Prime Minister’s Office had been defined as ‘consultative’. The participants had been united on the need to bar a return and there was general, if not complete, agreement as to the means to be used to attain this end – destruction of villages, settlement in other sites and on abandoned lands, cultivation of Arab fields, purchase and expropriation of Arab lands, and the use of propaganda to persuade the refugees that they would not be allowed back. The same day, orders went out to all IDF units to prevent ‘with all means’ the return of refugees. 91
On 22 August, Shertok explained the government’s position to Zionism’s elder statesman and president of the Provisional Council of State, Chaim Weizmann:
With regard to the refugees, we are determined to be adamant while the war lasts. Once the return tide starts, it will be impossible to stem it, and it will prove our undoing. As for the future, we are equally determined - without, for the time being, formally closing the door to any eventuality – to explore all possibilities of getting rid, once and for all, of the huge Arab minority which originally threatened us. What can be achieved in this period of storm and stress will be quite unattainable once conditions are stabilised. A group of people from among our senior officers [i.e., the Transfer Committee] has already started working on the study of resettlement possibilities [for the refugees] in other countries . . . What such permanent resettlement of ‘Israeli’ Arabs in the neighbouring territories will mean in terms of making land available in Israel for the settlement of our own people requires no emphasis. 92
Serious American pressure over the plight of the refugees began to be felt only in late August. Israel’s representative in Washington, Eliahu Epstein (Elath), reported: ‘American public opinion gradually being undermined . . . All hostile forces unite in publicizing and shedding crocodile tears regarding plight Arab refugees.’ 93 America’s representative, McDonald, met Ben-Gurion for the first time on 20 August and warned that the United States was contemplating measures on the refugee question that would prove unpalatable to Israel, and that Washington might even be prepared to impose sanctions to enforce its will. Ben-Gurion replied that Israel would not compromise on its ‘security and independence.’ Returning the refugees, ‘so long as an invading army’ was on Israeli soil, was hazardous. ‘We could not allow back one who hates [us], even if sanctions were imposed on us’, he concluded. 94
Israel’s two senior diplomats in the United States were recalled for consultations and in early September briefed the Cabinet. Epstein quoted Robert Lovett, the deputy secretary of state, as saying that the refugees constituted a ‘severe problem’, public opinion-wise, though he ‘did not make any threats’. 95 Abba Eban, the Israeli observer (soon ambassador) at the United Nations, said that Britain had failed to mobilize the United Nations ‘to act’ in support of a refugee return. 96"
"A specific American initiative was launched in early September, with the submission to Tel Aviv of ‘suggestions’ to facilitate the peace process. Western Galilee (in Israeli hands since mid-May but originally allotted to the Palestine Arab State) should go to Israel and a ‘large portion of desert land’ in the Negev (still largely in Egyptian hands but allotted to the Jewish State) should go to the Arabs (implicitly, to Jordan) and the problem of Jerusalem should be solved on the basis of ‘internationalization’ (or anything else acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs). Moreover, Washington said very hesitantly, it ‘would like the Israeli government to consider some constructive measures for the alleviation of Arab refugee distress.’ 97
Ben-Gurion, Shertok and McDonald met on 8 September to discuss the ‘suggestions’. Ben-Gurion left it to Shertok to deliver the response on the refugee question. ‘[Shertok] said that we were [willing] to consider the return of individual refugees now, and the return of part of the refugees after the war, on condition that most of the refugees would be settled in Arab countries with our help.’ This marked a substantial softening of Israel’s official and public position, but McDonald apparently failed to realise this. He asked whether ‘the door is shut’ to discussing the matter and Ben-Gurion responded: ‘In my opinion, the door is not shut – if we discuss the arrangement of a solid, stable peace with the Arabs. As part of such an arrangement, one can discuss anything.’ 98 Briefing the Cabinet later that day, Shertok said that it was ‘unclear’ whether the Americans had presented their d ´emarche (the ‘suggestions’) off their own bat or whether they had been put up to it by ‘someone’ else. 99"
"On 12 September, the Cabinet approved Shertok’s draft instructions to the Israel delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. The instructions, dated 10 September, read:
No return before the end of the war save for individual cases; a final solution to the refugee problem as part of a general settlement when peace comes. In informal conversations, the delegation will explain that it were better that the problem be solved by settling the refugees in the neighbouring countries than by returning them to the State of Israel – for their own good, for the good of the neighbouring countries, for the good of Israel and for the good of [future] Israeli relations with her neighbours.
...The ministers then voted. By seven votes to three, it was decided ‘not to discuss the return of the refugees until a peace settlement’. 101"
"On 27 September, a senior Israeli diplomat, Michael Comay, apprised the Israel Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris of his meetings on 23–24 September in Haifa with Bunche and two of his aides, Reedman and Paul Mohn. While the United Nations’ officials had reiterated Bernadotte’s commitment to securing recognition of the right of return, ‘they were all of the opinion that for the most part the Arabs did not want to go back and live under Jewish domination’. he reported. The middle-class exiles were definitely unenthusiastic about returning, and some of the villagers who wanted to return would, once back, no doubt ‘drift off again when they saw some of the things that were alleged to be going on in Israel, such as destruction of villages and taking over of land’. Comay reported that, according to Reedman, Bernadotte had first thought in terms of a general return ‘but had retreated from this position when he came to realise the deep-rooted and permanent complications’. Bernadotte, in the end, had sought only a partial return, for political and humanitarian reasons – agreeing that the main solution must be found through organised resettlement in the Arab countries. 108
Henceforward, while lip-service was still occasionally paid to the concept of ‘the right of return’, and while the General Assembly, in December, endorsed the refugees’ ‘right of return’ in Resolution 194 (see below), the international community was to focus more and more on the necessity, desirability and possibility of a partial repatriation coupled with the re-settlement of the bulk of the refugees in Arab lands. Israel, it would later be seen, had successfully rebuffed the pressures for a mass return."
"Meanwhile, a new wave of ad hoc appeals from exiled communities to be allowed back reached Shitrit. Shitrit generally referred them to Ben-Gurion, the IDF and Shertok for a ruling. By nature and politically a softliner, Shitrit, by the end of August, had more or less come around to Ben-Gurion’s and Shertok’s view. Allowing any Arabs back might serve as a precedent and might constitute a security problem. As Machnes, his director general, put it: ‘Over time, views have changed, and now the Minority Affairs Ministry is doing all in its power to prevent the Arabs who have gone from returning to the country.’ 104
A major debate, in which the various arguments re-surfaced, erupted over the refugees from Huj, near the Gaza Strip. Its inhabitants had been expelled eastwards, to Dimra, on 31 May (see above). Nothing was to demonstrate so convincingly the inflexibility of the crystallising Israeli resolve against a return.
In September, the exiles, noting that the Second Truce (19 July–15 October 1948) was holding and that the area around Huj was quiet, appealed to Israel to allow them back. The appeal, as usual, made the rounds of the bureaucracies – the IDF, the Military Government, the Foreign Ministry Middle East Affairs Department and the Minority Affairs Ministry. Shimoni wrote that the Huj appeal deserved ‘special treatment’ because the inhabitants had been ‘loyal collaborators’, ‘because they had not fled but had been expelled’, and because they had not wandered far afield and were still living near the village. His department, therefore, in view of ‘the commonly held opinion that an injustice had been done’, would be willing to recommend that the IDF permit the villagers to return to Israeli territory, not necessarily to Huj itself but rather to another ‘abandoned village’.
But, Shimoni added: ‘The problem of precedents arises. If we allow them [to return], hundreds and thousands of others may perhaps come, each with his own good reasons [to be allowed back].’ So he concluded his qualified recommendation by writing that ‘if the Defence Ministry could find a way’ to prevent the Huj case from becoming a precedent, ‘then we withdraw our opposition [to a return] in this particular case’. 105 Shitrit found Shimoni’s reservations irksome. He wrote that he did ‘not believe that allowing some . . . to return would [necessarily] serve as a precedent’. After all, there was a firm Cabinet decision that so long as the war continued, ‘there could be no talk of a return . . .’. So if the Middle East Affairs Department supported allowing the return of the inhabitants of Huj, ‘there will be no opposition on our part’, he wrote. But Shitrit, too, thought that the villagers would have to be resettled ‘inside’ Israel rather than in their home village, which was near the front lines. 106
But these (hesitant) recommendations proved unavailing. The de- fence authorities overruled Shitrit and Shimoni, and the inhabitants of Huj, whether because of arguments of security or precedent, were never allowed back. The flare-up of hostilities between Israel and Egypt a few weeks after this exchange sealed the fate of the villagers."
"The political argument against having a 40 per cent Arab minority inter- meshed with the strategic argument against retaining or bringing back hundreds of thousands of Arabs who would or might constitute a Fifth Column. The fighting provided both the opportunity and the reason for creating or at least maintaining an Arab-free country.
A mass return of refugees would have created grave problems for all the Israeli agencies prospectively involved in their repatriation – the IDF, the police, the civilian bureaucracies and the Jewish settlements – at a time when their energies and resources were being strained to capacity by the war and by the influx of masses of Jewish immigrants. To this, as the weeks and months passed, were added the ‘positive’ arguments of the Yishuv’s settlement and immigration absorption bodies. To expand (and it had to expand to meet the needs of the burgeoning Jewish population), Jewish agriculture had to have the abandoned lands. Jewish settlements, in general, needed more land. And the immigrants (and the many more potential immigrants) required land and houses. Moreover, some of the immigrants who reached Israel in 1948–1949 and, more so, during the 1950s, hailed from Arab coun- tries (Yemen, Iraq, Morocco) – enabling the Israeli leaders, with some justification and logic, to view what had happened as an (unplanned, uncoordinated) ‘exchange of population’. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs had left Palestine, losing almost all their belongings, and hundreds of thousands of Jews had left their native, Muslim countries, generally leaving their property behind. History had created an equation that helped Israel rebuff efforts and pressures for Palestinian refugee repatriation.
The political decision to bar a return had matured over April–June, had become official policy in July, and had been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Cabinet in August and September. It was reaffirmed at various levels of government over the following months as successive communities of exiles asked to be allowed back. During the second half of 1948 and the first half of 1949, developments on the ground worked to harden the status quo and certify the refugeedom of Palestine’s Arabs."
"In the course of 1948 and the first half of 1949, a number of processes definitively changed the physical and demographic face of Palestine. Taken collectively, they steadily rendered the possibility of a mass refugee return more and more remote until, by mid-1949, it became virtually inconceivable. These processes were the gradual destruction of the abandoned Arab villages, the cultivation or destruction of Arab fields and the share-out of the Arab lands to Jewish settlements, the establishment of new settlements, on abandoned lands and sites and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in empty Arab housing in the countryside and in urban neighbourhoods. Taken together, they assured that the refugees would have nowhere, and nothing, to return to.
These processes occurred under the protective carapace of the Haganah\IDF’s periodically reiterated policy of preventing the return of refugees across the lines, including by fire, and of the repeated bouts of warfare between the Israeli and Arab armies, which effectively curtailed the movement of civilians near the often fluid front lines. At the same time, these processes were natural and integral, major elements in the overall consolidation of the State of Israel. They were not, at least initially, geared or primarily geared to blocking the return of the refugees. They began in order to meet certain basic needs of the new State. Some of the processes, such as the destruction of the villages and the establishment of new settlements along the borders, were dictated in large part by immediate military needs. Others were due to basic economic requirements – the kibbutzim’s need for more land, the Yishuv’s growing need for more agricultural produce, the new immigrants’ need for housing. But, taken together, these processes substantially contributed, and were understood by the Yishuv’s leaders to contribute, to definitively preventing a refugee return."
"About 400 villages and towns were depopulated in the course of the war and its immediate aftermath"
"Some of the desolation was caused during abandonment and, later, by the ravages of time and the elements. Some of the destruction was the result of warfare – villages were mortared, shelled and occasionally bombed from the air, and houses were often destroyed to clear fields of fire immediately after conquest. In general, however, the Jewish forces, which were short of artillery and bombers, especially before July 1948, caused little destruction during the actual fighting. Most of the destruction was due to vandalism and looting, and to deliberate demolition, with explosives, bulldozers and occasionally hand tools, by Haganah and IDF units or neighbouring Jewish settlements in the days, weeks and months after their conquest. We shall trace the evolution of this process in the following pages.
The destruction of the villages can be said to have begun with, and stemmed naturally from, pre-war British Mandate antiterrorist policy and Haganah retaliatory policy. In punishing Arab terrorists and irregulars during the 1936–1939 rebellion and in the countdown to 30 November 1947, both the British and the Haganah destroyed houses, in towns and villages. Destroying the house of a guerrilla fighter or terrorist or their accomplices was regarded as just punishment and as a deterrent. The British 1 meted out the punishment in open and orderly fashion; the Haganah, usually in clandestine nighttime raids. On 20 May 1947, for example, a Palmah unit blew up a coffee house in Fajja after the murder of two Jews in Petah Tikva; in August, a Haganah unit blew up a house, suspected of being a terrorist headquarters, in the Abu Laban orchard, outside Tel Aviv. 2
During the countdown to the 1948 War, the destruction of Arab houses was formalised as a legitimate retaliatory measure in a succession of HGS plans setting out the guidelines for operations if and when the Yishuv was attacked by the Palestinians. The Haganah’s ‘Plan B’, finalised in September 1945, provided only vaguely for ‘the sabotage or destruction of [Arab] installations’ in retaliatory attacks. (The plan assumed that as during the Revolt, the British Army would assist in the defense of the Yishuv.) 3 Its successor, ‘Plan C’, of May 1946 (which assumed British neutrality in the imminent Arab-Jewish hostilities), provided in detailed fashion for retaliatory strikes against economic and infrastructure targets ‘(water [works], flour mills, etc.)’ and, more generally,
against villages, [urban] neighbourhoods and farms, serving as bases for Arab armed forces . . . by arson or explosion. If the aim was general punishment – the torching of everything possible and the demolition [with explosives] of the houses of inciters or [their] accomplices [was to be carried out].
The plan provided, ‘in certain cases,’ for the demolition of ‘club-houses, coffee-shops, assembly [halls] . . . after removing the people from them’. The Haganah was further instructed to sabotage ‘the property’ of Palestinian political and military leaders, ‘inciters’ and militants. 4"
"The theoretical underpinning of the destruction of individual houses in retaliatory strikes was reformulated in an HGS directive of 18 January 1948. Targeted for destruction were ‘houses serving as concentration points, supply depots and training sites’ for irregulars as well as residential houses, economic targets, and public buildings.10
As the fighting gained in intensity, so did the efficiency and destructiveness of Haganah raids. Through January, February and March, the raiders destroyed houses and parts of villages that harboured or were suspected of harbouring hostile militiamen and irregulars. In one exceptional reprisal – against ‘Arab Suqrir (see above) – the orders were to destroy the whole village, and this was done. 11 But while the main aim of the raids was cautionary and punitive, they often, almost inevitably, led to the evacuation of families."
"The Haganah strategy of aggressive defence, consisting mainly of fighting off attackers on the perimeters of settlements peppered with occasional retaliatory strikes, gave way in April to an offensive strategy, in line with ‘Plan D’, of conquest and permanent occupation of Arab sites. In the section in its preamble regarding ‘consolidating defence systems and obstacles’, the plan provided for the ‘destruction of villages (burning, blowing up and mining the ruins)’ that the Haganah was incapable of permanently controlling and that might be used as bases for Arab forces. 20"
"As the HGS directive of 18 January had provided the doctrinal foundation for the destruction of individual houses in reprisal raids, so Plan D supplied the doctrinal underpinning for the post-March leveling of whole villages and clusters of villages. The passage from the January directive to the March plan paralleled the growing scale of the war as well as its increased brutality. The directive had sought to pin- point ‘guilty’, individual targets (such as houses of terrorists); Plan D, on the other hand, consigned to collective destruction whole hostile and potentially hostile villages. However, the degree to which Plan D’s provision for destroying villages was implemented in different sectors over April–June 1948 depended largely on the local military situation (i.e., Arab resistance and topography), the mindset of individual Israeli commanders, and the availability to Haganah units of dynamite, bulldozers and manpower.
During the Haganah offensives of April and May, swathes of Arab villages were partly or completely destroyed – in the Jerusalem Corridor, around Mishmar Ha‘emek, and in Eastern and Western Galilee. The destruction of most of the sites was governed by the cogent military consideration that, should they be left intact, irregulars or, come the expected invasion, Arab regular troops, would reoccupy and use them as bases for future attacks. An almost instant example of this problem was provided at Qastal in early April (see chapter 4). The Haganah lacked the manpower to garrison each abandoned village and supervise and curtail the activities of communities that remained along and behind the front lines."
"During the first months of hostilities, the Haganah, while battling the Arab irregulars for control of, or freedom of passage along, the roads, determined its strategy, operations and, to a degree, tactics in line with the political framework and constraints of the partition resolution – that is, a Jewish State within partition borders and with a substantial Arab minority. But the lack of a quick and favourable resolution to the battle of the roads in February–March 1948, and the increasingly certain and ominous prospect of an invasion by the Arab states’ armies radically altered the military situation. Bases – i.e., villages – which were filled with irregulars, or had harboured irregulars, or which might do so in the immediate future, could no longer be tolerated in strategic areas (such as the Jerusalem Corridor, through which ran the road from Tel Aviv, the lifeline to the city’s besieged Jews).
The original operational order for Nahshon, issued on 4 or 5 April, had included no instructions to destroy villages in the Jerusalem Corridor. 22 But sometime during the second week of April, as a component of the in-principle decision to expel the hostile inhabitants in vital areas, Ben-Gurion and the HGS, prompted by the Battle of Mishmar Ha‘emek, agreed to, or initiated and ordered, the destruction of the conquered villages to assure that they would not again constitute a threat to the Yishuv. The second stage, follow-up order by Operation Nahshon HQ, dated 10 April, spoke of the conquest and destruction or ‘liquidation’ [hisul] of specific villages (while still refraining from a blanket order to demolish all conquered villages). 23 But on 14 April, Nahshon HQ issued guidelines to its units
to continue harrassing and cleansing operations as a first stage [i.e., preliminary] to the destruction and conquest of enemy forces and their bases . . . [We should deliver] strong blows against and blow up main enemy bases. 24"
"The destruction of the villages went to the heart of the political dilemma faced by Yishuv left-wingers, who believed in the possibility of, or at least hoped for, Jewish–Arab coexistence. Was the destruction dictated by military imperatives or was it, at least in part, politically motivated, with all the implications that this entailed, they asked. Already in early May, Mapam’s Aharon Cohen wrote that ‘a policy of eviction’ was being implemented. The Yishuv had insufficient troops to garrison every conquered village, so a policy had been adopted of ‘blowing up villages so that [Arabs] would not return’.42 On 10 May, Cohen completed a six-page memorandum entitled ‘Our Arab Policy in the Midst of the War’, which he circulated among Mapam Political Committee members in advance of the committees debate on the party’s Arab policy. He attacked what he saw as an emergent policy of transfer. He added:
The complete destruction of captured villages is not always carried out only because of ‘lack of sufficient forces to maintain a garrison’ or only so ‘that the gangs [i.e., irregulars] will not be able to return there’ so long as the war continues. 43
However, the assessment of Marxist Mapamniks, that the destruction of the villages was a main component of a politically motivated policy of transfer being implemented by the Haganah–Mapai leaders was probably a few weeks premature. Until June, it was perceived strategic–military necessity that underlay the Haganah’s destruction of the villages. There may have been local, isolated cases of destruction – in the Beit Shean Valley, in the northern Negev approaches and in the Sharon – where other reasons obtruded or were dominant: The desire to settle a score with aggressive neighbours or a wish to appropriate lands or a politically based desire to see as few Arabs as possible in the emergent Jewish State. Such considerations certainly guided some of the activities of Yosef Weitz’s circle over March–May 1948. 44 But primarily, until early June, the destruction of the villages was carried out by the Haganah with clear military motives – to deny bases and refuge to hostile irregulars and militiamen, to prevent a return of irregulars to strategic sites and to avoid the emergence of a Fifth Column in areas already cleared of Arabs."
"The mass exodus of April and early May 1948 and the imminence of the invasion focused Jewish minds wonderfully...The destruction of the villages became a major political enterprise. Henceforward, while on the local level the military continued to destroy villages for military reasons, major figures in the Yishuv sought the destruction of the villages with a primarily political rather than military objective in mind."
Weitz's Transfer Committee
"The thrust of this enterprise was to prevent a return; its principal guidelines were to mature in the Transfer Committee’s deliberations in late May and June 1948.
...The next day, 5 June, Weitz, armed with the committee’s proposal, ‘Retroactive Transfer, a Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel’, saw Ben-Gurion. One of the main recommendations was the destruction of the abandoned villages. 47 According to Weitz, Ben-Gurion agreed to the proposed policy, including the destruction of villages, the settlement of abandoned sites and the prevention of Arab cultivation of fields, though he had reservations about Weitz’s ‘temporary committee’ Nevertheless, Weitz informed the Prime Minister that he had ‘already given orders to begin here and there destroying villages and [Ben-Gurion] approved this. I left it at that’, Weitz recorded.48
The following day, 6 June, Weitz sent Ben-Gurion a list of the abandoned villages, and a covering note stating that at their meeting, Ben- Gurion had agreed to the start of the destruction operations: ‘In line with this, I have given an order to begin [these operations] in different parts of the Galilee, in the Beit Shean Valley, in the Hills of Ephraim and in Samaria [that is, the Hefer Valley].’ 49
There was no reply from Ben-Gurion, but, at this stage, Weitz was not deterred by the lack of formal authorisation"
"On 10 June, Weitz sent two officials, Asher Bobritzky and Moshe Berger, to tour the Coastal Plain to determine which empty villages should be destroyed and which renovated and settled with Jews. Berger’s activities were approved by and coordinated with the IDF. The same day, Zuckerman informed Weitz that he had made arrangements for the destruction of the village of al Mughar, which was to begin the next day. 51
On 13 June, Weitz travelled to the Jezreel and Beit Shean valleys, where he met with local leaders and IDF officers. He recorded that he found agreement to his programme of ‘destruction, renovation and settlement’. It can be assumed that he advised or ordered those he talked with to go ahead. 52 "
"Through June, Weitz pressed the national leadership to officially adopt his proposals and sanction the Transfer Committee. Ben-Gurion prevaricated. He was happy that the work was going ahead but could not, for a variety of reasons, bring himself to openly support the policy or Weitz’s activities. Weitz grew frustrated and wary. By the end of June, the wind had gone out of his self-appointed committee. ‘There are no tools and no materials’ with which to continue the work of demolition, he recorded. 56
But the problem went deeper. How could he and his committee take upon themselves such politically momentous actions without clear-cut endorsement from the political leadership? Weitz had nothing in writing. He got cold feet. Angry and frustrated, he at last gave orders to cease work. 57
Unknown to Weitz, word of his committee’s activities had quickly trickled out, generating anger and dissent on the Left; the army’s sepa- rate but complementary demolition activities in the villages were also noted. Opposition to the destruction quickly crystallised in Mapam and in the cabinet. The item ‘destruction of Arab villages’ – for discussion or response – appears on the Cabinet agenda on 16, 20, 23, 27 and 30 June. 58
Agriculture Minister Cisling spoke at length on 16 June. He differentiated between ‘destruction during battle’ – citing the case of Qastal – and destruction afterwards – citing the destruction of Beisan. Destruction during battle
is one thing. But [if a site is destroyed] a month later, in cold blood, out of political calculation . . . that is another thing altogether . . . This course [of destroying villages] will not reduce the number of Arabs who will return to the Land of Israel. It will [only] increase the number of [our] enemies."
"the destruction of the villages growingly encountered ‘economic’ opposition, spearheaded by Gwirtz: It made no sense in terms of the country’s economic problems and needs. Already on 26 May he wrote to HGS: ‘Groups of sappers are blowing up Arab houses, sometimes during conquest, and sometimes merely in exercises.’ Occasionally, military necessity may be the explanation. ‘But in many cases they destroy houses indiscriminately solely out of feelings of revenge, thus denying us the use of these buildings, which we need and will need.’ Gwirtz proposed that the army issue an order against blowing up buildings ‘not out of military necessity’ and consult his department about the demolitions in the course of exercises. In any case, things of value, such as machinery, should be first removed from buildings slated for destruction. 64
HGS responded by instructing all the brigades as follows:
1. The blowing up of Arab houses, if it is urgent and necessary for operational reasons, must be carried out immediately without taking into account other needs . . . 2. If the destruction is not urgent, [the troops] must try to remove from the houses destined for destruction the machinery (if there is any) or anything else . . . that can be of use to us. 3. It is prohibited to blow up Arab houses out of feelings of revenge. This harms us in several ways and mainly leads to a waste of explosives and [needless] destruction of property.
HGS instructed the troops to consult Gwirtz’s department when possible about destroying buildings during exercises. 65 A fortnight later, IDF-GS- HGS’s succesor issued a further order to curtail the ‘tendency to destroy Arab property, especially machinery and vehicles . . .’. Interestingly, the order failed to explicitly prohibit the destruction of houses. 66 The vandalisation and destruction of the villages continued."
"This cumulative pressure against the destruction of the villages and what some saw as a policy of expulsion resulted in the IDF-GS’s blanket order, at Ben-Gurion’s instruction, of 6 July, stating:
Outside of the actual time of combat, it is forbidden to destroy, burn and demolish Arab towns and villages [and] to expel Arab inhabitants . . . without special permission or an explicit instruction from the minister of defence in each case.70
By then, Weitz had suspended his destructive operations. He and his colleagues had accounted directly for only a handful of villages, and perhaps for a dozen more through ‘advice’ and ‘instructions’. But his continuous lobbying, arguments and actions had constituted a major factor in the crystallisation among the Yishuv’s leaders of the policy against a return, with a focus on the necessity of immediately destroying the empty villages (or alternatively filling them with Jewish settlers). Weitz, arguing clearly and acting with speed and determination, had shown the way.
Paradoxically, his activities had contributed to Ben-Gurion’s difficulties in implementing the Transfer Committee’s programme. The destruction of villages during or after conquest by the IDF could always be explained away on grounds of military necessity. Civilian critics, however august their positions, had difficulty in assailing the army’s motives and actions. Who was Cisling to say whether a local commander’s decision to destroy a certain village lacked military merit? But the simultaneous and similar activities of a shadowy, apparently unauthorised civilian group – clearly motivated by political considerations – placed a question mark beside the motives of the military when doing the same things."
Pressure against destruction
"IDF operational orders for the capture of towns and villages from July onwards only occasionally explicitly ordered the destruction of the sites (in contrast with the routinely ‘destructive’ operational orders from mid- April until mid-June). More often than not – as in the general directives for operations Dekel and Dani in July and operations Yoav and Hiram in October 71 – the subject was simply not addressed, and it was left to the discretion of field commanders to do as they wished, some obeying the 6 July directive and others disobeying it and destroying or expelling inhabitants apparently without Ben-Gurion’s prior agreement (though, let it be quickly stressed, no Israeli officer was ever punished for violating the 6 July prohibitions)."
"The continued pressure of the dissident ministers bore institutional fruit at the Cabinet meeting of 21 July. It was resolved that jurisdiction over the abandoned villages henceforward would reside with the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property, which had been set up earlier that month. But the committee was to prove, at least initially, something of a hollow reed. As Kaplan told his committee colleagues: ‘In practice, [the Finance Ministry and the Custodian for Abandoned Property] have no control over the situation, and the army does as it sees fit.’ Kaplan charged that his representative ‘was not even allowed [by the IDF] to enter occupied territory [so] how can he be responsible for property . . .?’ 74 Indeed, that summer, Ben-Gurion himself ‘ordered the General Staff to prepare a list of 109 villages recommended for destruction’. In the end, he approved the destruction of 76 of the sites.75
After the start of the Second Truce, on 19 July, IDF units continued to destroy villages in various parts of the country. But it had become increasingly difficult. A ministerial committee was now, at least formally, responsible for the villages. Moreover, when the guns were silent, as they were until mid-October, the argument of ‘military necessity’ sounded a bit hollow. Lastly, the growing influx of Jewish immigrants had begun to focus attention on housing needs and possibilities. The contradiction between destroying villages and preserving property for Jewish use quickly pushed itself to the fore. Even military units began to take note. In mid-August, for example, Golani Brigade HQ instructed its sub-units to stop burning ‘granaries with hay . . . in the [abandoned] Arab villages’ as these were needed by ‘the [Jewish] settlements’. 76 Special interest groups, such as archeologists, also began to complain, calling for curbs on IDF destructiveness. 77 Thus, on 7 October, Haifa District HQ ordered the 123rd Battalion to stop all demolition activities in ‘Qisarya [Caesarea], Atlit, Kafr Lam and Tiberias’; all contained Roman or Crusader ruins. 78
The IDF now occasionally felt compelled to apply to the ministerial committee for permission to destroy villages."
"On 13 September, Ben-Gurion asked the committee for permission to destroy a cluster of villages in the central area (though he said he was doing so on behalf of OC Central Front, General Ayalon). Ayalon, he said, had written to him that
because of a lack of manpower to occupy the area [in depth] . . . there was a need to partially destroy the following villages: 1. al Safiriya, 2. al Haditha 3. ‘Innaba, 4. Daniyal, 5. Jimzu, 6. Kafr ‘Ana, 7. al Yahudiya, 8. Barfiliya, 9. al Barriya, 10. al Qubab, 11. Beit Nabala, 12. Deir Sharif [should be Deir Tarif], 13. al Tira, 14. Qula.
Ben-Gurion feared opposition so instead of submitting the request to the full committee when it convened, he wrote to each member individually, asking that they respond in writing: ‘I will wait for your answer for three days . . . Lack of response will be regarded as consent.’ Cisling, used to the prime minister’s tricks, wrote back insisting that the committee be convened. 79 Ben-Gurion backed down and the demolitions were suspended. The committee decided that it would tour the sites and decide per each village – though it gave the IDF the go-ahead in relation to Deir Tarif, Qubab, Qula, and Beit Nabala ‘if [Ayalon] deems it urgent and necessary’.80
During 1948, Ben-Gurion consistently distanced himself in public from the destruction of villages as, more generally, from any linkage to the expulsion of Arabs. He was probably driven more by concern for his image in history and the image of the new State than by fears for coalition unity. Indeed, Ben-Gurion occasionally seems to have deliberately tried to put future historians off the scent. Thus on 27 October – a day filled with important happenings and meetings – he found time to insert in his diary the following: ‘Tonight our army entered Beit Jibrin [west of Hebron] . . . Yigal [Allon, OC Southern Front] asked [permission] to blow up some of the houses. I responded negatively.’ 81 Usually, however, he chose the path of omission. For example, his lengthy entry on the 18 August meeting on the question of a refugee return, in which several participants expatiated on the need to destroy the villages, simply omits any mention of the subject.82"
"Through the second half of 1948, the IDF, under Ben-Gurion’s tutelage, continued to destroy Arab villages, usually during or just after battle, occasionally, weeks and months after. The ministerial committee was not usually approached for permission. 85 The destruction stemmed from immediate military needs, as in Operation Dani, and from long-term political considerations."
"In the south, several kibbutzim took up the cause of the friendly village of Huj, protesting against the vandalisation of its houses. 95 Yitzhak Avira, an old-time HIS officer and member of Kibbutz Ashdot Ya‘akov, in the Jordan Valley, in late July protested against the destruction of the villages and policy toward the Arabs in general. He wrote Ezra Danin that
recently a view has come to prevail among us that the Arabs are nothing. ‘Every Arab is a murderer,’ ‘all of them should be slaughtered,’ ‘all the villages that are conquered should be burned’ . . . I . . . see a danger in the prevalence of an attitude that everything of theirs should be murdered, destroyed and made to vanish.
Danin answered:
War is complicated and lacking in sentimentality. If the commanders believe that by destruction, murder and human suffering they will reach their goal more quickly – I would not stand in their way. If we do not hurry up and do [things] – our enemies will do these things to us. 96
Some Mapam members in government service also tried to stem the tide of destruction. Moshe Erem, a member of the party’s Political Committee and a senior official in the Minority Affairs Ministry, tried to halt the destruction of some of the villages – ‘Innaba, al Barriya and Barfiliya – listed in September for demolition by General Ayalon. Erem understood the army’s desire to level the sites ‘to prevent infiltration’, but he regarded as ‘simplistic’ the assumption that ‘demolished villages would not attract refugees and would, therefore, reduce the influx of [Arab] refugees . . . It is the land rather than the buildings which attracts [them]’, he wrote. 97
But dissident kibbutzim and bureaucrats were the exception. The great majority of settlements and officials supported the destruction."
"The hand of Weitz and his Transfer Committee can be traced in the work of demolition some miles to the north. The following complaint reached Mapam’s leaders:
The destruction of the Arab villages has been going on for some months now. We are on the Syrian border and there is a danger that the Arabs will use [the villages] for military operations if they get a chance. But I spoke to a number of members from [Kibbutz] Ma‘ayan Baruch and nearby kibbutzim and I got the impression that there exists the possibility that there is a desire to destroy the villages and [the Arabs’] houses so that it will be impossible for the Arabs to return to them. A week ago a representative of the JNF [possibly Yosef Nahmani] came to visit. He saw that in the village of al Sanbariya . . . several houses were still standing, albeit without roofs. He told the secretariat of the kibbutz to destroy the houses immediately and he said openly that this will enable us to take the village’s lands, because the Arabs won’t be able to return there. I am sorry to say the kibbutz agreed immediately without thinking about what they were doing. 102
Through the summer and autumn of 1948, Weitz and his associates were active in dispensing this type of advice and instruction, indirectly carrying out the task they had abandoned at the end of June."
Renovation rather than destruction
"Over September–October, however, a gradual but important shift occurred in the views of executives charged with the fate of the villages. They began to think more in terms of renovation and Jewish settlement than destruction. Two major factors contributed. The first, clearly, was the growing awareness that the threat of a refugee return had diminished. The First and Second truces saw the IDF in control of firm front lines and in most areas able to bar significant infiltration. Politically, the Yishuv had for the moment staved off international pressures to allow a return. Secondly, the legal immigration of Jews into Israel, renewed with the lifting of the British naval blockade in May, began to assume mass proportions. By autumn 1948, it was clear that the country faced a major housing problem; it was necessary to salvage rather than destroy houses."
"From October–November, important officials – including supporters of transfer – began to battle openly against further demolitions. In late November, Weitz records, two of his officials, one of them Nahmani, complained that ‘the army continues to destroy villages in the Galilee, which we are interested in [settling]’. 104 Weitz himself, the following month, during a visit to Western Galilee, voiced apparent regret at some of the destruction. The village of Zib had been ‘completely levelled and I now wonder if it was good that it was destroyed and would it not have been a greater revenge had we now settled Jews in the village houses’. Weitz reflected that the empty houses were
good for the settlement of [our Jewish] brothers, who have wandered for generation upon generation, refugees . . . steeped in suffering and sorrow, as they, at last, find a roof over their heads . . . This was [the reason for] our war.105
In early November, Finance Minister Kaplan complained about the rumoured destruction of villages in the wake of the IDF conquest of upper central Galilee in Operation Hiram. ‘Every possibility of accommodating [immigrants] must be exploited and a general order must be issued to the army not to destroy houses without a reason.’ Some 20,000 immigrants, in need of housing, were living in tent camps, Kaplan complained. 106"
"During the rest of 1948, and through 1949 and the early 1950s, the destruction of abandoned sites, usually already partially demolished, continued. By then, the threat of a return had disappeared and the destruction was part of the process of clearing areas and renovating houses for Jewish cultivation or habitation rather than directed against would-be returnees.
The exact chronology and quantification of the amount of destruction of each village in the course of 1948 and during the following years is impossible to trace. Nor is it possible accurately to quantify and distinguish between the amounts of destruction for strictly military reasons, from political motives or for economic reasons, especially as much of the destruction resulted from a combination of reasons and the protagonists involved were variously motivated. 117"
"A question related to, but distinct from, the problem of destroying or renovating the villages was the fate of the abandoned lands. Ben-Gurion provided an early clue to his attitude in an address to the Mapai Council on 7 February. He spoke of the need for a substantial Jewish presence in the Jerusalem Corridor. Someone interjected: ‘We have no [Jewish- owned] land there.’ Ben-Gurion: ‘The war will give us the land. The concepts of “ours” and “not ours” are only concepts for peacetime, and during war they lose their meaning.’ 118
In a similar vein, he asked Weitz whether the JNF was ready to buy ‘from him’ land at P£25 a dunam. Weitz replied: ‘If the land is Arab [-owned] and we will receive the deed of property and possession then we will buy. Then he [i.e., Ben-Gurion] laughed and said: Deed of property – no, possession – yes.’ The next day, Weitz and Granovsky lunched with Ben-Gurion, who restated his
plan . . . Our army will conquer the Negev, will take the land into its hands and will sell it to the JNF at P£ 20–25 per dunam. And there is a source . . . of millions [of pounds]. Granovsky responded jokingly that we are not living in the Middle Ages and the army does not steal land. After the war the beduins [of the Negev] will return to their place – if they leave at all – and will get [back] their land. 119
A week later, Ben-Gurion suggested to Weitz that he divest himself of ‘conventional notions . . . In the Negev we will not buy land. We will conquer it. You are forgetting that we are at war.’ "
"The Jewish takeover of Arab lands began with the ad hoc, more or less spontaneous reaping of crops in abandoned fields by settlers in the spring of 1948. The summer crop ripened first in the Negev, and it was here that Jewish harvesting of Arab fields began. On 21 March, in the first documented incident of its kind, kibbutzniks from Kfar Darom, near Gaza, reportedly began reaping wheat adjacent to their own fields. Arab militiamen retaliated by firing on the settlement and British troops intervened, ordering the Arabs to cease firing and the Jews ‘to stop reaping the grass’. 121
Weitz, as chairman of the Negev Committee the de facto administrator of the Negev, linked Jewish harvesting of Arab fields to Jewish claims for war damages. He wrote to Nahum Sarig, OC Negev Brigade, which guarded the Negev settlements and the roads and water pipeline between them, that
until a [national level] decision was taken regarding the Arab wheat crop in the area – the committee believes that our settlements in the Negev, whose fields were destroyed by their Arab neighbours, will receive compensation by [way of] reaping the fields of the saboteurs to the [same] extent that their own fields were damaged. 122
Sarig thought otherwise. On 8 May he informed the kibbutzim in his jurisdiction that ‘all the crops reaped by the settlements will remain the property of the [Brigade] HQ and the settlements have no right to use them’.
As the summer crop ripened and as the exodus gained momentum, Jewish harvesting of Arab fields spread to other parts of the coun- try. During late April and early May, as requests from settlements and regional councils to harvest abandoned fields poured into the Arab Property Committee, Gwirtz began to organise the cultivation. In coordination with the settlements block committees, he allocated the fields to the settlements. Gwirtz’s committee regarded the abandoned crop as State property and sold the right to reap it to farmers and settlements. The embryonic State needed the money as well as the extra grain. The reaping was ‘crucial to the war effort’, wrote Gwirtz. 123"
"Not everywhere were things so well organised. Many settlements, without institutional authorisation or permission, took the initiative and harvested abandoned fields – and avoided payment to the government. In June and July, Gwirtz sent out a spate of angry notes to settlements, demanding that they conclude agreements with his department. ‘I heard with bewilderment and sorrow,’ he wrote to Kibbutz Ma‘ayan Zvi, ‘that [your] members . . . are stealing vegetables in the eastern fields of Tantura. Don’t your members have a more honourable way to spend their time . . .?’ 125 Gwirtz regarded such unauthorised harvesting as part of the widespread looting of Arab property. And, inevitably, disputes broke out between settlements over the right to cultivate specific abandoned fields.126
By the beginning of July, the reaping of the summer crop in the abandoned fields was nearing completion. Several objectives were achieved, according to Gwirtz: ‘(A) We added 6–7,000 tons of grain to the Yishuv’s economy. (B) We denied them to those fighting against us. (C) We earned more than I£ 100,000 for the Treasury.’ 127
During May, the organised reaping of the abandoned fields dovetailed with the emergent Haganah strategy of preventing Arabs from reaping and of destroying Arab fields that, for military or logistical reasons, could not be harvested by Jewish farmers. While before May, burning Arab crops was mainly a Haganah means of retaliation for Arab attacks, during May–June the destruction of the fields hardened into a set policy designed to demoralise the villagers, hurt them economically and, perhaps, precipitate their exodus. Certainly, it served to sever the fellah physically and psychologically from his land. The prevention of Arab harvesting, especially near the front lines, was seen by the Yishuv’s leaders as one element in the battle against a refugee return. The IDF\GS repeatedly ordered the brigades to prevent Arab harvesting with light arms fire. The burning of Arab fields inaccessible to Jewish cultivation and the prevention of Arab harvesting continued around the country through 1948. 128"
"The concept of ‘compensation’ for war damage offered a morally ‘soft’ entry point to acquiring abandoned lands. Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon, in the Coastal Plain, wrote twice to the Arab Property Committee listing the war damage it had suffered at Arab hands (3,400 dunams of wheat and barley burned), requesting compensation. The kibbutz pointedly referred in this connection to 400 dunams of Arab land between Kfar Yona and Ge’ulim and another 80 dunams near Shuweiqa, implying a desire for more than temporary possession. 129
The line between requesting the right of (temporary) cultivation and requesting permanent possession of a tract of land was almost imperceptibly crossed during May. A request from one settlement rapidly triggered requests from neighbouring settlements, prompted perhaps by a natural instinct to follow suit or fear of being left out by the land-dispensing institutions. Thus, for example, Kibbutz Sdeh Nehemia (Huliyot), in the Hula Valley, objecting to a land-allocation proposal they had seen, wrote to Harzfeld asking, somewhat shamefacedly, for 1,700 dunams of the lands of al ‘Abisiyya. 130
While some settlements in spring 1948 were already inching towards the idea of permanent acquisition, the thrust of individual requests and institutional activity over April–June was ad hoc and hand to mouth – to reap the largely abandoned summer crop so that it would not go to waste. This done, the settlements and agricultural institutions began to look to the future. The question of what was to happen to the abandoned lands was inexorably linked to the wider, political question – of a refugee return. A decision against a return would facilitate permanent possession.
The cultivation of the abandoned tracts over the summer built up and reinforced resistance to a refugee return. The farmers grew attached to ‘their’ new lands. The settlements delighted in the newly won expanses for economic reasons; and they relished the sense of security engendered by the permanent departure of their often belligerent neighbours. The settlers emerged as a powerful interest group in the struggle against a return."
"But, as Gwirtz pointed out, there was as yet no legal basis for such transfers. 133 On 30 June, the Provisional Government had issued Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Abandoned Lands) empowering itself to declare any depopulated conquered Arab area ‘abandoned’. The government could then impose any ‘existing law’ on the area or ‘regu- late regulations as [it] sees fit’, including ‘confiscation of property’. 134 But the ordinance, according to legal experts, while covering ‘confiscation’ of property, failed to relate to leasing. During the following months, the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property and the justice and agriculture ministries hammered out the appropriate legal measure, opting in the end for an administrative order rather than legislation. The ‘Emergency Regulations Relating to Absentees Property’ were pub-ished by the government on 12 December, giving the Agriculture Ministry control or possession (khazaka) of the lands. 135 The insufficiency of the regulations, and the possible illegality of some of the operations being carried out in their name, drew strong criticism, culminating in the detailed analysis of 18 March 1949 by the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Land Affairs, Zalman Lifshitz.136 Legal deliberations on these matters dragged on until the passage in 1950 of the Absentees Property Law."
"Through August–September, the authorities were flooded with leasing requests. Given the novelty of the enterprise and of the new State’s bureaucratic machinery, the settlements often did not know which was the right body to turn to; on occasion, neither did the institutions involved. 142
The ad hoc, often spontaneous harvesting of the abandoned crops of spring and early summer of 1948 had within weeks led to feelings – on both the national and local levels – of acquisitiveness. Land long coveted before the war had become land temporarily cultivated. Temporary cultivation led to a desire for permanent possession. The agricultural cycle itself reinforced the drift of political and demographic change. The harvesting of the summer crop left the fields ready for sowing the winter crop, but this meant large-scale investment of funds and workdays – which made sense only if harvesting the winter crop was assured. Such assurance – to the extent that there can be any certainties in wartime – could be vouchsafed only by long-term leasing. (Almost all agricultural land in the pre-1948 Yishuv was leased out by the JNF to the settlements for 49 or 99 years.) The one-year leases of autumn 1948 were a way-station on the road to such long-term leases and to the ‘equalisation’ of the status of the abandoned lands with pre-1948 JNF lands."
"By the start of 1949, the first wave of leasing was over. By mid- March, some 680,000 dunams had been leased to settlements and farmers in the Galilee, Jezreel Valley, Samaria, Judea and the northern Negev approaches, of which about 280,000 had been sown with winter crops. 149
However, the leasing mechanism was cumbersome and legally and politically problematic; the confiscation and allocation of Arab-owned lands, some of them in territory earmarked by the UN for Palestinian Arab sovereignty, was probably inconsistent with international law. The December 1948 Absentees Property Regulations cleared away the obstacles to a more efficient arrangement, one which had been on Ben- Gurion’s mind since February. Why should the State not sell the land to the JNF, which would lease it out to the settlements? The State would thus earn a large sum of money and be divested of the complex and politically irksome management of the abandoned lands.
It is possible that Ben-Gurion was also affected by the 11 December 1948 passage in the UN General Assembly of Resolution 194, which effectively endorsed the refugees’ ‘right of return’, if they so wished, and, at the same time, established the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), empowered to mediate and facilitate peace between Israel and the Arabs, a settlement that might include a refugee return. The resolution thus threatened, at least in theory, to impose or usher in a refugee return, which may have helped persuade Ben-Gurion to speed up the settlement of the abandoned villages and lands. 150 On 18 December, Ben-Gurion informed Weitz that the government had decided to sell the JNF a million dunams at cheap prices; it would use the money to establish new settlements. 151 Three days later, Ben-Gurion broached the idea more formally over lunch with Weitz, Granovsky, Kaplan and Eshkol: The JNF would buy from the state one million dunams, paying I£10 per dunam on account. If Israel ended up paying the Arab owners more than this in compensation, the JNF would pay the state another I£20 per dunam. The JNF representatives questioned the legality of the deal. Ben-Gurion responded that they had to stop thinking in ‘pre-State’ terms. The diners reached agreement in principle. 152 On 27 January 1949, Ben-Gurion and Kaplan summarised the terms 153 and, the following day a letter from Ben-Gurion and Kaplan informed Weitz of the implementation of the sale. The JNF proceeded to lease out the land, mostly for new settlements. 154"
"There were 279 Jewish settlements in Palestine on 29 November 1947. Mapai’s settlement experts – ‘the Committee for Settlement and Irrigation Matters’ – met during December and January 1948 to hammer out a plan for agricultural settlement and development in the emergent Jewish State. On 17 February 1948 the committee presented the party’s Central Committee with a plan for 1949–1951 based on the purchase, from Arabs, of 320,000 dunams of land and the establishment of 162 new settlements geared to securing the new State’s northern borders and developing the arid south. It was assumed that Arabs would sell the JNF land and that the modernisation of agriculture among the Israeli Arabs would enable more Arabs to subsist on less land; everybody would benefit. 158"
"About 135 new settlements were established between the start of the hostilities in November 1947 and the end of August 1949; 112 of them had gone up by June – 51 in the north (between Ijzim and the Lebanese border), 27 in the south and 34 in the coastal plain and Jerusalem Corridor. 159 Most were established on Arab-owned land and dozens were established on territory earmarked by the UN partition resolution for the Palestine Arab State."
"In the successive partition plans, the presence of clusters of settlements determined what would constitute the areas of future Jewish statehood. Settlements ultimately meant sovereignty. Each new settlement or cluster staked out a claim to a new area. Linked to this was their military–strategic value and staying power; over the decades the settlements stymied marauders and irregulars.
Nothing demonstrated the settlements’ political import and military significance more than the partition resolution and the subsequent months of hostilities. The partition plan largely followed the pattern of settlement/population distribution around Palestine. Areas with no, or practically no, Jewish settlements (except for the Negev) were automatically assigned to Arab sovereignty. In the first months of the fighting, the areas of Jewish strength and control overlapped the areas of concentrated settlement."
"But as the hostilities turned into full-scale war, attitudes in the Yishuv to the partition resolution and settlement changed. The partition plan was a peacetime solution to the Palestine problem; the war undermined its ‘sanctity’"
"Ben-Gurion had outlined two major characteristics of the settlement drive of the following months: Settlement of the abandoned villages and settlement in areas thinly populated by Jews (Western Galilee, Upper Galilee, the Jerusalem Corridor). 164 Indeed, Ben-Gurion argued that real victory was contingent on the settlement drive:
We will not be able to win the war if we do not, during the war, populate Upper and Lower, Eastern and Western Galilee, the Negev and the Jerusalem area, even if only in an artificial way, in a military way."
"But Shaham was already formulating a far more ambitious plan, covering 82 sites, with the aim of ‘consolidating our borders’. His plan was 'based on the partition proposal with appropriate changes to determine borders more comfortable for the defence of the Jewish State, alongside the changes that have occurred as a result of our military activity and the flight of the Arab population . . .’ He ruled that ‘there was a necessity and unrepeatable opportunity in the near future to determine facts on the ground which any political solution in the future will not be able to ignore. Making these faits accomplis will have a major influence in facilitating our military actions and consolidating our conquests.’ The war, he stressed, had opened up a new method of acquiring land – not, as previously, by purchase but ‘through military conquest’. The aim of the planned settlement enterprise, he wrote, was to ‘create borders’ according to the partition resolution but also to ‘correct them in line with strategic needs’ and ‘the inclusion [in the State] of settlement blocks left outside the State area’; and ‘the opening of a permanent, safe road and . . . corridor to Jerusalem’. Most of the settlements were to be established on Jewish-owned land but settlements were also to be established on German-owned, State and Arab-owned lands. 182 In planning these settlement ventures, officials were already thinking in terms of the expected mass influx of immigrants. As Haim Gvati, of the Agricultural Centre, put it:
The establishment of the state and the opening of the gates to large immigration in the not distant future obliges us to plan for agricultural settlement with momentum and with a scope which we never anticipated until now. 183
But the Yishuv lacked the wherewithal and energy to embark on these giant settlement projects as independence and the pan-Arab invasion loomed. 184 Moreover, as with expulsions and the destruction of villages, criticism of the planned settlement drive quickly surfaced. Mapam’s Ya‘akov Hazan warned against settling on lands owned by fellahin (though he agreed to settlement on effendi-owned land). Other Mapam leaders were more critical. ‘Should we [really] use this moment of opportunity when the Arabs have fled in order to create settlement facts?’ asked party stalwart Ya‘akov Amit. 185"
"The advent in mid-June of the First Truce galvanised the settlement lobbyists and executives: At last, some of the Yishuv’s resources could be diverted from war-making. Moreover, the ceasefire raised the prospect of Arab infiltration back to the villages; the establishment of settlements would help neutralize the danger. (As described in chapter 5, this was the line used by Weitz with Ben-Gurion, and by the Safad Jewish community notables, Ephraim Vizhensky and other local leaders with anyone who would listen.) Ben-Gurion was in favour. But he stressed that, unlike in the past, this settlement enterprise – which must be carried out quickly and massively – should not be accompanied by publicity: ‘The damage [that could be caused by publicity] outweighs the possible gains . . . This time we must maintain silence.’ 186"
"Most were established on Jewish- owned land but, from the start, also contained abandoned Arab land.
...Five new settlements went up in July, all on Jewish-owned lands and within the partition borders. 191 But pressure was building for settlement on Arab-owned lands within and beyond the partition lines. The IDF victories in mid-July contributed by adding territory outside the partition borders that, to be retained, it was felt, would quickly have to be settled. 192"
"On 28 July, Weitz, Harzfeld and Horin presented Ben-Gurion with a revised plan (new conquests necessitated upgrading old plans), calling for the establishment of 21 settlements mostly on Arab-owned lands in the Corridor, the Lydda–Ramle area and Western Galilee. 196 Weitz explained the plan to the JNF directorate on 16 August. Granovsky, performing a volte face, highlighted the plan’s ‘strategic-political’ importance. He stressed that the Yishuv would only expropriate some Arab land, so-called ‘surplus’ land. The rest, ‘with their houses and trees,’ would be left untouched and set aside for the fellahin and tenant farmers ‘for when they return’. Then the Yishuv would pay the returnees for the expropriated land and help the Arabs modernize and shift from ‘extensive’ to ‘intensive’ agriculture so that less land would produce more crops.197
Mapam’s leaders had adopted the ‘surplus lands’ formula – first worked out and enunciated by Weitz in January 198 – in July. In mid-July, Cisling had spoken of the need for ‘development’ schemes that would enable the Arabs to return. Haim Kafri, a local Mapam figure from the Hefer Valley, a fortnight later explained that through ‘agrarian reform’ and ‘intensification’ of cultivation, it was possible both to set aside tracts from the abandoned lands for the Arabs to return to and to embark, at the same time, on a ‘giant’ Jewish settlement drive. 199
The ‘21-settlement’ plan forced Mapam to face the ideological problem of settlement on Arab-owned land and on land earmarked for Arab sovereignty. The party supported continued Jewish–Arab co-existence and the return of the refugees. But the kibbutzim, of both the party’s Hashomer Hatza‘ir and Ahdut Ha‘avodah wings, favoured the establishment of new settlements and the expansion of existing ones as well as expanding Jewish agriculture. On both local and national levels, the establishment of new settlements, both inside and outside the partition borders, was seen as serving security and strategic interests. The ‘surplus lands’ formula pointed the way to both having one’s cake and eating it: Strategic and agricultural-territorial interests could be safeguarded while at the same time lands could be set aside for a possible refugee return. In any case, the Arabs were to be compensated for the lands expropriated. Hence, it was to be ‘development for the benefit of both peoples’, as Hazan described it; or, ‘we must fight for development and against eviction [of Arabs]’, said party co-leader Ya‘ari. Mapam had found a formula that seemed to marry strategic and economic expediency with principle. 200"
"During the first weeks of August, Eshel and Ben-Gurion engineered a major change in the ‘21-settlement’ plan, pressing the need for a block of new settlements in the south. 201
...Some of the proposed sites, such as ‘Eilabun, were not yet in Israeli hands. Almost all were aptly described as ‘strategic sites’ as they were located along the front lines established in late summer 1948 opposite the Jordanian, Egyptian and Lebanese armies. All but five lay outside the partition borders...According to Kaplan, the settlements were primarily designed to secure the road to Jerusalem and to enhance Israel’s grip on Western Galilee. Shitrit thought the plan involved no ‘wrong-doing’ as the original landowners were to be compensated. Cisling supported the plan for ‘security’ reasons and reiterated the ‘surplus lands’ formula.202"
"The political shift from the new settlement ventures of June–July to those planned in August is clear: The midsummer settlements had been established mainly on Jewish-owned land and within the partition plan borders; those established in August...were mostly on non-Jewish-owned land but inside the partition state borders; and those planned in August for the following weeks and months were almost all outside the partition borders and almost completely based on expropriation of Arab- and German-owned land.204 Most of the 32 settlements fortified Israel’s new borders and staked out claims to the newly conquered areas of Western Galilee, the Jerusalem Corridor and the Lydda–Ramle district."
Linking new settlements to barring a return
"During the following months, attitudes against a return hardened. The ‘surplus lands’ concept provided a smokescreen behind which those who opposed a return – Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Weitz and many in Mapam – were able, without disturbing the national consensus, to implement a settlement policy whose effect (and, in part, purpose) was to bar any possibility of a return. This was understood in Mapam, where Ya‘ari acknowledged that if the implementation was in the hands of the anti-return majority, then the ‘surplus lands’ concept was all so much hot air. ‘They want to sweep under the carpet the problem of the return . . . by [espousing] theories of planning and development’, he said. 208 Mapam’s posture, or postures, remained clear: Theoretically, the party was troubled and divided; in practice, it was as forward as any in participating in the settlement drive, on Arab-owned lands and within and outside the partition borders. As Kibbutz Artzi member Shlomo Rosen put it: ‘We have no choice; we must contribute our share towards the defensive settlement along the borders, despite our doubts about the intentions of those at the helm . . .’ 209"
"Then at the Committee of Directorates of the National Institutions on 3 and 10 December, Kaplan and, apparently, Cisling opposed the plan’s provision for settlement on the village sites (some of which were still inhabited), and Kaplan reiterated the need to set aside a ‘territorial reserve’ for returning Arabs. Weitz, annoyed, commented: ‘Many of the ministers were worrying more about [re-]settling the Arabs than settling the Jews.’ Weitz feared that, if there was a delay in implementation, ‘many Arab will manage to infiltrate back to their villages’. Nonetheless, the plan was halved and on 7 December the JNF directorate endorsed the establishment of 41 settlements – and with the stipulation that lands be set aside for returnees. The plan, ‘with qualifications’, was then approved by the Committee of Directorates 218 and, on 17 December, by the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property, which ruled that land should be left for returning Arabs and that settlement on actual village sites should be avoided, unless security considerations dictated otherwise. A strip 8–10 kilometres deep along all the borders was to be exempted from these stipulations.219"
"What occurred during September–December 1948 was a complex dialectic between the demands of existing settlements for more land and the State’s need to establish new settlements along its borders and fill the empty interior areas for reasons of immigrant absorption, security and border-determination; the available resources of a society at war; the thrust and parry of party political considerations; criticism and potential criticism of Israeli policies by the outside world; and a variety of contradictory ideological imperatives. But the bottom line, as it were, comes through starkly in a conversation between Yosef Weitz and Ben- Gurion – the ultimate fount of authority and policy – on 18 December. Weitz asked whether, in planning settlements, ‘surplus land’ should still be set aside for a return. Ben-Gurion replied: ‘Not along the borders, and in each village we will take everything, as per our settlement needs. We will not let the Arabs back.’ 220 In the end, the months of moralising breast-beating about ‘surplus lands’ amounted to no more than a hill of beans."
"But, ideological debates aside, few of the settlements were established on actual village sites; the original infrastructure – houses, roads and pavements, waterworks – was deemed inadequate. It proved easier to simply level the villages and build completely new settlements on the site or nearby"
"Almost all the settlements established during 1948 were founded by pioneering youth groups (gar‘inim) drawn from the socialist youth movements of Palestine or their affiliates in the Diaspora
...Most of the settlements established in 1949 were something else al- together. To be sure, several dozen new kibbutzim were founded. But the old Yishuv’s human resources for further pioneering settlement had been almost exhausted by the settlement enterprise of 1948, war losses and the needs of the State bureaucracies for high-calibre personnel. The bulk of the settlers of 1949 were ‘olim, who poured into the country from May 1948. (One hundred and forty-three thousand ‘olim arrived between 14 May 1948 and 9 February 1949; 229 some 700,000 arrived between May 1948 and December 1951.) There was mutuality and reciprocity in the process: The state needed to fill the empty villages; and the im- migrants needed a roof over their heads and work – with agriculture, for which not all were qualified, requiring the least investment and offering the most immediate prospects of a return. Ben-Gurion, as we have seen, was also keen on dispersing the (Jewish) population; his experience in London during the Blitz had persuaded him of the vulnerability of heavily populated urban hubs. And, of course, agriculture had to be expanded to feed the rapidly growing population. The bulk of the sites in the 41-settlement plan, like the overwhelming majority of all the sites settled in I949, were filled with new immigrants – from Europe, survivors of Hitler’s death camps, and from the Middle East and North Africa"
"In February 1948, the immigration absorption authorities anticipated that the first wave of immigrants, ending in September–October 1949, would consist of some 150,000. They believed that this would necessitate ‘the construction of more than 60,000 rooms’; they were thinking, at this time, of ‘construction’ rather than conquest and confiscation of Arab housing. 230 But the projections fell short of reality: By autumn 1949, more than 200,000 had arrived. "
Absorption and settlement of new immigrants:Jaffa
"Laniado summoned Jaffa’s Arab Emergency Committee to inform them of the settlement plans. He argued that there were ‘many empty flats in Jaffa . . . [and] we need to settle families in them . . . From the humane perspective we cannot leave [Jewish] people homeless and leave an unlimited number of flats [in Jaffa] empty.’ Laniado asked the notables for their cooperation. The notables asked whether the settlement enterprise would result in ‘the transfer of [Arab] families from place to place’. Laniado responded:
To be sure there would be special areas for Jews and [special] areas for Arabs and there would have to be transfers but we would make sure that the transfers would be carried out in line with their advice taking account of the number of persons, the type of family, etc. 256
The following day the notables returned and ‘energetically voiced their opposition to any sort of [Jewish] settlement [in Jaffa]’. Laniado said that the order was irrevocable but assured them that the Arabs moved would receive accommodation at least as good as what they were losing and in any case, as a result of the transfer, would end up living with their own people. 257
The Israeli officials spent the following fortnight planning the concentration of the remaining Arabs in part of the ‘Ajami neighbourhood and the settlement of immigrants in the rest of the town. The concentration of the Arab families was carried out during the second and third weeks of August. 258
The operation caused waves. Erem, head of the Minority Affairs Ministry’s Department for Promotion and Ordering of Relations between the Jews and the Minorities, complained to Shitrit that a barbed wire fence was going to be set up between the Arab area and the surrounding, soon- to-be Jewish, neighbourhoods, creating a ‘ghetto, raising among us many awful associations’; and access from the Arab area to the sea was to be barred ‘for security reasons’. Erem argued that Israel was ‘planting poisonous seeds, unnecessarily and without cause or purpose’. 259
Shitrit went to Jaffa to discuss the town’s affairs with Laniado and the Arab notables. The latter ‘complained bitterly’ about the concentration and house-transfer plans. The minister responded that it was a security matter but that the transferees would be properly accommodated. ‘I succeeded in persuading them’, he informed Ben-Gurion. He added that some houses must be held in reserve for (extraordinary) refugees who would be allowed back and that a few ‘old people, notables and those favoured’ would be allowed to remain in homes outside the concentration area. Shitrit explained that these people had said they would rather die than be moved to live in
company that, though Arab, was undesirable to them, as the vast majority of those who had remained in Jaffa were from among the poor, among whom were Egyptians whose hygienic conditions [i.e., habits] were very poor . . . 260
By 12 August, about 50 Arab families had been moved to the concentration area or moved about within it, and about 800 Jewish – mostly immigrant – families had been settled in the town, overwhelmingly in Manshiya and the German Colony. 261 Another 150 Arab families were moved into the concentration area during the following days. Many of the families were happy with the transfer as they ended up with better housing, wrote Laniado.262
But 11 families that remained outside the concentration area, in the Jewish or soon-to-be Jewish areas, remained a problem. IDF Tel Aviv District demanded that they too be moved. Shitrit (successfully) resisted this, saying that he had given them his word. 263"
Absorption and settlement of new immigrants:Conflict between army and immigrants
"The start of massive Jewish settlement was delayed by the need to concentrate the Arabs and by poor infrastructure; many of the houses needed renovation. It was additionally plagued by a three-way struggle over the allocation of the housing – between the Immigration Ministry, representing the needs of the new immigrants; the defence establishment, which sought housing for soldiers’ families and military units, and other government agencies; and private individuals, some of them soldiers and soldiers’ relatives, who sought to take over flats and houses for personal use or gain. The struggle, which was reproduced in Jerusalem and Haifa, resulted in a great deal of confusion; in Jaffa, for months, the situation bordered on anarchy.
The immigrants’ needs were pressing; but the army believed that its needs took precedence and should be met first. 264 It reserved ‘400’ housing units and then another ‘900’ for soldiers and their families and for the use of military units.265 But during the first week of August, impatient ‘olim, uncomfortably quartered in schools and other public buildings, spontaneously began to ‘invade’ and seize apartments in Jaffa. Soldiers who had been promised housing became worried, but Dov Shafrir, the Custodian for Absentees’ Property, insisted that they wait until the flats could be allocated in an orderly fashion, after renovation. By contrast, the Absorption Ministry encouraged ‘olim to take over flats, including in areas reserved for soldiers’ families, and on 1 September ministry officials organised a veritable ‘invasion’ by hundreds of ‘olim of houses earmarked for troops and their families. 266 Immigrant families received Immigration Ministry permits to take over specific apartments. ‘Akiva Persitz, the Defence Ministry official in charge of requisitioning Arab property, saw ‘people dragging objects in carts from place to place’. 267 He immediately set in motion, not quite inadvertently, a ‘counter-invasion’ by soldiers’ families in the Jibalya neighbourhood. On 8–10, September Naval and 34th Battalion units moved into the ‘Ajami ‘ghetto’ area and seized apartments; the Second Truce (19 July–15 October) had freed many soldiers from front line duties. Officers feared clashes between the various units. 268 The 8th Brigade also sent in troops – ‘with full webbing accompanied by armoured cars and signals [equipment], as is customary in embarking on any military operation’ – to guard houses against ‘invasion’ by immigrants and to safeguard houses for its own soldiers’ families. One officer intervened and persuaded the troops to take off their helmets and dispense with the armoured cars.
Troops appear to have intermittently fired into the air to frighten off invasive immigrants and rival units and into nearby cemeteries, damaging ‘crosses and tombstones’. 269 Meanwhile, soldiers’ families promised housing began to move into apartments, some without proper authorisation. Disputes erupted between these families and soldiers assigned to guard buildings against ‘invaders’, of whatever ilk. An officer trying to sort things out was beaten by a fellow officer whose family had moved into a flat.270 Shafrir demanded that Yoseftal order the ‘olim to move out271 and complained to the Cabinet that the Immigration Ministry had launched the settlement drive ‘without our knowledge and behind our back’. 272
The upshot was that IDF CGS Dori ordered an internal investigation of the military’s part in the affair while government and JA officials tried to hammer out an equitable shareout of the real estate. IDF Adjutant General Hoter-Ishai presented his findings on 15 and 17 September, in two reports. 273 But even before these were in, Ben-Gurion condemned the troops’ ‘running wild [hishtolelut] and abuse of weapons and power’ and called for ‘severe’ and ‘maximal punishment (by which I mean a reduction in rank to private and imprisonment)’ of the culprits. 274 Mean- while, on 12 September the officials agreed to turn back the clock to the pre-‘invasion’ share-out arrangements.275 The army was ordered to clear Jaffa, quarter by quarter, of all the ‘invaders’ and ‘counter-invaders’ and then to redistribute and resettle the soldiers, immigrants and officials in line with the agreed quotas.276 Dori, for his part, ordered the trial and punishment of a number of officers, including the deputy OC of the 8th Brigade’s 89th Battalion.277
But while some sort of order was restored, ‘invasions’ by troops, soldiers’ families and immigrants continued for months; neither Ben- Gurion’s anger, nor investigations, nor interdepartmental agreements seemed to help.
...Jaffa was thus anarchically settled by ‘invasions and counter- invasions’ by immigrants, soldiers and others, summarised a disgusted Shafrir in March 1949. Occasionally, ‘invaders’ roughly evicted Arabs and at least some houses went to veteran Israelis with the right connections. 286 In April–August 1950, Jaffa ceased to exist as a separate municipal entity and Tel Aviv officially changed its name to ‘Tel Aviv-Jaffa’.287"
Absorption and settlement of new immigrants
"Frontier demarcation considerations played a role in Israeli decision- making concerning settlement in Jerusalem’s neighbourhoods. In mid- March 1949, the military governor of Jewish Jerusalem, Colonel Moshe Dayan, demanded that ‘civilians’ be settled immediately in the southern neighbourhoods of Talpiyot, Ramat Rachel (a war-ravaged kibbutz, on the southern edge of the city) and Abu Tor because if a United Nations-chaired mixed armistice commission team visited the neighbourhoods ‘and finds [them] empty of civilians, there will be United Nations pressure [on us] to evacuate the area’. 325"
"During the summer of 1949, several hundred ‘olim from Eastern Europe were settled in Deir Yassin, despite a protest to Ben-Gurion by several leading intellectuals, including Martin Buber and ‘Akiva Ernst Simon. They wrote that while aware of the suffering of the ‘olim and of their need for housing, they did not think that Deir Yassin was
the appropriate place . . . The Deir Yassin episode is a black stain on the honour of the Jewish people . . . It is better for the time being to leave the land of Deir Yassin uncultivated and the houses of Deir Yassin unoccupied, rather than to carry out an action whose symbolic importance vastly outweighs its practical benefit. The settlement of Deir Yassin, if carried out a mere year after the crime, and within the regular settlement framework, will constitute something like . . . approbation of the slaughter.
The intellectuals asked that the village be left empty and desolate, as ‘a terrible and tragic symbol . . . and a warning sign to our people that no practical or military necessity will ever justify such terrible murders from which the nation does not want to benefit’. Ben-Gurion failed to reply, despite reminders, and ‘Givat Shaul Bet’, as it came to be called, was duly established on the site, with several Cabinet ministers, the two chief rabbis and Jerusalem’s mayor attending the dedication ceremony. 327"
"In April 1949, Yoseftal reported that of ‘190,000’ ‘olim who had arrived since the establishment of the State, 110,000 had been settled in abandoned Arab houses. Most had been settled in the former Arab neighbourhoods of Jaffa and the mixed towns; 16,000 had been settled in towns (Ramle, Lydda, Acre); and 18,800 in the abandoned villages. 337 By May, the number of ‘olim settled in abandoned villages had risen to 25,000. 338"
"The IDF operations of 9–18 July, triggered by the Arabs’ unwillingness to prolong the 30-day truce and, in the south, by the Egyptians’ pre-emptive offensive, created a major new wave of refugees, who fled primarily to Jordanian-held eastern Palestine, and to Upper Galilee, Lebanon and the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip.
Just before the start of the ‘Ten Days’, as this round of hostilities was to be called in Israeli historiography, Ben-Gurion instructed the IDF to issue a general order to all units concerning behaviour towards Arab communities. Signed by General Ayalon ‘in the name of the Chief of Staff’, it stated:
Outside the actual time of fighting, it is forbidden to destroy, burn or demolish Arab cities and villages, to expel Arab inhabitants from villages, neighbourhoods and cities, and to uproot inhabitants from their places without special permission or explicit order from the Defence Minister in each specific case. Anyone violating this order will be put on trial. 1
The order was a grudging response to left-wing political pressure, and, at least in the higher echelons of the IDF, may have been understood as such, rather than as a reflection of Ben-Gurion’s or the CGS’s real thinking. However, it reached all large formations and headquarters, and presented at least a formal obstacle to the deliberate precipitation of mass flight and the unauthorised destruction of villages. 2
During the ‘Ten Days’, Ben-Gurion and the IDF were largely left on their own to decide and execute policy towards conquered communities, without interference or instruction by the Cabinet or the ministries. That policy, as shall be seen, was inconsistent, circumstantial and haphazard. The upshot – different results in different places – was determined by a combination of factors, chief of which were the religious and ethnic identity of the conquered populations, specific local strategic and tactical considerations and circumstances, Ben-Gurion’s views on the cases brought, or of interest, to him, the amount and quality of resistance offered in each area, and the character and proclivities of particular IDF commanders. The result was that the Ramle–Lydda and Tel as Safi areas were almost completely emptied of their Arab populations while in Western and Lower Galilee the bulk of the Christian and Druse inhabitants as well as many Muslims stayed put and were allowed to remain in place."
"The operational orders for Mivtza Dekel spoke of ‘attacking . . . Qawuqji’s forces’ – the Arab Liberation Army units in Western Galilee and in and around Nazareth – and ‘completely destroying’ them. No explicit mention was made of how the overrun civilian population was to be treated. 3
But the civilians were already under pressure, by Qawuqji, even before the start of Dekel on 9 July, at least to partially evacuate their homes. Already on 24 June, soldiers garrisoning Ma‘lul and Mujeidil instructed the villagers ‘to evacuate all their women and children [with] all their property’...The beduin were also ordered to send their young men to Ma‘lul to join Qawuqji’s forces – but ‘they refused for fear of their Jewish neighbours’... a day or two before the resumption of the fighting, Qawuqji’s headquarters instructed all the inhabitants of the villages ‘around Nazareth’ to ‘sleep outside the[ir] villages’, starting on the night of 8 July. The villagers of ‘Illut, west of the town, were reported on 7 July to have begun leaving; the departees included the mukhtar and several other notables. 5 That day, ‘all the women and children’ of Mujeidil and Ma‘lul were reported to have been moved to Nazareth, and the same was happening ‘in the rest of the villages in the area’. 6
...Prior to this, the Druse collectively had decided to part company with the Muslims and Christians. Already on 23 June, the Druse notables of Abu Sinan, Julis and Yarka had decided to stay out of the hostilities. 8 Along with the notables in other Druse villages, they were also determined to stay put (as, in less uniform and organised fashion, were many Christian villagers). Muslim villagers, on the other hand, were by and large determined to resist and to evacuate should they fall under Israeli control. Apparently, this was also what the IDF commanders involved wanted. Dov Yirmiya, a company commander in the 21st Battalion, recalled the attack on Kuweikat thus: ‘I don’t know whether the artillery softening up of the village caused casualties but the psychological effect was achieved and the village’s non-combatant inhabitants fled before we began the assault.’ A few of the inhabitants had participated in the Yehiam Convoy battle and massacre of 28 March, and this, a fact known to the Israeli commanders, may have been a factor in unleashing the relatively strong barrage on Kuweikat.
... On 9 July, the IDF appealed to the village to surrender, but the mukhtar, probably fearing a charge of treason by the ALA, refused. That night, the Carmeli Brigade let loose with artillery.
... The village militiamen quickly followed, some of them going to ‘Amqa, whose inhabitants also fled following an IDF artillery barrage on their own village. The handful of Kuweikat villagers – mostly old people – who stayed put when the village fell were apparently expelled to neighbouring Abu Sinan. The Druse of Abu Sinan subsequently refused to give most of them shelter and they moved on into Upper Galilee and Lebanon. 9
... The Druse villagers, according to OC Northern Front Carmel, often helped the Israelis beforehand with intelligence and greeted the conquering columns with song, dance and animal sacrifies. 10 Most of the Muslims fled mainly out of fear of Israeli retaliation for having supported or assisted Qawuqji’s troops.
At Shafa ‘Amr, Israeli–Druse cooperation peaked, with IDF intelligence agents and Druse emissaries repeatedly meeting during the days before the assault and arranging a sham Druse resistance and surrender. "
"Those remaining in Mujeidil were apparently driven out toward Nazareth. 16 Of the villages captured in the second stage of Dekel, only Mujeidil, Ma‘lul, ar Ruweis and Damun were completely emptied of inhabitants and, later, along with Saffuriya, leveled. It is worth noting that four of these villages were completely or overwhelmingly Muslim and that at least Saffuriya and Mujeidil had strongly supported Qawuqji and had a history of anti-Yishuv behaviour (prominently during 1936–1939). Some of them, especially Saffuriya, put up strong resistance to the IDF advance. In all the other villages captured in the second phase of Operation Dekel and where the IDF had encountered no, or no serious, resistance, at least a core of inhabitants stayed put (usually by clan, some clans preferring to depart, some to stay), and these villages exist to this day."
"Most observers at the time believed that the IDF, in Dekel, had roughly drawn a distinction between Muslims on the one hand and Druse and Christians on the other. Yitzhak Avira, an old-time HIS hand and something of an Arabist, wrote about this in critical terms to Danin. Avira noted the ‘cleansing [of the area] of Muslims and a softer attitude towards Christians . . . [and] Druse’. He related that he had visited Shafa ‘Amr and had seen ‘wanted’ Christians and Druse who ‘not only walked about freely, but also had on their faces joy at the misfortune of the Muslims who had been expelled’. Avira warned of the ‘danger’ of assuming that Christians and Druse were ‘kosher’ while Muslims were ‘non-kosher’. He conceded that the Muslims were ‘our serious enemies, especially the Husseini [supporters]’, but added that some Druse and Christians were also dangerous and untrustworthy. 17"
Nazareth
"Overwhelmingly Christian Nazareth from the first was earmarked for special treatment because of its importance to the Christian world."
"The order for the conquest of Nazareth (and several neighbouring villages) – codenamed ‘Mivtza Ya‘ar’ (Operation Forest) – made no mention of how the town’s civilians were to be treated. 21 But on 15 July, the day before Nazareth fell, Ben-Gurion ordered the army to prepare a special administrative task force to take over and run the town smoothly and to issue warnings against the desecration of ‘monasteries and churches’ (mosques were not mentioned) and against looting. Soldiers caught looting should be fired upon, ‘with machine-guns, mercilessly’, Ben-Gurion instructed.22 The order was transmitted down the ranks and was strictly obeyed. Carmel instructed the Carmeli, Golani and 7th brigades not to loot and not to damage churches in the ‘cradle of Christianity, holy to many millions’. 23 Golani’s OC, Nahum Golan (Spiegel), explained: ‘Because of its importance to the Christian world – the behaviour of the occupation forces in the town could serve as a factor in determining the prestige of the young state abroad.’ 24 Even the property of those who had fled Nazareth was treated more diffidently than elsewhere. 25 On 16 July, units of the Golani and 7th brigades occupied the town, suffering one soldier wounded (the Arabs had 16 dead). 26 As the troops entered, the ALA units fled – and ‘immediately, white flags appeared on most of Nazareth’s buildings . . . A real wave of joy engulfed the city, joy mixed with dread regarding what was about to happen.’ The inhabitants, according to IDF intelligence, were happy at the departure of the ‘tyranny and humiliation . . . beating, cursing, shooting and detentions’ they had suffered at the hands of the Palestinian irregulars, headed by Tawfiq Ibrahim (‘Abu Ibrahim’) and, subsequently (and to a lesser degree), at the hands of the ALA’s Iraqi soldiery. But they were filled with dread lest ‘the reports that they had received about the Jews’ behaviour in [other] conquered areas’ be confirmed, ‘especially [those regarding] . . . rape . . . in Acre and Ramle’. But the inhabitants were quickly reassured by the Israelis’ benign behaviour. The locals handed over their arms and ‘a general atmosphere of cooperation prevailed among all classes’. The few incidents of robbery did not mar the proceedings. By the second day, ‘the markets and shops were open and the streets filled with people. It was evident that the inhabitants, who had suffered from a severe lack of food, were hoping to see us as saviours in this respect.’27
On the evening of 16 July the remaining notables and Haim Laskov, OC Operation Dekel, signed an instrument of surrender. Combatants were to surrender and arms were to be handed over. The mayor was to remain in place and ‘the Government of Israel . . . recognised the equal civil rights of all the inhabitants of Nazareth as of all the citizens of Israel without attention to religion, race or language’. 28
Yet the following day, 17 July, the army issued an expulsion order. According to Ben-Gurion, it was Carmel, the front commander, who had given the order ‘to uproot all the inhabitants of Nazareth; 29 according to Colonel Ben Dunkelman, the Canadian commander of 7th Brigade, the order had come from Laskov, his immediate superior.30 Hours earlier, Laskov had appointed Dunkelman military governor of Nazareth. But Dunkelman was ‘shocked and horrified’ and refused to carry out the order,31 forcing Laskov to obtain higher sanction. Laskov asked IDF General Staff for a ruling: ‘Tell me immediately, urgently, whether to expel [leharhik] the inhabitants from the city of Nazareth. In my view all, save for clerics, should be expelled.’32 The matter was referred to Ben-Gurion, who vetoed the proposal. ‘According to the order of the defence minister, the inhabitants of Nazareth should not be expelled’, the Golani Brigade was told that evening.33 Meanwhile, Laskov appointed another officer as military governor, in Dunkelman’s stead.
The townspeople were unaware of these goings on and quickly settled down to life under the Israelis. Indeed, the situation was so good that villagers from the surrounding area poured in. 34 Shimoni, of the Foreign Ministry, urged the military governor to ‘demand that the church leaders and the Muslims’ send a cable to the Pope and other ‘appropriate addresses’ affirming the Jews’ ‘good behaviour toward the holy places’.35 To prevent depredations against the Arab citizenry, on 22 July the IDF declared the town off limits ‘to all soldiers’ save those with special permits. 36
In the days following its conquest, Nazareth contained about 15,000 inhabitants and 20,000 refugees. An Arab informant reported that all told about ‘30,000’ people had fled the town and the surrounding villages, most of them going to Lebanon. In Bint Jbail, in southern Lebanon, the joke was that the locals were renting out to the refugees shady spots under fig trees for P£25. The refugees’ situation, in terms of food, was reportedly ‘very bad’. Lebanon had tried to bar entry to refugees unless they had with them at least P£100. During the following weeks, refugees in large numbers were infiltrating through IDF lines back to Nazareth, 37 while villagers who had initially fled to Nazareth – from Shafa ‘Amr, Kafr Kanna, Dabburiyya, etc. – were being allowed to return to their villages.
Why most of Nazareth’s inhabitants, despite the battle around them, had stayed put was explained – in part inadvertently – by Shitrit after he visited the town. No doubt, Qawuqji’s prevention of flight from the city just before and on 15 July played a part. Moreover, the inhabitants’ maltreatment by the ALA and the fact that the town’s mayor, Yusuf Bek al Fahum, and other municipal councilors, along with much of the municipal bureaucracy and the 170 policemen, had stayed, discounting fears of expected Jewish atrocities and retribution, had also contributed.
The occupying troops had generally behaved well. A Minority Affairs Ministry official, Elisha Sulz, rather than a military man, had quickly (on 18 July) been appointed military governor, and had been advised by Chizik, former military governor of Jaffa, on how to behave.
During his visit, Shitrit had also instructed Sulz on behaviour towards the population: to get the search for weapons over quickly, and to open the shops and renew normal life as soon as possible. The minister asked that a judge be appointed, the municipality and post office be reactivated and measures be taken against the spread of infection and epidemics. And Shitrit told the Cabinet that ‘the army must be given strict instructions to [continue to] behave well and fairly towards the inhabitants of the town because of the great political importance of the city in the eyes of the world’.
The thousands who had nonetheless fled the town immediately after conquest had done so, according to Shitrit, because they had believed ‘spurious and counterfeit Arab propaganda . . . about atrocities by Jews, who cut off hands with axes, break legs and rape women, etc.’. Some 200 of the Fahum clan had fled to Lebanon, he said, ‘mainly out of fear of rape of women’. Sulz later reported that most of those who had fled had been Qawuqji collaborators. 38 But during the following weeks, as some refugees, evading Arab and Israeli roadblocks, were making their way back to Nazareth, Muslims were continuing to leave the town – at the rate of 10 families a day, and growing, according to one IDF intelligence informant.39"
Uniformity of governance policy
"The conquest of towns and villages both inside and outside the partition plan Jewish state had raised a general problem of governance: how was Israel to behave toward its Arab citizens, how were they to be cared for, watched over and governed? Until July, the leadership had taken an ad hoc approach, appointing military governors for each conquered town; these had felt out and established their powers while dealing with the day-to-day problems that arose vis- a-vis the population and other state agencies (especially the IDF and Minority Affairs Ministry). But the conquest of three towns outside the partition borders, Nazareth and, a few days earlier, Lydda and Ramle, highlighted and exacerbated the gen- eral questions, which Ben-Gurion had formulated two months before:
There is a need to determine rules regarding a conquered city . . . Who rules it: The [military] commander or an appointed governor . . . What will be his powers . . . vis-a-vis the inhabitants [and] their property? . . . Should Arabs be expelled? . . . What is the rule regarding Arabs who stay? . . . Who looks after those who stay? 40
Uniformity – a policy – had to be established in the treatment of Arab communities and areas incorporated into the state and a central guiding hand had to control and supervise that treatment. On 21 July 1948, the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property decided on the establishment of a ‘Military Government Department’ in the Defence Ministry and
Ben-Gurion decided to appoint Elimelekh Avner (Zelikovich), a veteran Haganah officer, as its director, with the rank of general. Avner spent the following weeks studying the subject, touring the conquered towns and meeting military governors and officials. In mid-August, he received and accepted his commission. Initially, four military ‘governorates’ came under his jurisdiction: Western Galilee (Acre), which included Haifa; Galilee (Nazareth); Jaffa; and Lydda-Ramle. Others (Majdal and Negev (Beersheba)) were added as the southern coastal plain and the northern Negev were brought under Israeli control in October–November. With the help of attached IDF units, the governors ruled the communities, imposing curfews, handing out residency and travel permits, organising municipal services, dispensing food and health care to the needy, establishing schools and kindergartens, and organising search operations for infiltrating refugees and their expulsion. As part of the Defence Ministry, the Military Government was directly subordinate to the defence minister in matters of policy, but in terms of daily functioning – manpower, equipment, and operations – it operated as a military unit under IDF\GS supervision. Partly for this reason, as well as because of their bifurcated tasks, a lack of clarity characterised the authorities’ treatment of the Arab communities during the following months, with continuous clashes over powers and areas of jurisdiction between the IDF, the Military Government and the Minority Affairs Ministry. 41"
Atrocities
" Dekel operational orders contained no instructions to expel."
"The first to fall was ‘Illut, just west of Nazareth, on 16 July. The available documentation does not paint a clear picture of what exactly happened. The villagers may (or may not) have resisted the conquering force, Golani’s 13th Battalion. Some 15 inhabitants were killed that day and the inhabitants fled, according to one Golani report. Two days later, after the force left, the inhabitants began to return. An IDF patrol ordered the returnees to leave. At the end of July, troops surrounded the village and, during a ‘search and identification’ operation, shot and killed ‘about 10’ inhabitants – ‘while trying to escape’, according to a Golani Brigade report. 42 The report was written in response to a complaint sent to Ben-Gurion about the troops’ behaviour. The unnamed complainant wrote (confusedly) that ‘46 [‘Illut] youngsters’ had been detained ‘and taken to an unknown destination. Some of these people were found dead in the hills on 3.8.1948 by Arab shepherds. That day, 14 of the prisoners were murdered in the olive grove near ‘Illut in the presence of the villagers – women and children.’ 43 But the villagers were not expelled (and ‘Illut today has a population of 5,800 Muslims).
Another atrocity occurred in Kafr Manda, a village on the edge of the area occupied in Dekel that was to change hands repeatedly. The initial occupying force ‘behaved well’, disarming the population. Thereafter, IDF patrols from time to time visited the village. Then, apparently in August, an ALA force moved in and, maltreating the remaining inhabitants, forced them to build fortifications and supply the troops with water and food. The ALA was peeved at the villagers’ surrender to the IDF. One day, an IDF force attacked the village, the ALA fled and the inhabitants took refuge in the mosque. ‘A Jewish officer named Shlomo came to the mosque and pulled out some 20 young men and led them to the spring, where he stood them in a line [and] pulled out two and executed them.’ The Israelis – apparently angered by the villagers’ help to the ALA – then left and the village was again occupied by the ALA, finally falling into Israeli hands in October. 44
But ‘Illut and Kafr Manda were exceptional. Most of the villages fell without battle and without atrocities or expulsions"
"For the IDF, Operation Dani was the linchpin of the ‘Ten Days’. The aim was to relieve the pressure on semi-besieged Jerusalem, secure the length of the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road and neutralise the perceived threat to Tel Aviv from the Arab Legion, whose forward units, in Lydda and Ramle, were less than 20 kilometres away.
From the start of the war, militiamen from Ramle and Lydda had attacked Jewish traffic on nearby roads. Jewish retaliatory strikes, such as that by the Haganah, on 10 December 1947, in which 15 empty Arab vehicles, including two buses, were destroyed in a parking lot in Ramle and two guards were killed, 51 and the IZL’s bomb attack, on 18 February 1948, in Ramle’s market, in which seven died and two dozen were injured,52 eroded Arab morale. So did the massacre, apparently by the IZL, of ten Arab workers (one of them a woman) in the groves near ‘Arab al Satariyya (‘Arab al Fadl), near Ramle, in late February 1948. 53 The notables of both Lydda and Ramle, after the initial bouts of violence, generally tried to keep the peace and keep local militants in check, but were only sporadically successful. 54 By early May, there was mass flight from Ramle, which suffered from periodic cut-offs of water and electricity and a shortage of fuel.55 Militiamen on Ramle’s outskirts were reportedly preventing young males from leaving town, though women, children and the old were allowed to go. 56"
Ramle
"Even before the First Truce, IDF\GS and Ben-Gurion had begun to think offensively vis-a-vis the two towns. The Kiryati Brigade, responsible for Tel Aviv, in late May reported that the Arabs had a ‘substantial force concentrated (including armour and apparently also artillery) in the Ramle-Lydda-[Lydda] Airport-Wilhelma-Beit Nabala line’ and the idea that they might ‘break out in the direction of Tel Aviv’ had to be taken into account.58 On 30 May, Ben-Gurion told his generals that the two towns ‘might serve as bases for attack on Tel Aviv’ and other settlements. Their conquest by the IDF would gain new territory for the state, release forces tied down in the defense of Tel Aviv and the highway to Jerusalem, and sever Arab transportation lines. While the Arab Legion in fact had only one, defensively-oriented company (about 120–150 soldiers) in Lydda and Ramle together, and a second-line company at Beit Nabala to the north, IDF intelligence and Operation Dani OC General Yigal Allon believed at the start of the offensive that they faced a far stronger Legion force and one whose deployment was potentially aggressive, posing a threat to Tel Aviv itself. 59
... But during May–June, Ben-Gurion appears to have developed an obsession regarding Lydda and Ramle, partly because they sat astride the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road and, ultimately, threatened Jewish Jerusalem, partly because of their proximity, and threat, to Tel Aviv. Repeatedly he jotted down in his diary that Lydda and Ramle had to be ‘destroyed’: 61 In mid-June, he spoke in Cabinet of the need to remove ‘these two thorns’ in the Yishuv’s side.62"
"From the start, the operations against Lydda and Ramle were designed to induce civilian panic and flight – as a means of precipitating military collapse and possibly also as an end itself. After the initial air attacks on the towns, Operation Dani headquarters at 11:30 hours, 10 July, informed IDF\GS: there was ‘a general and serious [civilian] flight from Ramle. There is great value in continuing the bombing.’ 65 During the afternoon, the headquarters asked General Staff for renewed bombing, and informed one of the brigades: ‘Flight from the town of Ramle of women, the old and children is to be facilitated. The [military age] males are to be detained.’66"
"The bombing and shelling of 10 July were successful. The following day, Yiftah Brigade’s intelligence officer reported: ‘The bombing from the air and artillery [shelling] of Lydda and Ramle caused flight and panic among the civilians [and] a readiness to surrender.’ That day, Operation Dani HQ repeatedly asked for further bombing, ‘including [with] incendiaries’. 67 Civilian morale (and the military will to resist) was fur- ther dented by the raid on late afternoon 11 July of the 89th Battalion (commanded by Lt. Colonel Moshe Dayan) on Lydda and along the Lydda–Ramle road. Two of the battalion’s companies, mounted on an armoured car, jeeps, scout cars and half-tracks, drove through Lydda from east to west spraying machine-gun fire at anything that moved, and then proceeded southwards, shooting up militia outposts along the Lydda–Ramle road, reaching Ramle’s train station on the town’s north- eastern edge, before returning to their starting point at Ben Shemen. The battalion suffered six dead and 21 wounded – but killed and wounded dozens of Arabs (perhaps as many as 200). 68 One of Dayan’s troopers, ‘Gideon’, was some months later to describe what he saw and felt that day:
[My] jeep made the turn and here at the . . . entrance to the house opposite stands an Arab girl, stands and screams with eyes filled with fear and dread. She is all torn and dripping blood – she is certainly wounded. Around her on the ground lie the corpses of her family. Still quivering, death has not yet redeemed them from their pain. Next to her is a bundle of rags – her mother, hand outstretched trying to draw her into the house. And the girl understands nothing . . . Did I fire at her? . . . But why these thoughts, for we are in the midst of battle, in the midst of conquest of the town. The enemy is at every corner. Every one is an enemy. Kill! Destroy! Murder! Otherwise you will be murdered and will not conquer the town. What [feeling] did this lone girl stir within you? Continue to shoot! Move forward! . . . Where does this desire to murder come from? What, because your friend . . . was killed or wounded, you have lost your humanity and you kill and destroy? Yes! . . . I kill every one who belongs to the enemy camp: man, woman, old person, child. And I am not deterred. 69
To judge from this description, the battalion’s death-dispensing dash through Lydda combined elements of a battle and a massacre. Some months later, in November, Natan Alterman, Israel’s most celebrated poet, was to portray the operation in a condemnatory, moralistic poem. 70 Be that as it may, the battalion’s hour-long expedition certainly shook morale in Lydda (and probably in Ramle)."
"Yiftah HQ had apparently initiated contact on 10 July with Ramle’s notables to bring about a surrender. 72 The following day, IDF aircraft dropped leaflets on the two towns calling for surrender: ‘Whoever resists – will die. He who chooses life will surrender.’ The notables of Ramle were instructed to proceed by foot to the village of Barriya holding aloft a white flag; Lydda’s notables were told to go Jimzo. 73 During the night of 11–12 July, a delegation of Ramle notables – Isma’in Nakhas, Haret Haji, Hussam al Khairi, and Imada Khouri – reached Barriya and were ferried to Yiftah Brigade HQ at Kibbutz Na‘an, where the following morning they signed a formal instrument of surrender. 74 The document stated that all arms and ‘all strangers in the town’ would be handed over to the army; ‘all non-military age inhabitants . . . would be allowed to leave town should they wish to’; ‘the lives and peace of the inhabitants would be guaranteed if their representatives . . . will cooperate with the army’. 75 Kiryati Brigade’s 42nd Battalion entered Ramle later that morning and imposed a curfew."
Lydda
"In Lydda, where no formal surrender was signed, events took a more violent turn. The Yiftah Brigade’s 3rd Battalion fought its way into town on the evening of 11 July, hard on the heels of the 89th Battalion’s blitz. Supported by a company from the brigade’s 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion took up positions in the town centre. A small force of Legionnaires and irregulars continued to hold out at the police fort on the southern edge of town. ‘Groups of old and young, women and children streamed down the streets in a great display of submissiveness, bearing white flags, and entered of their own free will the detention compounds we arranged in the mosque and church – Muslims and Christians separately.’ Soon, the two sites were overflowing: ‘There was a need to let the women and children go and to collect only the adult males.’ A curfew was imposed, by which time only a few thousand males were in detention.76
The calm in Lydda was shattered at 11:30 hours, 12 July, when two or three Legion armoured cars, commanded by Lt. Hamadallah al ‘Abdullah, either lost or on reconnaissance or seeking a missing officer, entered the town. A firefight erupted and, eventually, the armoured cars withdrew. 77 But the noise of the skirmish sparked sniping by armed Lydda townspeople against the occupying troops; some townspeople probably believed that the Legion was counter-attacking and tried to assist.78
The 300–400 Israeli troops in the town, dispersed in semi-isolated pockets in the midst of thousands of hostile townspeople, some still armed, felt threatened, vulnerable and angry: they had understood that the town had surrendered. 3rd Battalion OC Moshe Kelman ordered the troops to suppress the sniping – which Israeli and Arab historians and chroniclers, for different reasons, were later to describe as an ‘uprising’ – with the utmost severity. The troops were told to shoot at ‘any clear target’ or, alternatively, at anyone ‘seen on the streets’. 79 At 13:15, Yiftah HQ informed Dani HQ: ‘Battles have erupted in Lydda. We have hit an armoured car with a two-pounder [gun] and killed many Arabs. There are still exchanges of fire in the town. We have taken many wounded.’ 80
Some townspeople, shut up in their houses under curfew, took fright at the sound of shooting outside, perhaps believing that a massacre was in progress. They rushed into the streets – and were cut down by Israeli fire. Some of the soldiers also fired and lobbed grenades into houses from which snipers were suspected to be operating. In the confusion, dozens of unarmed detainees in one mosque compound, the Dahaimash Mosque, in the town centre, were shot and killed. Apparently, some of them tried to break out and escape, perhaps fearing that they would be massacred. IDF troops threw grenades and apparently fired PIAT (bazooka) rockets into the compound. 81
By 13:30, it was all over. The IDF had lost three–four dead and about a dozen wounded. Yeruham Cohen, an intelligence officer at Operation Dani headquarters, later described the scene:
The inhabitants of the town became panic-stricken. They feared that . . . the IDF troops would take revenge on them. It was a horrible, earsplitting scene. Women wailed at the top of their voices and old men said prayers, as if they saw their own deaths before their eyes. 82
Yiftah’s fire caused ‘some 250 dead . . . and many wounded’. 83 The ratio of Arab to Israeli casualties was hardly consistent with the descriptions of what had happened as an ‘uprising’ or battle. In any event, the Israeli officers in charge were later to regard the suppression of the ‘uprising’ (and the subsequent expulsion of the townspeople) as a dismal episode in Yiftah’s history. ‘There is no doubt that the Lydda–Ramle affair and the flight of the inhabitants, the uprising and the expulsion [geirush] that followed cut deep grooves in all who underwent [these experiences]’, Yiftah Brigade OC Mula Cohen was to write.84 These events were ac- companied and followed by a great deal of looting.
The Third Battalion was withdrawn from Lydda on the night of 13–14 July and, along with the brigade’s other battalions, spent the following day in a ‘soul-searching gathering’ in the Ben Shemen Wood, where they were berated by Cohen and forced to hand over their loot, which was subsequently thrown onto a large bonfire and destroyed. 85 But the looting of the empty houses of Ramle and Lydda by groups of troops continued, apparently, for weeks. 86"
Expulsion
"The shooting in the centre of Lydda also sealed the fate of the inhabitants of Ramle. As the outbreak of sniping had scared the Third Battalion, so, apparently, it had shaken Operation Dani HQ, where, during the previous hours, it was believed that the two towns were securely in IDF hands. The unexpected eruption highlighted the threat of a Jordanian counter-attack accompanied by a mass uprising by a large Arab population behind Israeli lines, as Allon’s brigades continued their push eastwards, towards the operation’s second-stage objectives, Latrun and Ramallah. The shooting focused minds at Operation Dani HQ at Yazur. A strong desire to depopulate the two towns already existed; the shooting seemed to offer the justification and opportunity for what the bombings and artillery barrages, insubstantial by World War II standards, had in the main failed to achieve.
Ben-Gurion was at Yazur that afternoon. According to the best ac- count of the meeting, at which Yadin, Ayalon and Allon, Israel Galili and Lt Colonel Yitzhak Rabin, chief of operations of Operation Dani (and of the Palmah), were present, someone, possibly Allon, after hearing of the outbreak in Lydda, proposed expelling the inhabitants of the two towns. Ben-Gurion said nothing, and no decision was taken. Then Ben-Gurion, Allon and Rabin stepped outside for a cigarette. Allon reportedly asked: ‘What shall we do with the Arabs?’ Ben-Gurion responded with a dismissive, energetic gesture with his hand and said: ‘Expel them [garesh otam].’ 88"
"The Cabinet had been told nothing of the expulsion orders. Shitrit, as was his wont, had arrived in Ramle to look over his new ‘constituency’; after all, he was responsible for the Arab minority. He was shocked by what he heard and saw: Kiryati troops were in the midst of preparations to expel the inhabitants. Ben-Gal told him that ‘in line with an order from . . . Paicovitch [i.e., Allon], the IDF was about to take prisoner all males of military age, and the rest of the inhabitants – men, women and children – were to be taken beyond [sic] the border and left to their fate’. The army ‘intends to deal in the same way’ with the inhabitants of Lydda, Shitrit reported. 92 Upset and angry, Shitrit returned to Tel Aviv and went to Shertok, reporting on what he had heard. Shertok rushed to Ben-Gurion and the two men hammered out a set of policy guidelines for IDF behaviour towards the population of Lydda and Ramle. Ben-Gurion apparently failed to inform Shertok (or Shitrit) that he had been the source of the original expulsion orders; perhaps he denied that any had been issued.
Shertok then wrote to Shitrit explaining what had been agreed. The guidelines reached between Shertok and Ben-Gurion, according to Shertok’s letter to Shitrit of 13 July, were:
1. It should be publicly announced in the two towns that whoever wants to leave – will be allowed to do so.
2. A warning must be issued that anyone remaining behind does so on his own responsibility, and the Israeli authorities are not obliged to supply him with food.
3. Women, children, the old and the sick must on no account be forced to leave [the] town[s].
4. The monasteries and churches must not be harmed. Shertok appeared to believe that he had averted the expulsion – but he wasn’t certain. His letter ended with a caveat: ‘We all know how difficult it is to overcome [base] instincts during conquest. But I hope the aforementioned policy will be carried out.’ 93
True to his word, Ben-Gurion passed on (a variant of) these guidelines to General Staff\Operations, which transmitted them to Operation Dani headquarters at 23:30 hours, 12 July, in somewhat abridged form:
1. All are free to leave, apart from those who will be detained.
2. To warn that we are not responsible for feeding those who remain.
3. Not to force women, the sick, children and the old to go\walk [lalechet – a possibly deliberate ambiguity].
4. Not to touch monasteries and churches.
5. Searches without vandalism.
6. No robbery.’ 94
But Ben-Gurion, clearly, was saying different things to different people over 12–13 July. Finance Minister Kaplan, for instance, said that Ben-Gurion had told him – either late on 12 July or early 13 July – that the orders were that ‘the young male inhabitants [of Ramle and Lydda] were to be taken prisoner. The rest of the inhabitants were to be encouraged to leave the place [yesh le‘oded la‘azov et hamakom], but whoever stayed – Israel would have to take care of his maintenance.’ 95
Shitrit came away from his meeting with Shertok and his reading of Shertok’s letter of 13 July believing that he had averted a wholesale expulsion. He was wrong. During 13–14 July, the townspeople of both Ramle and Lydda were ordered and ‘encouraged’ to leave. At the same time, the inhabitants – especially of Lydda – probably needed little such ‘encouragement.’ Within a 72-hour period, they had undergone the shock of battle and unexpected conquest by the Jews, abandonment by the Arab Legion, a slaughter, a curfew with house-to-house searches, a round-up of able-bodied males and the separation of families, lack of food and medical attention, the flight of relatives, continuous isolation in their homes and general dread of the future. News of what had happened in Lydda probably reached Ramle, three kilometres away, almost immediately, causing fright. During the night of 12–13 July, many of the remaining inhabitants of the towns probably decided that it would be best not to live under Jewish rule. "
"The ‘deal’ was apparently reached in ‘negotiations’ between IDF intelligence officer Shmarya Guttman and other Palmah officers and some Lydda notables. The IDF said they wanted everyone to leave. The Arab notables said there could be no exodus so long as thousands of towns- people (many of them heads of families) were incarcerated in detention centres. The officers agreed to release the detainees if all the inhabitants left. The notables assented. Guttman then proceeded to the mosque, where his announcement that the detainees could leave was greeted with cries of joy. Town criers and IDF soldiers went about the town announcing that the inhabitants were about to leave and instructed them where to muster for the departure. 96"
"All the Israelis who witnessed these events agreed that the exodus, under a hot July sun, was an extended episode of suffering, especially for the Lydda refugees. Some were stripped by soldiers of their valuables as they left town or at checkpoints along the way. 100 Guttman subsequently described the trek:
A multitude of inhabitants walked one after another. Women walked burdened with packages and sacks on their heads. Mothers dragged children after them . . . Occasionally, [IDF] warning shots were heard . . . Occasionally, you encountered a piercing look from one of the youngsters . . . in the column, and the look said: ‘We have not yet surrendered. We shall return to fight you.’
For Guttman, an archaeologist, the spectacle conjured up ‘the memory of the exile of Israel [at Roman hands, two thousand years before]’; the town, he added, looked like ‘after a pogrom’. 101
One Israeli soldier (probably 3rd Battalion), from Kibbutz ‘Ein Harod, a few weeks after the event recorded his vivid impressions of the refugees’ thirst and hunger, of how ‘children got lost’ and of how a child fell into a well and drowned, ignored, as his fellow refugees fought each other to draw water. 102 Another soldier described the spoor left by the slow- shuffling columns, ‘to begin with [jettisoning] utensils and furniture and in the end, bodies of men, women and children, scattered along the way’. Quite a few refugees died on the road east – from exhaustion, dehydration and disease – before reaching temporary rest near and in Ramallah. Muhammad Nimr al Khatib, working from hearsay, put the Lydda refugee death toll during the trek eastward at ‘335’; Arab Legion OC John Glubb, more carefully wrote that ‘nobody will ever know how many children died’.103
The creation of the refugee columns, which for days cluttered the roads eastward, may have been one of the motives for the expulsion decision. The military thinking was simple and cogent: the IDF had just taken its two primary objectives and had, for the moment, run out of offensive steam. The Legion was expected to counter-attack (through Budrus, Jimzu, Ni‘lin and Latrun). Cluttering the main axes, deep into Arab territory, with human flotsam would severely hamper the Legion. And, inevitably, the large, new wave of refugees would sap Jordanian resources at a crucial moment. An IDF logbook noted on 15 July:
The refugees from Lydda and Ramle are causing the Arab Legion great problems. There are acute problems of housing and supplies . . . In this case, the Legion is interested in giving all possible help to the refugees as the Arab public is complaining that the Legion was unforthcoming in assisting Ramle and Lydda. 104
A Palmah report, probably written by Allon soon after, stated that the exodus, beside relieving Tel Aviv of a potential, long-term threat, had ‘clogged the Legion’s routes of advance’ and had foisted upon the Jordanians the problem of ‘maintaining another 45,000 souls . . . Moreover, the phenomenon of the flight of tens of thousands will no doubt cause demoralisation in every Arab area [the refugees] reach . . . This victory will yet have great effect on other sectors.’ 105 Ben-Gurion, in his wonted oblique manner, also referred to the strategic benefits: ‘The Arab Legion cables that on the road from Lydda and Ramle some 30,000 refugees are on the move, who are angry with the Legion. They demand bread. They must be transferred to Transjordan. In Transjordan there are anti- government demonstrations.’ 106
In the policy debate in Mapam during the following weeks, there was criticism of Allon’s use of the refugee columns to achieve strategic aims. Party co-leader, Meir Ya‘ari, said:
Many of us are losing their [human] image . . . How easily they speak of how it is possible and permissible to take women, children and old men and to fill the roads with them because such is the imperative of strategy. And this we say, the members of Hashomer Hatza‘ir, who remember who used this means against our people during the [Second World] war . . . I am appalled.107"
"The fall of Lydda and Ramle and the exodus of their inhabitants were to shake Jordan. Demonstrations erupted in Amman and other towns on both sides of the river, with the Legion – and particularly its British commanders – being charged, by Palestinians and outside Arab leaders, with ‘abandoning’ the towns if not actually colluding with the Zionists in their demise. 114 Even among the some 2,400 local militiamen and army- age adults detained by the IDF in the towns there was ‘great bitterness’ toward the Legion and King Abdullah, ‘who receives money from the British’.115 The arrival in Ramallah – population 10,000 – of as many as ‘70,000’ refugees severely undermined civilian morale. The acting mayor, Hana Khalaf, appealed to the king to order them to leave the town: they ‘are dispersed in the town streets, most of them poor, they suffer from great want of basic goods and water and pose a serious threat to health’. Abdullah advised ‘patience’. 116 The British consul-general in Jerusalem reported a similar state of affairs in Nablus and Bethlehem. 117"
"During the three months between the start of the Second Truce on 19 July and the renewal of hostilities on 15 October, the IDF carried out a number of operations designed to clear its rear and front line areas of actively or potentially hostile concentrations of Arab population."
During the days after Shoter, the IDF blew up much of ‘Ein Ghazal and Jab‘a. Arab spokesmen complained of Israeli brutality and atrocities. Tawfiq Abul Huda, the Jordanian prime minister, cabled the UN that the villagers were ‘subjected to savage treatment of the cruelest kind known to humanity. Masses were . . . forced to evacuate their homes . . .’ 161 Another complaint spoke of ‘4,000’ dead or missing in Ijzim. On the morning of 29 July, a team of UN observers, at Bernadotte’s behest, visited the village and found ‘not one body’. 162 But they were not looking hard. There were bodies in the villages, lying under rubble, in the outlying militia outposts, and in the surrounding hills, of those strafed and shelled by IDF aircraft and artillery, or killed in ambushes. According to one IDF report, ‘some 200 [Arab] bodies’ were found in the Little Triangle. 163 IDF teams buried them.164
The main atrocity story that surfaced was that IDF troops had burned alive 28 Arabs. 165 Israel vehemently denied the allegation. The story may have originated in the burning of 25–30 bodies ‘in an advanced state of decomposition’ found near ‘Ein Ghazal. For lack of timber, explained Walter Eytan, the bodies were only partially consumed, and captured villagers had been assigned to bury them. 166 ‘Azzam Pasha had alleged that most of the 28 had been refugees from Tira who had fled to the ‘Little Triangle’. On 28 July, a United Nations observer visited the area and, according to Bernadotte, found ‘no evidence to support claims of massacre’.167
However, Arab pressure resulted in a thorough UN investigation of Shoter. Altogether, five teams were deployed and, basing themselves largely on interviews with refugees from the three villages encamped in the Jenin area, they worked out what had happened and compiled lists of who was missing or killed. According to Bernadotte, Israel’s assault on the villages was ‘unjustified . . . especially in view of the offer of the Arab villagers to negotiate and the apparent Israeli failure fully to explore this offer’. Bemadotte condemned Israel’s subsequent ‘systematic destruction’ of ‘Ein Ghazal and Jab‘a and demanded, ‘in the light of the findings of the Board’ of inquiry, that the inhabitants of all three villages be allowed to return, with Israel restoring their damaged or demolished houses. Bernadotte concluded by saying that altogether, ‘the number killed [in the three villages] could not have exceeded 130’ and that ‘no great number were captured’ (he was responding to the allegation that ‘4,000’ Arabs had been ‘massacred’ or ‘captured’). 168 The investigating ‘Central Truce Supervision Board’, chaired by W.E. Riley, a seconded US Marine Corps Brigadier General who later became the first head of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East, concluded that ‘with the completion of the attack . . . all the inhabitants . . . were forced to evacuate’. The investigators found no evidence that, in the days before the IDF assault, the villagers had violated the truce (that began on 18 July). The assault, on the other hand, had been a violation. 169"
"The institution of the Second Truce and the relative quiet that descended on the front lines tempted the refugees to try to return to their mhomes or, at least, to reap their crops along and behind the lines. Immediately after the start of the truce, IDF units on all the fronts were instructed to bar the way, including by use of live fire, to Arabs seeking to cross into Israeli territory, be it for resettlement, theft, smuggling, harvesting, sabotage or espionage. 176 Such instructions were periodically reissued.177 The units were also instructed to scour the now-empty villages for infiltrators, to kill or expel them, and to patrol still-populated villages where illegal residents were to be identified, detained and expelled. Different units implemented these orders with varying degrees of efficiency, severity and consistency.
Pressure on the national-level leadership to act firmly against Arab infiltration was applied by settlements, especially in hard-hit areas like the Coastal Plain, which feared terrorism and theft; by officials who feared for the future of the new settlements; by IDF units deployed along the front lines, who saw the infiltrators as a security threat; 178 and by the police. On 29 August, Police Commissioner Yehezkeel Sahar wrote to Police Minister Shitrit:
There are organised groups of Arabs infiltrating between the [IDF] positions at night across the [truce] lines and stealing cows. Last week a farmer was even murdered, and there is no doubt that their successes in this area may open the way for the Arab military commanders to exploit this for tactical purposes . . . We see the matter as grave . . .
Shitrit passed the letter on to Ben-Gurion, adding his own cautions:
From [Sahar’s] words you will realise that the Arab infiltration . . . is a very worrying phenomenon, undermining security in the country . . . In my tours around the country I have personally encountered this phenomen mainly in Upper Galilee and Beit Shean, where Arabs infiltrate nightly in their hundreds, steal and vandalize and do so with impunity."
"Perhaps the most extensive rear-area Second Truce ‘cleansing’ operation was carried out by Giv‘ati around Yibna-‘Arab Suqrir-Nabi Rubin, an area of sand dunes north of the Egyptian Army’s area of control... The troops – of the 55th Battalion, the brigade Cavalry Unit, Samson’s Foxes and the 1st Territorial Corps – destroyed ‘most of the stone houses and the [wooden] shacks were torched; [and] killed 10 Arabs, wounded three and captured 3’. The troops killed about 20 camels, cows and mules. There were no IDF casualties. One of the troops described the operation in great detail. He wrote that they set out with a feeling of ‘merriment’ [‘alitzut]. Later, they captured several ‘fear- filled, shocked’ Arabs whose ‘miserable appearance caused mixed feelings of contempt and pity’. The soldiers sat around discussing whether or not to kill them. In the end, after deciding, in half-jest, that they should not be killed but turned into ‘drawers of water and hewers of wood’ – as Joshua had done three thousand years before with his Gibeonite prisoners – the troops fed them bread and cheese and gave them water. "
"With his penchant for hyperbole and lies, on 4 August Haj Amin al Husseini complained, more than two weeks into the truce, that ‘for two weeks now . . . the Jews have continued with their attacks on the Arab villages and outposts in all areas. Stormy battles are continuing in the villages of Sataf, Deiraban, Beit Jimal, Ras Abu ‘Amr, ‘Aqqur, and ‘Artuf . . .’ 211 But there was an element of truth in the charge. Periodically through the Second Truce, the IDF raided Arab villages across the lines, in Arab-held territory, moving in and killing local militiamen and civilians, blowing up houses and then withdrawing. Yigal Yadin explained: ‘The lack of operations on our part during the truce prompts the Arab irregular forces to acts of robbery, infiltration, etc. Therefore, ambushes and light raids [pshitot kalot] against the border villages should be organised.’ 212 The aim was usually retaliation and deterrence."
"Altogether, the Israeli offensives of the ‘Ten Days’ and the subsequent clearing operations probably sent something over 100,000 Arabs into exile in Jordanian-held eastern Palestine, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and the Upper Galilee pocket held by Qawuqji’s ALA."
"Bernadotte’s report of 16 September, proposing the award of the Negev to the Arabs in exchange for Jewish sovereignty over Western Galilee, compelled the Israeli political and military leadership to focus attention on the south, where the surrounded, poorly supplied enclave of less than two dozen settlements was cut off from the core of the Yishuv by Egyptian forces holding the Majdal–Faluja–Beit Jibrin–Hebron axis. Contrary to the truce terms, the Egyptians refused to allow Israeli supply of the enclave by land. The threat of an award of the Negev to the Arabs, the untenable geo-military situation and the plight of the besieged settlements made the breakdown of the truce, in the absence of a political settlement, inevitable. In early October, the Cabinet approved an Israeli offensive to link up with the enclave and to rout the Egyptian army."
"On 26 September, he had told the Cabinet that, should the fighting be renewed in the north, the Galilee would become ‘clean’ (naki) and ‘empty’ (reik) of Arabs, and had implied that he had been assured of this by his generals. The Prime Minister had been responding to a statement/question by Sharett, who, addressing the Bernadotte proposal that Israel be awarded the Galilee, had implied that it were better that Israel should not take over the Galilee pocket as it was ‘filled with Arabs’ – ‘we are definitely not getting the Galilee empty, we are getting it full’ – including refugees from Western and Eastern Galilee bent on returning to their villages.3 On 21 October, when Ezra Danin, in a tete- a-tete with Ben-Gurion, tabled the Foreign Ministry Arabists’ pet project at the time of setting up a Palestinian pup- pet state in the West Bank, the prime minister had impatiently declared that he was not interested in new ‘adventures’ and that ‘the Arabs of the Land of Israel [i.e., Palestine] have only one function left – to run away’. 4"
"This attitude was not converted into or embodied in formal government or even IDF General Staff policy. Neither before, during nor immediately after Yoav and Hiram did the Cabinet or any of its committees decide or instruct the IDF to drive out the Arab population from the areas it was about to conquer or had conquered. Nor, as far as the available evidence shows, did the heads of the defence establishment – Ben-Gurion, IDF CGS Dori or Yadin – issue any general orders to the advancing brigades to expel or otherwise harm the civilian populations.
But, clearly, the OCs of northern and southern fronts, respectively Moshe Carmel and Yigal Allon, both hoped and acted to clear their areas of Arab communities. Both were affiliated to Ahdut Ha‘avoda and its leader, Yitzhak Tabenkin, a major proponent of transfer in the Israeli political arena. In the north, at 07:30, 31 October, with the start of the ceasefire scheduled for 11:00, Carmel ordered his brigades and district OCs ‘to continue in the cleansing operations inside the Galilee’. 7 A few hours later, at 10:00 hours, Carmel honed his order as follows: ‘Do all in your power for a quick and immediate cleansing [tihur] of the conquered areas of all the hostile elements in line with the orders that have been issued[.] The inhabitants of the areas conquered should be assisted to leave.’ The order was apparently issued while Carmel and Ben-Gurion – who had come to visit – were meeting in Nazareth, or minutes after their meeting; one may assume that it was authorised, if not actually authored, by the prime minister. 9 Ten days later, Carmel repeated this order, in a somewhat watered down version: ‘[We] should continue to assist the inhabitants who wish to leave the areas we have conquered. This matter is urgent and should be expedited quickly.’ 10
In the south, Allon, in the course of Operation Yoav and its aftermath, apparently never issued such general orders, in writing (at any rate, none have surfaced in the archives). But he most certainly passed on expulsive guidelines orally – and, indeed, almost no Arabs remained in the towns and villages conquered in that campaign. But whereas Allon acted with determination and consistency, and with almost complete success, Carmel, perhaps impeded by moral and political considerations and recalcitrant subordinates, displayed irresolution and belatedness, and many of the Arab communities overrun in Hiram remained in place.
On both fronts, to be sure, most IDF soldiers and officers at this stage in the war were happy – for military and political reasons – to see Arab civilians along their path of advance take flight. Many were also ready to expel communities and some, as we shall see, were even willing to commit atrocities, perhaps in part to induce flight. The exodus, all understood, vastly simplified things. But, as we shall also see, different units acted in different ways, their disparate behaviour governed by the political outlook and character of their commanders, their ‘collective outlook’, circumstances of topography and battle, and the religion and political or military affiliations of the communities encountered."
"In all his previous campaigns Yigal Allon had left no Arab communities in his wake: So it had been in Operation Yiftah in eastern Galilee in the spring, so it had been in Operation Dani in July. Nothing was said in the operational order for Operation Yoav about the prospective fate of the communities to be overrun 11 – but Allon, the OC, no doubt let his officers know what he wanted and most probably they knew (and agreed with) what he wanted without explicit instruction."
"The inhabitants of the areas conquered in Yoav were nervous and largely demoralised before the battle was joined. They were Muslim al- most to a man. Small towns (or oversized villages) like Isdud, Majdal and Hamama contained fairly large refugee populations that had fled from areas to the north in the spring and summer. They had been living under unsympathetic, coercive Egyptian military rule since May. The Egyptians were inefficient and often heavy-handed and were regarded by many locals as foreigner occupiers; they were perennially short of supplies and not generous with them with the locals, whose fields, in many cases, had been ravaged or rendered inaccessible by the hostilities. Moreover, during the long Second Truce, the locals understood that the stalemate would soon be broken, that they would be on the firing line, and that the Egyptian army was weak. They feared the flail of war and dreaded Jewish conquest and rule; they, too, had heard of Deir Yassin."
"A Palmah account, by a woman soldier, Aviva Rabinowitz, of Kibbutz Kabri, of a patrol in the Hebron Hills, near al Jab‘a, in the wake of the Harel offensive, illustrates the immediate fate and condition of the refugees from these hilltop villages:
Scattered in the gully, sitting in craters and caves . . . [were] dozens of refugees . . . We surprised them. A cry of fear cut through the air . . . They began to praise us and dispense compliments about the Jewish army, the State of Israel. With what obsequiousness! Old men bowing, genuflecting, kissing our feet and begging for mercy; young men standing with bowed heads and helpless . . . We tried to persuade them to flee towards Hebron. We fired several shots in the air – and the people were indifferent. ‘Better that we die here than return [to Egyptian-held territory] to die at the hands of the Egyptians.’ We fired again. No one moved. Tiredness and hunger deprived them of any will to live and of any human dignity. These are the Arabs of the Hebron Hills, and it is possible that this youngster, or that man, shed the blood of the 35 or looted the Etzion Bloc [after its fall in May] – but can one take revenge here? You can fight against people of your own worth, but against this ‘human dust’? We turned back and returned [to our base] . . . That evening, for the first time during the whole war, I felt I was tired. My soul has grown weary of this war. 15"
"The upshot of the October–November battles in the south was that the Gaza Strip’s refugee population jumped from the pre-Yoav figure of less than 100,000 to ‘230,000’, according to an official of the United Nations Refugee Relief Project, F.G. Beard. Beard reported that the condition of these refugees ‘def[ies] description . . . Almost all of them are living in the open . . . [and are] receiving no regular rations of food . . . There are no sanitary facilities . . . and conditions of horrifying filth exist.’ Beard said the Egyptian Army and the Arab Higher Refugee Council had been ‘grossly negligent in their handling of the situation’. 72"
Dawayima
"Dawayima was captured by companies of the 89th Battalion, Eighth Brigade, who encountered only ‘light resistance’, on 29 October. 39 The troops, mounted on half-tracks, first laid down a mortar and machinegun barrage and then stormed in, machine-guns blazing.40 Villagers were gunned down inside houses, in the alleyways and on the surrounding slopes as they fled:
As we got up on the roofs, we saw Arabs running about in the alleyways [below]. We opened fire on them . . . From our high position we saw a vast plain stretching eastward . . . and the plain was covered by thousands of fleeing Arabs . . . The machineguns began to chatter and the flight turned into a rout.41
The houses of Dawayima, later wrote one 89th Battalion veteran,
were filled with the loot of the Etzion Bloc . . . The Jewish fighters who attacked Dawayima knew that . . . the blood of those slaughtered cries out for revenge; and that the men of Dawayima were among those who took part in the massacre . . . [in] the Etzion Bloc. 42
The refugees who reached Hebron, according to Yiftah Brigade intelligence, informed UN observers that ‘the Jews had repeated the Deir Yassin massacre in Dawayima’, and Arab officials demanded an investigation. 43 The Egyptian garrison in Bethlehem cabled Egypt that ‘the Jews had massacred 500 men, women and children’. 44 The American consul-general in Jerusalem reported that ‘500 to 1,000’ Arabs had reportedly been ‘lined up and killed by machinegun fire’ after the capture of the village.45 Word of the massacre swiftly reached the Israeli authorities. Ben-Gurion, quoting General Avner, briefly referred in his diary to ‘rumours’ that the army had ‘slaughtered (?) about 70–80 persons’.46 One version of what happened was provided by an Israeli soldier to a Mapam member, who transmitted the information to Eliezer Peri, the editor of the party daily Al Hamishmar and a member of the party’s Political Committee. The party member, ‘Sh.’ (possibly Shabtai) Kaplan, described the witness as ‘one of our people, an intellectual, 100 per cent reliable’. The village, wrote Kaplan, had been held by Arab ‘irregulars’ and was captured by the 89th Battalion without a fight. ‘The first [wave] of conquerors killed about 80 to 100 [male] Arabs, women and children. The children they killed by breaking their heads with sticks. There was not a house without dead’, wrote Kaplan. Kaplan’s informant, who arrived immediately afterward in the second wave, reported that the men and women who remained were then shut away in houses ‘without food and water’. Sappers arrived to blow up the houses.
One commander ordered a sapper to put two old women in a certain house . . . and blow it up . . . The sapper refused . . . The commander then ordered his men to put in the old women and the evil deed was done. One soldier boasted that he had raped a woman and then shot her. One woman, with a newborn baby in her arms, was employed to clean the courtyard where the soldiers ate. She worked a day or two. In the end they shot her and her baby.
The soldier, according to Kaplan, said that
cultured officers . . . had turned into base murderers and this not in the heat of battle . . . but out of a system of expulsion and destruction. The less Arabs remained – the better. This principle is the political motor for the expulsions and the atrocities. Kaplan understood that Mapam was in a bind. The matter could not be publicised; it would harm the State and Mapam would be blamed. But he demanded that the party ‘raise a shout’ in internal debate, launch an investigation and establish disciplinary machinery in the army. 47
Unknown to Kaplan, a number of parallel investigations were under way, the first initiated by Allon himself. On 3 November, Allon cabled OC Eighth Brigade, General Yitzhak Sadeh – his mentor, the founder and first commander of the Palmah – to check the ‘rumours’ that the 89th Battalion had ‘killed many tens of prisoners on the day of the conquest of al Dawayima’, and to respond. 48 (Two days later, perhaps worried about a UN investigation, Allon ordered Sadeh to instruct the unit ‘that is accused of murdering Arab civilians at Dawayima to go to the village and bury with their own hands the corpses of those murdered’.) 49 On 4 November, Yadin informed Dori that there had recently been ‘a number of incidents like Deir Yassin’ – he apparently named Dawayima – and recommended an investigation. 50 The following day, Dori ap- pointed Isser Be’eri, the commander of the IDF Intelligence Service – HIS-AD’s successor organisation – to investigate, and on 13 and 18 November he submitted his interim and final reports. Be’eri concluded that about 80 inhabitants had been killed during the 89th Battalion’s conquest of the site and another ‘22’ had been subsequently captured and murdered. He recommended that the platoon OC who had carried out the massacre (and had confessed) be tried. 51 (Later Arab reports also tended to ‘downgrade’ the massacre: On 7 November, for example, Haj Amin al Husseini was informed by West Bank AHC officials Rafiq Tamimi and Munir Abu Fadl that the initial reports had been ‘exaggerated’; one report spoke of only ‘27’ villagers killed from one Dawayima clan. 52 )
On 7 November, a team of UN observers visited the site. They found several demolished buildings and one corpse but no evidence of a massacre. Nonetheless, they assumed – presumably on the basis of previously heard oral testimony by Arab survivors – that a massacre had taken place. 53 No one, it appears, was ever tried or punished, Be’eri’s recommendation notwithstanding. 54 News of the massacre no doubt reached the village communities in the western Hebron and Judean foothills, possibly precipitating further flight."
"In the north, the IDF’s 60-hour campaign, Operation Hiram, precipitated major civilian flight from the Upper Galilee pocket held by Qawuqji’s forces. Many fled before the approaching battle; some were expelled; many others, to be out of harm’s way, initially left their villages for nearby gullies, orchards and caves. In many cases, Israeli units barred their return or encouraged them to move on to Lebanon. Some may have decided not to return to live under Israeli rule. Of the area’s estimated 50,000–60,000 population (locals and refugees) before 28 October, more than half ended up in Lebanon. On 31 October, Ben-Gurion recorded that roughly half the pocket’s villagers had fled, and a few days later, the army estimated that only some 12,000–15,000 inhabitants had remained, 73 lending credence to the later reports that ‘more than 50,000 new refugees’ had reached Lebanon as a result of Hiram. 74"
"Repeatedly during the operation, Northern Front ordered the units to issue strict prohibitions against looting. 86 No such prohibitions were issued regarding expulsions (or, for that matter, the killing of civilians and POWs87 ). Regarding expulsions, rather the opposite, as we have seen: On 31 October Northern Front instructed all units ‘to assist’ the inhabitants ‘to leave’. But that order came too late, reaching almost all the units after they had completed their initial sweeps and conquests. (The follow-up order, of 10 November, came even later.) It was one thing to order units before they had set out, before they had overrun villages, to expel inhabitants in the midst of battle and conquest; it was quite an- other to instruct them, after the shooting had died down, to go back and expel communities they had already overrun and left in place. Moreover, the order of 31 October was couched in euphemistic, non-imperative terms, avoiding the verb ‘to expel’ (legaresh); this left commanders with a great deal of discretion. As none, subsequently, were held to account for expelling anyone, so no one was tried or reprimanded for failing to expel (so far as the available records show). 88
The demographic upshot of the operation followed a clear, though by no means systematic, religious-ethnic pattern: Most of the Muslims in the pocket fled to Lebanon while most of the pocket’s Christian population remained where they were. 89 Almost all the Druse and Circassian inhabitants remained. Thus, despite the fact that no clear guidelines were issued to the commanders of the advancing IDF columns about how to treat each religious or ethnic group, what emerged roughly con- formed to a pattern as if such ‘instinctive’ guidelines had been followed by both the IDF and the different conquered communities.
At the same time, the demographic outcome generally corresponded to the circumstances of the military advance. Roughly, villages which had put up a stiff fight against IDF units were depopulated: Their inhabitants, fearing retribution, or declining to live under Jewish rule, fled or, in some cases, were expelled. The inhabitants of villages that surrendered quietly generally stayed put and usually were not harmed or expelled by the IDF. They did not fear (or little feared) retribution. This apparently was the main reason why the inhabitants of the half-Muslim, half- Christian village of Fassuta decided to stay: ‘The majority argued that the Jews had no reason to vent their wrath on Fassuta’, which had not fought against the Haganah or the IDF. Only a few fled to Lebanon. 90 The facts of resistance or peaceful surrender, moreover, roughly corresponded to the religious-ethnic divide. In general, wholly or largely Muslim villages tended to put up a fight or to support units of Qawuqji’s army that fought. But there were Muslim villages that surrendered without a fight. Christian villagers tended to surrender without a fight or without assisting Qawuqji. In mixed villages where the IDF encountered resistance, such as Tarshiha and Jish, the Christians by and large stayed put while the Muslims fled or were forced to leave. Druse and Circassian villagers nowhere resisted the IDF advance (except in (Druse) Yanuh)."
"Apart from these general patterns, the campaign was characterised by vagaries of time and place. Much depended on the circumstances surrounding the capture of a given village and on the character of middle- echelon IDF commanders. The history of each village, whether in the past ‘friendly’ or hostile towards the Yishuv, also affected IDF (and the villagers’ own) behaviour as, apparently, did its behaviour after being conquered: In all the villages, the IDF assembled the villagers, sorted out non-locals from locals and young adult males from the old, women and children and usually sent for questioning or to PoW camps the non-local and local army-age males. The units also collected the villages’ arms. Some villages were more cooperative than others in these detention and arms collection sweeps."
"Christian villages, traditionally friendly or not unfriendly towards the Yishuv, were generally left in peace. An exception was ‘Eilabun, a mainly Maronite community, which fell to Golani’s 12th Battalion on 30 October after a battle on its outskirts with the ALA, in which the Israelis suffered six injured and four armoured cars knocked out. 106 The villagers hung out white flags and the Israelis were welcomed by four priests. The inhabitants huddled inside the churches while the priests surrendered the village. But the troops were angered by the battle just concluded and by reports of a procession in the village, a month before, in which a large number of inhabitants had participated, in which the heads of two IDF soldiers who had gone missing after the attack on 12 September on a nearby hilltop – ‘Outpost 213’107 – were carried through the streets, or by the actual discovery in a house of one of the rotting heads.
What happened next is described in a letter from the village elders to Shitrit: The villagers were ordered to assemble in the square. While assembling, one villager was killed and another wounded by IDF fire.
Then the commander selected 12 young men 108 and sent them to another place, then he ordered that the assembled inhabitants be led to [the neighbouring village of] Maghar and the priest asked him to leave the women and babies and to take only the men, but he refused, and led the assembled inhabitants – some 800 in number – to Maghar preceded by military vehicles . . . He himself stayed on with another two soldiers until they killed the 12 young men in the streets of the village and then they joined the army going to Maghar . . . He led them to Farradiya. When they reached Kafr ‘Inan they were joined by an armoured car that fired upon them . . . killing one of the old men, Sam‘an ash Shoufani, 60 years old, and injuring three women . . . At Farradiya [the soldiers] robbed the inhabitants of I£ 500 and the women of their jewelry, and took 42 youngsters and sent them to a detention camp, and the rest the next day were led to Meirun, and afterwards to the Lebanese border. During this whole time they were given food only once. Imagine then how the babies screamed and the cries of the pregnant and weaning mothers.
Subsequently, troops looted ‘Eilabun. 109
Not all the villagers were taken on the trek to Lebanon. The four priests were allowed to stay. Hundreds fled to nearby gullies, caves and villages, and during the following days and weeks infiltrated back. The affair exercised the various Israeli bureaucracies for months, partly because the ‘Eilabun case was taken up and pleaded persistently by Israeli and Lebanese Christian clergymen. The villagers asked to be allowed back and receive Israeli citizenship. They denied responsibility for severing the soldiers’ heads, blaming one Fawzi al Mansur of Jenin, a sergeant in Qawuqji’s army. 110
The affair sparked a guilty conscience and sympathy within the Israeli establishment. Shitrit ruled that former inhabitants still living within Israeli-held territory must be allowed back to the village. But Major Sulz, Military Governor of the Nazareth District, responded that the army would not allow them back. He asserted, ambiguously, that ‘Eilabun had been ‘evacuated either voluntarily or with a measure of compulsion’. A fortnight later, he elaborated, mendaciously: ‘The village was captured after a fierce fight and its inhabitants had fled.’ The Foreign Ministry opined that even if an ‘injustice’ had been committed, ‘injustices of war cannot be put right during the war itself’. 111
However, Shitrit, supported by Mapam’s leaders and egged on by the village notables and priests, persisted. Cisling suggested that the matter be discussed in Cabinet. Shitrit requested that the villagers be granted citizenship (relieving them of the fear of deportation as illegal infiltrees), that the ‘Eilabun detainees be released and that the villagers be supplied with provisions. 112 Within weeks, Shitrit was supported by General Carmel, who wrote that ‘in light of the arguments [about their mistreatment]’ and of the fact that the area was not earmarked for Jewish settlement, the inhabitants should be left in place ‘and accepted as citizens’.113 Within weeks, the inhabitants received citizenship and provisions, and the detainees were released. At the same time, Shitrit, as Minister of Police, persuaded Yadin, to initiate an investigation of the massacre. 114 During the summer of 1949, the ‘Eilabun exiles in Lebanon who wished to return were allowed to do so, as part of an agreement between Palmon, head of the Arab Section of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, and Archbishop Hakim, concerning the return of several thousand Galilee Christians in exchange for that cleric’s future goodwill towards the Jewish State. Hundreds returned to ‘Eilabun.115
The abortive attack on ‘Outpost 213’, bizarrely enough, triggered a second atrocity four days after the first massacre. On 2 November, two squads of the 103rd Battalion were sent on a search operation to Khirbet Wa‘ra as Sauda, a village inhabited by the ‘Arab al Mawasi beduins, three kilometres east of the outpost. While one squad kept guard over the villagers, the other – led by Lt. Haim Hayun, veteran of the September assault – climbed up to the outpost, where it discovered ‘the bones of the soldiers lost in the previous action’. The bodies were ‘headless’. The troops then torched the village (and presumably expelled the inhabitants), taking with them to their HQ in Maghar 19 adult males. There, the prisoners were sorted out and 14 were determined to have ‘taken part in enemy activity against our army’. They were taken away and ‘liquidated’ (huslu). The remaining five were transferred to a POW camp. 116
‘Eilabun and ‘Arab al Mawasi were only two of the atrocities committed by the IDF during Hiram, which saw the biggest concentration of atrocities of the 1948 war. Some served to precipitate and enhance flight; some, as in ‘Eilabun, were part and parcel of an expulsion operation; but in other places, the population remained in situ and expulsion did not follow atrocities."
"These atrocities, mostly committed against Muslims, no doubt precipitated the flight of communities on the path of the IDF advance. A community already nervous at the prospect of assault and probable conquest would doubtless have been driven to panic by news, possibly embellished by exaggeration, of atrocities in a neighbouring village. What happened at Safsaf and Jish no doubt reached the villagers of Ras al Ahmar, ‘Alma, Deishum and al Malikiya hours before the Seventh Brigade’s columns. These villages, apart from ‘Alma, seem to have been completely or largely empty when the IDF arrived. If the memory of a former inhabitant of Sa‘sa is to be believed, the Safsaf atrocity, rather than the battle for Sa‘sa, was what precipitated the exodus from the village. 127
But the atrocities were limited in size, scope and time. And as, immediately after Hiram, movement by inhabitants between villages was curtailed, news of massacres probably moved slowly. Moreover, atrocities did not occur in many, perhaps most, of the villages captured. In most, the primary causes of flight were those that had precipitated previous waves: Fear of being caught up and hurt in battle, fear of the conquerors and of revenge for past misdeeds or affiliations, a general fear of the future and of life under Jewish rule, and confusion and shock. A year or so after Hiram, Moshe Carmel described the panic flight of some of the villagers:
They abandon the villages of their birth and that of their ancestors and go into exile . . . Women, children, babies, donkeys – everything moves, in silence and grief, northwards, without looking to right or left. Wife does not find her husband and child does not find his father . . . no one knows the goal of his trek. Many possessions are scattered by the paths; the more the refugees walk, the more tired they grow – and they throw away what they had tried to save on their way into exile. Suddenly, every object seems to them petty, superfluous, unimportant as against the chasing fear and the urge to save life and limb.
I saw a boy aged eight walking northwards pushing along two asses in front of him. His father and brother had died in the battle and his mother was lost. I saw a woman holding a two-week-old baby in her right arm and a baby two years old in her left arm and a four-year-old girl following in her wake, clutching at her dress.
[Near Sa‘sa] I saw suddenly by the roadside a tall man, bent over, scraping with his fingernails in the hard, rocky soil. I stopped. I saw a small hollow in the ground, dug out by hand, with fingernails, under an olive tree. The man laid down the body of a baby who had died in the arms of his mother, and covered it with soil and small stones. [Near Tarshiha, Carmel saw a 16-year-old] sitting by the roadside, naked as the day he was born and smiling at our passing car.
Carmel described how some of the Israeli soldiers, regarding the refugee columns with astonishment and shock and ‘with great sadness’, went down into the wadis and gave the refugees bread and tea. ‘I knew [of] a unit in which no soldier ate anything that day because all [the food] sent it by the company kitchen was taken down to the wadi ’, he recalled. 128
But usually, it appears, IDF behaviour in the days after Hiram was less humane. In general, the units along the Lebanese border made sure that the refugee columns continued on their way to Lebanon and often prevented with live fire any attempt to return to Israeli territory. And in the interior of the Galilee, the IDF made sure that villages that had been depopulated would stay empty. For example, on 3 November the 11th Battalion reported that a squadron of its armoured cars had encountered ‘columns of refugees returning [to Israel] from Lebanon’ on the Sa‘sa-Malikiya road. ‘A number of bursts were fired at them and they vanished.’ 129"
"By mid-November, once the dust of battle had settled, the Military Government in the Occupied Territories was demanding that Northern Front hand over control of the internal areas of the Galilee. General Avner wrote that already on 11 November, Yadin had assured him that ‘these areas would be handed over in the coming days’. The events in Majd al Kurum had only highlighted the need to transfer authority from the regular army to the Military Government. Or as Komarov put it: ‘The situation in the central Galilee is awful, and causes us great [diplomatic–political] harm. The [UN] observers are still [out there and] gunning for us. Please rush the transfer of governance.’ Yadin minuted: ‘Write the Military Government that they can immediately receive control of the Galilee areas in coordination with OC Northern Front.’ 137
But it was precisely the chaotic situation – with IDF troops having committed atrocities, inhabitants streaming out of the country and from Lebanon back into Israel, ex-irregulars on the loose and hiding in the villages, and arms caches still undiscovered in many places – that prevented Carmel from handing over the area, he explained later that month. He would be happy to transfer control ‘the moment it was possible in light of security [considerations]’. 138"
"Ben-Gurion’s views were also fairly clear. Soon after Hiram, he travelled to Tiberias for a holiday weekend. He jotted down in his diary: ‘. . . [it’s] almost unbelievable: On the way from Tel Aviv to Tiberias there are almost no Arabs.’ 143 The passage echoed, almost word for word, his thoughts in February (see above), when he had travelled from Tel Aviv through west Jerusalem to the Jewish Agency building, encountering no Arabs on the way. But then his observation had expressed a mixture of astonishment and satisfaction; now, it was pure satisfaction."
Atrocities
"The Hiram atrocities, like a brushfire, triggered rumours and reports, accurate and inaccurate, that sped up and down the various IDF chains of command and sideways, through Arab survivors and conscience-stricken soldiers, to civilian officials and party politicians. Key in the transmission of the rumours and reports were Arab radio broadcasts and complaints and old HIS hands and kibbutz mukhtars in the Galilee, such Emmanuel Friedman, of Rosh Pina, and Benjamin Shapira, of Kibbutz ‘Amir. 144 By 4 November, Yadin had heard of the atrocities committed by the 89th Battalion in Dawayima and by the Seventh Brigade in the Galilee, and was demanding an investigation. 145 A handful of internal IDF investigations were set in motion. These were quickly followed by what was slated to be a major, external probe by the country’s attorney- general, Ya‘akov Shimshon Shapira. Until then, through the war Ben-Gurion had consistently protected and defended the men in uniform and their actions against all outside criticism and investigation (save in the matter of looting). Maltreatment of civilians and POWs went almost completely uninvestigated and unpunished: It was a war for survival and the Haganah and IDF had to be allowed to get on with the job. And all were aware that the Arabs, viewed as barbaric and mendacious, had (a) launched the war and (b) had themselves committed countless atrocities before 1948 and a number of major ones during the war (which, needless to say, they had never apologised for, investigated, or atoned for through punishment of the guilty). So they were to blame for what had happened.
But by Hiram, it was no longer, palpably, a war for survival, from Israel’s perspective; the danger to the State’s existence, at least in the short term, had passed. And the October–November atrocities were simply too concentrated, widespread and severe to be ignored. Even Ben-Gurion could no longer keep the lid on. On 12 November, Major Emmanuel Yalan (Vilensky) was appointed by Be’eri (at Dori’s behest) to investigate what had happened in Safsaf, Jish, Sa‘sa and ‘Eilabun (and Kafr Bir‘im, whose inhabitants were about to be expelled). A week earlier, Haim Laskov, the IDF’s new head of training, began investigating what had happened at Saliha; already on 7 and 8 November he had begun questioning 79th Battalion officers. 146 At about the same time, an IDF Intelligence Service\Field Security unit cursorily investigated the atrocities and submitted a report. On 16 November, Laskov presented CGS Dori with a ‘file’ – apparently of depositions though it may also have contained a report with conclusions – concerning Saliha, which the CGS duly passed on to the Defence Minister. 147 Meanwhile, Yalan questioned 79th Battalion senior officers 148 and on the 18th submitted a very confused and undefinitive report of his own. Yalan concluded that the atrocities were committed deliberately and with aforethought, mainly in order to promote flight and secondarily as expressions of revenge. It may have been the inadequacy of Yalan’s report that prompted Carmel to appoint, on 20 November, yet another investigative team to look into Northern Front’s atrocities. The team was composed of Captain Nahum Segal, Captain Moshe Taflas and First Lieutenant Isser Perlman. It was instructed to start work on 22 November and submit its findings – on the accuracy of the rumours regarding the atrocities committed in the course of Operation “Hiram”’, as the letter of appointment put it – by the 25th. 149 The team questioned 79th Battalion officers – ‘regarding atrocities in Jish and Safsaf’ – on 24 November. 150 At the end of November, it submitted an interim report which determined, according to Carmel, that ‘there is a basis for charging soldiers and officers for committing unjustified killings outside the framework of military necessity, in Safsaf, Jish and Saliha’. Carmel ordered the Front’s adjutant-general to ‘immediately’ put these people on trial – and informed the CGS that one officer, presumably Captain Shmuel Lahis, a company OC, was to be tried on 2 December for the massacre in Hule. Meanwhile, the investigative team continued work.151
The atrocities, given their number and lethality, almost inevitably generated political fallout. But as not a word about them was published in the media, probably due to a combination of internal and external censorship, 152 the fallout was limited to closed meetings of senior political bodies, such as the Cabinet and Mapam’s Political Committee. Large parts of the Cabinet meetings of November and December were devoted to the atrocities and their repercussions. 153 At the Cabinet meeting of 7 November, the criticism was led off by Immigration and Health Minister Shapira. He was followed by Interior Minister Gruenbaum and Justice Minister Rosenblueth. Labour and Construction Minister Bentov also spoke up. Mapai’s ministers apparently kept their peace, but Ben-Gurion beat a tactical retreat. The Cabinet appointed a three-man (Bentov, Rosenblueth and Shapira) ministerial committee of inquiry to investigate ‘the army’s deeds in the conquered territories’. Bentov later reported that only Ben-Gurion and Sharett appeared not to have been ‘shocked’ by what had happened.154
The atrocities, and the start of the ministerial probe, were discussed in Mapam’s executive bodies on 11 November. The party faced its usual problem: Ideologically, it was motivated to lead the clamour; in practice, caution had to be exercised as its ‘own’ generals, party members Sadeh and Carmel, were involved if not implicated. Aharon Cohen demanded that the party set up its own, internal inquiry. Benny Marshak asked that the party executives – he was referring to Cisling – refrain from using the phrase ‘Nazi actions’ and said that the Palmah had already tried a number of soldiers for killing Arabs not during battle. Riftin asserted that there was ‘no connection’ between the atrocities and the expulsion of Arabs (in effect, justifying the expulsions while condemning the atrocities). He called for death sentences for those guilty of atrocities. Galili warned against ‘rushing to attribute responsibility to our officer comrades’ before investigation. But Bentov feared that the soldiers would decline to testify before the ministerial committee and that the ministers lacked an effective investigative apparatus. The Political Committee decided to hold formal ‘clarification’ sessions with the Mapam officers involved and to urge its members to testify before the ministerial committee. 15
The doings – or, more accurately, the non-doings – of the ministerial ‘Committee of Three’ preoccupied the Cabinet and some of the political parties for weeks. On 12 November, Kaplan, urged the three – in light of details he had heard about what had happened in the Galilee – to push on with their work. 156 But the committee encountered evasiveness, delays and silence from the IDF; the officers refused to cooperate and testify. Rosenblueth and Shapira complained to Ben-Gurion and demanded wider powers; Ben-Gurion refused. 157 The committee then raised the matter in Cabinet, on 14 November. Rosenblueth asked for increased powers, to be anchored in new emergency regulations; Gruenbaum suggested that a senior IDF officer be added to the committee and that the defence minister issue an order compelling all officers summoned to appear before the committee ‘and answer all questions’. Ben-Gurion parried manipulatively by taking the committee to task for doing nothing and wasting a week; ‘[and] after a week it is much harder to investigate than immediately after a deed’, he added. He turned down Rosenblueth’s proposal that the committee be given judicial powers and avoided response to the suggestion that he issue an order compelling officers to cooperate. The exchange led to a further week’s delay. 158 Three days later, in the Cabinet meeting of 17 November, Cisling charged that for over half a year, Ben-Gurion had avoided the problem of Jewish behaviour toward the Arabs, had pleaded ignorance of abuses and had consistently deflected criticism of the army. Cisling referred to a letter he had received about the atrocities – possibly Shabtai Kaplan’s on Dawayima – and declared: ‘I couldn’t sleep all night . . . This is something that determines the character of the nation . . . Jews too have committed Nazi acts.’ Cisling agreed that outwardly Israel, to preserve its good name and image, must admit nothing; but the matter must be thoroughly investigated, he insisted. Dori, said Cisling, had repeatedly postponed appearing before the ‘Committee of Three’, arguing that he did not yet have the information required, while a subordinate officer had delayed appearing on the grounds that the committee should first hear the CGS.159
The Cabinet, at Ben-Gurion’s insistence, refused to increase the committee’s powers and Shapira resigned (from the committee). Ben-Gurion then proposed that the committee be replaced by a one-man probe, and accompanied this with a statement apparently threatening, or implying a threat of, resignation from the Defence Ministry if he did not get his way. The ministers caved in and voted that ‘the Prime Minister investigate the charges concerning the army’s behaviour . . .’. 160 Ben-Gurion appointed Attorney-General Ya‘akov Shimshon Shapira as sole investigator, and proposed that three IDF officers help him. Ben-Gurion’s letter of instruction to Shapira read:
You are requested herein . . . to investigate if there were depredations [p’gi‘ot ] by . . . the army against Arab inhabitants in the Galilee and the South, not in conformity with the accepted rules of war . . . What were the attacks . . .? To what degree was the army command, low and high, responsible for these acts, and to what degree was the existing discipline in the army responsible for this and what should be done to rectify matters and to punish the guilty?
Ben-Gurion added that orders would be issued to the troops to provide all the necessary evidence and aid to the investigation. 161 In consequence, on 25 November, Carmel issued a stern warning to his troops against further atrocities and ordered ‘every battalion’ OC to ‘help uncover the atrocities and put the criminals on trial’. He said the battalion OCs were ‘personally responsible’ for bringing the perpetrators to justice. 162 In a masterly political stroke, Ben-Gurion then switched from a manipulative, stonewalling defence to the offensive, outflanking Mapam on its own turf. On 21 November, he wrote to the nation’s leading poet, Natan Alterman, praising his poem ‘Al Zot’ (on this). The poem, critical of the atrocities, had appeared in the Histadrut daily, Davar, two days before. Ben-Gurion requested the poet’s permission for the Defence Ministry to reprint and distribute it throughout the IDF. The poem, apparently about the 89th Battalion’s July raid on Lydda, was duly reprinted and distributed, along with Ben-Gurion’s letter to Alterman. Ben-Gurion later read out the poem at a meeting of the Provisional Council of State. The poem describes a young, jeep-mounted soldier ‘trying out’ his machinegun on an old Arab in a street in a conquered town. More generally, it castigates ‘the insensitivity of the Jewish public’ to the atrocities. Its publication in Davar was an ‘event.’ 163
On 5 December, Ben-Gurion submitted the Attorney General’s (bland, unilluminating) report to the Cabinet and promised that the IDF was continuing its own investigations. The Cabinet set up a standing committee of five ministers to continue probing past IDF misdeeds and to look into future ones, should these occur, and a second committee to formulate guidelines geared to preventing atrocities. 164
The major outcome of the simultaneous Mapam, IDF and Shapira investigations was the publication in the IDF of strict rules on the treatment of civilians. 165 On 23 December, Ben-Gurion instructed General Avner to take severe measures to protect the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip – which the Prime Minister believed was about to fall into Israeli hands – and to avoid expulsions (‘The policy [is] – to leave the inhabitants in place, to prevent any attempt at robbery’). 166 A few days before, on 17 December, Allon, just before the start of Operation Horev, which he commanded and in which the IDF conquered Abu Ageila and reached the outskirts of El Arish, issued a detailed appendix to the operational orders setting out guidelines for the treatment of captured soldiers and overrun civilian populations. The preamble referred to the ‘disgraceful incidents’ that had occurred in the past. The appendix stated that the IDF should take prisoners where possible (rather than kill them); ‘unjustified killing of civilians will be regarded as murder . . . Torture of placid civilians will be dealt with sharply; Arab populations must not be expelled except with special permission from the Front Combat HQ.’ The appendix ordered commanders of brigades and districts to issue ‘special orders’ to all units in this connection. All battalion commanders were instructed to sign a special form declaring that ‘they had received these orders and would abide by them’. The brigade and district commanders were ordered to react to any infringement publicly and with extreme severity. Similar orders reached all large IDF formations during the winter. 167"
"The primary aims of operations Yoav and Hiram were to destroy enemy formations – the Egyptian army in the south and Qawuqji’s ALA in the central Galilee – and to conquer additional territory, giving the Jewish State greater strategic depth. The operational orders, as in nearly all IDF offensives, did not refer to the Arab civilian population."
"Hence, when the offensives were unleashed, there was a ‘coalescence’ of Jewish and Arab expectations, which led, especially in the south, to spontaneous flight by most of the inhabitants. And, on both fronts, IDF units ‘nudged’ Arabs into flight and expelled communities.
However, there were major differences. In the south, the OC, Allon, was known to want ‘Arab-clean’ areas along his line of advance; such had been his policy in Eastern Galilee in April–May and in Lydda-Ramle in July. His subordinates usually acted in accordance. Moreover, the nature of the battle in the south, involving two large armies and the use of relatively strong firepower affected civilian morale. "
"In the Galilee, the picture was far more circumstantial and complex. There, there was no clear IDF policy and Carmel displayed hesitancy and ambivalence. And Carmel’s officers sensed this. Previously, Carmel – in Haifa and Acre in April–May and in Nazareth in July – had left thousands of Arabs in place. And the Galilee, with its patchwork of communities, including many Druse and Christians, was different. In October, different communities, like different IDF officers, acted differently. Druse and Christian villages by and large offered no or less resistance and had no, or less of a, history of anti-Zionist militancy and, hence, expected, and received, ‘better’ treatment. Muslim villages often had a history of pro-Husseini activism and, in 1948, often resisted and expected, and received, worse treatment. In mixed villages, such as Tarshiha and Jish, Christians remained while Muslims fled."
"To the foregoing must be added the ‘atrocity factor’, which played a major role in precipitating flight from several clusters of Galilee villages and from Dawayima in the south. In the north, the atrocities appear largely to have been premeditated rather than spontaneous outbreaks of vengeful impulses by undisciplined troops; company OCs, and perhaps battalion OCs, gave the orders. They appear to have felt that they were carrying out the wishes of Northern Front HQ. The atrocities were largely limited to Muslims.
This said, about 30–50 per cent of the Galilee pocket’s inhabitants stayed and were left in place during and immediately after Operation Hiram.
From the Arab side, there were several factors that generated greater ‘staying power’ in the Galilee than in the south. Firstly, the traditional non- belligerency toward the Yishuv of the Christians and Druse meant that they had less fear of Israeli conquest. Secondly, before October 1948, the war had not severely affected the lives of the inhabitants. There had been little Haganah/IDF harassment and, in most places, no major food shortages. And the presence of Qawuqji’s troops may have been less irksome (except in the Christian villages) than that of the Egyptians in the south."
"Together, operations Hiram and Yoav and their appendages precipitated the flight of roughly 200,000–230,000 Arabs."
"In the weeks and months after the termination of hostilities, the Israeli authorities adopted a policy of clearing the new borders of Arab Communities. Some were transferred inland, to Israeli Arab villages in the interior; others were expelled across the border. The policy, which matured ad hoc and haphazardly, was motivated mainly by military considerations: The borders were long and highly penetrable. Along the frontiers of the newly conquered territories there were few, if any, Jewish settlements. Arab border villages could serve as way- stations and bases for hostile irregulars, spies and illegal returnees. In the event of renewed war, the villages could serve as soft entry points for invading armies.
At the same time, IDF, police and GSS units repeatedly scoured the populated, semi-populated and empty villages in the interior to root out illegal infiltrees and returnees. Some, such as Farradiya, sat astride strategic routes; almost all, given the State’s size and shape, were themselves relatively close to the borders. In one or two cases – vide Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya in the south – the authorities expelled whole villages from sites in the interior. In general, throughout this period, the political desire to have as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish State and the need for empty villages to house new immigrants meshed with the strategic desire to achieve ‘Arab-clear’ frontiers and secure internal lines of communication. It was the IDF that set the policy in motion, with the civil and political authorities often giving approval after the fact."
"A week after Operation Hiram, Carmel, with General Staff consent, decided to clear the Israeli side of the Israeli–Lebanese border of villages. On 10 November, he instructed the Ninth and Second brigades: ‘A strip five kilometres deep behind the border with Lebanon must be empty of [Arab] inhabitants . . .’ 1"
"On 10 November, Northern Front sent out the blanket order to clear the Lebanese border and, during the following months, the policy was to be implemented in staggered fashion along Israel’s other borders. It is unclear whether Carmel received specific prior support for the policy from Ben-Gurion or whether he simply drew on the blanket authorisation he apparently received from the prime minister at their meeting on 31 October. On 24 November, the Cabinet retroactively endorsed the Lebanese border-clearing operation. 7
Unlike earlier transfers, these evictions were carried out with a soft touch: The villagers were given days in which to move out and were usually allowed to take their property with them, in organized fashion. Some, such as Iqrit’s Christians, were transferred inland rather than kicked across the border (of course, filling up Rama’s empty Muslim- owned houses served the additional purpose of obstructing the return of Muslims)."
"Then, on 15–16 November, the expulsions came to an abrupt stop – even before all the designated villages had been emptied. 19 On 15 November, IDF Galilee District HQ ordered its battalions ‘to immediately stop evicting the inhabitants from the occupied villages and freeze the existing situation’.20 The following day, Ben-Gurion met with Dori and Carmel. Carmel, according to Ben-Gurion’s diary entry, explained that he had ‘had . . . to expel the border villages southward for military reasons . . . [But] he was [now] ready to freeze the situation – not to expel any more, and not to allow [those expelled] to return . . .’ Ben-Gurion agreed, and added: ‘As to the Christians in Kafr Bir‘im and other villages, [Carmel] should announce that we will willingly discuss their return, once the border was secure.’ 21 Why Ben-Gurion put a stop to the northern border-clearing operation, and why specifically on 15–16 November, is unclear. Of course, by then almost all of what had been planned had been implemented; only Fassuta (Christians), Jish (Maronites), Rihaniya (Circassians), Mi‘ilya (Christians), and Jurdiye (Muslim), within the 5–7-kilometre-deep strip, were not uprooted, the last because its beduin inhabitants, the ‘Arab al ‘Aramshe, were deemed ‘friendly’. Perhaps the ongoing ruckus over the October–November atrocities, which were linked, in various ways, to expulsions, also stayed Ben-Gurion’s hand; he was facing enough criticism in Cabinet as it was. He was particularly worried about pressure from Mapam, itself in turmoil over the atrocities, and Immigration Minister Shapira. 22 And then there were the pro- Christian lobbyists, Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, as well as pressure from clerics in Lebanon, all militating against the evictions. (A few days later Shitrit was to complain that ‘villages were being uprooted’ without his knowl- edge and that General Avner had done nothing to prevent the atrocities (and, perhaps, the expulsions).)23"
"During the last months of 1948 and the first months of 1949 there was constant infiltration of refugees from Lebanon back to the villages."
"On 27 April 1949, the government issued regulations, based on the Mandatory Emergency Regulations, empowering the defence minister to declare a border area a ‘security zone’, enabling him to bar anyone from entry. In September, the Lebanese border area was declared such a zone. 30 This legalised the previous months’ operations.
For decades thereafter, the refugees of Bir‘im (in Jish and Lebanon), Iqrit (in Rama) and Mansura (in Lebanon) pleaded with Israel to be permitted to return to their homes. They were supported by Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, president of Israel from 1952 to 1963. They also appealed to the High Court of Justice. On 31 July 1951, the High Court ruled in favour of the return of the Iqrit refugees to their village. But the IDF continued to obstruct a return. As to Bir‘im, in 25 February 1952 the High Court ruled in favour of the state, though it allowed that the initial eviction had not been completely legal. Here, too, the IDF continued to block a return and new settlements were established on the two villages’ lands. The settlements joined the IDF and GSS in lobbying against a return. The defense establishment argued that a return would harm border security, pave the way for infiltrators and serve as a precedent; the settlements, that a return, or an endorsement of the refugees’ claims to lands, would undermine their existence. During 1949–1953, natural erosion, the settlers and the IDF gradually levelled the villages.
...The case of Bir‘im, Iqrit and Mansura illustrates how deep was the IDF’s determination from November 1948 onward to create and maintain a northern border ‘security belt’ clear of Arabs. That determination quickly spread to the civilian institutions of state, particularly those concerned with immigrant absorption and settlement. Immediately after Hiram, Weitz and other executives began planning settlements in the border strip and exempted them from the ‘surplus lands’ requirement; indeed, in their planning, they tended to ‘widen’ the strip to a depth of 10–15 kilometres. However, Kaplan and Cisling, while accepting the IDF’s arguments, insisted that the evictees should be properly and comfortably resettled. Only Minority Affairs Ministry director general Machnes opposed the principle of an Arab-less border strip. 31"
"But the military periodically raided the full and half-empty Galilee villages to weed out illegal returnees, dubbed ‘infiltrators’. The authorities did not recognise the legality of residence of anyone not registered during the October–November 1948 census and not in possession of an identity card or military pass. Anyone who had left the country before the census and was not registered and in possession of a card or pass was regarded as an ‘absentee’. If he subsequently infiltrated back into the country (including to his home village), he was regarded as an ‘illegal’ and could be summarily deported. In the course of 1949, the IDF repeatedly raided the villages, sorted out legal from illegal residents and, usually, expelled returnees."
"On 21 January, General Avner proposed that the inhabitants of Tarshiha be transferred to Mi‘ilya, but political objections blocked a final decision. Matters hung fire. In March, Weitz lamented that it would be good, ‘if only it were possible,’ to empty the village so that ‘1,000 [Jewish] families’ could move in. But it was not possible: ‘The prime minister is against dealing with transfers at the moment, [and] this from an international [political] viewpoint,’ explained one of Ben-Gurion’s aides, Zalman Lifshitz. He proposed ‘to try to persuade [the inhabitants] to move.’ 40 There were also internal objections. One official explained, in a private letter to Rehav‘am ‘Amir that ‘we . . . have no right or authority to order the inhabitants of the place . . . to leave (unless they agree to this, on their own volition, and this is unlikely).’ They are ‘citizens,’ he argued, and, as such, ‘the State must protect their rights.’ No ‘security’ or ‘moral’ arguments could justify their transfer. He assumed, he wrote, that ‘all or most’ of his fellow members on the Committee for Transferring Arabs from Place to Place shared his view. 41
But the defence establishment wanted Tarshiha cleared. In light of the political obstructions, it opted for suasion rather than coercion. The pressure on the Arab inhabitants increased after the first Jewish families moved in. On 5 June, Jewish officials met with the local Arab leaders and, according to the AFSC representatives, said that the Arabs would have to move out. ‘The Arabs refused.’ The Jewish officials said that the village’s ‘115’ illegal inhabitants would be expelled from the country – unless the infiltrees and the remaining ‘600’ legal residents agreed to move to other villages or Acre. 42 But the inhabitants stayed put."
"Pressure to eject the remaining Arabs from Khisas had been building for months. Atiya Juwayid and his clan had for years provided services for the HIS and the JNF; Arabs from neighbouring Qeitiya had also apparently been of service to the JNF. But in February–March 1949, Jewish settlers and officers of the IDF Galilee District (Battalion 102) began pressing for eviction. The complaints related to general security in the area and intelligence being passed to the Syrians.
...The IDF moved on 5 June. 48 The evictions sparked outrage in various quarters. ‘This is shameful and disgraceful . . . Brutality . . . Woe to a state that treads such an immoral path,’ Yosef Nahmani jotted down in his diary.49 Nahmani, a friend of Ben-Gurion’s, for decades had enjoyed good relations with Khisas’s Arabs, who had helped him in land purchases.50 Mapam’s leaders also criticised the operation. Ben-Gurion responded that he found the military’s reasons for the eviction ‘sufficient’. Mapai’s Yosef Sprinzak, the speaker of the Knesset, sarcastically criticised the government over the operation and the post-operation explanations.51 Ha’aretz, the leading independent daily newpaper, also criticised Ben-Gurion’s justifications as ‘not very convincing’. The news- paper conceded the army’s right to move Arabs out of ‘border areas’, but such evictees must be adequately resettled, with land, houses and food. The editorial argued that this was sheer common sense as well as humanity, since to create a class of deprived and dispossessed Arabs would play into the hands of subversives bent on ‘undermining . . . the State’.52 The June evictions moved American charg ´e d’affaires in Tel Aviv Richard Ford to reflect pessimistically about the fate of Israel’s Arab minority: ‘The unhappy spectacle presents itself of some scores of thousands of aimless people “walking about in thistle fields” until they either decide to shake the ancestral dust of Israel from their heels or just merely die.’ 53 Conditions at ‘Akbara, a dumping spot for ‘remainders’ from various eastern Galilee villages, were to remain bad for years. 54"
"A last border problem remained in the north: A string of villagers in eastern Galilee, in the area that became the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) along the Israeli–Syrian border. Their presence and property were formally protected by the provisions of the Israeli–Syrian General Armistice Agreement (Article V) of 20 July 1949. 55 Nonetheless, for a combination of military, economic and agricultural reasons, Israel wanted the inhabitants of Kirad al Baqqara, Kirad al Ghannama, Nuqeib, al Samra, and al Hama, numbering about 2,200 in all, to move, or move back, to Syria. The military suspected them of helping Syrian intelligence. The DMZ inhabitants remained in the main loyal ‘Syrians’ and, under Syrian pressure, refused to recognise the legitimacy of Israeli rule. In case of renewed hostilities, they could prove strategically useful to the Syrians. As it was, Jewish settlers and police suspected the villagers of stealing cattle, tres- passing and other criminal or troublesome behaviour. 56 And, of course, the settlement agencies and settlers coveted their lands.
Most of the villagers, including from Samra57 and Nuqeib, 58 had fled or been expelled to Syria during April and early May 1948. Some of the population returned following the Syrian invasion of 16 May. More returned following the signing of the Israeli–Syrian General Armistice Agreement. During the following months, using a combination of stick and carrot – economic and police pressures and ‘petty persecution’, and economic incentives – Israel gradually evicted the inhabitants of Samra and Khirbet al Duweir. Small beduin encampments, such as that at Khirbet al Muntar, east of Rosh Pina, were periodically visited by IDF patrols and, ultimately, expelled.59 The two Kirads, though subjected to the same treatment, received UN protection and were only removed to Syria in the course of the 1956 war, though some had earlier been moved to, and permanently settled in, Sh‘ab, near Acre. 60"
"Ben-Gurion was later to say that he viewed the infiltration problem ‘through the barrel of a gun’. 63
From mid-December 1948 onward, the IDF periodically mounted massive sweeps in the Galilee villages to root out returnees and expel them.
... During January 1949, the IDF expelled in similar operations almost 1,000 Arabs and transferred another 128 to other villages inside the country.68"
"But a problem arose, as IDF officers were quick to note: After being shoved into the West Bank, many expellees infiltrated back. The operations officer of the Ninth Brigade explained:
. . . the system of expelling infiltrators to the Triangle is not very effective . . . The unit bringing the deportees lets them off the vehicles and sends them toward the border, and leaves the place. There is no one there to make sure that they will not return. In most cases the refugees move several kilometres across the border, wait until sunset and infiltrate back during the night.76
Another officer thought he had a solution, after pointing out that ‘almost all’ those expelled – all adult males – from one village, ‘Ibillin, had since returned: ‘We have not yet heard of any case in which a whole family of expellees has returned. It is clear, therefore, that the expulsion of whole families better assures their non-return.’ 77"
"More ambitiously, on 11 March the IDF mounted a series of major pushes eastward, to ‘create facts’ on the ground in advance of the UN survey of the Jordanian and Israeli positions scheduled for later that day.104 The aim was to gain a little more, or tactically advantageous, territory and to drive concentrations of Arabs eastwards. But Israeli liaison officers took pains to persuade UN observers that the clashes were the result of Arab incursions and attacks:
Arab civilians with their herds go into a valley where the pastures are good . . . five kilometres west of Surif. Some of these Arabs even go between the Israeli positions with their herds. Normally, the local [IDF] commander orders small arms fire directed above their heads to scare them away. When they remain near the Israeli positions, the local commander sends out patrols to take prisoner all men of [military] age . . . This is why nine Arab civilians were taken to a prisoners camp on 11 March . . . The local commander stated that on 11 March . . . [Arab] irregulars infiltrated . . . at . . . Khirbet Jubeil Naqqar, directing rifle fire at . . . [an IDF] position . . . [and] two mortar rounds coming from Khirbet ‘Illin were directed at the Israeli position . . . On 13 March . . . a group of 25 Arab irregulars advanced from [Khirbet] Ghuraba to the Israeli position at Khirbet al Hamam. 105
In reality, the Israeli troops were ordered, in a well-organised, concerted operation, to take al Qabu, Khirbet Sanasin (southwest of Wadi Fukin), al Jab‘a, and Khirbet al Hamam, even if it involved battling the Jordanians. 106"
"Altogether, according to the UN, the IDF overran ‘35 or 36’ khurab and beduin encampments adjacent to no man’s land, expelling the inhabitants eastward. One UN report put the number of those expelled toward Dura during March at ‘7,000’. 110 But within days, UN intervention persuaded Israel to withdraw from some of the khurab, including Khirbet Sikka and Khirbet Beit ‘Awwa, and the inhabitants trickled back.
Following the signing of the armistice agreement on 3 April, a question mark arose regarding a number of villages on the southern edge of the Jerusalem Corridor. Refugees had gradually returned to both al Walaja and al Qabu, which were in Israeli territory, and the IDF wanted them empty. On 1 May, Israeli troops raided them, and the inhabitants fled and the troops blew up their houses. 111 A few weeks later, the IDF raided the village of Wadi Fukin, on the Jordanian side of the border and expelled its inhabitants. The village had been at least partially abandoned during the war and for months was in no man’s land, both sides claiming that their troops – during March–April 1949 – had occupied or patrolled it. 112 It had been partially inhabited during the winter months and ‘completely inhabited’ during the spring, according to a UN observer. But most of the houses had been demolished. 113 Around 14 April, in accordance with the territorial provisions of the armistice accord, the Jordanians had withdrawn from Wadi Fukin, though the inhabitants had remained.114 In July, the IDF drove out the villagers, claiming that they were infiltrees. 115 On 31 August, the Israel–Jordan MAC ruled that Israel must allow the inhabitants to return, the UN chairman casting the deciding vote.116 The inhabitants returned and, ultimately, the village was transferred to Jordanian sovereignty."
"Further to the south, three major problems remained. One was the Faluja Pocket (today, the site of the Israeli town of Kiryat Gat), where some 4,000 Egyptian troops had been left stranded and surrounded by the IDF between late October 1948 and late February 1949. Inside the pocket were two large villages with civilian inhabitants, Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya, with a combined population of over 3,100: More than 2,000 were locals and the rest, refugees from elsewhere in Palestine. On 24 February, Israel and Egypt signed an armistice agreement. Two days later the besieged troops (who included Egypt’s future president, Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser), along with some of the refugees, departed for Egypt. But most of the civilians remained and were placed under Military Government rule, with nightly curfews and severe restrictions on movement. The Egyptians had insisted that the armistice agreement explicitly guarantee their safety. 126 In the appended exchange of letters, Israel agreed that
those of the civilian population who may wish to remain in Al Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya are to be permitted to do so . . . All of these civilians shall be fully secure in their persons, abodes, property and personal effects. 127
But within days Israel went back on its word. Southern Front’s soldiers mounted a short, sharp, well-orchestrated campaign of low-key violence and psychological warfare designed to intimidate the inhabitants into flight. According to one villager’s recollection, the Jews ‘created a situation of terror, entered the houses and beat the people with rifle butts’. 128 Contemporary United Nations and Quakers documents support this description. The UN Mediator, Ralph Bunche, quoting UN observers on the spot, complained that ‘Arab civilians . . . at Al Faluja have been beaten and robbed by Israeli soldiers and . . . there have been some cases of attempted rape’. 129 The Quaker team (Ray Hart- sough and Delbert Replogle), who were at Faluja between 26 February and 6 March assessing the civilians’ food and medical needs, kept a diary. On 3 March they wrote that ‘about half the people of Faluja plan to remain’. But at ‘Iraq al Manshiya, the acting mukhtar told them that ‘the people had been much molested by the frequent shooting, by being told that they would be killed if they did not go to Hebron, and by the Jews breaking into their homes and stealing things’. On March 4, 02:30 hours, they recorded: ‘The worst barrage of shooting we had heard all week – about 300 rounds by a machinegun within a hundred yards of where we were sleeping . . .’ And at 06:30 hours: ‘The boy living in one of the rooms of our compound brought a man into the room where I was sleeping. His eye was bloody and he had other wounds on his face and ear . . . He had been beaten by “the Jahoudy”.’ The Quaker and UN observers complained to an Israeli officer. He reportedly replied: ‘They had some new recruits stationed there and . . . new recruits are the same the world over. When they get hold of a gun they want to shoot and shoot and shoot.’ "
"The Quakers said that the Arabs now wanted to leave but that sincere reassurances by Israeli officials could still persuade the Arabs to stay. No such reassurances were forthcoming. 131 The intimidation operation was orchestrated by Rabin, Allon’s head of operations. 132 Yadin dismissed the United Nations complaints of Israeli intimidation as ‘exaggerated’. 133 But Sharett, wary of the international repercussions and, especially, of the possible effect on Israeli–Egyptian relations, and angered by the IDF actions, that lacked Cabinet authorisation and were carried out behind his back, was not easily appeased. He let fly at IDF CGS Dori in most uncharacteristic language. ‘The IDF’s actions’, he wrote, threw into question
our sincerity as a party to an international agreement . . . One may assume that Egypt in this matter will display special sensitivity as her forces saw themselves as responsible for the fate of these civilian inhabitants. There are also grounds to fear that any attack by us on the people of these two villages may be reflected in the attitude of the Cairo Government toward the Jews of Egypt.
The Foreign Minister pointed out that Israel was encountering difficulties at the United Nations, where it was seeking membership,
over the question of our responsibility for the Arab refugee problem. We argue that we are not responsible . . . From this perspective, the sincerity of our professions is tested by our behaviour in these villages . . . Every intentional pressure aimed at uprooting [these Arabs] is tantamount to a planned act of eviction on our part.
Sharett added that in addition to the overt violence displayed by the soldiers, the IDF was busy conducting covertly
a ‘whispering propaganda’ campaign among the Arabs, threatening them with attacks and acts of vengeance by the army, which the civilian authorities will be powerless to prevent. This whispering propaganda (ta‘amulat lahash) is not being done of itself. There is no doubt that here there is a calculated action aimed at increasing the number of those going to the Hebron Hills as if of their own free will, and, if possible, to bring about the evacuation of the whole civilian population of [the pocket]. Sharett called the army’s actions ‘an unauthorised initiative by the local command in a matter relating to Israeli government policy’. 134 Allon admitted (to Yadin) only that his troops had ‘beaten three Arabs . . .
There is no truth to the observers’ announcement about abuse/cruelty [hit‘alelut], etc. I investigated this personally.’ 135
The decision to intimidate into flight the inhabitants of the two villages was probably taken by Allon after a meeting with Yosef Weitz on 28 February (and probably after getting agreement from Ben-Gurion). 136 A few months before, Weitz and Ben-Gurion had agreed on the need to drive out, by intimidation, Arab communities along the Faluja–Majdal axis. 137 Ben-Gurion may also have approved the action as Faluja had become a symbol of Egyptian military fortitude and courage; the expulsion of the inhabitants that army had protected would no doubt dent its reputation.138 On 28 February, Allon asked the General Staff for per- mission to evict the inhabitants. He argued that they were near the West Bank border and could serve as way stations for infiltrators, spies and guerrilla fighters, and that they sat astride a strategic crossroads. ‘I am certain that with the right argumentation and real help in transporting their property across the border we can persuade them to evacuate the villages voluntarily (in relative terms, of course)’, he argued. If, for international-political reasons, it was decided not ‘to encourage’ their departure from Israeli territory, ‘[I] recommend to transfer them inland . . .’. Allon said the matter was ‘urgent’. 139 That day, he issued an order declaring the two villages closed to unauthorised personnel, effectively sealing off the area from busybodies. 140 General Staff Division apparently approved Allon’s request, probably adding a caution concerning the visibility of the means employed.141
The fright inflicted on the pocket’s civilians in the first days of March sufficed to persuade most of them to opt for the ‘Jordanian solution’. They left for Hebron in a series of Red Cross-organised convoys. Faluja’s inhabitants all seem to have left in the first half of March"
"A second major problem in the south, as seen from the Israeli perspective, was the beduin tribes concentrated in the northern Negev. The Israeli leadership was split on the issue. There were two basic approaches. The army’s approach, at least initially, was that the beduin were congenitally unreliable and unruly, had sided with the Arabs during the war and, given the chance, would do so again. As well, they were incorrigible smugglers and thieves. It was best that they clear or be cleared out of the area. A more nuanced approach was adopted by various Arabists, who differentiated between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ beduin. The ‘bad’ ones should be ejected. But the ‘good’ ones – and beduins naturally tended to accept and display loyalty towards those in power – could be harnessed to serve the state, particularly in the form of an in situ border guard. 147
During Operation Yoav, many had moved off, some into Sinai, to be out of harm’s way. Afterwards, for more than a month, the authorities pondered the problem, undecided. At the end of October, following the clear IDF victory, a number of chieftains – led by Sheikh Suleiman al Huzeil – asked to meet the newly-appointed military governor of the Negev, Michael Hanegbi: 148 They wanted to know ‘what would be their future’.149 Ben-Gurion told his fellow ministers that he favoured ‘a peace pact with all the tribes’, implying that they would be allowed to stay. But 'the locals’, he said – presumably he meant settlers and IDF units in the area – were opposed. So meanwhile, he said, the beduin would not be allowed ‘to return to their places’. 150 On 3 November, Southern Front ordered that the beduin within a radius of 10 kilometres of Beersheba be expelled. The IDF was concerned about infiltration into town and intelligence the beduin might give the Egyptians; there was also sniping at Israeli traffic on the road between Beersheba and Bir ‘Asluj, to the
south.151 The following day, the Ninth Battalion carried out the ‘cleansing’ operation, killing a number of ‘suspicious Arabs’ and expelling one tribe.152 But beyond the 10-kilometre limit, and perhaps even inside that radius, the number of nomads steadily grew as more and more returned, reported Hanegbi. 153
On 2 November, Hanegbi and other officers met al Huzeil and several other traditionally friendly chieftains. The army, it appeared, wanted ‘to push back the beduin as much as possible from the [Beersheba] area, far into the desert’. Some officers suggested that the tribes voluntarily move ‘into Transjordan’. 154 The Foreign Ministry, previously more conciliatory, now bowed to the military, but suggested that Israel offer compensation to the departees.155 But the local Minority Affairs Ministry representative, Ya‘acov Berdichevsky, thought the tribes could be usefully turned into a border guard.156"
"Hanegbi began vigorously lobbying that Israel take the beduin under its wing. He argued that there were only ‘8–10,000’ 157 ‘friendlies’ and, dispersed over a large area, they represented ‘no danger to our plans, in terms both of security and development’. Accepting them as citizens would also look good vis-a-vis the outside world, he argued. The Foreign Ministry came round to Hanegbi’s way of thinking: It began to regard a well publicised ceremony in which the beduin sheikhs declared allegiance to the Jewish state as a boon to Israel’s efforts to parry international demands that it give up its claim to the Negev (most of which was still in Arab hands). 158 The IDF Negev Brigade, too, began to come round. On 25 November, OC Nahum Sarig informed his Seventh Battalion that ‘the tribal heads’ desire to accept Israeli protection . . . was politically important’ and en- joined the battalion not to harm the tribes or their property. 159
A ceremony of sorts duly took place on 18 November. Sixteen sheikhs offered to submit to Jewish rule and formally requested permission to stay. The officials did not respond, except to ask for the request in writing. 160 Weitz feared that important settlement and agricultural interests were being sacrificed for short-term political gain. He wrote Ben- Gurion that it was best that the beduin were not around. But, ‘if political requirements’ compelled leaving them in Israel, then they should be ‘concentrated’ in a specific, limited area. 161
It was Weitz’s line of retreat that was eventually adopted. On 25 November, Ben-Gurion met with his top Arab affairs and military advisers, including Yadin and Avner. Allon and Hanegbi favoured allowing loyal beduins to stay – but to concentrate them in an area east of Beersheba, far from the border."
"But before the ‘friendly’ beduin could be moved to the new concentration areas (soon to be known as eizor hasayig or the limited or fenced area), Israel launched Operation Horev. Between 22 December and 7 January 1949, the IDF drove the Egyptian Army out of the western Negev and surrounded most of it in the Gaza Strip. Its annihilation, in a matter of days, was only averted by forceful Anglo-American diplomatic intervention, which led to a ceasefire and Egyptian agreement to armistice talks, previously taboo, with Israel.
The new conquests resulted in the incorporation of thousands of additional beduin and to renewed movement by beduin from Sinai into the Negev. Additional tribes, including the ‘Azazme, most of which had supported the Egyptians during the war, now asked for Israeli protection (khasut) and to pledge allegiance. 164 A few months later, during Operation ‘Uvda, in early March 1949, when two IDF columns swept southwards from Beersheba and occupied the central and southern Negev down to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba (Gulf of Eilat), the troops were ordered ‘to expel all the beduin who had not accepted IDF protection [khasut] . . .’. 165 It is unclear whether any, indeed, were expelled though additional beduin certainly came under Israeli control."
"During 1949, thousands of beduin living south and west of Beersheba were moved to the concentration areas east and northeast of town. 166 But elsewhere in the Negev the paucity of security forces, the relative vastness of the area and the beduins’ migratory habits meant that Israel was left with a major and continuing problem. In January, the head of the Military Government reported ‘a massive flow’ of beduins back to Israeli-held territory; the beduins felt ‘that there was no government or supervision’. 167 Some engaged in smuggling, theft, 168 inter-tribal raiding and, occasionally, sabotage. 169 Periodically, after incidents, Israeli forces swept parts of the northern Negev, destroyed houses and tents, 170 and expelled tribes and sub-tribes.171 A major expulsion to the West Bank took place in early November, with some 1,500–2,500 beduins being pushed across the border south of Hebron. The expulsion was triggered by the murder, a few days before, of five members of Kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev. "
"During 1949, the status of the beduins granted protection – initially numbering some ‘10,000’ – remained precarious. Many had been given Israeli citizenship and ID cards; others had not. Their number continuously grew. By mid-1950, according to the IDF, there were ‘35,000’ in the Negev, ‘20,000’ of them protected. 174 Yehoshu‘a Palmon, the prime minister’s adviser on Arab affairs, wanted to restrict the number getting citizenship. He wrote: ‘In my opinion one must keep down as much as possible the number with permanent [ID] cards and to give the majority of those recently registered [only] temporary residence permits.’ 175 But the military in the Negev, no doubt with Hanegbi prodding them, sought to clarify the situation and bring closure to the problem. All the beduin given protection should be treated as ‘citizens of Israel’, wrote the Negev District HQ.176 Most apparently were."
"The last major problem in the south was the Arab concentration in al Majdal (Ashkelon), whose pre-war population had been around 10,000. Almost all had fled their homes in October–November 1948. By early 1949, due to infiltrating returnees and refugees from the area, the town had more than 2,000 inhabitants; by the end of the year, the number had swelled to ‘2,600’. 177
... Already in January 1949, Allon urged the General Staff to approve the transfer of the registered Arab inhabitants inland, to Isdud or Yibna, and the rest to the Gaza Strip. The town was ‘too close to the [Egyptian] front lines . . . [and] served as a base for enemy infiltration and for small hostile actions . . .’. 180 But Ben-Gurion turned down the request ‘for the time being’.181 When Moshe Dayan became OC Southern Command, in early November 1949, he renewed the campaign. On 14 November, Dayan submitted a detailed proposal for the transfer of the Arabs tsites inside Israel. He repeated Allon’s arguments and added that a port city for the Negev was to be built in Majdal. 182 The IDF CGS approved, adding that the town served as a way station for Arabs infiltrating to Jaffa and Ramle and ‘the Arab inhabitants of Majdal hope for the return of Arab rule to their city’.183 In December, Ben-Gurion agreed 184 and on 14 January 1950 the matter was decided, with the stipulation that the transfer ‘should be carried out without coercion’.185
The matter was not brought before the Cabinet, and it is not clear when and how Southern Command switched the prospective refugees’ destination from sites inside Israel to the Egyptian-ruled Gaza Strip. What is clear is that during the following months, the authorities, spear- headed by Major Yehoshu‘a Varbin, the military governor of Majdal, employing carrots and sticks, applied subtle and not-so-subtle pressure, and offered incentives, to obtain the population’s evacuation. Israel’s trade union federation, the Histadrut, and the Israel Communist Party tried unsuccessfully to stem or limit the transfer. Many, perhaps most, of Majdal’s Arabs, who were and felt isolated, wanted to rejoin their families, who had fled during 1948 to the Gaza Strip. The Israelis bolstered this with oppressive restrictions on movement and employment and a readiness to exchange Israeli pounds for Palestine pounds (used in the Gaza Strip) at favourable rates."
"The purpose of most of the infiltrations was agricultural or to return home or theft; very few were terroristic. 187 But there was sporadic terrorism. A cluster of terrorist infiltrations at the end of 1948 triggered the first of the post-war IDF retaliatory strikes, on the night of 2\3 January 1949, against the Iraqi- held village of Tira, northwest of Qalqilya, and neighbouring military positions.188
The Israeli–Jordanian armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 provided for minor frontier changes, with a few small areas (in the Beisan Valley and southwest of the Hebron Hills) being transferred from Israel to Jordan, and two larger strips, along Wadi ‘Ara and between Baqa al Gharbiya and Kafr Qasim, being ceded to Israel. "
"Israel reassured the United States that nothing would happen to the villagers. Tel Aviv did not want to jeopardise the cession or damage relations with Washington. Eytan told McDonald that Tel Aviv was ‘keenly anxious’ for the villagers to stay as Israel did not wish to fur- ther aggravate the refugee situation and that if these villagers were to stay, it would serve as proof ‘to the world that [the] mass exodus [from] other [previously] captured areas was more [the] fault [of the] hysterical Arabs . . . than [of the] occupying forces’. Eytan said that the troops who would take over the ceded areas were being thoroughly briefed about how to behave. 194 A fortnight later, McDonald conveyed Acheson’s and Truman’s concern directly to Sharett. The Ambassador asked that Israel reassure the inhabitants and cautioned that harming them might damage the continuing secret Israeli–Jordanian peace negotiations. Sharett told McDonald that all would be well. 195 But Sharett’s thinking in fact took another tack altogether: We have inherited a number of important villages in the Sharon and Shomron and I imagine that the intention will be to be rid of them [i.e., the inhabitants], as these sites are on the border. Security interest[s] dictate to be rid of them. [But] the matter [in light of the American diplomatic warnings] is very complicated. 196
The cession passed relatively smoothly. There were almost no expulsions or transfers or untoward pressures. Indeed, in advance of the entry of the troops, Carmel, OC Northern Front – responsible for Wadi ‘Ara – had specifically instructed: ‘The explicit desire of the state of Israel is that no soldier will harm the Arab population . . . All . . . are obliged to careful and kind behaviour . . . in the areas passing under our control . . .’ Violators would be severely punished, he warned. 197 Identical orders were issued by OC 16th Brigade, which took over the Kafr Qasim area.198"
"Political considerations – generated by the repeated American warnings against the backdrop of the deadlocked Lausanne Conference – prevailed over the military’s desire for Arabless border areas. Apparently it was felt that there was no ‘clean’ way to ‘persuade’ the Arabs to leave."
"But an exception was made of the refugees living in and around the villages. For example, 1,200–1,500 such refugees 202 living in and around Baqa al Gharbiya on the night of 27 June were ‘forcefully and brutally’ (in Sharett’s phrase)203 pushed across the border into the Triangle. The Israel–Jordan MAC, chaired by the United Nations, investigated the incident during the following months. Israel argued that the armistice agreement protected only local inhabitants, not refugees temporarily resident in the ceded areas and that, in any case, it was the Baqa al Gharbiya mukhtar rather than the Israelis who had ordered them out. In September, the MAC – meaning its United Nations chairman – ruled in favour of the Israeli interpretation (save regarding 36 of the expellees, who were deemed permanent inhabitants who had been wrongfully expelled).
Not unnaturally, given the character of his relationship with the Israeli authorities, the mukhtar confirmed the Israeli arguments. He testified that
the village council decided for economic reasons [that the village] could not maintain the many refugees . . . and [therefore] told them to leave. No order to do this had been received from the Israeli military governor or from any other Israeli official. In certain cases, when refugees did not agree to leave, the mukhtar told them that this was an order from of the [Israeli] governor . . . (despite the fact that such an order had not been issued by the governor). 204
One Israeli analysis later explained that the refugees had left ‘under pressure from the local inhabitants’ because they had been a burden, in terms of accommodation and employment, ‘they had stolen from the local inhabitants, they had stolen from the Jewish neighbours [in neighbouring settlements], [and they had] been engaged in smuggling’. The presence of the refugees, as the Baqa al Gharbiya notables saw things, had undermined the development of good relations between their village and the Israeli authorities. 205
While the commission’s decision hung in the balance, Israel made it clear that, if forced to take the expellees back, they, the refugees, ‘would regret it’ (in Dayan’s phrase). General Riley, the United Nations chief of observers in Palestine, privately described this as ‘typical’ of Israel’s use of threats during negotiations. 206 At the same time, clandestinely, Israeli intelligence mounted a campaign to persuade the expellees now in the Triangle not to agree to return. ‘We are busy spreading rumours among the Arab refugees’, Dayan wrote to Sharett, that whoever is returned to Israel will not receive assistance from the Red Cross . . . [and] would be returning against the wishes of the Israeli government [and, therefore,] there is no chance that he would return one day to his [original] land. We therefore hope that . . . most of them will refuse to return.
In other words, IDF intelligence had disseminated the rumour that there would one day be a mass refugee repatriation but that those Baqa expellees returning ‘prematurely’ and against Israel’s wishes would ‘suffer for it’. The expellees duly told the UN investigators that they were not eager to return. Friedlander, Dayan’s deputy on the MAC, observed that ‘these rumours . . . are easily accepted by the Arabs . . .’. 207"
"The clearing of the borders of Arab communities following the hostilities was initiated by the IDF but, like the expulsions of the months before, was curbed by limitations imposed by the civilian leadership and was never carried out consistently or comprehensively.
Even the initial border-clearing operation in the north in November 1948, which set as its goal an Arab-free strip at least five kilometres deep, was carried out without consistency or political logic. Maronite communities such as Kafr Bir‘im and Mansura were evicted while Muslims in Tarshiha and Fassuta were allowed to stay. Intervention by ‘softhearted’ Israeli leaders, such as Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, succeeded in halting some evictions and expulsions. Consideration of future Jewish–Druse, Jewish–Circassian and Jewish–Christian relations, as well as fears for Israel’s image abroad, played a decisive role in mobilising the various civilian bureaucracies against undifferentiating, wholesale expulsions and, in some cases, changed expulsion to Lebanon to eventual resettlement inside Israel.
In terms of the army’s independence in expelling or evicting Arab communities, November 1948 marked a watershed. The Lebanese border operation was ordered by OC Northern Front, probably after receiving clearance from Ben-Gurion. It was not weighed or debated in advance by any civilian political body. Thereafter, the IDF almost never acted alone and independently; it sought and had to obtain approval and decisions from the supreme civilian authorities, be it the full Cabinet or one or more of the various ministerial and inter-departmental committees. The IDF’s opinions and needs, which defined in great measure Israel’s security requirements, continued to carry great weight in decision-making councils. But they were not always decisive and the army ceased to act alone.
The army wanted Arab-free strips along all of Israel’s frontiers. It failed to achieve such a strip on the Lebanese border (Rihaniya, Jish, Hurfeish, Fassuta, Tarshiha and Mi‘ilya remained) as it was to fail – even more decisively – along the armistice line with Jordan, west of the Triangle. With respect to the villages ceded by Jordan in spring-summer 1949, international political considerations outweighed the security arguments. Given the state of Israeli–United Nations and Israeli–United States relations against the backdrop of the Lausanne talks, Israel’s leaders found that they could not allow themselves the luxury of causing the type of friction a new wave of expulsions would have generated. The American warnings on this score had been explicit. The fact that peace talks were proceeding intermittently with King Abdullah and that Tel Aviv still hoped for a breakthrough no doubt also influenced decision-making.
In this sense, the very success of the intimidation operation in Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya in early March 1949, which precipitated the flight of 3,000 or so villagers, proved counterproductive. It put the Arabs, the United Nations and the United States on alert against a repeat performance along the border with the Triangle, where there were many more Arabs.
But where politics did not interfere, the army’s desire for Arab-clear borders was generally decisive. Arab villages along the border meant problems in terms of infiltration, espionage and sabotage. When the villages were semi-abandoned, as was generally the case, it meant a continuous return and resettlement in the empty houses, thus consolidating the Arab presence in the area and increasing their numbers in the country. To this was added the interest of the Jewish agricultural and settlement bodies in more land and settlement sites and the interest of the various government ministries (health, finance, minorities) to be rid of the burden of economically problematic, desolate, semi-abandoned villages. These interests generally dovetailed.
The period November 1948 – March 1949 saw a gradual shift of emphasis from expulsion out of the country to eviction from one site to another inside Israel: What could be done without penalty during hostilities became increasingly more difficult to engineer in the following months of truce and armistice. There was still a desire to see Arabs leave the country and occasionally this was achieved (as at Faluja and Majdal), albeit through persuasion, selective intimidation, psychological pressure and financial inducement. The expulsion of the Baqa al Gharbiya refugees was a classic of the genre, with the order being channelled through the local mukhtar. But generally, political circumstances ruled out brute expulsions. Eviction and transfer of communities from one site to another inside Israel was seen as more palatable and more easily achieved.
Side by side with the border-clearing operations Israel also mounted recurrent sweeps in the villages in the interior designed to root out illegal returnees and to ‘shut down’ minimally inhabited villages (such Umm al Faraj and Bir‘im after November 1948). The aim was to keep down the Arab population as well as to curtail various types of trouble that infiltrators augured. In a narrow sense, political, demographic, agri- cultural and economic considerations rather than military needs seem to have been decisive. The presence of Arabs in a half-empty village, given the circumstances, meant that the village would probably soon fill out with returnees. Completely depopulating the village and levelling it or filling the houses with Jewish settlers meant that infiltrators would have that many less sites to return to. In complementary fashion, filling out half-empty Arab villages (as happened at Tur‘an, Mazra‘a and Sha‘b) with the evicted population of other villages meant that these host villages would be ‘full up’ and unable to accommodate many infiltrees.
Excluding the Negev beduin, it is probable that the number of Arabs kicked out of, or persuaded to leave, the country in the border-clearing operations and in the internal anti-infiltration sweeps during 1948–1950 was around 20,000. If one includes expelled northern Negev beduin, the total may have been as high as 30,000–40,000"
"International efforts at the end of 1948 and during the first half of 1949 to solve the refugee problem proceeded along two crisscrossing avenues – one, as conducted by agencies of the United Nations, primarily the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), and the other, as conducted by the Great Powers, meaning, primarily, the United States. Both sets of efforts were guided in large measure by Bernadotte’s testament, the interim report of mid-September 1948, and its ‘doctrinal’ postulate that the right of the refugee to return to his home and land was absolute and should be recognised by all parties. This postulate was enshrined two months after the Mediator’s death in UN General Assembly Resolution 194, of 11 December 1948. The resolution stated that ‘the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date’. (The resolution also offered those ‘choosing not to return’ the alternative of ‘compensation’.) The PCC, set up by the resolution, was instructed to facilitate the ‘repatriation’ of those wishing to return.
The absolute nature of the return provision was immediately and al- most universally qualified, in the minds of Western observers, by the appreciation that Israel would not allow a mass return and that many refugees might not wish to return to live under Jewish rule. It was understood by the powers, and by Bernadotte himself already from late summer 1948, that the bulk of the refugees would not be repatriated. The solution to the problem, therefore, would have to rest mainly on organised ‘resettlement’ in areas and countries outside Israel, a matter vaguely addressed in Resolution 194."
"Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Eytan shortly afterwards wrote in the same vein to Claude de Boisanger, the French chairman of the PCC:
The war that was fought in Palestine was bitter and destructive, and it would be doing the refugees a disservice to let them persist in the belief that if they returned, they would find their homes or shops or fields intact. In certain cases, it would be difficult for them even to identify the sites upon which their villages once stood."
"But the Arab states refused to absorb the refugees. Over the second half of 1948, the Arabs united in thrusting the refugee problem to the top of the agenda. They demanded repatriation and linked all progress towards a resolution of the conflict to Israeli agreement to a return. United Nations and United States efforts to organise Israeli–Arab peace talks were dashed on the rocks of Arab insistence on, and Israeli resistance to, a return. Arab policy on this score was bolstered by a genuine economic inability to properly absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees and by fear of the refugees as a major potential subversive element vis-a-vis their own regimes. The western governments, fed by alarmed diplomats in the field and fired by global Cold War concerns, concurred that the masses of disgruntled refugees were potential tools of Communism and posed a threat to the pro-western host governments.
The Arab states appeared to be in a no-lose situation. Israeli refusal to take back the refugees, leaving them in misery, would turn world opinion and perhaps western governments against the Jewish State on humanitarian grounds. Israeli agreement to take back all or many of the refugees would result in the political and demographic destabilisation of the Jewish State, with clear military implications. All of Israel’s leaders appreciated this: The refugees had become a ‘political weapon against the Jews’. 3
But conversely, for Tel Aviv, the refugees also constituted a political tool by means of which Israel might prise peace and recognition out of a reluctant, rejectionist Arab world. As the months passed and the prospects of peace grew increasingly dim, Israel hesitantly brandished the refugees as a carrot in the multilateral negotiations. (Indeed, Israel had little else, save hard-won territory, to offer in exchange for peace.) Tel Aviv would accept back a small number of refugees if the Arabs agreed to direct negotiations leading to peace."
"J. Rives Childs thought – independently, but along the same lines as Israel’s leaders – that resettlement of the refugees ‘principally in Iraq and possibly Syria’ would be the best solution. 6
But the Arab states refused to absorb the exiles. The impasse pushed the United States and the PCC towards a solution based on Arab agreement to absorb, with western aid, most of the refugees coupled with Israeli agreement to the repatriation of the remaining several hundred thousand.
From the first Ambassador McDonald and Burdett thought Israeli agreement to such a massive (if still partial) repatriation unlikely, if not in- conceivable. Moreover, Burdett doubted, given Israel’s major economic problems, whether Tel Aviv would agree to pay the refugees substantial compensation. Politically, security in the region would best be served by refugee resettlement in the Arab countries, principally in the Arab-held parts of Palestine and in Transjordan.
Since the US has supported the establishment of a Jewish State, it should insist on a homogeneous one which will have the best possible chance of stability. Return of the refugees would create a continuing ‘minority prob- lem’ and form a constant temptation both for uprisings and intervention by neighbouring Arab states,
he wrote. But he acknowledged that, in the absence of organised, systematic absorption and resettlement in the Arab countries, the refugees represented a subversive ‘opportunity’ on which the USSR ‘may capitalize’. 7"
"Mark Ethridge, the Southern Baptist appointed by Truman to the PCC, quickly understood that the developing impasse over the refugees was lethal to any possibility of peace. Ethridge thought Shertok’s attitude – that the refugees were ‘essentially unassimilable’ in Israel and should all be resettled in the Arab world – ‘inhuman’. Israel’s views in this context,
he said, were ‘similar to those which I heard Hitler express in Germany in 1933. It [sic] might be described as anti-Semitism toward the Arabs.’ At the same time, he believed that ‘it might be wise in long run to resettle greater portion Arab refugees in neighbouring Arab states’. 8
Ethridge, like everyone attuned to the Arab position, soon realised that the refugee problem was the ‘immediate key to peace negotiations if not to peace’ itself. The Arab states were united around the proposition that a start to the solution of the refugee problem must precede meaningful negotiations for a settlement. The outlines of a compromise were clear: The Arabs, Ethridge felt, had to reduce their demand for complete repatriation and Israel had to abandon its opposition to a substantial partial repatriation. Both sides were treating the refugees ‘as [a] political pawn’. By the end of February 1949, Ethridge felt that there was need of ‘a generous Israeli gesture’ – that is, a statement agreeing to a return of a large number of refugees and an immediate start to repatriation. This would break the ‘Arab psychosis’ and enable movement towards a compromise. (This assumed sincere Arab interest in a compromise that included the continued existence of the Jewish State.) Ethridge asked the State Department to ‘encourage’ Israel to make the gesture and the Arabs to respond favourably. The idea of a redemptive Israeli ‘gesture’ as the key to peace was to characterise all Ethridge’s work on the PCC during the frustrating weeks ahead."
"On 14 March, Shertok wrote Ethridge that while the main solution to the refugee problem must rest on resettlement in the Arab countries, Israel might, under certain circumstances, admit a ‘certain proportion’, though this would depend on the ‘kind of peace’ that emerged. But Ethridge sought a precise and public commitment. Six weeks of PCC efforts had failed to elicit any concrete concessions. Ethridge pressed Washington to ‘urge’ Tel Aviv to make the required ‘gesture’. 9
Sharett (Shertok) put it bluntly at a meeting with Acheson in Washington on 22 March: The Israeli government ‘could not possibly make such a commitment’ before negotiations began and, in any case, ‘it was out of the question to consider the possibility of repatriation of any substantial numbers of the refugees’. 10 The Arabs, for their part, appear to have insisted, at the Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting with the PCC in Beirut the day before, on the refugees’ ‘right of return’ – while continuing to reject the UN partition resolution of 1947 and recognition of Israel. 11"
"The joint communication on 29 March from Ethridge and George McGhee, Special Assistant to Acheson, appears to have been decisive with Truman and the Secretary of State..., the two officials concluded that Israel must be pressed to repatriate at least ‘250,000’, from the areas conquered by the IDF outside the Jewish State partition borders. The rest of the refugees, it was implied, should be resettled in the Arab countries. 12
Washington was fired into action. McDonald ‘informally’ pressed that Israel agree to take back the 250,000 from the conquered areas. 13 On 5 April, Acheson and Sharett met in New York. Acheson performed with unwonted bluntness, deploying the ‘big gun’ of presidential displeasure. Truman, he said, was greatly concerned about the plight of the refugees, who numbered, he said, some ‘800,000’."
"Sharett requested that the three (Weitz, Danin, Lifshitz)
prepare an absolutely secret plan for the event that the Cabinet feels itself compelled to agree to a return of part of the refugees to Israel. This plan must determine the maximal dimensions of the return . . . the method of selecting the returnees and . . . the areas and villages that can be resettled.
A plan was apparently prepared. 15
Ben-Gurion himself hinted at a new-fangled flexibility at his meeting with the PCC in Tel Aviv on 7 April. He said: ‘. . . it is desirable that the refugees be resettled in the Arab states. But I do not discount the possibility that we might contribute [to the solution] by settling part of them in our [country].’ But Ben-Gurion denied ‘emphatically that Israel had expelled the Arabs . . . The State of Israel expelled nobody and will never do it’, he said. PCC chairman de Boisanger seemed to agree, noting that ‘no Arab maintained [before the PCC] that he had been expelled from the country. The refugees said they had fled from fear, because of the preparations for war, as thousands fled from France in 1940.’"
"Vague statements about a readiness to repatriate some of the refugees served the practical purpose of parrying PCC–American pressures. But the Yishuv’s desire to take back refugees had in no way increased; if it depended on Tel Aviv, there would be no returnees.
Meanwhile, the PCC was affected by growing gloom. In late March and early April, de Boisanger, Ethridge and Huseyin Cait Yalcin, the Turkish PCC representative, concluded that their Middle East shuttle was fruitless. Yalcin, ‘disgruntled’ chiefly with the United States, explained it this way:
Nobody was strong enough or sufficiently determined to deter the Jews from doing anything they wanted to do . . . [US] diplomatists and officials seemed [not] to have the courage to tell the truth about the Jews unless they were within sight of retirement.
Yalcin added that before joining the PCC, he had ‘always had a soft spot for the Jews . . . a universally oppressed people’. Now, according to his British interlocutor, he was ‘definitely anti-Semitic’. 17"
"The PCC took two steps to try to break the logjam: It set up a Technical Committee on Refugees to work out ‘measures . . . for the implementation of the provisions of the [11 December 1948 UN] resolution’, meaning to find out how many refugees there were, how many wished to be repatriated and how many to stay in Arab countries, and how these could be economically ‘rehabilitated’; and called an international conference at Lausanne where, under PCC chairmanship, the parties could discuss the range of issues – refugees, Jerusalem, borders, recognition – and hammer out a comprehensive peace settlement. 18"
"Israel’s policy-makers met to define the country’s positions. The meetings were attended by Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Yadin, Eytan (who was to head the delegation to Lausanne), members of the Transfer Committee, and other senior officials, including Sasson, who was to be Eytan’s second in command. The refugee problem received scant attention, few of the participants anticipating that the Arab delegations intended to push it immediately to the top of the agenda...Kohn advised that the delegation stress the security threat which a mass return would pose and cited the Sudeten problem as a telling and useful comparison: ‘Now that the exodus of the Arabs from our country has taken place, what moral right have those who fully endorsed the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia to demand that we readmit these Arabs?’ 19"
"The upshot of the consultative meetings in Tel Aviv was a reiteration of the traditional line – no substantial repatriation, no ‘gesture’ and no statement on the number of returnees Israel might be willing to take back within the framework of a settlement. 20
The lack of movement in the Israeli position was brought home to Ethridge at a meeting with Ben-Gurion in Tiberias (which, in his cable, Ethridge called ‘Siberias’) on 18 April. Ben-Gurion treated Ethridge to an extended analysis of British misdemeanours in the Middle East since 1917 and to a lecture on how the United States ‘should declare its second independence of [the] British Foreign Office’. On the refugees, Ben-Gurion gave not an inch. He made no mention of a possible Israeli ‘gesture’. Resettlement in the Arab countries was the ‘only logical answer’, he said. Israel ‘cannot and will not accept return Arab refugees to Israeli territory’, on grounds both of security and economics. Israel, said Ben-Gurion, would compensate the refugee fellahin for their land, would provide advice on resettlement in the Arab countries and would allow back a few refugees within the family reunion scheme.
The meeting appropriately crowned the months of fruitless PCC shuttling. Ethridge rushed off a cable to Acheson asking to be relieved of his post. The PCC could not solve the refugee problem, he wrote; only American pressure could facilitate a solution. He did not look to the prospective meeting at Lausanne with great hope. 21
Ethridge’s resignation threat elicited a reaffirmation of the American position favouring substantial repatriation and a plea by the Secretary of State and the President that he soldier on, at least for a while longer. Acheson wrote that the United States Government ‘is not disposed to change policy because of Israeli intransigence’; Truman wrote that he was ‘rather disgruntled with the manner in which the Jews are approaching the refugee problem’. Truman and Acheson both personally pressed Israeli officials at the end of April to soften its stance. 22 Ethridge agreed to stay on, probably hoping that at Lausanne the United States would at last bring its full weight to bear on Israel."
"The delegations gathered at Lausanne at the end of April. But the PCC’s effort to bring the parties to formal face-to-face negotiations failed; the Arabs refused (though Arab and Jewish officials met often and secretly for informal discussions). The refugees represented the major, initial and insuperable sticking point.
The Arab delegations arrived united in the demand that Israel declare acceptance of the principle of repatriation before they would agree to negotiate peace. Eytan, in response, mouthed only a pious plea for the refugees’ ‘permanent settlement and rehabilitation’. The Israeli delegation, he said, had ‘come prepared to tackle [the refugee problem] with sincerity and above all in the spirit of realism’. ‘Realism’ meant no repatriation.
Privately, however, Eytan acknowledged that Israel’s opening positions were inadequate. He wrote Sharett:
I think the time has come for us to realise that mere words will not carry us much further towards peace . . . A statement such as that which I issued [at the press conference] this afternoon is interpreted by everyone as yet another attempt by us to shirk the real issues."
"Through the spring and summer, Israel and Jordan conducted parallel, direct peace negotiations. Sharett met King Abdullah on 5 May 1949. They discussed borders, recognition, access for Jordan to the Mediterranean and refugees. Amman linked the refugee and territorial questions: The more occupied territory Israel would be willing to cede, the more refugees Jordan would be willing to absorb and resettle. Abdullah was primarily interested in Lydda and Ramle, but Israel was unwilling to give up territory. Indeed, it sought further land (Tulkarm and Qalqilya). Nothing came of the talks though, in Tel Aviv’s view, the Jordanians were ‘most anxious’ to make peace. 26
At the same time, Sasson held informal talks at Lausanne with a Palestinian refugee delegation, headed by Muhammad Nimr al Hawari, the Jaffa lawyer who had commanded the Najjada. Hawari proposed that Israel agree to the repatriation of 400,000, who would live in peace with Israel and act as a ‘peace bridge’ between Israel and the Arab states. On the other hand, he argued, if the masses of refugees continued to live stateless and impoverished along Israel’s borders, they would cause the Jewish State nothing but grief. This – not a return – was precisely what the Mufti and Abdullah wanted, argued Hawari. The Arab states did not want the refugees and would not assimilate them. Nothing came of the talks. Hawari returned to Ramallah, ‘desperate and depressed’. 27"
"Whether by Israeli design or American misunderstanding and wishful thinking (or, as is probable, by an admixture of the two), while things at Lausanne were at a standstill, Israeli diplomats in the United States signalled a more moderate line. Abba Eban, Israel’s representative to the United Nations, on 5 May told the United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committee at Lake Success that Israel ‘does not reject’ the principle of repatriation. 29
Eagerly awaiting such a sign of flexibility on this cardinal issue, United States policy-makers jumped for joy. Acheson took Eban to mean that Israel had formally accepted the principle of repatriation, and cabled as much to all and sundry. 30 Eliahu Elath, the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, provided further grounds for optimism by telling the Americans that Israel feels that ‘both repatriation and resettlement are required for solution of problem’. But the Israelis refused to talk numbers. Acheson believed that Israel would be more specific after it was assured that the Arabs would integrate the remainder of the refugees and that ‘outside’ financial assistance for such resettlement would be vouchsafed. 31
But, of course, Israel had not accepted the principle of repatriation, whatever its emissaries were hinting or were understood to have said. But for weeks thereafter, American policy-makers referred to Israel’s acceptance of the principle of repatriation. Israeli officials, such as Eban, found this amusing – and advantageous to Israel. 32 This proved to be only a temporary semi-comic interlude. In truth, apart from fleeting moments of self-delusion, American policymakers understood that Israel remained set against repatriation and that this was a major obstacle to progress. "
"Sharett responded in Ben-Gurion’s name that Washington had ‘mis- understood’ Israel’s position. Israel had accepted the principle of a negotiated peace embedded in Resolution 194. But the Arabs had refused to negotiate in good faith – indeed, even to meet the Israelis or to negotiate peace....
The economic, demographic and social conditions in Palestine had meanwhile changed: ‘. . . The wheel of history cannot be turned back . . . Israel cannot in the name of humanitarianism be driven to commit suicide’, though it was willing to assist in the refugees’ resettlement elsewhere, to provide compensation and to ‘reunite families separated by the war . . . So long as the Arab states do not evince any readiness even to discuss peace, any significant measure of repatriation is clearly impracticable.’ 34"
" Ethridge, according to Eytan, had remained ‘fair-minded enough’ to see that the Arabs were being ‘unrealistic’ over repatriation. But, to achieve ‘immediate peace’, Israel had to agree to repatriate 200,000 refugees and to give the Arabs ‘part of the Southern Negev’, Ethridge felt, according to Eytan. 35"
"Through June and early July, the policymakers in Tel Aviv agonised, understanding that continued blanket stonewalling would inevitably lead to the collapse of the conference, with Israel possibly figuring as chief culprit. The refugee problem ‘seems in many ways to have become now the central problem of our foreign affairs’, wrote Teddy Kollek, one of Ben-Gurion’s aides. (He was in London, trying, among other things, to interest British businessmen, including Sir Marcus Sieff, in financing development projects in the Middle East that could employ Palestinian refugees.) Kollek urged Tel Aviv to take ‘positive action’, by which he may have meant that Israel should agree to a limited mea- sure of repatriation. 36 The problem was to find a concession or ‘gesture’ whose implementation could cause Israel least damage while sufficing to relieve or reduce American and PCC pressure and to transfer the ball to the Arab court. The solution adopted was the ‘100,000 Offer’."
"Simply and initially, the plan was that the Gaza Strip – occupied by the Egyptian army since May 1948 – should be transferred to Israeli sovereignty along with its relatively large local and refugee populations. While gaining a strategic piece of real estate, Israel would thus be considered to have done its bit for refugee repatriation. In most American and British readings of the plan, the refugees in the Strip, after the transfer, were to be allowed to return to their towns and villages of origin. In a revised version, Israel, in addition to absorbing the Strip’s populations, was expected to give either Egypt or Jordan (or both) territorial compensation for the Strip, probably in the southern Negev. Discussion of the plan, even after all hope of its implementation had vanished, continued through the summer, playing a counterpoint to the American and PCC main efforts to induce Israel to agree to substantial ‘front door’ repatriation and the Arabs, to organised refugee resettlement in their own countries."
" the Strip’s 200,000–250,000 refugees, whom Egypt did not want to absorb and Israel refused to take back, constituted a giant burden for the Egyptian authorities. Was holding onto the Strip worth the candle?
By March, according to Israeli officials, the Egyptians thought not. Sasson, who was in constant touch with them in Paris, believed that Egypt wanted to evacuate the Strip. Sharett feared that Egypt would try to transfer the Strip to the Jordanians. Mapai Knesset Member David Hocohen suggested that it would be worth Israel’s while to take over the area, even if it meant enlarging the State’s Arab minority. Sharett, while mindful of the price, thought that Israel would gain a strategic piece of real estate and ‘could portray the absorption of 100,000 [sic] refugees as a major contribution . . . to the solution of the refugee problem as a whole and to free itself once and for all of UN pressure in this regard’. 37"
"The idea was formally debated in the consultative meetings in April in preparation for Lausanne. On 12 April, Sasson said that there were in the Strip altogether some ‘140,000’ Arabs; the mooted figure of ‘240,000’ was an exaggeration.
... No decision was taken. Ethridge, reporting from Jerusalem on 13 April, thought that Israel would not take the Strip – which, he said, contained ‘230,000’ refugees and ‘100,000’ locals – if it meant absorbing its entire population. But, as Ethridge learned a few days later, Ben-Gurion quite clearly favoured Israeli absorption of the Strip, with (and despite) its population. Ben-Gurion even seems to have suggested that the Gaza refugees would be allowed to return to their original villages. 39
The idea of the Gaza Plan meshed with the peace plan then being secretly negotiated with Abdullah. Abdullah stressed Jordan’s need for an outlet to the sea via Gaza or Acre. The transfer by Egypt – unfriendly to Jordan – of the Strip to Israel could facilitate the conclusion of a deal which included Jordanian access to the Mediterranean through Gaza, though there was a school of thought in Tel Aviv that opposed ‘conspiring’ with Abdullah against Egypt. 40
Matters were clarified somewhat on 22 April at the last consultative meeting before Lausanne. Sasson, eager to conclude a deal with Abdullah, backed the transfer of the Strip to Jordan. Ben-Gurion cautioned against rushing into a decision, but Shiloah rejoined that the matter would surely be raised in the impending negotiations. Ben-Gurion responded that if the Strip was transferred to Israel, ‘we would not refuse [it], and then of course we would take it with all its inhabitants. We will not expel them.’ But Shiloah, unlike Sasson, was worried that Egypt might agree to transfer Gaza to Jordan in a deal against which Israel would be powerless. Shiloah opposed such a transfer because – if the West Bank was eventually linked to the Strip by a land corridor, as Jordan was demanding – it would ‘sever’ the Negev from the rest of Israel. Sharett argued that the war had made the Yishuv’s leaders think too much in terms of territory and too little in terms of population: ‘We are drunk with victory [and] territorial conquests.’ He opposed having to ‘swallow 150,000’ Arabs and argued against both Israeli incorporation of and joint Israeli–Egyptian condominium over the Strip. The moment Israel became responsible, the Strip’s refugees would press to be allowed to return to their original homes. Lifshitz, of the Transfer Committee, also opposed Israeli incorporation though pressed for Israeli annexation of Qalqilya and Tulkarm, which had ‘only 20,000 Arabs’. Like Shiloah, Sharett opposed a Jordanian takeover of the Strip. 41
Ethridge was enthusiastic about the Gaza idea, which he began calling a ‘plan’. He saw it as a ‘back door’ method of achieving a measure of repatriation and of getting the Lausanne peace ball rolling. Ethridge told Eytan that he was
sure the Egyptians did not want to keep it and he personally was in favour of giving it to Israel . . . [if] the refugees went with it. He felt that by accepting those refugees, estimated at 150–200,000, [Israel] would be making [its] contribution towards the solution of the refugee problem. 42"
"But were the Egyptians amenable? An initial indication was provided in early May. Egypt would rather give the Strip to Israel than to Jordan, said a Jordanian official in Lausanne. But it was more likely that Egypt would prefer to hold onto the Strip ‘and give it to nobody’. 43
A cable on 2 May from Eytan to Tel Aviv brought matters to a head. The Cabinet met the next day and decided that ‘if the incorporation of the Gaza district into Israel with all its population is proposed, our response will be positive’. Sharett had argued against, saying that Israel had not ‘matured sufficiently to absorb three hundred thousand Arabs. I see it as a catastrophe [ani ro’eh zot ke’sho’ah].’ But Ben-Gurion, mobilising geo-political and strategic arguments, brought the majority around. In the vote, Sharett abstained. 44 On 20 May, after informing Ethridge that Israel would ‘demand’ the Strip but would not press the demand ‘if Egypt said no’, Israel formally proposed to the PCC that she be given the Strip and said that ‘[we] would be prepared to accept . . . all Arabs at present located in the Gaza area, whether inhabitants or refugees, as citizens of Israel’. Tel Aviv committed itself to their ‘resettlement and rehabilitation’, reiterating the proposal on 29 and 31 May. 45
Israel felt that by accepting Gaza’s local and refugee populations, as well as a handful of refugees under the family reunion scheme – coupled with its existing Arab citizens – it would have an Arab minority roughly equal in number to the Arab minority it would have had under the 1947 UN partition scheme and it ‘would have discharged its full obligation’ towards solving the refugee problem. ‘The proposal is an earnest of the great lengths to which the Government of Israel is prepared to go in helping to solve the problem that is central to all our discussions’, Eytan wrote de Boisanger. Israel linked acceptance of Gaza and its refugees to large-scale international aid to cover the entailed costs. 46
But from Washington’s perspective, which took account of projected Arab sensibilities, the plan could not be so simple as mere Israeli incorporation of the Strip. While the United States regarded the refugee problem and its potential solution as the ‘overriding factor in determining eventual disposition Gaza Strip’, Washington was prepared to ap- prove the incorporation only if achieved with full Egyptian consent ‘and provided [that] territorial compensation [is] made to Egypt . . . if Egypt desires such compensation’. Washington added that Israel would have to provide iron-clad assurances and guarantees that the Gaza locals and refugees would enjoy full rights and protection; the fear was of a repeat ‘Faluja’. There was also chariness in Washington about footing the Gaza refugees’ resettlement bill.
The feeling of the United States Embassy in Cairo was that the Egyptian Government ‘might well be willing [to] cede [the] Gaza Strip’ if Israel ‘assumed refugee burden’ and that Arab League Secretary General ‘Azzam was similarly minded. But the Egyptians, the embassy felt, would probably ‘reserve final decision’ until formal peace negotiations took place, using Gaza as a ‘bargaining point’. 47"
"The Israeli Government had given only scant publicity to its decision to incorporate the Strip with its population. The Cabinet feared a strong public reaction against the plan, especially from the Right. The plan had been approved only reluctantly and under the mistaken belief that the Strip contained substantially fewer than 200,000–250,000 refugees. 49 The lack of a positive Egyptian response after 20 May had further eaten away at Israeli enthusiasm.
The official caginess about Israel’s acceptance of the plan stretched to covering the plan’s origin, which was to become the focus of a minor, and somewhat bizarre, diplomatic scuffle.
...The dispute about the origin of the plan was not motivated by a pen- chant for accuracy so much as by political calculation. Egypt, having just lost a war with Israel, could not allow itself to appear eager or willing tcede the only chunk of Palestine it had won to the Jews while helping them get off the hook on the refugee issue. Israel, for reasons of internal unity and diplomacy, could neither appear as the fount of the idea nor overeager to lay its hands on the Strip, lest its eagerness put off the Egyptians. Moreover, Israeli conception of, or eagerness about, the plan implied that Israel was willing and able to absorb some 200,000–250,000 refugees. If the plan fell through, American and United Nations pressure for a ‘gesture’ of repatriation could be expected to be renewed, citing Israel’s eagerness and expressed ability to take in a large number of refugees. (This, indeed, happened.) "
"The American linkage of an Egyptian cession of the Strip to territorial compensation in the Negev (possibly at the northern end of the Gulf of ‘Aqaba) was not manifest in the early multilateral contacts on the matter. Its appearance in late May or early June probably owed much to the seeming Egyptian disinterest in the original proposal and, possibly, also to British signals favouring Israeli–Egyptian ‘reciprocity’, stemming from an imperial interest in obtaining a land-bridge between the British-ruled Suez Canal and Jordan–Iraq, where British troops were stationed and which were linked by defence treaties to London. 52 The United States concurred with the British view that it was in the West’s interests to maintain a territorially continuous Arab world, with a land-bridge across the Negev between Egypt and Jordan.
From the start, Cairo opposed the Gaza Plan: In the circumstances, it implied a separate peace with Israel. ‘Not only would Egypt not give up the Gaza district but [it] would firmly demand the southern Negev’, the Egyptian delegation head at Lausanne, ‘Abd al Mun‘im Mustafa, told Sasson on 1 June.53 ‘The Egyptian Government’, Cairo told Washington a few days later, ‘regarded the proposal as “cheap barter.” [The Egyptian ambassador to Washington] characterised the offer as that of exchanging human lives for territory.’ Or, as Arab representatives put it to a British official at Lausanne, ‘it is wrong to bargain territory against refugees’, and that if the Israelis wanted the Strip, they should compensate the Arabs in kind (that is, with territory). 54
Egypt’s lack of enthusiasm did not kill the plan, if only because it was the only thing on the market in May and June. Taking stock of the Egyptian response, Ben-Gurion agreed, on 6 June, to compensate Egypt with a similarly sized strip of territory along the border in the northwestern Negev. But Ben-Gurion ‘doubted whether this proposal would win the Arabs’ heart’."
"In July, during the Lausanne recess, the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, at the behest of Bevin, formulated a revised plan for a comprehensive settlement in which the Gaza Plan figured as a prominent element; it included the idea of compensation. Britain thought a breakthrough over Gaza essential if Lausanne was to succeed: Israel would get the Strip if it compensated ‘the Arabs’ with territory and if ‘safeguards’ were instituted concerning Israel’s future treatment of the Gaza refugees, including allowing them to return to their original homes.
Britain interwove in the plan the original Israeli core with other ideas for a territorial–political solution then floating about at Lausanne. The thrust of the British plan was to assure the interests of its Hashemite client State, Jordan, rather than of Egypt: ‘If the . . . compensation . . . were to be in the form of the award to Jordan or Jordan and Egypt of part or whole of the Southern Negev, thus providing a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan’, Israel must receive freedom of access to the Red Sea. The Arabs, similarly, must receive access to the Mediterranean through ‘Gaza and Haifa’, stated the plan. ‘If another solution were adopted for the Southern Negev, there should nonetheless be guaranteed freedom of communication and access across it between Egypt and Jordan.’"
"Acheson agreed to the bulk of the British proposal. The State Department understood that territorial ‘land communication’ between Jordan and Egypt was of major importance to the Arab states and agreed both to the partition of Jerusalem and the desirability of the incorporation of ‘Arab [eastern] Palestine in Jordan’... the Arab world needed territorial continuity; a ‘wedge’ in the form of a completely Jewish-held Negev would make for ‘eternal friction’ in the region."
"What had started as a limited Israeli initiative had become a comprehensive, joint Anglo–American d ´emarche. The two western powers separately but simultaneously approached the Egyptian government with the proposal. The American charg ´e d’affaires, Jefferson Patterson, felt that if ‘suitable’ territorial compensation were offered, ‘the Egyptians might be able to get away with it’. The Egyptian forces in the Strip, he said, were ‘rather jittery’ and felt strategically exposed and isolated, and ‘this might dispose them to get rid of the strip against territorial compensation’. And Cairo did not want the refugees.
But the Egyptians took an obstreperous tack. The Egyptian Prime Minister, while complaining of the refugee burden, reacted ‘with some bitterness to the US proposal for cession of the Gaza Strip to Israel’. 64 At Lausanne, the Egyptians said they ‘could not discuss Gaza proposal. Showed complete indifference fate Gaza refugees who were international and Jewish responsibility.’ In Cairo, the Egyptians denounced the plan as a ‘forerunner of Israeli aggression against Gaza and Arabs expressed surprise US should “lend itself” to such schemes’. The Egyptians questioned America’s impartiality and Patterson gained the impression that if the United States continued ‘to play up merits of Gaza Plan, which are invisible to Arab eyes, Egypt may begin regard US as accomplice of Israeli aggression’. Egypt officially rejected the plan on 29 July. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry contended that the plan could serve only the interests of Israel, which was ‘making use’ of the refugee question to extend its boundaries. The Egyptians ignored the offer of territorial compensation and asserted the refugees’ right of return. 65
By July, Israel was having deep second thoughts about the plan, and not only because of the compensation element. Officially, Tel Aviv remained willing to go through with it, as initially conceived – incorporation in ‘exchange’ for agreement to absorb the Strip’s population. But over the months, the sceptics had gained the upper hand. Israel had agreed to the territory–population trade-off, explained Sharett, in the belief that the Strip contained ‘150–180,000 Arabs’. But this ‘assumption . . . turned out to be incorrect’. Israel now believed there were some 211,000 refugees and 65,000 locals in the Strip; it could not absorb such a total. Also, Israel feared that other refugees, now in Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, would move to the Strip before its incorporation in the hope of using it as a springboard from which to return to their homes. Israel, he said, must specify the maximum number of Arabs it was willing to take back with the Strip; otherwise, in practice, the commitment would be open-ended. In early August, Sharett, Ben-Gurion, Kaplan and Lifshitz met and decided on a ‘200,000’ ceiling. Israeli diplomats were instructed to ‘mention’ in conversation that Israel would not take back ‘an unlimited number’ of Gaza refugees. 66
As to territorial compensation, Sharett instructed his diplomats to ‘vigorously’ reject the idea. But he added:
If things reach a practical stage and it appears necessary to abandon the completely rejectionist stance, it would be possible to discuss border corrections/changes in the northern Negev, both in the east and in the west, that is, in favour of both Transjordan and Egypt, but on no account [will we be willing to discuss] any concession [i.e., cession] in the southern part of the Negev, including Eilat.
(Eytan, incidentally, objected to this. He argued in favour of a cession in the southern Negev, if it brought peace with Egypt, and dismissed Eilat’s
strategic importance.) Sharett thought that Israel might have to decide whether to agree to take the full ‘300,000’ Arabs in Gaza in ‘exchange’ for the Strip but without making any territorial compensation, or to agree to take part of the Strip’s population and to make territorial compensation. In the end, thought Sharett, perhaps the status quo in Gaza was best left as it was. 67
American and Israeli officials continued to discuss the plan through July. But for all practical purposes, it had died with the Egyptian veto."
"Lausanne dragged on unpromisingly as the bright hope of the Gaza Plan rapidly faded. The Americans stepped up their demand for a ‘gesture’, Israel’s readiness to incorporate the Strip, indeed, being cited in support.
US Government greatly disturbed over present Israeli attitude refugee question . . . This attitude . . . difficult [to] reconcile with Gaza Strip proposal, which represents firm admission on part [of] Israel [of] its ability [to] assume responsibility 230,000 refugees plus 80,000 normal residents area.
If Israel was able and willing to absorb the 300,000 Arabs of Gaza, how could it argue an inability and unwillingness to take in a smaller number outside the context of the Gaza Plan? 71
Ethridge, retiring from the fray, primarily blamed Israel for the Lausanne impasse. Tel Aviv was ‘steadfastly’ refusing to make concessions. Ethridge took a high moral tone:
Israel was a state created upon an ethical concept and should rest upon an ethical base. Her attitude toward refugees is morally reprehensible and politically short-sighted. She has no security that does not rest in friendliness with her neighbours."
"Israel’s position, according to Israeli diplomats in the United States, was also affecting American public opinion, until then solidly pro-Israel. The Israel Consul General in New York, Arthur Lourie, transmitted a copy of a letter from American journalist Drew Pearson, which Lourie said ‘expressed . . . anxieties . . . characteristic of a large section of American opinion on whose support we have hitherto been able to count’. Pearson had written that ‘in preventing Arab refugees from returning to their native land, the Jews may be subject to the same kind of criticism for which I and others have criticised intolerant Gentiles . . . Now we have a situation in which the Jews have done to others what Hitler, in a sense, did to them!’ 73 Eban on 22 June assessed that the impasse was leading to a major rupture in Israeli–American relations:
We face crisis not comparable previous occasions. Careful attempt being made alienate President from us nearer success than ever before, owing humanitarian aspect refugee situation and his firm belief gesture our part is necessary condition persuade Arabs [to agree to] resettlement and Congress vote funds. We may have face choice between some compromise principle non-return before peace and far-reaching rift USA. 74"
"Sasson’s assessment of the situation in Lausanne did not differ greatly from Ethridge’s. Sasson wrote, in mid-June, that he was sorry he had come. The city was beautiful, the climate temperate, the hotel (the Beau Rivage) luxurious. But the delegation had come to make peace and, after two months, had advanced ‘not one step’ towards its goal. Moreover, he wrote, ‘there is no chance of such progress in the future even if we decide to sit in Lausanne for several more months . . . The Lausanne talks are fruitless and are destined to fail.’
Sasson explained – and his order of priorities is worth noting – that:
Firstly, the Jews believe that it is possible to achieve peace without [paying] any price, maximal or minimal. They want to achieve (a) Arab surrender of all the areas occupied today by Israel, (b) Arab agreement to absorb all the refugees in the neighbouring [Arab] states, (c) Arab agreement to rectification of the present frontiers in the centre, south and Jerusalem area in favour of Israel only . . . etc., etc.
The refugees, wrote Sasson, had become
a scapegoat. No one pays attention to them, no one listens to their demands, explanations and suggestions. But . . . all use their problem for purposes which have almost no connection to the aspirations of the refugees themselves.
For example, while all the Arab states demanded the refugees’ repatriation, in practice none of them, ‘save Lebanon’, wanted this. Jordan and Syria wanted to hold on to their refugees in order to receive inter- national relief aid; the Egyptians wanted the problem to remain in order to destabilise Jordan and Israel.
Nor was Israel concerned about the refugees, he wrote. Israel was ‘determined not to accept them back . . . come hell or high water’. Sasson himself believed that, in essence, this attitude was correct but thought that Israel should demonstrate flexibility and statesmanship by favourably considering a proposal brought to him by the refugees’ representatives at Lausanne, which called for Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip and the area now known as the ‘West Bank’, while granting these territories autonomy and absorbing in Israel proper 100,000 refugees. Sasson felt that such a plan could achieve for Israel the complete withdrawal from Palestine of the Arab armies and the ‘complete resolution of the Palestine question’, and possibly also hasten peace between Israel and the Arab states. 75"
"The intense American and PCC pressure on Israel over the early summer bore minor fruit in the form of the ‘Family Reunion Programme’, announced by Sharett in the Knesset on 15 June. Israel would ‘consider favourably’ requests by Israeli Arab citizens to allow back ‘their wives and young children’ – meaning ‘sons below the age of 15 and unmarried daughters’. Israel proposed that special posts be set up on the frontiers with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (no armistice agreement had yet been signed with Syria) through which the reunions could be accomplished.
Israeli officials widely described and trumpeted the scheme as a ‘broad measure easing the lot of Arab families disrupted as a result of the war’. But, in fact, the scheme eased the lot of only a handful of families. During the following months, according to Israel Foreign Ministry figures, 1,329 requests were received pertaining to 3,957 refugees. Tel Aviv issued 3,113 entry permits. By 20 September 1951, a total of 1,965 refugees had made use of the permits and returned to Israeli territory. 76
If meant as a sop to the United States and the PCC and as a means of neutralising western pressure for repatriation, the family reunion scheme was not a major success. 77 The United States and the PCC wanted a grand ‘gesture’, not a trickle of returnees.
... The seeds of such a ‘gesture’ had long been hibernating in the soil of Tel Aviv. Already in August 1948, Sasson had recommended that Israel consider allowing a return of ‘40–50,000’ refugees and to start repatriating them ‘immediately.’ (He said he sought to neutralise the expected pressure on Israel at the impending meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris.)79 In mid-April 1949, with America demanding that Israel agree to repatriate 250,000, Sasson implied that Israel could perhaps take back ‘150,000’. 80
Until summer 1949, Sasson’s advice had been consistently rejected. But by late June, the cumulative pressure was proving irresistible. Sharett enjoined Ben-Gurion to agree to publicly declare that Israel would accept ‘25,000’ refugees through the reunion scheme. Moreover, Sharett informed Eban on 25 June, ‘am weighing whether [to] urge Government [to] agree [that we] should add 50,000 as further maximum contribution without Gaza . . . Will this pacify U.S.[,] turn scales our favour?’
On 5 July, Sharett proposed to the Cabinet that Israel publicly declare its readiness to absorb ‘100,000’ refugees in exchange for peace. This number, he said, would include the ‘25,000’ refugees who had already returned to the country illegally and some ‘10,000’ who would re- turn within the family reunion scheme. Most of the ministers supported Sharett. But Ben-Gurion objected, arguing that the number would not mollify Washington or satisfy the Arabs. He also argued, on security grounds, against re-absorbing so large a number. Agriculture Minister Dov Yosef was more adamant: ‘I oppose the return of even a single refugee.’ Sharett, who did not want to push through a major decision opposed by the Prime Minister and fellow Mapai stalwarts, then proposed, by way of compromise, that the Cabinet merely authorise him to sound out the Americans as to whether an Israeli announcement of readiness to take back 100,000 would indeed reduce or neutralise the pressure on Tel Aviv. The ministers agreed, and Sharett was empowered to make the 100,000 offer if, indeed, the feelers to Washington resulted in an encouraging response. 82
The Israeli leadership had concluded that there must be some ‘give’ if Israeli–American relations were not to be strained to the breaking point. Sharett later explained the Cabinet’s vote thus:
The attempt to resurrect the Lausanne Conference is necessary also because of the urgent need to ease the tension which has been created between us and the United States. This tension has surfaced especially [over] the refugee problem, whose non-solution serves as an obstacle in the whole [Lausanne] negotiation. 83"
"During the following days, the State Department and White House were indirectly, and then directly, sounded out on the prospective announcement of readiness to take back 100,000 refugees. The United States was first informed on 15 July of Israel’s decision in principle to let back a specific number. Ambassador McDonald had already heard that the Cabinet ‘was toying with the idea of an offer of 100,000’. 84
... The Israeli feelers about the ‘100,000 Offer’ met with a mixed reception in Washington. Eban’s impression on 8 July was that the ‘100,000’ announcement ‘would have very deep impression’, to judge from a talk with McGhee and Hare. But Andrew Cordier, a senior aide to the United Nations Secretary General, reported that the Americans regarded the ‘figure [as] too low’. 86 On 26 July, Acheson reiterated the American demand that Israel absorb some 250,000 – bringing its Arab population up to 400,000, or roughly the number of Arabs who would have lived in the Jewish State under the 1947 partition plan. 87
But President Truman’s was the decisive reaction. John Hilldring, a Truman aide, reported after a conversation with the President on 18 July that Truman was ‘extremely pleased . . . thinks 100,000 offer may break deadlock’. 88
The United States was officially informed on 28 July of Israel’s readiness to take back 100,000 refugees after there was an overall refugee resettlement plan and after there was ‘evidence’ of ‘real progress’ towards a peace settlement. Elath said that day that Israel had taken the decision in order ‘to demonstrate [its] cooperation with the U.S.’ and to contribute its share to a solution of the refugee problem, and ‘in spite of the fact that Israeli security and economic experts had considered the proposed decision as disastrous’. Elath said the figure included ‘infiltrees’ already inside Israel as well as those returning through the reunion scheme. Sharett, informing McDonald, stressed that 100,000 was the limit, bringing Israel’s Arab minority ‘far beyond margin of safety by all known security standards’. 89
The State Department did not immediately react to the ‘100,000 Offer’. Perhaps Acheson wanted to see how the Arabs would react. And, as perhaps anticipated, the Arabs immediately and flatly rejected the offer. But, unofficially, some Arab officials at Lausanne now hinted at a willingness to accept less than full repatriation. Israel, they said, should take back ‘340,000’ refugees from the conquered territories (outside the partition borders), and repatriate another ‘100,000’ from inside partition plan Israel. The Arab states, with international aid, would then absorb the remaining ‘410,000’. 90"
Internal debate in Israel
"Meanwhile, the publication of the ‘100,000 Offer’ caused a major political explosion in Tel Aviv. There was enormous opposition to it within Mapai. Hapo‘el Hamizrahi, the General Zionists and Herut all vigorously opposed the offer.
The Progressives were silent, and the press interpreted their silence as a silent protest . . . Mapam’s acknowledgement in weak language of the justice of the act . . . was buried and blurred completely in the wave of rage in which the government was swept for surrendering to ‘imperialist pressure’,
Sharett reported.
Eban felt that the offer ‘represents a very considerable effort in advance of public opinion in [Israel].’ Acheson’s view was similar: ‘Israel . . . has allowed public opinion to develop . . . to such an extent that it is almost impossible for [the] Israeli Government to make substantial concessions re refugees and territory.’ 91
A major debate took place in Mapai on 28 July. The party’s Knesset faction leader, Meir Grabovsky (Argov), put the case against the offer succinctly: ‘No one wanted . . . and anticipated that the Arabs would leave’, he said. But events produced a ‘more or less homogeneous [Jewish] state, and now to double the number of Arabs without any certain recompense . . . [should be seen] as one of the fatal mistakes destroying the security of the state . . . We will face a Fifth Column.’ Israel would have a minority problem like that ‘in the Balkans’."
"The internal Mapai debate continued on 1 August (just before the Knesset plenum debated the offer). Opposition was bitter. As Knesset Member Assaf Vilkomitz (‘Ami) put it, ‘there will be too large an Arab minority’. Knesset Member Shlomo Lavi (Levkovich) called the offer ‘a grave mistake’. Knesset Member Eliahu Carmeli (Lulu) said that bringing back the refugees would create ‘not a Fifth but a First Column. I am not willing to take back even one Arab, not even one goy [i.e., non-Jew]. I want the Jewish state to be wholly Jewish.’ Moshe Dayan’s father, Knesset Member Shmuel Dayan, another Mapai old-timer, opposed any return, ‘even in exchange for peace. What will this formal peace give us?’ Knesset Member Ze’ev Herring argued that allowing back ‘100,000’ would generate further pressure and waves of returnees.
... Sharett announced that while there would be no Knesset vote on the offer, the Government ‘should be interested in being attacked in the Knesset on this question . . . It is important that the uneasiness of the Mapai members in this matter be expressed.’ Sharett’s thinking was clear: The more widespread and vicious the internal opposition, the easier it would be for Israel to ‘sell’ to the United States and the PCC the offer as final and as ‘the limit of possible concession’. And, indeed, Sharett instructed his diplomats in this vein: To play up the Government’s difficulties in selling the offer to the parties and the public. 100,000, clearly, was the absolute ceiling. 93 In the noisy Knesset plenum debate that followed, Sharett assured the members that the offer would not be binding except as part of a general peace settlement.
‘It must be [made] clear to Paul Porter [Ethridge’s successor as United States representative on the PCC] that anything further cannot be dreamed of . . . Explain to Porter’, Sharett cabled the new head of the Israeli delegation to Lausanne, Reuven Shiloah, ‘that our proposal generated grave opposition internally, including in Mapai, and we only with difficulty in a five-hour debate succeeded in calming the storm in the faction . . . Any further concession will destroy the Government’s standing.’ Sharett added that if the Arabs failed to ‘latch onto’ the Israeli offer immediately, pressure would surface, which the Cabinet would be unable to withstand, to withdraw it. The proposal was being made on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. Sharett suggested that the United States counsel the Arabs to take it. He repeatedly referred to the mood of the Israeli public. 94
Sharett believed that the storm over the offer had ‘slightly undermined’ his personal political standing but that it had helped to ‘sell’ the proposal abroad. In any case, he tended to believe that the Lausanne talks would collapse, in which event the ‘100,000 Offer’ would never have to be implemented. 95
Needless to say, the Arab rejection of the ‘100,000 Offer’ did not overly displease Israel. In general, its leaders were not unhappy with the no-war, no-peace situation. In mid-July, Ben-Gurion described Eban’s thinking thus:
He sees no need to run after peace. An armistice is sufficient for us; if we run after peace – the Arabs will demand of us a price – [in the coin of] borders [i.e., border rectification] or refugees or both. We will [i.e., can afford to] wait a few years."
"Israel formally informed the PCC of its readiness to take back ‘100,000’ refugees on 3 August, making it conditional on ‘retaining all present territory’ and on the freedom to resettle the returnees where it saw fit. The PCC, considering the offer ‘unsatisfactory’, informally transmitted it to the Arab delegations. The Arabs reacted as expected. One Arab diplomat told Porter the offer was a ‘mere propaganda scheme and [the] Jews [are] either at your feet or [at your] throat’. The offer was rejected as ‘less than token’. "
"Burdett, like the Arabs at Lausanne, immediately dismissed the proposal, along with the family reunion scheme, as a ‘sham’ designed to frustrate American and United Nations efforts to get Israel to agree to more substantial repatriation. He believed that ‘in large part’, the Knes- set debate and the press campaign against the ‘100,000’ were geared to foreign consumption. The American Embassy in Tel Aviv, on the other hand, stressed the ‘genuineness’ of the internal opposition to the offer. It explained:
Conditioned by a long build-up in the Hebrew press, in the Knesset and by Government leaders themselves, which had as its theme the utter un- desirability of taking back any Arab refugees whatsoever, the people of this country were hardly prepared for a reversal in policy.
No Israeli, ‘from Prime Minister down wishes see single Arab brought back if can possibly be avoided’. 98
The United States did not think that the Israeli offer ‘provide[d] suitable basis for contributing to solution of Arab refugee question’. The offer was ‘not satisfactory’, Acheson wrote. 99
But Israel was immovable; 100,000 was the ceiling. By mid-August, all the participants understood that Lausanne had failed. Even Shiloah was ‘worried [and] tense’. Sharett reassured him that the Israeli offer had ‘vastly improved’ Israel’s ‘tactical position vis-a-vis UN and Arabs.’ But Shiloah, like Eytan and Sasson before him, knew that Lausanne was going nowhere. The Arab rejection of the Gaza Plan and of the ‘100,000 Offer’ and Israel’s rejection of complete repatriation and withdrawal to the partition plan borders left, in Acheson’s phrase, ‘no real basis for conciliation’. By the end of August, it was all over. The participants raised their hands, having achieved nothing, and indefinitely suspended the conference. The delegations returned home in September. The PCC continued to churn out reports on the Palestine refugee problem into the 1950s. 100"
McGhee Plan
"But meanwhile, in August 1949, the PCC and the United States made one last more or less coordinated effort. Politics had clearly failed. So they tried an indirect approach, economics. The upshot was Washington’s ‘McGhee Plan’ and the PCC’s Economic Survey Mission. Both were geared to finding an economic solution to the refugee problem. The American policymakers focused on a grand economic development scheme for the Middle East, a regional Marshall Plan, which would bring the Arab states into the American orbit against the backdrop of the Cold War, push these states forward economically and, possibly, solve the refugee problem by well-funded, organised resettlement in the Arab states. The scheme was known as the ‘McGhee Plan’.
Meanwhile, the Technical Committee on Refugees, created by the PCC on 14 June 1949 to report on the scope and nature of the refugee problem, on 20 August submitted its findings. The committee found that there were ‘711,000’ bona fide refugees, and that the higher number of international relief recipients (totalling close to one million) was the result of ‘duplication of ration cards’ and the inclusion ‘of persons who, although not displaced, are destitute’. It recommended that a thorough census be conducted. The committee found that an ‘overwhelming’ number of refugees wished to return to their homes but that Israel was blocking repatriation. The committee opined that ‘the clock cannot be turned back’, especially in view of the increase of the Yishuv by ‘50 per cent’ since the Palestinian exodus; immigrants were pouring into Israel at the rate of ‘800 a day’. The committee surveyed employment possibilities and mooted regional development projects of benefit to the refugees. 101
Even before the Technical Committee’s report was in, the PCC and the United States set in motion the creation of the Economic Survey Mission (ESM), whose focus was regional development projects that could employ the refugees. The ESM, headed by Gordon Clapp, was formally set up on 23 August, as (like the Technical Committee) a subsidiary body of the PCC under Resolution 194. Washington understood that the projects’ funding would be mainly American and the underlying assumption was a solution based on resettlement in the Arab countries rather than repatriation. 102 The ESM, based in Beirut, began touring the region in mid-September and presented an interim report to the PCC and General Assembly in December.
... As time passed, the status quo and Arab and Israeli policies hardened and calcified. The mass influx of immigrants into Israel steadily obviated any possibility of mass refugee repatriation. Only the destruction of the Jewish State and the death or expulsion of its population could have made a mass refugee return physically possible. From the Arab side, resettlement in the Arab countries remained through the years a clear possibility, though one requiring a vast amount of Western capital. But the Arab states objected to such resettlement mainly for political reasons. They regarded repatriation as the ‘just’ solution and, incidentally, as one that could help undermine the Jewish State, to whose continued existence they objected. The Arab states were also eager to be rid of the refugee burden for internal reasons, fearing the refugees’ potential as a restive Fifth Column. Meanwhile, while Israel blocked repatriation, the refugees’ presence and misery served as a useful political weapon against Israel.
In retrospect, it appeared that at Lausanne was lost the best and perhaps only chance for a solution of the refugee problem, if not for the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East settlement. But the basic incompatibility of the initial starting positions and the unwillingness of the two sides to move, and to move quickly, towards a compromise – born of Arab rejectionism and a deep feeling of humiliation, and of Israeli drunkenness with victory and physical needs determined largely by the Jewish refugee influx – doomed the ‘conference’ from the start. American pressure on both sides, lacking a sharp, determined cutting edge, failed to budge sufficiently either Jew or Arab. The ‘100,000 Offer’ was a classic of too little, too late. The Gaza Plan, given Egypt’s defeat in the war, the just-ended territorial expansion of the Jewish State and Egyptian–Jordanian rivalries, was a nonstarter; Egypt alone may have agreed to it, but not as part of an Arab coalition generally guided by its most extreme constituents (the key to Arab political group dynamics)."
"The first Arab–Israeli war, of 1948, was launched by the Palestinian Arabs, who rejected the UN partition resolution and embarked on hostilities aimed at preventing the birth of Israel. That war and not design, Jewish or Arab, gave birth to the Palestinian refugee problem.
But the displacement of Arabs from Palestine or from the areas of Palestine that would become the Jewish State was inherent in Zionist ideology and, in microcosm, in Zionist praxis from the start of the enterprise. The piecemeal eviction of tenant farmers, albeit in relatively small numbers, during the first five decades of Zionist land purchase and settlement naturally stemmed from, and in a sense hinted at, the underlying thrust of the ideology, which was to turn an Arab-populated land into a State with an overwhelming Jewish majority. And the Zionist leaders’ thinking about, and periodic endorsement of, ‘transfer’ during those decades – voluntary and agreed, if possible, but coerced if not – readied hearts and minds for the denouement of 1948 and its immediate aftermath, in which some 700,000 Arabs were displaced from their homes (though the majority remained in Palestine).
But there was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel ‘the Arabs’ from Palestine or the areas of the emergent Jewish State; and the Yishuv did not enter the war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war ‘transfer’ thinking ever translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion. Hence, in the war’s first four months, between the end of November 1947 and the end of March 1948, there were no preparations for mass expulsion and there were almost no cases of expulsion or the leveling of villages; hence, during the following ten months, Haganah and IDF units acted inconsistently, most units driving out Arab communities as a matter of course while others left (Muslim as well as Christian and Druse) villages and townspeople in place; and hence, at war’s end, Israel emerged with a substantial Arab minority"
"At the same time, largely as a result of Arab belligerence and the Yishuv’s sense of siege, fragility and isolation, from early April 1948 on, ‘transfer’ was in the air and the departure of the Arabs was deeply desired on the local and national levels by the majority in the Yishuv, from Ben-Gurion down. And while this general will was never translated into systematic policy, a large number of Arabs were expelled, the frequency of expulsions and the expulsive resolve of the troops increasing following the pan-Arab invasion of mid-May 1948 that threatened the Yishuv with extinction. Yet, still, in July and again in October–November 1948, IDF troops continued to leave Arab communities in place; much depended on local circumstances and on the individual Israeli company, battalion and brigade commanders."
"there was nothing ambiguous about Israeli policy, from summer 1948, toward those who had been displaced and had become refugees and toward those who were yet to be displaced, in future operations: Generally applied with resolution and, often, with brutality, the policy was to prevent a refugee return at all costs. And if, somehow, refugees succeeded in infiltrating back, they were routinely rounded up and expelled (though tens of thousands of ‘infiltrators’ ultimately succeeded in resettling and becoming Israeli citizens). In this sense, it may fairly be said that all 700,000 or so who ended up as refugees were compulsorily displaced or ‘expelled’.
Yet it is also worth remembering that a large proportion of those who became refugees fled their towns and villages not under direct Israeli threat or duress. Tens of thousands – mostly from well-to-do and elite families – left the towns in the war’s early months because of the withdrawal of the British administration, the war-filled chaos that followed and the prospect of Jewish rule. And, in the following months, hundreds of thousands fled not under Jewish orders or direct coercion though, to be sure, most sought to move out of harm’s way as Zionist troops conquered town after town and district after district. And most probably believed that they would be returning home in a matter of months if not weeks, perhaps after the Arab armies had crushed Israel."
"From the first, the AHC and the local National Committees opposed the exodus, especially of army-aged males, and made efforts to block it. But they were inefficient and, sometimes, half-hearted. And, at the same time, they actively promoted the depopulation of villages and towns... There can be no exaggerating the importance of these early, Arab-initiated evacuations in the demoralisation, and eventual exodus, of the remaining rural and urban populations."
"The exodus unfolded in four or four and a half stages, closely linked to the development of the war itself. It began during December 1947- March 1948 – the first stage – with the departure of many of the country’s upper and middle class families, especially from Haifa and Jaffa
... Most of the upper and middle class families, who moved from Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramle, Acre and Tiberias to Damascus, Nablus, Amman, Beirut, Gaza and Cairo, probably thought their exile would be temporary. They had the financial wherewithal to tide them over; many had wealthy relatives and accommodation outside the country. The ur- ban masses and the fellahin, however, had nowhere to go, certainly not in comfort. For most of them, flight meant instant destitution; it was not a course readily adopted. But the daily spectacle of abandonment by their ‘betters,’ with its concomitant progressive closure of businesses, shops, schools, law offices and medical clinics, and abandonment of public service posts, led to a steady attrition of morale, a cumulative sapping of faith and trust in the world around them: Their leaders were going or had gone; the British were packing. They were being left ‘alone’ to face the Zionist enemy.
Daily, week in, week out, over December 1947, January, February and March 1948, there were clashes along the ‘seams’ between the two communities in the mixed towns, ambushes in the fields and on the roads, sniping, machine-gun fire, bomb attacks and occasional mortaring. Problems of movement and communication, unemployment and food distribution intensified, especially in the towns, as the hostilities drew out. There is probably no accounting for the mass exodus that followed without understanding the prevalence and depth of the general sense of collapse, of ‘falling apart’ and of a centre that ‘cannot hold’, that permeated Arab Palestine, especially the towns, by April 1948. In many places, it would take very little to nudge the masses to pack up and flee.
Come the Haganah (and IZL–LHI) offensives and counteroffensives of April–June, the cumulative effect of the fears, deprivations, abandonment and depredations of the previous months, in both towns and villages, overcame the natural, basic reluctance to abandon home and property and flee. As Palestinian military power was swiftly and dramatically crushed and the Haganah demonstrated almost unchallenged superiority in successive battles, Arab morale cracked, giving way to general, blind, panic or a ‘psychosis of flight’, 1 as one IDF intelligence report put it. This was the second – and crucial – stage of the exodus. There is a clear, chronological, one-to-one correspondence between the Jewish offensives and the flight of the bulk of the population from each town and district attacked.
Often, the fall of villages harmed morale in neighbouring towns... For decades the villagers had looked to the towns for leadership; now, they followed them into exile."
"If Jewish attack directly and indirectly triggered most of the exodus up to June 1948, a small but significant proportion was due to direct expulsion orders and to psychological warfare ploys (‘whispering propaganda’) designed to intimidate people into flight. Several dozen villages were ordered or ‘advised’ by the Haganah to evacuate during April–June. The expulsions were usually from areas considered strategically vital and in conformity with Plan D, which called for clear main lines of communications and border areas. But, in general, Haganah and IDF commanders were not forced to confront the moral dilemma posed by expulsion; most Arabs fled before and during battle, before the Israeli troops reached their homes and before the Israeli commanders were forced to confront the dilemma.
Moreover, during April–July, Arab commanders and the AHC ordered the evacuation of several dozen villages as well as the removal of dependents from dozens more. The invading Arab armies also occasionally ordered whole villages to depart, so as not to be in their way."
"In April–May, and indeed, again in October–November, the ‘atrocity factor’ played a major role in flight from certain areas. Villagers and townspeople, prompted by the fear that the Jews, if victorious, would do to them what, in the reverse circumstances, victorious Arab fighters would most probably have done (and, occasionally, did, as in the Etzion Bloc in May) to the Jews, took to their heels. 2 The actual atrocities committed by the Jewish forces (primarily at Deir Yassin) reinforced such fears considerably, especially when magnified loudly and persistently in the Arab media for weeks thereafter. Apart from the 20-odd cases of massacre, Jewish troops often randomly killed individual prisoners of war, farm hands in the fields and the occasional villager who had stayed behind. Such actions could not but amplify flight. There were also several dozen cases of rape, a crime viewed with particular horror in Arab and Muslim societies. The fear of rape apparently figured large in the Arab imagination, and this may in part account for the despatch of women and girls out of active or potential combat zones and, in some measure, for the headlong flight of villages and urban neighbourhoods from April on."
"To what extent was the exodus up to June 1948 a product of Yishuv or Arab policy?
To be sure, the Haganah’s adoption and implementation during December 1947 – March 1948 of a retaliatory strategy against Arab militia bases – meaning villages and urban neighbourhoods – resulted in civilian flight. But the strategy, to judge from the documentation, was designed to punish, harm and deter militiamen, not to precipitate an exodus.
In early March, the prospect of pan-Arab invasion gave rise to Plan D. It accorded the Haganah brigade and battalion-level commanders carte blanche to completely clear vital areas of Arab population. Many villages served as bases for bands of irregulars; most had militias that periodically assisted the irregulars in attacks on settlements and convoys. During April–May, Haganah units, usually under orders from HGS, carried out elements of Plan D, each unit interpreting and implementing the plan as it saw fit in light of local circumstances. "
"During April–June, neither the political nor military leaderships took a decision to expel ‘the Arabs’. As far as the available evidence shows, the matter was never discussed in the supreme decision-making bodies. But it was understood by all concerned that, militarily, in the struggle to survive, the fewer Arabs remaining behind and along the frontlines, the better and, politically, the fewer Arabs remaining in the Jewish State, the better. At each level of command and execution, Haganah officers, in those April–June days when the fate of the State hung in the balance, simply ‘understood’ what was required in order to survive. Even most Mapam officers – ideologically committed to coexistence with the Arabs – failed to ‘adhere’ to the party line: Conditions in the field, tactically and strategically, gave precedence to immediate survival- mindedness over the long-term desirability and ethos of coexistence.
The Arab leadership inside and outside Palestine probably helped precipitate flight in the sense that, while doctrinally opposed to the exodus, it was disunited and ineffectual, and had decided, from the start, on no fixed, uniform policy and gave the masses no consistent guidelines for behaviour, especially during the crucial month of April"
"During the months before April 1948, especially in March, the flight of the middle and upper classes from the towns provoked condemnations from local NCs and the AHC (while NC members, and their families, were themselves busy fleeing their homes or already living abroad). But little was effectively done to prevent flight. And the surrounding Arab states did little, before late March, to block the entry of the evacuees into their territory. The rich and middle class arrived in Nablus, Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in a trickle and were not needy; it seemed to be merely a repeat of the exodus of 1936–1939. No Arab country effectively closed its borders though, at the end of March, Syria and Lebanon severely curtailed the issue of entry visas. The Husseinis were probably happy that many Opposition-linked families were leaving Palestine. The AHC, almost all its members already dispersed abroad, issued no forceful, blanket, public condemnations of the exodus, though occasionally it implored army-aged males to stand, or return, and fight. 3 At the local level, some NCs (in Haifa and Jerusalem, for example) and local commanders tried to stem the exodus, even setting up people’s courts to try offenders and threatening confiscation of the departees’ property. However, enforcement seems to have been weak and haphazard; the measures proved largely unavailing. And bribes could overwhelm any regulation. Militiamen and irregulars often had an interest in encouraging flight – they needed the houses for quarters and there was money to be made out of it (departees paid to have their empty homes ‘protected’, abandoned houses were looted, and money was extorted from departees)."
"Regarding April–May and the start of the main stage of the exodus, I have found no evidence to show that the AHC or the Arab leaders outside Palestine issued blanket instructions, by radio or otherwise, to the inhabitants to flee. However, in certain areas, women, children and old people continued to be evacuated and specific villages were instructed to leave, lock, stock and barrel. Moreover, it appears that Husseini supporters in certain areas ordered or encouraged flight out of political calculation, believing that they were doing what the AHC would want them to do. Haifa affords illustration. While it is unlikely that Husseini or AHC members from outside Palestine instructed the Haifa Arab leadership on 22 April to opt for evacuation rather than surrender, local Husseini supporters, led by Sheikh Murad, certainly did. They were probably motivated by fear that staying in Haifa would be interpreted as acquiescence in Jewish rule and ‘treachery’ and by the calculation that Palestinian misery, born of the exodus, would increase the pressure on the Arab states to intervene"
"However, politically and militarily it was clear to most Israelis that a return would be disastrous. Militarily – and the war, all understood, was far from over – it would mean the introduction of a large, potential Fifth Column; politically, it would mean the reintroduction of a large, disruptive, Arab minority. The military commanders argued against a return; so did political common sense. Both were reinforced by strident anti-return lobbying by settlements around the country.
The mainstream national leaders, led by Ben-Gurion, had to confront the issue within two problematic political contexts – the international context of future Israeli–Arab relations, Israeli–United Nations relations and Israeli–United States relations, and the local context of a coalition government, in which the Mapam ministers (and, less insistently, other ministers) advocated future Jewish–Arab coexistence and a return of ‘peace-minded’ refugees after the war. Hence the Cabinet consensus of June–August 1948 was that there would be no return during the war and that the matter could be reconsidered after the hostilities. This left Israel’s diplomats with room for manoeuvre and was sufficiently flexible to allow Mapam to stay in the government, leaving national unity intact.
On the practical level, from spring 1948, a series of developments on the ground increasingly precluded any possibility of a refugee return. These were an admixture of incidental, ‘natural’ processes and steps specifically designed to assure the impossibility of a return, including the gradual destruction of the abandoned villages, the destruction or cultivation and long-term takeover of Arab fields, the establishment of new settlements on Arab lands and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in abandoned villages and urban neighbourhoods."
"During and after these battles in July, October–November and December 1948 – January 1949, something like 300,000 more Palestinian became refugees.
Again, there was no Cabinet or IDF General Staff-level decision to expel. Indeed, the July fighting (the ‘Ten Days’) – the third stage of the exodus – was preceded by an explicit IDF General Staff order to all units and corps to refrain from destruction of villages and expulsions without prior authorisation by the Defence Minister. The order was issued as a result of the cumulative political pressure during the summer by various softline ministers on Ben-Gurion and, perhaps, was never intended to be taken too seriously. In any event, it was largely ignored.
But the overarching operational orders for operations Dekel, Dani, Yoav and Hiram – the main July–November offensives that resulted in Arab displacement – did not include expulsory clauses. However, from July onwards, there was a growing readiness in the IDF units to expel. This was at least partly due to the feeling, encouraged by the mass exodus from Jewish-held areas to date, that an almost completely Jewish State was a realistic possibility. There were also powerful vengeful urges at play – revenge for the Palestinian onslaught on the Yishuv during December 1947 – March 1948, the pan-Arab invasion of May–June, and the massive Jewish losses. In short, the Palestinians were being punished for having forced upon the Yishuv the protracted, bitter war that had resulted in the death of one, and the maiming of two, in every 100 in the Jewish population. The Arabs had rejected partition and unleashed the dogs of war. In consequence, quite understandably, the Yishuv’s leadership – left, centre and right – came to believe that leaving in place a large hostile Arab minority (or an Arab majority) inside the State would be suicidal. And driving out the Arabs, it emerged, was easy; generally they fled at the first whiff of grapeshot, their notables and commanders in the lead. Ben-Gurion said that this revealed a collective lack of backbone. In general, the advancing Haganah and IDF units were spared the need to face morally painful decisions to expel communities; to a large degree, Arab flight let the commanders off the moral hook, though, to be sure, many were subsequently, at the very least, troubled by the need to confront, and repel, would-be returnees."
"During the summer, the Arab governments intermittently tried to bar the entry of new refugees into their territory. The Palestinians were encouraged to stay in Palestine or to return to their homes."
"Ben-Gurion clearly wanted as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish State. From early on he hoped that they would flee. He hinted at this in February 1948 and said so explicitly in meetings in August, September and October. But no expulsion policy was ever enunciated and Ben-Gurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals ‘understand’ what he wanted. He probably wished to avoid going down in history as the ‘great expeller’ and he did not want his government to be blamed for a morally questionable policy. And he sought to preserve national unity in wartime.
But while there was no ‘expulsion policy,’ the July offensives were characterised by far more expulsions and, indeed, brutality than the first half of the war. Yet events varied from place to place. Ben-Gurion ap- proved the largest expulsion of the war, from Lydda and Ramle, but, at the same time, IDF Northern Front, with Ben-Gurion’s authorisation, left mostly-Christian Nazareth’s population in place; the ‘Christian factor’ outgunned security and demographic concerns and was allowed to determine policy."
"Again, the IDF offensives in October–November – the fourth stage of the exodus – were marked by a measure of ambivalence in all that concerned the troops’ treatment of overrun civilian populations. In the south (‘Yoav’), where Allon was in command, almost no Arab civilians remained. Allon preferred Arab-clear rear areas and let his subordinates know what he wanted. In the north (‘Hiram’), where Carmel was in charge, the picture was varied. Many Arabs declined to budge, contrary to Ben-Gurion’s expectations. This was partly due to the fact that before October, the villagers had hardly been touched by the war or its privations. Again, Carmel’s hesitant, inexplicit expulsion orders, issued after the battles were over, contributed. So did the varied demographic make-up of the central-upper Galilee pocket. The IDF generally related far more benignly to Christians and Druse than to Muslims."
"In examining the causes of the Arab exodus from Palestine over 1947–1949, accurate quantification is impossible. I have tried to show that the exodus occurred in stages and that causation was multi-layered: A Haifa merchant did not leave only because of the weeks or months of sniping and bombings; or because business was getting bad; or because of intimidation and extortion by irregulars; or because he feared the collapse of law and order when the British left; or because he feared for his prospects and livelihood under Jewish rule. He left because of the accumulation of all these factors. And the mass of Haifaites who fled in his wake, at the end of April – early May 1948, did not flee only as a result of the Arab militia collapse and Haganah conquest of 21–22 April. They fled because of the cumulative effect of the elite’s departure, the snipings and bombings and material privations, unemplyment and chaos during the previous months; and because of their local leaders’ instructions to leave, issued on 22 April; and because of the follow up orders by the AHC to continue departing; and because of IZL and Haganah activities and pressures during the days after the conquest; and because of the prospect of life under Jewish rule."
"Even in the case of a Haganah or IDF expulsion order, the actual departure was often the result of a process rather than of that one act. Take Lydda, largely untouched by battle before July 1948. During the first months of the war, there was unemployment and skyrocketing prices, and the burden of armed irregulars. In April–May, thousands of refugees from Jaffa and its hinterland arrived in the town, camping out in courtyards and on the town’s periphery. They brought demoralisation and sickness. Some wealthy families left. There were pinprick Haganah raids. There was uncertainty about Abdullah’s commitment to the town’s defence. In June, there was a feeling that Lydda’s ‘turn’ was imminent. Then came the attack, with bombings and shelling, Arab Legion pullout, collapse of resistance, sniping, massacre – and expulsion orders. Lydda was evacuated.
What happened in Palestine/Israel over 1947–1949 was so complex and varied, the situation radically changing from date to date and place to place, that a single-cause explanation of the exodus from most sites is untenable. At most, one can say that certain causes were important in certain areas at certain times, with a general shift in the spring of 1948 from precedence of cumulative internal Arab factors – lack of leadership, economic problems, breakdown of law and order – to a primacy of external, compulsive causes: Haganah/IDF attacks and expulsions, fear of Jewish attacks and atrocities, lack of help from the Arab world and the AHC and a feeling of impotence and abandonment, and orders from Arab officials and commanders to leave. In general, throughout the war, the final and decisive precipitant to flight in most places was Haganah, IZL, LHI or IDF attack or the inhabitants’ fear of imminent attack."
"During the second half of 1948, international concern about therefugee problem mounted. Concern translated into pressure
...From summer 1948, Bernadotte, and from the autumn, the United States, pressed Israel to agree to a substantial measure of repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and the conflict. In December, the UN General Assembly endorsed the (peace-minded) refugees’ ‘right of return... In the spring of 1949, the thinking about a ‘gesture’ matured into an American demand that Israel agree to take back 250,000, with the remaining refugees to be resettled in the neighbouring countries. America threatened and cajoled, but never with sufficient force or conviction to persuade Tel Aviv to accede.
... The insufficiency of the ‘100,000 Offer’, the Arab states’ continuing rejectionism, their unwillingness to accept and concede defeat and their inability to publicly agree to absorb and resettle most of the refugees if Israel agreed to repatriate the rest, the Egyptian rejection of the ‘Gaza Plan’, and America’s unwillingness or inability to apply persuasive pressure on Israel and the Arab states to compromise – all meant that the Arab–Israeli impasse would remain and that Palestine’s displaced Arabs would remain refugees, to be utilised during the following years by the Arab states as a powerful political and propaganda tool against Israel. The memory or vicarious memory of 1948 and the subsequent decades of humiliation and deprivation in the refugee camps would ultimately turn generations of Palestinians into potential or active terrorists and the ‘Palestinian problem’ into one of the world’s most intractable. And at the core of that problem remain the refugees."